

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR



The London Times

THE
BATTLEFIELD
OF EUROPE

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THE TIMES
HISTORY OF THE WAR

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
[Repainted from a canvas by Howard V. Brown in *The Scientific American*]

GERMAN SIEGE GUNS USED IN THE REDUCTION OF LIEGE.

The  Times

HISTORY OF THE WAR

—
The Battlefield of Europe



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PREFACE

THIS VOLUME IS COMPLETE IN ITSELF

THIS book marks the beginning of what will probably be for many years the most comprehensive and authoritative history of the Great War. Interesting as is the present volume, "The Battlefield of Europe," the subsequent volumes, recording various dramatic phases of the war, are likely to be even more engrossing.

Pre-eminent as a gatherer and interpreter of news, and thoroughly competent to deal with historical subjects, *THE TIMES*, of London, is the institution that would reasonably be expected to produce the one great history of the most stupendous struggle the world has ever seen.

The average size of *THE TIMES* each week-day, not counting the many and elaborate supplements on a variety of subjects, is twenty full pages. According to the pressure of news, the number of pages varies from fourteen to thirty-six. Expansion beyond the latter number is considered by the publishers impracticable, because the capacity of the reader has its limitations. The mechanical facilities of the paper, however, are so complete that it would be easy to go beyond the thirty-six-page limit. Each ten pages of *THE TIMES* contains about as much reading matter as the ordinary standard novel of 90,000 to 100,000 words. Thus every day the reader of *THE TIMES* is offered an average amount of matter equivalent to two complete novels; and a thirty-six-page issue contains as much reading as three and a half novels. In a single recent year *THE TIMES* with its supplements printed the equivalent of more than seven hundred novels.

The chief importance of the paper, however, is by no means in its physical size, but rather in its far-reaching ability to gather the news of the world, and the high standards maintained by its numerous editors and correspondents. These considerations give the paper its extraordinary influence throughout Europe, and recently lead a Berlin journalistic authority to write, in commenting upon the recent sixty-four page special number of *THE TIMES*, celebrating its forty thousandth issue: "With this number *THE TIMES* has proved once more that it continues to hold its place at the very head of all newspapers" ("dass sie noch immer an der Spitze aller Zeitungen steht").

VAST EDITORIAL ORGANIZATION

The vast editorial work of *THE TIMES* is of necessity divided into departments, each with its own staff, and each as independent of the others as the various units of an army in active service. To quote a recent commentator on this subject: "The Editor is the commander-in-chief, and with his assistants, secretaries, sub-editors and leader writers (who constitute the headquarters staff), he inspires and controls the general conduct and policy of the paper. Since to write to *THE TIMES* became the chief refuge of the aggrieved Briton, in every part of the world, the Editor has received an ever-increasing volume of correspondence." Much of this is handled by the various departments, but a great deal is handled at headquarters. Although many letters are published, they represent so very small a proportion of those received that it is something of a distinction to have an unsolicited communication accepted for publication.

Besides the various editorial staffs and the special departments responsible for the supplements, *THE TIMES* has fourteen distinct editorial departments,

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namely: Foreign, Military, Naval, Home News, Parliamentary, Law, Police, Sporting, Court and Personal, Ecclesiastical, Dramatic, Art, Finance, and Commercial and Shipping.

WORLD-WIDE FOREIGN NEWS SERVICE

The Foreign Department of the *LONDON TIMES* has been famous since the foundation of the paper in 1785. Nelson's great naval victory over the French and Spanish fleets off Trafalgar in 1805 was first announced in the columns of *THE TIMES*. Its dispatches from the field of Waterloo, June 18, 1815, announced the downfall of Napoléon several hours before the regular couriers reached the Government officials in London. The amazingly outspoken letters of the brilliant war correspondent, William Howard Russell, bitterly criticizing the conduct of the Crimean campaign, when Great Britain with her allies was pitted against Russia, exemplified the extraordinary independence and overwhelming influence of *THE TIMES*.

When the Congress of Berlin, which included delegates from Germany, Austria, Russia, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Turkey, was in session, under the presidency of Bismarck, the famous *LONDON TIMES* correspondent, de Blowitz, was the chief figure among the European correspondents of the day. Possessing sources of information more complete than most of the rulers and diplomats with whom he daily came in contact, he was in the habit of supplying to his paper intelligence of the most valuable description. One of his most notable achievements, said to be without a parallel in the history of journalism, was the publication in the *LONDON TIMES* on July 13, 1878, of the text of the Treaty of Berlin a couple of hours before it was signed by the congress of ministers in Berlin. This same de Blowitz of *THE TIMES* held the key to a multitude of state secrets and is credited with having averted a second Franco-Prussian war in 1875.

During one year, 1898, the foreign intelligence of *THE TIMES* cost about \$250,000. A single cable message, on the subject of a revolution in Argentina cost \$6,000. During the Boer War *THE TIMES* supplied its readers with war dispatches from some twenty-four correspondents.

Although *THE TIMES* is celebrated for the reliable and brilliant work of its own correspondents, yet, as a well-informed writer has pointed out, "part of the business of the editorial organization of every newspaper nowadays is to make the best possible use of the invaluable assistance which the various news associations and press agencies place at its disposal. *THE TIMES* subscribes for the service of some two score of such associations. . . . To the brains of the members of the paper's own staff, therefore, must be added the brains of all the vast and highly efficient army of contributors to each of these associations.

"The strength of *THE TIMES* has, of course, always rested, hardly less on the great ability of its successive editors, on the excellence of its corps of contributors which has been organized with so much judgment and so laboriously built up, but the work of this corps is in these later days supplemented and, as it were, buttressed at every point by the work of the correspondents of all the news associations. And when it is considered that each one of all these thousands of workers is in his degree a trained writer and a trained observer and interpreter of news—each one a man of parts and education—it is probably safe to say that there is no other institution in the world, no department of any government which needs and is daily fed by so great a volume of talent of so high an order.

"*THE TIMES* has naturally, in its long career, built up a large and valuable library. This is reinforced by a special intelligence department in which fifteen persons are constantly at work filing, cataloguing and indexing information on a multitude of subjects for the use of the staff. Moreover, the complete file of *THE TIMES* itself is a reference library of the greatest value. The history of *THE TIMES* begins with the history of modern Europe. It has been said that "no considerable historian has been able to conduct his inquiries into any epoch within the last century and a quarter without consulting the files of *THE TIMES*."

More than fifty years ago De Quincy in estimating the influence of the Delphic Oracle upon the public mind of the Greece of antiquity, wrote that however

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influential it may have been as the great organ of publicity of those ancient days, yet it "perhaps never rose to the level of *THE TIMES*."

PIONEER STEAM-DRIVEN PRINTING PRESS

The development of *THE TIMES* physically has always kept in step with the growth of its influence. During the period when its vigorous editorials were earning it the affectionate but respectful nickname, "The Thunderer," its proprietor, John Walter, was bending every energy to the perfecting of its mechanical equipment. In 1814, Walter courageously became the patron of a German inventor, Frederick Koenig, who had contrived a printing press, "operated by the steam engine," and capable of printing as many as 1100 copies of the paper in an hour. The capacity of the hand press then owned by *THE TIMES* was 250 copies an hour. It is worth noting that Walter paid full wages to the operators of his discarded hand press until they could secure positions in other shops.

These few notes on *THE TIMES* lay no claim to being an adequate description of the newspaper which for more than a hundred years has been an imposing institution of the greatest authority and influence. But enough has been said perhaps to suggest that, when such an institution sets itself the task of producing a current history of the war, at once popular and authoritative, the result will be highly acceptable to the public.

While striving to be popular in the best sense of the word, and endeavoring to discuss the political factors which have led up to the crisis, and the military operations of the war in a manner which will prove useful to those who have not hitherto followed European policy with any very close attention, this history, as is demonstrated by the present volume, "The Battlefield of Europe," will also aim at securing a genuine position as a work of reference. It is an account written by men of broad experience in political, military, and naval matters, and contains a great deal of first-hand material which will be of real value to historians of the future.

UNIQUE FACILITIES OF "THE TIMES"

As has been intimated, *THE TIMES* possesses unique facilities for supplying a narrative of the-kind here indicated. Its staff of foreign correspondents has for years been celebrated for the knowledge and insight into political and social conditions which its members possess. Their efforts have combined to make the foreign pages of *THE TIMES* probably the most accurate review of current foreign affairs published in any paper in Europe. Equally well known are the military and naval correspondents of *THE TIMES* who are, by universal consent, among the most brilliant exponents of their respective subjects.

The services of the special staff of war correspondents now acting for *THE TIMES* in the theatre of war are available for this history. Descriptions of eye-witnesses of the actual scenes of battle will be employed in this history. A word should also be said about the maps which appear in the present work. They are in all cases specially designed to illustrate the immediate points under review at the moment, and special pains have been taken to secure their accuracy in every particular.

It is, for obvious reasons, impossible that a history of contemporary events, many of the most of which are shrouded in the fog of war, can lay claims to the fullness of information, and consequently the stability of judgment, which are within reach of a historian writing many years after the events have taken place. But it is the endeavor of the writer of this history to approximate as nearly as may be to the historical standard attainable in ordinary circumstances, and so far as the conditions allow to present a faithful record of the impressions of the time, and of the progress of the struggle which is the subject of their narrative. *THE TIMES* aims to lay before the public the most accurate and complete account of the war that will for a long time be available.

PUBLISHERS OF THE AMERICAN EDITION.

CHAPTER I.

POLITICAL ANTECEDENTS TO THE WAR.

BIRTH OF GERMAN WORLD-POLICY — GERMANY AND RUSSIA — GERMANY IN SOUTH AMERICA AND IN AFRICA — THE KRUGER TELEGRAM — EXPLOITATION OF THE BOER WAR — THE FRANCO-RUSSIAN ALLIANCE — ANGLO-FRENCH AGREEMENT OF 1904 — ANGLO-RUSSIAN AGREEMENT OF 1907 — EASTERN CRISIS OF 1908-9 AND GERMANY'S ARMED DIPLOMACY — AGADIR CRISIS OF 1911 — GROWTH OF THE GERMAN NAVY — THE BALKAN WARS OF 1912-13 — DISABLEMENT OF TURKEY — GERMANY AND ENGLAND — INCREASE OF THE GERMAN ARMY — JUNE 28, 1914, MURDER OF THE ARCHDUKE FERDINAND — AUSTRIAN ULTIMATUM TO SERBIA — ANALYSIS OF THE PARLIAMENTARY WHITE PAPER—ATTITUDE OF GERMANY — THE "INFAMOUS" PROPOSAL — APPEAL OF THE KING OF THE BELGIANS TO KING GEORGE V. — THE BRITISH ULTIMATUM — GERMAN FEELING.

NEVER probably in the history of the world, not even in the last years of the Napoleonic domination, has there taken place such a display of war-like passion as manifested itself in the most civilized countries of Europe at the beginning of August, 1914. Then was seen how frail were the commercial and political forces on which modern cosmopolitanism had fondly relied for the obliteration of national barriers. The elaborate system of European finance which, in the opinion of some, had rendered war impossible no more availed to avert the catastrophe than the Utopian aspirations of international Socialism, or the links with which a common culture had bound together the more

educated classes of the Continent. The world of credit set to work to adapt itself to conditions which seemed, for a moment, to threaten it with annihilation. The voices of the advocates of a world-wide fraternity and equality were drowned in a roar of hostile preparation. The great gulfs that separate Slav, Latin, Teuton, and Anglo-Saxon were revealed; and the forces which decide the destinies of the world were gauntly expressed in terms of racial antagonism.

Yet, though the racial factor was the predominating force in this tremendous struggle, it was nevertheless the instrument of varying policies and ideals. Russia stood forth as the representative and protectress of Slav nationality and religion against Teutonic encroachment



H.M. THE KING.



H.M. THE QUEEN.

[Thomson.]



LUXEMBURG.

and oppression. France, bound to Russia by the exigencies of national existence, marched to support an ally of alien faith and race. Austria went to war in the hope of cementing her ill-compacted dominions by the subjugation of a race akin to a portion of her own subjects. England, the Mother of a world-Empire "brought forth in liberty," stood forward as the friend of small nations, and as the upholder of the European balance which she had once maintained against the ambition of Spain and France, and with which her own security was inextricably involved. Together with France, now freed from her old dreams of European domination, she appeared as the protagonist of European democracy and liberty against the militarism of Germany, as the upholder of political idealism against the materialism of Prussia. Germany, nurtured on the doctrines of Clausewitz and Treitschke, strong in her belief in the sufficiency of the law of force and in her power to fulfil its conditions, confident in the memory of earlier successes and in the energies of the Teutonic peoples, aspired through European victory to world-wide dominion. Like Napoleon she looked for ships, commerce and colonies; like him she prepared to wage war on land and sea, and like him in the days of his decadence, and forgetful of the ally of 1813, she strove to strengthen her moral position by posing as the bulwark of Europe against Muscovite barbarism. Alone of the great powers Italy stood aside. Diplomatically she

was justified in excusing herself from joining the other members of the Triple Alliance on the ground that she was not bound to participate in a war of aggression; nationally the repugnance of her people for the unnatural alliance with the German Powers made joint action with them impossible. The smaller countries announced their neutrality; the precariousness of their position was sufficiently emphasized by the fact that most of them, including Switzerland, Sweden, Turkey, Holland, and Belgium, thought it necessary to accompany the announcement by a complete mobilization.

One feeling, apparent from the first and deepening in strength and volume as the war proceeded, dominated not merely the populations allied against the German Powers, but those beyond the area of conflict. This was antagonism to Germany as the author of the war and to the system for which her Government stood. Outside her frontiers and those of Austria hardly one representative voice was raised in her justification. Her arrogance, her cynical disregard for the rights of others, her disgraceful treatment of ambassadors and foreigners, her use of brute force, estranged sympathy and roused against her believers in humanity and liberty in all parts of the world. The American Press was not the least loud in its denunciations. In the words of Colonel Stoffel, the French military attaché at Berlin before the war of 1870, it was felt that the Prussians were a race "*sans passions généreuses*."



THE GRAND DUCHESS OF LUXEMBURG

The nobler qualities of the German people were forgotten ; and they were simply regarded as the instrument of a system dangerous to all that was best in European civilization. The desperate opposition that their soldiers were to encounter from the countries they invaded was the measure of the intensity of this feeling. The omission of the directors of German policy to reckon with it was the measure of their statesmanship.

The war was, above all, Imperial Germany's war, not merely because throughout the final crisis she alone of all the Powers might have averted it and did not, but because it was the direct and inevitable outcome of the transformation which her whole policy underwent during the reign of William II.


Bismarck, who deliberately fought three wars, 1864, 1866, and 1870, in order to create a German Empire and restore German national unity under the ægis of Prussia, was a man of blood and iron, but he was also a great statesman. So long as he remained at the helm the policy of Imperial Germany was mainly confined to the undiminished maintenance of the dominant position she had acquired in Europe after 1870. This object he attained by substituting where he could binding alliances for mere friendships, whilst his diplomacy laboured unceasingly to keep all other Powers, as far as possible, apart, and so to prevent the estab-

lishment of any other system of alliances than the Triple Alliance, which Germany dominated. It was, in the main, a policy of conservative concentration, and he never concealed his reluctance to take the risks of speculative entanglements, whether in the Balkans or beyond the seas, which might have endangered his main position.

This did not satisfy the Emperor William's more ardent imagination. His ambition was to transform the German Empire from a purely continental Power into a world Power. This involved the substitution of a world policy for Bismarck's policy of European concentration. Let us recall briefly the chief stages of the "Imperial Rake's Progress." The old chancellor was dismissed in 1890, two years after the Kaiser's accession to the throne. The famous "re-insurance" Treaty with Russia was dropped and with it the coping-stone of the diplomatic system which Bismarck's genius had built up. The Kaiser preferred to rely on the Asiatic interests of Russia to

THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR IN LONDON,
M. PAUL CAMBON

[Lafayette]



THE EMPEROR WILLIAM II.

paralyse her influence in Europe and so his first dramatic appearance on the larger stage of world-policy was his cooperation with Russia in the Far East at the close of the war between China and Japan, when he joined in 1895 with Russia and her more unwilling ally, France, in imposing upon the Japanese the surrender of a large part of the spoils of victory. China herself was soon to feel the weight of the "mailed fist" in the seizure of Kiaochao in 1897, and again in 1900 in the dispatch of a large expe-

America, and if he could have succeeded in his attempts to use Great Britain against the United States at the time of the Spanish-American war of 1898 he would soon have driven the "mailed fist" through the Monroe doctrine. But of this phase of German world policy the annexation of Samoa remains as the only important achievement. Our loyalty to our American kinsmen forced him to fall back upon Africa as the more promising field for German expansion. There, however, Great Britain inevitably blocked his



BERLIN.

ditionary force which, if it arrived too late for the relief of the Peking Legations, spread terror of the German name throughout Northern China. The severe blow inflicted by the Japanese arms on Russia's policy of adventure in Asia, which the Kaiser had steadily encouraged, was a serious check to Germany's political calculations, but it scarcely affected the campaign of peaceful penetration which she was waging at the same time for the economic conquest of China, chiefly at the expense of British interests.

But it was not only in the Far East that Germany was pegging-out claims for "a place in the sun." For a moment the Kaiser undoubtedly cast his eye on South

way by her mere presence. Her difficulties could alone be Germany's opportunities. So whilst Germany picked up such crumbs as she could in West and Central and East Africa without coming actually to loggerheads with Great Britain, the Kaiser eagerly watched and encouraged the growing estrangement between Boer and Briton. The Jameson Raid gave him, as he thought, his opportunity, and the notorious Kruger telegram was the first open challenge flung to British power. It miscarried, partly owing to the unexpected outburst of feeling it provoked throughout the British Empire, and partly owing to the failure of German diplomacy to elicit any cordial response in Paris or St. Petersburg. During the Boer War the Kaiser



THE LATE ARCHDUKE FRANCIS
FERDINAND.

proceeded more cautiously. Again France and Russia declined to swallow the baits he dangled before them, and Germany was not yet in a position to measure herself unaided against the naval power of Britain. But the great wave of Anglophobia which had been allowed to sweep over Germany during the Boer War did not spend itself wholly in vain. It served to carry safely into port the schemes which the Kaiser had already formed for a German fleet that should at least give pause to the greatest sea-power. "The Trident," he declared, "must be in our fist," and from that moment Germany began steadily to face the ultimate issue, which the greatest of her modern historians had already clearly defined. "When we have settled our accounts with France and with Russia, will come the last and greatest settlement of accounts—with Great Britain."

Combined with the wonderful development of German commerce and industry the Kaiser's world-policy, which had achieved not a few brilliant if somewhat superficial successes, was well calculated to intoxicate a nation which had been raised within 40 years on to an astounding pinnacle of material power and prosperity. But it was undermining the very foundations of the Bismarckian edifice. The Kaiser's successive excursions and alarms were felt on all sides to constitute a new danger to the peace of the world, and the Powers

which the great Chancellor had succeeded in keeping asunder began gradually to draw nearer together. First had come the Franco-Russian Alliance, but so long as there were long-standing differences and jealousies between the two allies and Great Britain their alliance could be regarded in Berlin as scarcely less threatening to Great Britain than to Germany. The outlook was completely changed when first France and then Russia decided to compose their differences and to substitute friendly understandings for their old antagonisms.

The measure of Germany's wrath when the Anglo-French Agreement of 1904 was announced to the world was gauged in the following year by the violent quarrel she picked with France over Morocco, where hitherto she had never professed to have any substantial interests. By a campaign of brutal intimidation in Paris she succeeded in driving from office the Minister who had actually signed the Anglo-French Agreement, M. Delcassé, but thanks to the loyal support which this country gave to France at the Algeiras Conference Germany failed utterly in her chief object. The Anglo-French *entente* which she had hoped to break up had only been strengthened by that ordeal. Three years later the Anglo-Russian Agreement further and still more grievously disturbed Germany's calculations. Here indeed



THE LATE DUCHESS OF HOHENBERG.
[E. O. Hoppé.]



SERAJEVO.

she had been hoisted on her own petard. For Russia's policy of adventure in Asia, which the Kaiser had spared no pains to encourage in order to divert her energies from Europe, had not only landed her in disaster, but had compelled her to reconsider her whole position, and induced the chastened mood in which she would alone have been willing to welcome overtures for a friendly understanding with this country. Russia was fain to realize that, whilst she had been pouring out blood and treasure in the Far East, Germany had been steadily entrenching herself at Constantinople as the paramount power in the Near East, and largely at the expense of Russia herself. The Baghdad Railway was merely the outward and visible symbol of a German *mainmise* on Turkey which had begun with the Kaiser's sensational visit to Abdul Hamid in 1898, when the "Red Sultan's" hands were still dripping with the blood of the Armenian massacres. Whilst German enterprise was being urged on to the economic exploitation of Turkey, German political influence at Yildiz and the direct control exercised over Turkish military affairs by German military missions justified the Kaiser in boasting that every Turkish Army Corps was an addition to the armed forces of the Triple Alliance. Russia had been pursuing

the shadow in the Far East, and Germany had filched away from her the substance in the Near East.

Hence the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907, which, following on the Anglo-French Agreement of 1904, resulted in the Triple Entente. There was, as the Germans were themselves ultimately bound to admit, nothing more aggressive in this diplomatic grouping than in the Triple Alliance which Germany had initiated, so long as Germany was not herself contemplating aggression. None the less Berlin resented the Anglo-Russian Agreement even more bitterly than she had resented the Anglo-French Agreement, and again within a year there followed a desperate attempt to break down the Triple Entente before it had time to consolidate. Austria-Hungary was on this occasion given the leading part at the outset. The Near Eastern crisis of 1908-9 which grew out of the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Hapsburg dominions was in many respects very analagous to the crisis which has resulted in the present War. For it assumed its most dangerous form when Russia pressed Vienna for compensations for the little kingdom of Servia. Russia, however, was not then in a position to face Germany in her "shining armour," and a scarcely-veiled Ultimatum



THE EMPEROR FRANCIS JOSEPH.

from Berlin won another temporary triumph for the Kaiser's armed diplomacy. Nevertheless, in spite of this outward success, the Kaiser had again failed in his main object. The Triple Entente survived this shock just as the Anglo-French Agreement had survived the first German onslaught in Morocco.


The Kaiser, however, was not yet cured of his illusions, and in the French occupation of Fez in 1911, at a time when England was passing through a difficult domestic crisis, he saw another chance of smashing the Entente. The dispatch of the Panther to Agadir was an even more direct provocation to France than had been the Kaiser's own demonstrative visit to Tangier in 1905. It was destined to still more signal failure. Great Britain's loyalty to France again never wavered, nor did French patience and moderation give way. Germany, it is true, secured a slice of French Colonial territory towards the Congo, but the Entente remained intact. Germany's main consolation was a fresh outburst of Anglophobia, with a new Navy Bill deliberately based upon untrue statements regarding British naval preparations "to fall upon Germany."

In this place it is worth while to summarize the series of steps by which the Emperor William during the past 15 years sought to forward the growth of the German Navy. His embarkation upon a world policy was neces-



THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR IN BERLIN,
SIR EDWARD GOSCHEN.

sarily accompanied by the development of the weapon upon which the realization of such a policy must depend. It was, as we have seen, the South African War that enabled the Emperor finally to suppress German reluctance to unlimited naval expenditure, and upon ground prepared by an unparalleled campaign of anti-British calumny to create universal enthusiasm for German sea power. Immediately after President Kruger's Ultimatum the Emperor declared:—"We are in bitter need of a powerful German navy. Had I not been refused the increase for which I repeatedly pressed during the early years of my reign, how different would be our position to-day." In 1900 the first great Navy Bill was introduced with the phrase:—"Germany must have a fleet of such strength that even for the mightiest naval power a war with her would involve such risks as to jeopardize its own supremacy." Thenceforward there was no turning back. There was a second Navy Bill in 1906, a third in 1908, and a fourth in 1912, and although the Bill of 1912 added about 15,000 officers and men there was to have been a further increase of *personnel* in 1914. Most of the increases were carried upon artificial waves of Anglophobia, although explained with soft words. Most strenuous resistance was offered to all suggestions or proposals of disarmament, and the



THE RUSSIAN MINISTER OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS, M. SAZONOFF.



THE EMPEROR NICHOLAS II.

[W. & D. Downey.]



BELGRADE.

successive efforts of British Governments to arrive at some agreement were always treated as hypocrisy. In 1911, when the Agadir crisis threatened war, the German naval authorities had to admit they were not ready. From about 1912 they were able to say that "Germany had a fleet of such strength that even for the mightiest naval power a war with her would involve such risks as to jeopardize its own supremacy."

There can be no doubt that German naval policy was throughout directed against England. It was explained in all sorts of ways; at first as aiming only at a modest defence of German trade, but it was always essentially a challenge to England in the matter that was most vital to England and to her alone. If England remained in "splendid isolation" as far as other Powers were concerned, she could meet the growth of a great navy on the other side of the North Sea only by direct agreement with Germany, at the expense of other Powers and of her own Imperial interests, or by war. One effect of Germany's naval challenge—much to her continual surprise—was to weld even more firmly the fabric of the British Empire, and to strengthen the ties between Great Britain and the Dominions beyond the seas. The other main effect was to give England's friendships with France and Russia a shape which, although the British Government maintained its freedom

to the very end, rendered naval and military cooperation more and more probable. Up to the very end Germany could have altered her course if she had wished to do so, and England remained free to negotiate for the limitation of expenditure upon armaments which she earnestly desired. But Germany clung steadily to her ambitions. Twice—in 1905 and 1911—British Governments had to avert European war by plain intimations to Germany that England would stand by France. In November, 1912, the position was defined in an exchange of letters between Sir Edward Grey and the French Ambassador in London. Sir Edward Grey then wrote :—

From time to time in recent years the French and British naval and military experts have consulted together. It has always been understood that such consultation does not restrict the freedom of either Government to decide at any future time whether or not to assist the other by armed force. We have agreed that consultation between experts is not, and ought not to be regarded as, an engagement that commits either Government to action in a contingency that has not arisen and may never arise. The disposition, for instance, of the French and British Fleets respectively at the present moment is not based upon an engagement to cooperate in war.


You have, however, pointed out that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, it might become essential to know whether it could in that event depend upon the armed assistance of the other.

I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, or something that threatened the general peace, it should



THE KING OF THE BELGIANS.

[W. & D. Downey.]



THE SERVIAN PRIME MINISTER,
M. PASHITCH.

immediately discuss with the other whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they would be prepared to take in common. If these measures involved action, the plans of the general staffs would at once be taken into consideration and the Governments would then decide what effect should be given to them.

In 1912 came the Turkish and Balkan Wars. The war between Italy and Turkey was by no means altogether welcome to Germany. If, on the one hand, it made Italy more dependent upon her German allies, and incidentally created a good deal of friction between Italy and France, it was calculated to impair to some extent Germany's position in Constantinople, where the Turks felt, not unnaturally, surprise and indignation at finding themselves attacked by one of the members of the Triple Alliance. Far more disconcerting, however, to Germany were the results of the Balkan Wars, 1912-1913. The enfeeblement of Turkey and the new partition of her European provinces before Germany had completed her exploitation of the Turkish Empire, and the aggrandisement of Servia and Greece, which barred the way to Salonika against Austria and checked the growth of Austro-German preponderance in the Balkan Peninsula, constituted a severe, if indirect, blow to the whole fabric of European relationships which the Austro-German alliance had slowly and laboriously sought to build up. Incidentally, the exacerbation of the always latent

jealousy between Austria and Italy, barely veiled by the outward appearances of cooperation in Albania, undermined, to a degree which the Italian declaration of neutrality has suddenly illuminated, the foundations of the Triple Alliance in which Italy had been for many years the prisoner rather than the partner of Austria and Germany.


During the first Balkan War Germany unquestionably regarded every defeat by Turkey as a victory of the Slav forces, and as far as Servia was concerned the results of the second war were still more unpalatable to Germany, inasmuch as the failure of the Bulgarian attack was a further failure for the Austro-German diplomacy which had certainly encouraged it. In spite of the recapture of Adrianople by the Turks, Germany could no longer count with the same confidence on the cooperation in any European conflict of the large number of Turkish army corps which the Emperor William had been accustomed to regard as additional army corps of the German Army. The *rapprochement* with England during and after the Balkan Wars, out of which German diplomacy made a good deal of capital at the time, was in these circumstances, as far as Germany was concerned, a compulsory *rapprochement* for a purely temporary purpose. As soon as the fortunes of war turned so unexpectedly against Turkey it was obviously Germany's interest to cooperate with




THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN MINISTER
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, COUNT
BERTHOLD.

MAP OF THE AREA OF THE EUROPEAN WAR







THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR IN VIENNA,
SIR MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

England in arresting as rapidly as possible the progress of hostilities during the first war, and for similar reasons again during the second war, as soon as the Bulgarian effort was seen to have failed. How little, nevertheless, German policy was directed towards any permanent preservation of European peace subsequent events abundantly showed.

Before the end of 1912 Germany had resolved upon enormous increases of the Army. It was announced in the spring of 1913 that they were to cost from £60,000,000 to £65,000,000. Although the peace strength of the Army had only a year before been increased to 544,000, it was increased further to 661,000, and all the most important measures were treated as "urgent" and carried out by October, 1913. In introducing the Army and Taxation Bills the Imperial Chancellor, Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, said:—

One thing remains beyond doubt—if it should ever come to a European conflagration which set *Slaventum* against *Germanentum*, it is then for us a disadvantage that the position in the balance of forces which was occupied hitherto by European Turkey is now filled in part by Slav states.

He professed a perfunctory belief in the possibility of continued good relations between Russia and Germany, but the whole speech was full of warnings and forebodings, and was as nearly a preface to the coming conflict as diplomatic decency at the moment allowed.

The Army increases were indeed accompanied by a number of violent Press attacks, now upon Russia, now upon France, and occasionally upon both. England was left as far as possible out of all discussions, and every attempt was made to accentuate the improvement of Anglo-German relations, and to make the most of so-called "negotiations," especially with regard to the Portuguese colonies in Africa, which Germany believed to be already in her grasp. Interrupted only by a peculiarly venomous Press assault upon Russia in February, 1914, matters drifted on until June 28, 1914, when the Austrian Heir-apparent, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, and his morganatic wife, the Duchess of Hohenberg, were murdered in the streets of Serajevo, the capital of the Bosnian province annexed in 1909. The news interrupted a British naval visit to Kiel. It was a great blow to the German Emperor, who for some years past had conquered his personal antipathy, and had created intimate ties with the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, whose policy as Emperor he hoped to guide and to control. His dreams for the next decade were shattered, and the conflict with Russia, which it was probably hoped to postpone a little longer, was brought nearer. Germany, like Austria, chose immediately to assume, without trustworthy evidence, that the Serajevo crime was the direct work of Servia. and



THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR IN
ST. PETERSBURG, COUNT POURTALES.



METZ.

that Serbia must be punished. As a matter of fact, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his wife, who had insisted upon accompanying him upon his perilous tour, were wantonly exposed to a death for which the true responsibility will probably be found to have lain less in Belgrade than in Vienna. Under the circumstances, however, all the Powers were ready to give Austria any reasonable amount of "satisfaction" and to justify any treatment of Serbia which did not menace her existence as a sovereign state. Austria-Hungary, however, was bent upon a military punishment of Serbia, and Austria-Hungary and Germany together were bent upon either a fresh humiliation of Russia or war. There was a lull of nearly three weeks after the Serajevo crime, and then there was a further fortnight of diplomacy beginning with the presentation by Austria to Serbia of a monstrous Ultimatum, to which was attached a peremptory demand for an entirely favourable answer within 48 hours. Within 48 hours Serbia, acting upon Russian advice, accepted all the Austrian demands except two, which she asked to be reserved for The Hague Tribunal. Austria, however, immediately withdrew her Minister from Belgrade, and opened hostilities. Germany had placed herself in a situation of nominal detachment by avoiding direct knowledge of the contents of the Austrian Note, and by showing readiness to communicate good advice from London to Vienna. As late as July 25, when Austria broke off relations with Serbia, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs "did not believe that

Germany really wanted war." Europe was soon undeceived.

A Parliamentary White Paper entitled "Correspondence Respecting the European Crisis" told with grim simplicity the grim story of the fruitless efforts to maintain peace. On July 26 Sir Edward Grey inquired whether Germany, Italy, and France "would instruct their representatives in London to meet him in conference immediately for the purpose of discovering an issue which would prevent complications." Germany alone refused on the ground that "such a conference was not practicable." The German Foreign Secretary, Herr von Jagow, advanced many specious objections, and "thought it would be best" (July 27) to await the outcome of an exchange of views between Vienna and St. Petersburg. The very next day Austria declared war against Serbia, and Russia replied by a partial mobilization of her forces.

Three days before, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs had impressed upon the British Ambassador in St. Petersburg the supreme importance of England's attitude. If she took her stand firmly with France and Russia there would be no war. If she failed them now, rivers of blood would flow and she would in the end be dragged into the war. Prophetic words! Similar arguments were used by the French and then by the Italian Governments to press Sir Edward Grey to throw the weight of British influence into the scale in the only way in which they believed it could effectively redress the balance against the influences which were



BISMARCK.

[Augustin Rischgiltz.]

making for war in Vienna and in Berlin. But the British Foreign Minister had to reckon with public opinion in this country, and to M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador in London (July 29), he explained that

It approached the present difficulty from quite a different point of view from that taken during the difficulty as to Morocco a few years ago. In the case of Morocco, the dispute was one in which France was primarily interested, and in which it appeared that Germany, in an attempt to crush France, was fastening a quarrel on France on a question that was the subject of a special agreement between France and us. In the present case, the dispute between Austria and Serbia was not one in which we felt called to take a hand. Even if the question became one between Austria and Russia we should not feel called upon to take a hand in it. . . . If Germany became involved and France became involved, we had not made up our minds what we should do; it was a case that we should have to consider. France would then have been drawn into a quarrel which was not hers, but in which, owing to her alliance, her honour and interest obliged her to engage. We were free from engagements, and we should have to decide what British interests required us to do.

Nevertheless—and the same intimation was conveyed to the German Ambassador—we were taking all precautions with regard to our Fleet, and Germany was not to count on our standing aside.

On the same day that Sir Edward Grey made this cautious communication a council of war was held at Potsdam under the presidency of the German Emperor. Immediately after the Council—at midnight—the German Imperial

Chancellor sent for the British Ambassador in Berlin, Sir Edward Goschen, who telegraphed the following account of the Chancellor's extraordinary proposals to London:—

He said that should Austria be attacked by Russia a European conflagration might, he feared, become inevitable, owing to Germany's obligations as Austria's ally, in spite of his continued efforts to maintain peace. He then proceeded to make the following strong bid for British neutrality. He said that it was clear, so far as he was able to judge the main principle which governed British policy, that Great Britain would never stand by and allow France to be crushed in any conflict there might be. That, however, was not the object at which Germany aimed. Provided that neutrality of Great Britain were certain, every assurance would be given to the British Government that the Imperial Government aimed at no territorial acquisitions at the expense of France should they prove victorious in any war that might ensue.

I questioned his Excellency about the French colonies, and he said that he was unable to give a similar undertaking in that respect. As regards Holland, however, his Excellency said that, so long as Germany's adversaries respected the integrity and neutrality of the Netherlands Germany was ready to give his Majesty's Government an assurance that she would do likewise. It depended upon the action of France what operations Germany might be forced to enter upon in Belgium, but when the war was over, Belgian integrity would be respected if she had not sided against Germany.

Sir Edward Grey replied:—

His Majesty's Government cannot for a moment entertain the Chancellor's proposal that they should bind themselves to neutrality on such terms.

What he asks us in effect is to engage to stand by while French colonies are taken and France is beaten so long as Germany does not take French territory as distinct from the colonies.

From the material point of view such a proposal is unacceptable, for France, without further territory in Europe being taken from her, could be so crushed as to lose her position as a Great Power, and become subordinate to German policy.

Altogether, apart from that, it would be a disgrace for us to make this bargain with Germany at the expense of France, a disgrace from which the good name of this country would never recover.

The Chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain away whatever obligation or interest we have as regards the neutrality of Belgium. We could not entertain that bargain either.

In the House of Commons on August 6th the Prime Minister, Mr. Asquith, branded the Chancellor's proposal as "infamous," and as meaning that behind the back of France we should give free licence to Germany to annex the whole of the extra-European dominions and possessions of France, and as regarded Belgium, meaning that without her knowledge we should barter away to the Power that was threatening her our obligation to keep our plighted word.

Notwithstanding the extent to which German diplomacy had now been unmasked, Sir Edward Grey maintained his efforts to the end, and

actually appended the following passage to his stinging reply to Germany :—

If the peace of Europe can be preserved and the present crisis safely passed, my own endeavour will be to promote some arrangement, to which Germany could be a party, by which she could be assured that no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against her or her allies by France, Russia, and ourselves, jointly or separately. I have desired this and worked for it, as far as I could, through the last Balkan crisis, and, Germany having a corresponding object, our relations sensibly improved. The idea has hitherto been too Utopian to form the subject of definite proposals, but if this present crisis, so much more acute than any that Europe has gone through for generations, be safely passed, I am hopeful that the relief and reaction which will follow may make possible some more definite *rapprochement* between the Powers than has been possible hitherto.

On July 31, the day on which Germany dispatched an Ultimatum to Russia requiring immediate demobilization and an inquiry to France as to her attitude, Sir Edward Grey inquired of the French and German Governments respectively whether they would respect the neutrality of Belgium so long as no other Power violated it. France gave a definite pledge. Germany gave no reply.

On August 4 Germany was informed that the King of the Belgians had made the following appeal to King George :—

Remembering the numerous proofs of your Majesty's friendship and that of your predecessor, and the friendly attitude of England in 1870 and the proof of friendship you have just given us again, I make a supreme appeal to the diplomatic intervention of your Majesty's Government to safeguard the integrity of Belgium.

England again demanded assurances from Germany, but German troops were then already in Belgium. Luxemburg had been occupied by Germany some days before. The Imperial Chancellor, speaking in the Reichstag which had been specially convened, said :—

We are now in a state of necessity, and necessity knows no law! . . . We were compelled to override the just protest of the Luxemburg and Belgian Governments. The wrong—I speak openly—that we are committing we will endeavour to make good as soon as our military goal has been reached. Anybody who is threatened, as we are threatened, and is fighting for his highest possessions, can have only one thought—how he is to hack his way through.

There was nothing left to the British Government but to send Sir Edward Goschen the following final instructions, which reached Berlin at 7 p.m. on August 4 :—

We hear that Germany has addressed Note to Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that German Government will be compelled to carry out, if necessary by force of arms, the measures considered indispensable.

We are also informed that Belgian territory has been violated at Gemmenich.

In these circumstances, and in view of the fact that Germany declined to give the same assurance respecting Belgium as France gave last week in

reply to our request made simultaneously at Berlin and Paris, we must repeat that request, and ask that a satisfactory reply to it and to my telegram of this morning be received here by 12 o'clock to-night. If not, you are instructed to ask for your passports, and to say that his Majesty's Government feel bound to take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a treaty to which Germany is as much a party as ourselves.

Immediately after these instructions reached Berlin the German Government, without waiting for the *ultimatum* to expire, announced that England had declared war. There had been disgraceful scenes on the departure of the Russian Ambassador, M. Sverbejev, but they were as nothing in comparison with the outburst of fury when it was found that the efforts to keep England neutral had failed. There was a mob demonstration at the British Embassy, where windows were broken, many Englishmen were arrested as spies, and only the vigour of the American Embassy, which had undertaken the protection of British interests, made the situation—thanks especially to German eagerness to court American feeling—to some extent tolerable. As the Government was unable for obvious reasons to explain the facts about the neutrality of Belgium, for which Germany, as Sir Edward Grey pointed out, was as much responsible as England and the other Powers, it encouraged the public to believe that England had only been waiting her opportunity to strike Germany when she was already at war on both



VON MOLTKE.

[Augustin Rischgitz.]

frontiers. The world then saw the bad side of her patriotism, which was in itself admirable. All who had an opportunity of watching Germany during the fortnight of acute tension could testify to the patience, confidence, and enthusiasm of the people, although in Prussia, and in most other parts of the Empire, practically the whole reserves were called upon at once, absorbing the bulk of the able-bodied population and bringing ordinary life to a standstill. There was no sound of complaint or question of a policy which the country did not understand, and had no opportunity to judge. The Socialists, although they in Germany constituted not less than one-third of the whole population, and although they had been organizing great anti-war demonstrations, came immediately into line. The Reichstag passed without consideration all the emergency Bills presented by the Government, including war credits of £250,000,000, together with the absorption of the Empire's "war chest" of gold and silver to the amount of £15,000,000, and the authorization of loans on all sorts of securities to the amount of £75,000,000. But, once England was involved, there appeared beneath all this patriotism and readiness to make sacrifices a deep and general animosity against



THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR IN PARIS,
BARON VON SCHOEN.



THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR IN BERLIN,
M. JULES CAMBON.

England. It was the fruit of the teaching of the whole school of German intellectuals; the fruit of the many violent campaigns against England with which the German Government had accompanied all its efforts for a generation, and especially the challenge to British naval supremacy; and the fruit of the overweening contempt which sprang from Germany's abnormal and, to a large extent, unnatural industrial and commercial expansion in a period of only about 20 years. Germany had become incapable of seeing any but one side—the German side—of any question, and although her own moral and intellectual ideals had been submerged in an utter materialism, she was unable to appreciate interests which did not march with her own—much less to appreciate moral obligations and national sentiments which did not suit the ambitions of Germany. The fault lay mainly with the Government and with the Emperor, for they had deceived the German people and led them along paths which ended only in an impenetrable wall. But, as has been well observed, the responsibility must rest, not only with those who constructed an impossible programme, but with all those—and they were the whole German people—who would have welcomed its success.

CHAPTER II.

THE ARMY AND THE FORTRESSES OF BELGIUM.

BELGIAN NEUTRALITY AS A POLITICAL ABSTRACTION AND ITS VIOLATION AS A MILITARY THEOREM—NEUTRALITY BECOMES A FOCUS OF PATRIOTISM—THE OLD ARMY A GOVERNMENTAL ARMY—THE NEW CITIZEN ARMY—THE CREATION OF THE FORTRESSES—BRIALMONT—THE PROBLEM OF LIEGE AND NAMUR—CONCRETE AND CUPOLA—THE ARMY IN 1863, 1899, AND 1902—THE NATIONAL ARMY ACTS OF 1909 AND 1913—STRENGTH IN 1914—THE GARDE CIVIQUE—ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY ON MOBILIZATION—ARMAMENT AND EQUIPMENT—TYPICAL BRIALMONT FORTS—LATER DESIGNS—ANTWERP—LIÈGE AND NAMUR—CUPOLAS *versus* MODERN HOWITZERS.

WHEN Belgium was declared "perpetually neutral" it was quite as much in the interests of the Great Powers as in her own. A dangerous crisis over the fate of Limburg had just been passed, and both France and Prussia had formed the habit of studying the invasion of their respective countries by way of Belgium. In nearly all Moltke's memoranda of 1859-1869 on possible Franco-German wars the eventuality of a French attack from Belgium was taken into consideration. Since 1870, however, the question had been studied rather from the point of view of German attack upon France than *vice versa*, and it is safe to say that there was no problem of higher strategy that had been so freely discussed as that of the violation of Belgium's neutrality.

That Germany would not be restrained by the old Treaty of London if it suited her to attack France by way of Belgium was assumed on all sides as the basis of discussion. Rightly and naturally, the soldiers left the question of public law and policy to higher authority, and applied themselves to the consideration of the military conditions and consequences of an act which was obviously possible.

It must be said that, after the formation of the Dual Alliance and the consequent possibility of a war on two fronts for Germany,

military opinion was by no means agreed, either in principle or in detail, on the question of Germany's advantage in the matter. Some held that the time limit imposed upon Germany by Eastern necessities was too small to allow of the march through Belgium. Others considered that Germany's only object would be to pass troops through Southern Belgium only as rapidly as possible, and, deploying for the first time in France itself, to pick up new railway communications with Germany *via* Mézières and Luxemburg—in other words, to borrow part of Belgium for a week or so, to confront Europe with the *fait accompli*, and to pacify Belgium by prompt payment of the bill for damages. Still others held that Germany needed Belgium, south and north of the Meuse alike, both for the deployment and for the subsequent maintenance of her huge forces. In all these studies, as a matter of course, estimates were formed of the theoretical resistance of the Belgian Army to the invaders. One would assert that mobilization would require such-and-such a period, others would calculate in terms of "neutralizing" one, two, or three German army corps, and others imagined that Belgium would only save her face, and worked out their problem purely on the distances and times separating Aix-la-Chapelle from Mézières.

These frigid calculations and estimates usually ignored the fact that since her independence Belgium had developed a distinct and remarkable national spirit. Yet in some respects this omission was natural enough, for it was not always that the Belgian authorities themselves realized, before the war, the bearing of patriotism—this new and real patriotism—on their military problem. One of the leading Belgian generals, for instance, defined the *rôle* of the Belgian Army as the detaining of such a proportion of the invader's force as would weaken him unduly on his main battlefield. On these cold premises, Belgium was not a neutral nation at all, but simply a State possessing a certain number of soldiers who could be thrown into the scale on this side or that, if her treaty rights were infringed. In fact, in the eyes of the Army, neutrality had become, in a sense, a badge of servitude.

Far different were the realities of the case. When Belgium faced the Germans in August, 1914, in defence of her neutrality, that privilege stood for nothing less, in the eyes of the people, than national independence. It was not a question of telling the Army to act as a make-weight, but a question of fighting the Germans to the bitter end. Belgian patriotism, frequently supposed to have been smothered in infancy by sectional, political, and industrial quarrels, was suddenly put to the supreme test and proved its existence.

At that moment the Regular Army had only recently come to be representative of that patriotism—to be an army, so to speak, of “principals.” Up to 1913, or at least up to 1909, it had been conceived of rather as an army of “agents.” The community itself had been too completely absorbed in its industrial development and its social questions to pay much heed to those of defence. It paid, and willingly paid, for its costly fortifications, just as the British public paid for its Navy. But its personal living connexion with the Army was small. The Government, on its part, was certainly somewhat unwilling to surrender to the principle of the armed nation, conceiving that it needed a force of agents of its own to support its authority in time of internal trouble.


At the time when the Belgian Army took shape, practically all the armies of Europe were organized on the principle of substitute-conscription. This principle produced, in practice, armies that were chiefly composed of volunteer professionals, since, on the one hand, the substitute who served on behalf of a conscript was really a volunteer with a bounty,

and on the other, the re-engagement of the time-expired substitute to serve for a second conscript gave the State a long-service army that it could fairly regard as its own property. Until after 1871, therefore, this form of army was as normal and natural as an army of soldiers of fortune in the 17th century or a mechanical army in the 18th century.

After 1871, however, the military problem of Belgium was by no means so simple. The most formidable military Power of Europe was to the east, and the second most formidable to the west, of her. At the same time, in Belgium itself both the popular view of the Army as a thing apart and the governmental objections to the arming of a people not easily governed still held good. Whereas in the case of the new French Army the new organization was a recombination of free atoms into which the war had disintegrated it, Belgium had undergone no such process of disintegration, and the reforms in her Army after the precautionary mobilization of that year were rather adjustments than reconstructions. In fact, for more than 30 years the Army remained, in kind and type, the same.

Belgium's answer to the new conditions created by 1870 was fortification. It so happened that she possessed in General Brialmont the greatest military engineer of the 19th century, and his genius and activity dominated the scheme of defence. As a young officer in the days of smooth-bore guns, he was, like his French contemporaries, a disciple of the orthodox “bastion” school of fortification, but presently he went over to the “polygonal” side of Carnot, Montalembert, and the Prussians. The enceinte of Antwerp, built to his designs in 1859, with its chicanes of all sorts—little rises of the parapet level to give fire upon this or that corner, little falls and recesses to protect it from enfilade, ingeniously-curved short flanks to search shy corners of the ditch, and so on—still exists to attest his skill and ingenuity in a lost cause. But with 1864 and 1870 came the rifled gun, and Brialmont was young enough to adapt his works to the new standard of resistance.

For some years after 1870 the question of the Army had precedence over the question of the forts. Strong and determined efforts were being made by the army officers (Brialmont amongst them) and the democrats, approaching the problem from widely different sides, to introduce the principle of the nation in arms, and it was with the *arrière pensée* of diverting attention from this side of the defence question that the Government took up the



LIÈGE.

fortification proposals of Colonel Deboer, Brialmont's right-hand man.

It was already provided in the defence scheme of 1859 that Antwerp should be the main stronghold of the kingdom, upon which all field operations—whether against French or against German intruders—should be based. Deboer, supported by his chief, proposed some barrier-forts (not, be it observed, a ring of forts) at Liège in 1879. Three years later Brialmont himself proposed more important works, both at Liège and at Namur, and with these proposals began three fresh sets of controversies. These were, first, the political disputes which made the expenditure of money on those new works a party question; secondly, the strategical question whether Namur and Liège should be made into important fortresses, a proposition to which many senior officers of the Belgian Army would not assent; and, thirdly, the technical military question of armour and concrete *versus* earth parapets, which was then at its height in all countries.*

Echoes of this last still lingered thirty years afterwards, when war put the Meuse fortresses to the test. The first was set at rest when, under the spell of Brialmont's personality, the Government decided to make Liège and Namur fortresses after his own heart. The second, or strategical, issue was fought and re-fought throughout the years of peace, the

most serious competing proposal being that of General Dejardin, who urged his countrymen to give up the too exposed Meuse line and to make Brussels itself a first-class fortress connected with Antwerp by barrier-forts on the Dyle and Scheldt.


The forts as actually constructed were of Brialmont's third period—strong simple masses of steel and concrete without chicanes or weaknesses, but of course very expensive. The course of operations in 1914 may be said on the whole to have justified the money sunk in these passive defences. What is more questionable, however, is their service to the general defence of Belgium. For beyond doubt Belgians were content to point with pride to these superb structures, the finest military engineering work of the age,* as British people were wont to enumerate the ships of their great Navy instead of tackling the problem of the *personnel*.

In 1863, on the eve of Prussia's challenge to the old armies of Austria and France, Belgium possessed a substitute-conscript "standing army" of 73,718 rank and file, which was raised as far as possible by voluntary enlistment, the ballot (with substitution) making good vacancies, as in other armies. The term of service for all alike was eight years, of which four were spent "on furlough," and thus roughly 38,000 men were permanently under arms, with a drilled reserve of 36,000 behind them.† The eleven fortresses that then existed


*Major G. S. Clarke (afterwards Lord Sydenham) and Major Louis Jackson (afterwards Assistant Director of Fortifications) were amongst those who broke a lance with General Brialmont.

*Though rivalled perhaps by the same engineer's Bucharest works in Rumania.

†There was also a small naval force. To-day the only Government vessels are fast Channel steamers.



GENERAL LEMAN.



PLAN OF THE LIÈGE FORTRESSES.

absorbed practically the whole of this force. At that time the population was just under 5,000,000 souls.

In 1899, in a population of about 6,750,000, the peace strength was still only 43,000 rank and file, and substitution was still the ruling principle. But the Army had ceased to be the almost purely professional force that it had been, for enough non-substitute militiamen had been passed through the ranks into the reserve to give a total war strength (in the ten year-classes* liable) of about 130,000. On the other hand, Namur and Liège had, rightly or wrongly, been raised from the status of *forts d'arrêt* to that of fortresses, and their garrisons had been correspondingly enlarged, so that it was doubtful whether even as many as 80,000 men would be available for the free field army.

It was this last fact which more than any other consideration led to the passing of the

Army Law of 1902. This Law certainly marked no progress towards the realization of a national militia. On the contrary, it made voluntary enlistment of professionals the acknowledged basis of the Army by increasing their emoluments and practically doubling the proportion of them on the peace establishment. But two reforms of great importance were effected. First, the liability period was extended to thirteen years, and, secondly, the framework of the Army was recast so as to give many cadres on a low peace establishment, to be filled on mobilization by the reservists, of whom thirteen-year classes were now available instead of eight or ten. Thanks to these two reforms, it was expected that on mobilization 180,000 men would be available in organized formations. Under this Law the strength of the eventual field army—after garrisons had been provided for—was supposed to be 100,000.

In a few years, however, it became evident that the system of relying upon increased

*Legally only eight were available, but the Government had emergency powers to call up two more.



BELGIAN SOLDIERS AT BRUSSELS.



CIVIL GUARDS AT ANTWERP.

voluntary enlistment was a failure. The deficit was not indeed very alarming in itself, considered in relation either to the peace strength or to the ultimate mobilizable force, but it did indicate that no farther expansion was possible on the old lines of a governmental army. The reason for this was certainly not want of patriotism in the Belgian people, for national military service was in the creed of the most democratic political parties, as it had been in the creed of the old Radicals of the 1848 Revolutions. It was due partly to the fact that the Army was being kept away from the people by the Government, and still more to the absorption of the unemployed in the growing industries at home and of the most adventurous in the service of the Congo.*

Meanwhile the international outlook grew darker. The Russo-Japanese war, the first Morocco dispute, and the Austrian annexation of Bosnia followed one another swiftly. Every other year at least there was a threat of general European war. Every year witnessed some development in mobile siege artillery that was supposed to increase the military chances of a brusque attack on Brialmont's Meuse fortresses, hitherto supposed to be reducible only by sapping and mining. It was now not the fortresses, but the Army, that took first place in the scheme of national defence. There were moments in the years 1909-1914 when Liège and Namur could fairly have been said to be suffering from neglect—a thing that would have been inconceivable ten years before. Antwerp, on the other hand, resumed the place that it had held in the defence scheme of 1859. While Liège and Namur began to be looked upon again as simple barrier-groups, Antwerp, in its capacity as base of the field army, received an enormous outer ring of new forts, more modern in conception even than Brialmont's.†

Almost the last act of King Leopold II. was to give the Royal assent to the Army Bill of 1909. In that Bill substitution and the governmental army that it produced at last definitely gave way to the principle of the national army. The new scheme was in many respects tentative and imperfect, and in fact had to be thoroughly revised in 1913. But the first and hardest step was taken. The nation was armed, and neutrality as a politico-military abstraction rapidly gave way to "independence" as a popular creed.

By limiting substitution to the one case of brothers the character of the Army was changed



COUNT DE LALAING,
the Belgian Minister in London.

[Bassano.]

from that of a contract force rendering services professionally to that of a duty force serving as members of society. The peace strength (42,800) remained at much the same figure as before, as also did the periods of colour service required of the militiamen. But the absence of a high proportion of long-service men enabled the annual intake of recruits—which is what determines the war strength of an army—to be increased from a nominal 13,000 to a real 17,500. The low-establishment cadres of the previous organization were thus filled up to the ordinary standard of active units in peace. At the same time the liability period was reduced by one year, so that a war strength of 210,000 rank and file could be obtained with certainty so long as the *volontaires de carrière*—i.e., the enlisted professionals—still remained in the Army in great numbers. Given this standard of strength, it was clearly unnecessary to apply the principle of universal service rigorously throughout a population of over 7,000,000.* Accordingly, liability was restricted to one son in each family, and, as above mentioned, one brother could join as substitute for another.

But the question was soon asked—Was this war strength itself adequate? Having regard to the immense development of the new entrenched camp of Antwerp, not less than 130,000

*Moreover, the drilled volunteer battalions of the Civic Guard (see below) doubtless absorbed some promising material.

†These forts were completed and fit to stand a siege, according to published German reports, in November, 1913.

*The maximum annual contingent on such a population would have been about 67,000, of whom some 33,000 or 34,000 would be fit for service.

of the 210,000 would be required for fortress duties, and the field army, instead of being increased, would remain stationary at the figure of 80,000.*

The second Morocco crisis of 1911, and the Italian and Balkan wars of 1911-12, with the consequent increases in the strength and war-readiness of the French and German Armies, answered the question promptly and decisively; and in January, 1913, a new Army scheme was brought forward by the Government. It became law in due course and had been about a year and a half in operation when the Great War broke out.

Under this scheme the standard of strength on mobilization was to be as follows (rank and file only):—

Field army	150,000
Antwerp	90,000
Liège	22,500
Namur	17,500
Reserves in dépôts (for drafts)				60,000
				<hr/> 340,000

To realize this standard, liability to service was made in fact, as it already was in theory, universal. But certain exemptions were, as usual, granted, and allowing for these and for the physically unfit it was calculated that no more than 49 per cent. of the gross annual contingent would be available for service. The thirteen years' term of liability to serve on mobilization was reintroduced. Had events permitted the scheme to grow to maturity, the above numbers would have been realized with certainty, since thirteen classes each of 33,000 compulsory service men and 2,000 volunteers would have given a total of 455,000. As it was, however, only two classes had become available under the new scheme, and the resources of the country in *trained* men (not counting the Civic Guard) were, roughly:—

The 1913 class	30,000
Four classes (1909-12), at 20,000	80,000
Eight classes (1901-8), at 13,300	106,400
Volunteers (steadily decreasing from 1901, but averaged at about 2,500)	34,600
			<hr/> 251,000
Plus the recruit class of 1914			33,000
Plus professional cadres	12,000
			<hr/>
Gross	296,000

Deduct 15 per cent. as unfit and missing on mobilization, and the net strength becomes	261,000
Add gendarmerie not included in the classes above, about			2,000
			<hr/>
Total available	263,000

If therefore, as foreseen, Antwerp, Namur, and Liège were to absorb 130,000 men of the active army and its reserves, only 133,000 at the outside would be available for the field army, even assuming that the new recruits of the 1914 contingent could by judicious distribution be safely incorporated in the active ranks, and the hoped-for drafting reserve of 60,000 men at the dépôts would be non-existent. If, therefore, the war establishment of the field army (150,000) was to be attained, it was necessary to economize on the fortress garrisons, and to that end to call upon the Civic Guard to bear a greater share in the defence than had been contemplated.

This call was the final test of the reality of Belgian patriotism.

The Garde Civique was one of the few survivors of the National Guards of the days when the citizen-in-arms stood for liberty against Governmental autocracy; in its virtues and its defects, therefore, it was the true descendant of the citizen bands who had risen against the Dutch in the War of Independence, and of the National Guards that in France, Germany, and Italy played so great a part in the revolutionary movements of 1830-48. As with all formations of this kind, its military efficacy was in proportion simply to its passion. That it could not give full effect to its passion for want of specifically military training may freely be admitted—the point is that all the value that it possessed was derived from the cause in which it was called upon to fight.

On any conception of Belgian defence as a Governmental act, therefore, little reliance was or could be placed upon the Garde Civique; and, moreover, by its very nature it was rather a counterpoise than an auxiliary to the Army, which, both as a regular force and a Governmental force, looked down upon the *bourgeois* amateur. But, as we have seen, the conception of neutrality as an affair of policy involving the use of an army as the agent of policy had given way to the conception of a national independence defended by the stout hearts of the citizens themselves. In making this new patriotism possible the Garde Civique had worthily played its part, as it had done also in assisting to maintain public order during industrial disputes. With the bringing together

* This figure, however, would now be a minimum and not a maximum, as it would have proved in a mobilization under the 1902 scheme.

of the Army and the nation that followed the Army Acts of 1909 and 1913, its part seemed to be over, and gradually, as the Army absorbed the citizens, it was intended to die out.


But in August, 1914, this absorption had no more than begun, and the Garde Civique still existed in the old form and the old numbers. To it belonged in theory every able-bodied man who was not in the line or the reserve of the regular forces, between the ages of twenty-one and thirty-two; and behind it was its reserve of men of thirty-three to fifty, whose sole peace liability was to report themselves three times a year. Taking 35,000 as the total able-bodied contingent, and deducting 15,000 as enrolled in the Army, we find the nominal strength of the 1st Ban Garde Civique to be $13 \times 20,000$, or 260,000. Actually it was far below that figure, for only in the cities and towns did it possess any effective organization, and it may be assumed that not more than 90,000 Gardes Civiques were available for duty. These men had been present at ten drills a year, but (as was to be expected from their origin and principle) they were under the Home and not the War Department, and received little if any assistance, either in training or in organization, from the active army. However, in modern Belgium, as in the France of Louis Philippe, the existence of the general liability had given the enthusiasts the opportunity of forming volunteer corps, and these like the British Volunteers, met habitually for drill and social purposes,


and, with little direct assistance from above, attained a fair standard of military efficiency. This category included between 37,000 and 40,000 of the 90,000 men in the organized force. How well these men did their duty by the side of the regulars the defence of Liège attests. If as a national guard they were moribund, as part of the new National Army that had not had time to grow, they bore their full share of the defence of the kingdom, and this in spite of the brutality of the invaders, who chose to regard them as non-military irregulars, to be shot when caught—a view which might equally well be taken of the police of Great Britain, or even of the King's African regiments under the Colonial Office. For a moment, when overwhelmed and unsupported by the Allies, the Belgian Government dismissed the Civic Guard, in order to save it from this treatment, but it was soon re-armed and re-employed.

The aid of the Garde Civique, then, being justly reckoned upon for the fortresses, it was possible on mobilization to constitute the field army more or less in accordance with the normal scheme.


This provided for six divisions and a cavalry division, besides the regular fortress troops. The division consisted of staff and three "mixed brigades"; each was composed of two three-battalion regiments of infantry and a group of three four-gun field batteries, plus the divisional artillery (three groups), divisional cavalry (one regiment) and special troops.

The order of battle of the division is shown in the accompanying diagram:—





PENTAGONAL BRIALMONT FORT.



TRIANGULAR BRIALMONT FORT.

(For description see pages 16 & 17.)

A very interesting feature of this organization, which is almost peculiar to the Belgian Army, is the mixed brigade of six battalions and three batteries. Such an organization, when found in other armies, is usually only for detachments stationed in outlying frontier districts (e.g., the Austro-Montenegrin and the Franco-Italian frontiers). In Belgium, on the contrary, it was not detachments, but the parts of the main army itself that were so organized. The needs of modern tactics had produced the idea of the "tactical group" of all arms within the division in the French and the British Armies, but in these armies the grouping was only a temporary *ad hoc* arrangement, whereas in Belgium it was the basis of the regular organization.

The cavalry division consisted of three brigades, each of two four-squadron regiments, a mobilized gendarmerie regiment in addition, and three batteries of horse artillery; a cyclist battalion, a cyclist engineer detachment on bicycles and a motor-ambulance section also figured in the organization.

The establishment-strength of the division was roughly 22,000 combatants, which meant

that the so-called division was in reality a small army corps. The cavalry division was about 5,000 strong in combatants.


This force of six divisions,* a cavalry division,† with the 13th and 14th mobile brigades at Namur and Liège, was formed on mobilization by the expansion of each of the 20 infantry regiments of three battalions, or about 1,650 men, into a six-battalion brigade of about 7,000. This meant a four-fold expansion for the regular field army alone, without counting the fortress garrisons, but the Balkan Wars had already shown that for a thoroughly national war it was safe to multiply even by eight. The lieutenant-colonels and the second captains of the active regiments, with a proportion of junior officers serving as supernumeraries in peace, commanded the regiment and companies newly formed on mobilization.‡

The cavalry and artillery were maintained on a high establishment in peace, the field artillery being only doubled and the cavalry scarcely

*1st Ghent, 2nd Antwerp, 3rd Liège, 4th Namur, 5th Mons, 6th Brussels. Instead of the two howitzer groups of divisional artillery, the 6th division had one of horse artillery and one of heavy howitzers.

†Brussels.

‡The regiments at Namur and Liège formed fortress battalions in addition.



THE MODERN DEFENCES OF ANTWERP.

increased at all, by the intake of reservists (men and horses) on mobilization.*

Of the fortress troops, both artillery and engineer, details need not be given. It will suffice to say that the formations in these branches were numerous, as one would expect from the preponderant part played by the three fortresses in the defence scheme.

Before we deal with these fortresses in any detail, however, we may set forth briefly the characteristic points of the armament, equipment, and uniform of the Belgian Army. The field artillery weapon was a Krupp quick-firer of

1905,* with single long running-up spring and panorama sight, but without "independent line of sight"—in a word, a typical equipment of its date, inferior to the French, Russian, and British models, but superior to the German. At the outbreak of war no definite decision had been made as to the pattern of quick-firing field howitzer to be adopted, and the old breech-loading weapons were taken into the field. The rifle, pattern 1889, a Mauser, of .30lin. calibre, was also a typical weapon, differing only in points of detail from the rifle of many other armies.

*The periods of militiamen's service with the colours were:—Infantry, Heavy Artillery, and Pioneers, 15 months; Cavalry and Horse Artillery, 24 months; Field Artillery and Train, 21 months.

*Some of the guns were made at Essen, and others at the ordnance works of Cockerill, at Seraing, Liège.



NAMUR.

The machine-guns were of three types—a Hotchkiss, used in the fortresses, a Maxim of much the same pattern and weights as those of other armies, and a new type named the “Berthier,” a light automatic weapon weighing only 18lb. This was frequently, if not always, mounted (for transport only) on a light two-wheeled carriage drawn by dogs. The cavalry machine guns had pack transport. When in action all field machine guns were tripod-mounted.

On the whole, then, as regards weapons Belgium was on a level with her contemporaries, but in no way ahead of them, for even the light machine-gun had been introduced into the Danish, Russian, and other armies.

The same can hardly be said of the uniforms and the infantry equipment. The Belgian linesmen went into action against the grey Germans wearing the blue tunic or greatcoat, the heavy knapsack, and the white buff accoutrements of peace time. Trials had recently been made of a khaki field uniform, but none such had been adopted.

As we have already seen, the older fortifications of Antwerp represent Brialmont’s youth, and those of Liège and Namur, and some of the newer Antwerp forts, his maturity, while the newer Antwerp works are more modern in design than even Brialmont’s final plans. The first, constructed before the days of the siege howitzer shell, scarcely concern us. But the second and third call for more detailed description, and for

that purpose we take two of Brialmont’s designs—one for a large fort with an internal keep, and one for a “fortin” or smaller work. The ring fortresses of Namur and Liège were simply combinations of these forts and “fortins,” varied slightly in detail to suit the sites.

The larger fort shown is five-sided, and surrounded by a deep ditch, of which the counter-scarp is a masonry wall, while the earthen escarp is simply the prolongation of the exterior slope of the parapet. Behind the counter-scarp wall and running along almost its whole length is a vaulted gallery, which at the angles of the ditch is pierced for machine-guns and rifles, so as to sweep the floor of the ditch at the moment of assault. From this gallery small galleries run outwards and downwards at right angles to enable the defenders to counter-attack the besiegers’ mining operations, and other galleries communicate with the fort below the floor of the ditch. This counter-scarp gallery, therefore, is the main defence of the fort during the final stages of the besiegers’ advance, both against his assault overground across the ditch, and against his mining operations underground, and it is itself practically secure against any form of attack except slow and systematic mining—unless, indeed, artillery of quite unforeseen power were to be brought against it, in which case it would succumb like any other works.

In the rear (or “gorge”) of the fort the escarp is of masonry, and galleried and pierced



BELGIAN SOLDIERS IN BRUSSELS.

so as to command the floor of the ditch. The parapet of the fort is a plain infantry breast-work, with steel gun-cupolas bedded in concrete at intervals.

Within this five-sided work and separated from it by an inner ditch is a triangular mass of concrete, galleried and pierced on its rear side to sweep the rear of the inner ditch* and on all sides so as to give fire upwards upon the interior of the outer fort, and so to prevent an enemy who has stormed the front part from establishing himself solidly in the interior and to keep open a way for reinforcements by way of the rear side or "gorge." Access from the outer fort to the inner ditch is obtained through a tunnel from a well or sunk "area,"† all parts of which are kept under fire by carefully sloping the earth on the inner side, glacis-fashion, so as to bring it under the observation of a cupola in the centre of the triangular keep.

*The counter-scarp galleries at the apex provide for ditch defence on the front faces.

†This sunk "area" also assists in limiting the space open to the assailant after penetrating the outer fort.

The smaller fort is a triangular work of simpler trace, and without provision for interior defence. At the angles of the triangle are small cupolas for light quick-firing guns. The infantry parapet is traced somewhat in the shape of a heart, and in the hollow of this heart is a solid central mass of concrete, on which are the shelters and gun-cupolas. The mortar-cupolas emerge from the floor of the hollow, outside the central mass. Ditch defence is provided for the front faces by counter-scarp galleries, and for the rear face by the trace and loopholes of the escarp gallery, as in the case of the larger fort.

By the later engineers, though cupolas and concrete were used freely, the upright escarps and deep ditches and general costly massiveness of Brialmont's works were replaced, in Belgium, as in other countries, by glacis-ditches; that is, the parapet slope was continued outwards and downwards until the proper depth was reached for the building up of a steep, forbidding counter-scarp. Entanglements and steel fences were fixed on this slope as a barrier to sudden assault. The gun-cupolas were placed much as they were in Brialmont's designs, but in



BELGIAN TROOPS.


general the earthen slopes were longer and flatter.

The Antwerp fortifications were (1) the 1859 *enceinte*, already alluded to as a fine example of the old "polygonal" fortification, and still possessing military value against all forms of attack except a regular siege, although, of course, powerless to protect the town against bombardment; (2) the "old" forts, a partial ring of self-contained works at regular intervals of 2,200 yards, and at an average distance of 3,500 yards from the *enceinte*; these were built at the same time as the *enceinte* and at first extended only from the river at Hoboken, above the city, to the railway running out of Antwerp eastward, but after 1869 were reinforced by Fort Merxem, north of the city, and Forts Cruybeke and Zwynndrecht to the west of the Scheldt, to which was presently added the combined fort and coast-battery, Sainte-Marie, on the lower Scheldt; (3) the first instalment of the "new" forts, built in 1879 and the following years by Brialmont; these marked the most important points of an immense defended area, Rupelmonde—Waelhem near Malines — Lierre — Schooten—Berendrecht; (4) the second instalment of the "new forts," which were completed in 1913, and filled up the wide intervals left unguarded in the preliminary scheme; (5) the defences commanding the ship-channel, of which the water battery of Fort

Sainte Marie with its long row of casemate guns at the water level behind heavy masses of curved armour was perhaps the most effective; (6) the inundated areas. It is to be noted that the old forts of class (2) received new cupolas and additional concrete at the same time as the works of class (4) were built.

As the base of the field army and the final keep of the Kingdom, Antwerp had generally been well cared for. With Liège and Namur, however, matters were different. They were intended originally as barrier-fortresses, to be held only for a few days, and many authorities declared that any further development of them as fortresses in the ordinary sense was undesirable in the general interests of the defence. Only the strong will and personality of Brialmont made them what they were, for good and evil, and the war gave no final answer to the question, since the resistance of Liège surprised those who regarded it as a mere barrier position while the swift overwhelming of Namur was equally startling to those who looked upon it as a fortress.

Liège possessed a ring of six forts and six "fortins," Namur a ring of four forts and five "fortins" of the two kinds described above, or analogous types. The armaments were the same in all cases—two 6in., four 4.7in., two 8in. mortars, four light quickfirers for the forts, two 6in., two 4.7in., one (or two) 8in. mortars,



THE DEFENCES OF NAMUR.

and three light quickfirers for the "fortins." Including separately emplaced guns, Liège had 400 and Namur 350 pieces.

Searchlights and the necessary stores and supplies for resisting a siege were reported as ready and complete in the winter of 1913, even the line enlargement being in position.

But what was true for the forts individually was not altogether true for the fort ring as a whole, for bomb-proof infantry redoubts would have guarded the intervals of the forts far more effectually than the mere field defences that were hastily thrown up after mobilization. The uses and design of such redoubts were well known to all European engineers, and it can only be supposed that no definite decision to treat Liège and Namur as fortresses had ever been reached.

One other consideration must be mentioned. At the time when the cupolas were constructed and the depth of the concrete determined, the typical siege gun was the

6-inch howitzer. But artillery had made great progress since the siege of Port Arthur had afforded definite data as to the numbers and kinds of guns required, and 8-inch and even 11-inch howitzers could now be mounted on wheeled carriages and brought into action without waiting to make concrete beds for them.

The resisting power of the cupolas was therefore, in August, 1914, somewhat doubtful, and this doubt cannot but have intensified in the minds of the Belgian staff their more general doubts as to the wisdom of treating the Meuse places as fortresses at all. These doubts, indeed, had been partially allayed by the manœuvres of 1913, in which the "Red" Army attacked Namur from the East and was repulsed, even though the umpires allowed the attack to smother the cupolas in a few hours. But manœuvres and realities may differ, and until the heavier shell was actually pitted against the cupola in war, indecision was bound to



ANTWERP.

remain. Had the new army scheme been complete in August, 1914, a clear policy one way or the other as to the Meuse forts would *ipso*

facto have been decided upon. As it was, in this as in other matters of defence, Belgium was caught at a moment of transition.



CHAPTER III.

THE GERMAN INVASION OF LUXEMBURG AND BELGIUM.

THE WAR BEGINS—GERMAN SEIZURE OF LUXEMBURG—USELESS PROTESTS—PREPARATIONS FOR DEFENCE—UNEXPECTEDNESS OF GERMAN ATTACK—COURAGEOUS BELGIAN RESISTANCE—NEGOTIATIONS STILL IN PROGRESS—OBJECT OF GERMAN STRATEGY—SPEECH BY KING ALBERT—THE CROSSING OF THE BELGIAN FRONTIER—LIMBURG AND VERVIER—MEUSE BRIDGES DESTROYED—THE ATTACK ON VISÉ—FIRST REPORTS OF MASSACRES UNTRUE—ANOMALOUS POSITION OF THE GARDE CIVIQUE—GERMAN FORCE AMBUSHED—BELGIAN CIVILIANS INVOLVED—GERMAN REPRISALS—“FRIGHTFULNESS.”

IN the very early days of August, 1914, Europe passed suddenly from the cool ante-chamber of politics into the heated arena of war. The war, as we have seen, opened with the German invasion of Belgium. The first military operation of real importance was the attack on Liège.

In order to comprehend the purport of the sudden onslaught upon Liège and the full importance of the check which its unexpectedly gallant defence inflicted upon the Germans, it is necessary to note the success which had attended the first step of their advance, in Luxembourg. Here almost everything went in accordance with the general German plan, which was secretly and swiftly to move a large but lightly-equipped force towards the Franco-Belgian frontier. The light equipment was due to the necessity for rapid and secret movement and also to the belief in Berlin that the troops would obtain provisions in Belgium and that ammunition and transport trains with the heavy artillery could be sent on after the mask was thrown off and would reach the troops before they were seriously needed. Thus it was possible for the advance guard to take Luxembourg completely by surprise. During the night of Saturday, August 1, German soldiers arrived

and occupied the station as well as the railway bridges on the Trèves and Trois Vierges lines so as to ensure the subsequent passage of German troop trains through the Grand Duchy, and on Sunday, August 2, the population of Luxembourg awakened to find that they were no longer free citizens in their own country, because all the means of communication were in the hands of detachments of soldiers in German uniform, commanded in many cases by officers in whom the surprised citizens recognized men who, up to two days previously, had been masquerading as employees in offices in Luxembourg. There, of course, they had acquired an intimate knowledge of the topography of the place and all its internal arrangements, which enabled them not only to place the soldiers everywhere to the best advantage, but also to indicate where stores of provisions could be commandeered and what persons should be arrested in furtherance of German plans. Against a plot so cunningly devised and so effectively carried out the citizens of Luxembourg were helpless.

This might not have been the case if Europe, only half a century ago, could have foreseen the rise of a great military Power in Germany which would regard international treaties as mere “scraps of paper,” because the position



THE REIGNING GRAND DUCHESS MARIE
ADELAIDE OF LUXEMBURG.

of Luxemburg, which has sometimes been compared to Jerusalem and sometimes to Gibraltar, makes it one of the great natural strongholds of the earth. The city stands on a rocky plateau, with precipitous descents of several hundred feet upon three sides, and is only connected with the neighbouring country on the west—i.e., towards France. Thus it seemed to have been placed as the natural barrier against advance from the German side; and the fortifications, chiefly hewn out of the solid rock, had been so increased and strengthened by the Spaniards, Austrians, French, and Dutch, who had held Luxemburg in successive ages, that in the middle of the last century, before the days of high explosives, it was held to be second only to Gibraltar in impregnability if resolutely defended.

But, as has been said, Europe did not foresee that a time could come when an armed German Empire would strive to abolish international honour as a factor in world-politics. So the mighty fortifications of Luxemburg were demolished in accordance with the Treaty of

London in 1867 and beautiful public gardens were laid out in their place.

This was a great triumph of civilization, substituting a mere scrap of paper and the national honour of its signatories for the frowning forts with their snarling embrasures toothed with guns! No doubt there were many among the cultured German officers who strolled amid the roses and lavender, never more beautiful or fragrant than in the early August of 1914's wondrous summer, who had studied the history of Europe enough to realize that their Kaiser had in very deed made a name for himself unlike that of any potentate in the previous annals of the world.

At this time, of course, the great gorges of Luxemburg were spanned by fine viaducts, and of these the most important to the Germans was the Adolf Bridge, which they had carefully seized on the night of August 1.

The first to attempt a futile resistance was M. Eyschen, a member of the Cabinet, who drove his motor-car across the Adolf Bridge and confronted the leading officer of the German advance guard with a copy of the Treaty, guaranteeing the neutrality of the State. To this the German officer merely replied that he was acquainted with the Treaty, but had his orders. The Archduchess Marie Adelaide, who also tried to block the bridge with her motor-car, and General Vandyck, Commandant of Luxemburg, who arrived in anger to protest, fared no better, for the former was simply told to go home at once and the latter was confronted with a revolver.

On the same day the Imperial Chancellor at Berlin telegraphed to the Luxemburg Government that no hostile act against the Grand Duchy had been taken, but only measures necessary to secure the safety of German troops by protecting the railways of Luxemburg against a possible attack by the French.

Having thus seized Luxemburg the Germans lost no time in strengthening their position against attack, destroying for this purpose all the villas, farm-houses, woods, and standing crops which might have provided cover for an enemy. At the same time no pretext was too flimsy for the arrest of the citizens as spies. Thus Luxemburg began to appreciate fully the blessings of German rule.


In a few days Luxemburg began to wonder why the tide of German invasion did not pass on more quickly towards France; but the fact was that the tide had received an unexpected check elsewhere, which delayed it all along the line. The light equipment of the invading force had proved to be too light to break down the

Belgian barrier at Liège. Provisions and ammunition ran short, and the attacking army was obliged to wait not only for these, but also for the heavy guns which, according to the original plan, were to have been sent on comfortably through Belgium, behind the victorious army of occupation, because they would probably not be needed, except to batter down the forts of Paris !

The resistance of Liège upset all these plans, although the actual circumstances of the fighting which led to this result were equally puzzling at the moment to Belgium's friends and foes.

It was on August 2 that Germany had already signified the value which she attached to "scraps of paper" by seizing Luxemburg, whose neutrality she was bound by treaty to respect and protect. Baron de Broqueville, Chief of the Belgian Cabinet, declared on that date his conviction that Belgian territory would not be violated. Nevertheless, no effort was being spared to make ready for the worst, although perhaps not even the Belgians dreamed at that moment of the frightful ordeal which was coming upon their country—almost with the suddenness of a thunderbolt from a blue sky—or the splendid heroism with which it would be met.

At the end of July, when the storm was about to burst, 13 classes of Belgian recruits had been called to the colours ; but even so the entire army numbered only 200,000 men—a total which in a historical retrospect of the forces subsequently engaged, scarcely seems



M. EYSCHEN,
The Minister of State for Luxemburg.


more than a group of men struggling against the first waves of the grey-green tide of troops by which they were soon inevitably surrounded and thrown back.

Perhaps no better evidence of the unexpectedness of the smashing blow, deliberately prepared and remorselessly delivered, against Belgium can be found than the fact that in *The Times* report of the British Cabinet meeting in London on the following day it was pointed out that no necessity had as yet arisen for dissensions in the Government ranks,



VIEW OF LUXEMBURG.

From a corner of the old fortifications, which were turned into public gardens because the European Powers had signed a "scrap of paper" which was supposed to render the fortress unnecessary.



THE ADOLF BRIDGE AND VIADUCT, LUXEMBURG.

It was in order to obtain possession of this bridge that the German plot to seize Luxemburg by surprise was necessary, because it was practically the only means of access to the city from the side of Germany. It was at this spot that the Archduchess and the Commandant and M. Eyschen offered a futile opposition.

because the occasion had not yet arisen at which "the plain and acknowledged duty and interest of this country—the preservation of Belgium, Holland, and Luxemburg against German invasion" needed to be fulfilled. So far were British observers from comprehending the cynical contempt of Germany for her sacred obligations that in reviewing the considerations which impelled Britain to support France it was pointed out by *The Times* that "if once the German armies are allowed to crush France, not only will England be unable to preserve the independence of Holland, Belgium, and Luxemburg," &c. What was in British minds was that we should be compelled to support France primarily to prevent the violation of Belgium, not that we should need to combine with France to exact vengeance for unhappy Belgium ruthlessly outraged and shockingly mutilated.

And if few of us anticipated the callous brutality which the Teuton was about to display to an indignant world, still fewer could have foreseen the magnificent courage with which the little Belgian nation flung itself in the way of the Kaiser's armed millions. Had even the Belgians been able to calculate beforehand the price which they would be called upon to pay for doing their duty to themselves and to Europe, flesh and blood might have proved too weak. But honour does not count costs beforehand, and to the eternal glory of Belgium be it said that she went straight with head erect and step unflinching into the hell upon earth which the Kaiser's hordes had prepared for her.

Even after the German guns had spoken to Liège, so little did we think in Britain of the value of Belgian resistance that in the tables then published, in Berlin as in London, of the armed strength of the conflicting parties no mention whatever was made of the Belgian army; for who could have foreseen that its gallant handful of men would be able to do much more than vehemently protest against the high-handed breach of treaty obligations by the German hosts?

Even the Belgians themselves seem to have expected to make little armed resistance; because, several days after the outbreak of war, the Paris correspondent of *The Times* stated that among the foreigners applying for enrolment in the French Army "Italians, Belgians, and Dutch form the majority." If those Belgians had only dimly foreseen the halo of military glory so soon to crown their countrymen in arms at home it would not have been in the ranks of France that they would have sought to answer the call of honour.

And it is greatly to the credit of the Belgian Government that, even when the army had been mobilized and 100,000 men were hurrying to the frontier in every direction, it endeavoured to maintain the strictest neutrality, as was shown in Brussels on August 2 by the seizure of the *Petit Bleu* for publishing an article headed "Vive France!"; and in the British Press of the same date it was merely announced that "general mobilization is taking place in Belgium, Holland, Denmark, and Switzerland."

as though these four countries were placed on the same level of semi-detached interest in the threatened war.

Even while the violation of Belgium was in progress Europe had no knowledge that the crime was done. The leading article in *The Times* of August 3, dealing with the situation generally, said:—"Yesterday it was Luxemburg. To-day it may be Belgium or Holland." And so it was: for on that day we learned that Germany had followed up her illegitimate invasion of Luxemburg by an ultimatum to Belgium. She had indeed offered terms. If Belgium would but allow German troops to use her territory as a basis for an attack on France, Germany would undertake to respect her integrity. In case of refusal Germany threatened to treat Belgium as an enemy.

To this the Belgian Government worthily replied that Belgium had too high a regard for her dignity to acquiesce in the proposal, that she refused to facilitate the German operations, and that she was prepared to defend energetically her neutrality, which was guaranteed by treaties signed by the King of Prussia himself.

Subsequent rapid negotiations made no impression upon the little country's loyalty to her treaty obligations; and, even while these negotiations were proceeding, Germany, with cynical disregard of the international etiquette which would have embarrassed at this juncture the action of any more punctilious Power, had already sent troops across the Belgian frontier near Liège.

The obvious object of the Germans in invading Belgium was, as has been adequately explained in Chapter II., to avoid a difficult frontal attack upon the troops and fortresses on the eastern frontier of France, by using the triangle of Belgium between Namur, Arlon, and Aix-la-Chapelle as a base from which to turn the left of the French defences; and it was expected that, in this case, Belgium, taken by surprise before her new Army organization was complete, could do no better than give way before the German hosts and unite her Army with the left of the French line.

But Belgium could do better; and the defence of Liège against the Germans at the outset of the great war of 1914 took its place in history, at once and for all time, among the most glorious events in the annals of Europe.


For the national spirit and the spirit especially of the Army had risen in worthy response to the brave words of King Albert, who, addressing the extraordinary sitting of the Belgian Parliament—a large proportion of whose members

were already in campaigning kit, ready to start for the front—had said:—

"Never since 1830 has a graver hour sounded for Belgium. The strength of our right and the need of Europe for our autonomous existence make us still hope that the dreaded events will not occur. If it is necessary for us to resist an invasion of our soil, however, that duty will find us armed and ready to make the greatest sacrifices. Our young men have already come forward to defend the Fatherland in danger.

"One duty alone is imposed upon us, namely, the maintenance of a stubborn resistance, courage, and union. Our bravery is proved by our faultless mobilization and by the multitude of voluntary engagements. This is the moment for action. I have called you together to-day in order to allow the Chambers to participate in the enthusiasm of the country. You will know how to adopt with urgency all necessary measures. Are you decided to maintain inviolate the sacred patrimony of our ancestors?

"No one will fail in his duty, and the Army is capable of performing its task. The Government and I are fully confident. The Government is aware of its responsibilities, and will carry them out to the end to guard the supreme




PALACE OF THE GRAND DUCHESS
OF LUXEMBURG.

welfare of the country. If a stranger should violate our territory he will find all the Belgians gathered round their Sovereign, who will never betray his constitutional oath. I have faith in our destinies. A country which defends itself wins the respect of everyone, and cannot perish.

"God will be with us."

It may seem surprising that the attack upon Liège should itself have been in the nature of a surprise, seeing that it was not a frontier town and fighting between the Belgians and Germans had already been taking place. But the fact was that the German occupation of Verviers near the frontier had been so sudden that there was no adequate Belgian force to resist them there, and the German troops, coming by train part of the way to Liège, were themselves practically the first to announce their arrival on Belgian soil. Before they actually reached Liège, however, the Belgians had had time to tear up the rails, and the last part of the German advance was completed by road. To understand what had happened up to this point—and in view of the subsequent savagery of the German invasion, it is essential to know how it all began—we must go back to the frontier, to Verviers, and try to realize the actual conditions under which German troops, transgressing international law, crossed the Belgian frontier.



BELGIAN SOLDIERS SNIPING FROM A BRIDGE.

[*Sport & General.*


As far as Herbesthal, the German town whose suburbs actually touch the frontier nearest to Liège, the troops had been conveyed by train, and they simply formed up after detraining and took their places in the lengthening column on the road into Belgium.

Thus on the actual frontier there was absolutely no resistance, although the cavalry which advanced in front of the main force and penetrated to a distance beyond the frontier reported that stray shots had been fired upon it. These came, no doubt, from Belgian sentries or scouts; but there was no military opposition to the German occupation of Limburg, the first Belgian town on the road to Liège. So unexpected, indeed, had been the turn of events that the Germans found not only the railway intact, but also the locomotives and rolling stock, which were very useful for their transport towards Liège.

The next Belgian town beyond Limburg was Verviers; and from this place a weak Belgian force had easily been driven by the German cavalry. The panic-stricken inhabitants offered no resistance, only peeping through closed shutters at the invaders, who quietly took possession of the public buildings and issued proclamations announcing the annexation of the town and district, appointing a German officer as Governor and warning the populace that any resistance to German authority would be punished immediately with death. So far, no doubt, events had marched exactly in accordance with the Germans' plan; and, as they had expected, the people were not only meek and zealous in carrying out orders for provisions, but very soon overcame their fear sufficiently to come out of their houses and converse freely with the enemy. On the same day German troops entered Belgium without opposition at Dalhem, Franconchamps, and Stavelot.

This auspicious beginning was, however, much too good to last. The "peaceful occupation of Belgian territory" reported in the first telegrams to Berlin did not extend for many miles; and unexpected opposition had a bad effect on the German temper.

The first serious intimation to the invader that Belgian words of protest meant effective deeds to follow was found by the German troops advancing towards Liège by Dalhem and Herve in the blown-up bridges of the Meuse and the Trois Ponts tunnels. Thus the German attempt to seize these bridges by surprise was foiled, and their efforts to throw others over were at first successfully resisted. These, however, were only affairs of outposts; and



VIEW ON THE RIVERSIDE, LUXEMBURG.

[Underwood & Underwood.]

though the fortifications of Liège were in readiness and order and the garrison of 22,500 men apportioned to them complete in numbers and high in courage, it was not expected anywhere that the defence of Liège by the Belgians could exert any real influence upon the course of the campaign.

This was no doubt in the minds of the Germans when they had crossed the Belgian frontier. One of their first objectives was

naturally Visé, a quiet little Belgian town just outside the Dutch frontier, and occupying a strategic position on the flank of any force advancing from the east upon Liège. Here, however, the Germans discovered that, prompt as their advance had been, the Belgians had been at least equally prompt: because the bridges had been blown up and they were forced to stop to build others. Nor was this an uninterrupted work. In one case the German engineers were



ONE OF THE INCIDENTS WHICH IMPEDED THE GERMAN ADVANCE.

[Sport & General.

allowed to proceed until the new pontoon bridge was just completed. Then a concealed Belgian force opened fire upon it and most of the engineers perished with their construction. Thus the capture of Visé, which should have been a preliminary to the partial investment of Liège with a view to attacking the forts, was itself delayed until the general assault upon the forts was already being delivered. After fierce fighting the Germans then succeeded in entering Visé. At first, however, they did not, as was reported at the time, massacre the inhabitants, although those who assisted the Belgian troops, including women and boys who threw stones, were remorselessly shot down. There was, however, no indiscriminate slaughter; and it is some satisfaction to make this record, because the first accounts which reached England of the capture of Visé accused the Germans of wholesale atrocities, and these accusations were repeated without reservation and evidently without inquiry in later accounts professing to be historical. The indictment against the Germans under this head is heavy enough without adding thereto charges which cannot be supported by evidence. Moreover, it is particularly important that we should be scrupulously just and accurate with regard to these initial proceedings, because outrages committed by the Germans before they had received any provocation at all would mani-

festly fall under a worse category of crime than similar outrages perpetrated as "reprisals," even if the provocation, judicially considered, did not justify them. For we must not forget that amid the excitement of war, and especially under the aggravation of an unexpected and humiliating reverse, most men's minds are unfitted to take a calm, judicial view of things in general, and, least of all, the conduct of the enemy. You have only to listen to the unfair and often absurd insinuations which the defeated team in a hotly-contested football match usually make against their rivals to understand how roused passions impair fair judgment; and it is certain that in Belgium not only were the German "reprisals" based upon untrue rumours of the conduct of Belgian civilians, but also that they were exaggerated in extent by rumour current upon the Belgian side. In the interest of fair play it is necessary to remember this, and also to bear in mind that the international military situation was gravely complicated by the anomalous position of the Belgian Garde Civique.

As has been pointed out in a previous chapter, the outbreak of war came upon Belgium at a peculiarly awkward moment, when her military forces were in a state of transition. The problem which she had had to solve was how to obtain enough men to garrison her great fortresses of Antwerp, Liège, and Namur, to fill the ranks of her modest field Army of

150,000, and to maintain adequate reserves in the depôts. Without a more stringent system of conscription it was only possible to bring the Army up to strength by allowing it to absorb the old Garde Civique, a relic of the days when Belgium had no national policy and therefore needed no force more military than a sort of armed police. So it was decided to absorb the Garde Civique into the Army; but war came before the process could be carried out, and when the Garde Civique gallantly fell into line with the regular Army to oppose the German invader the latter insisted upon regarding it as a civilian force which was breaking the rules of war by taking part in military operations. The Garde Civique possessed all the attributes of soldiers, and wore a distinct uniform. But the Germans found in them a part of the Belgian forces which might be excluded by the threat of treating them as non-combatants. Eventually Belgium withdrew them. The shooting of a captured member of the Garde Civique was inevitably regarded by the Belgians as the murder of a prisoner and by the Germans as merely the execution of a spy. Such occurrences, however, naturally exasperated the Belgians; and it is therefore some consolation to know that even Belgian witnesses exonerate the Germans from the charge of committing entirely unprovoked atrocities on the occasion of the capture of Visé. In the first full narrative of the attack


upon Liège, which was sent to *The Times*, it is expressly stated:—

“After fierce fighting the German troops succeeded in entering Visé. They did not, however, as has been reported, massacre the inhabitants of this place. With the exception of a few civilians who were shot during the attack, the civil population was not much interfered with. Fire broke out in several quarters, but the town was not fired deliberately.”

This passage, quoted from a narrative which was instinct throughout with sympathy and admiration for the Belgians in their gallant struggle, is very important, because it shows that the Germans, whatever their subsequent conduct may have been, did not deliberately adopt brutal methods against the Belgian population as part of their plan of campaign at the outset.

Yet, although the passage quoted above fairly summarizes the facts, it was really at Visé that the Germans first showed how quickly their methods were changing for the worse.

According to a Belgian eye-witness the trouble materialized when the Germans attempted to seize Visé bridge over the Meuse. The Belgians had destroyed about 50 yards of it in the centre, and when the first party of Prussian cavalry arrived to take possession they were almost annihilated by a hot fire which was opened upon them by infantry hidden among the



BELGIAN EXPERT SHOTS ON A FAST AUTOMOBILE.
Who were continually harassing the Germans.

[Record Press.]



GERMANS MARCHING THROUGH A BURNING VILLAGE. [*Daily Mirror.*]

piers of the broken bridge. At the same time shots were fired from houses near the bank ; and, according to the account of the eye-witness, it was then that German troops, coming up in support of the ambushed cavalry, commenced an indiscriminate massacre of the inhabitants, although they had no proof that the shots from the houses were not fired by Belgian soldiers.

When the latter had retired and all resistance was over, the remaining inhabitants were rounded up like sheep in the centre of their shattered town and surrounded by the troops, whose commander addressed the sullen crowd in French, explaining that Germany was "not at war with Belgium," but that they must submit to German military law, and that any attack upon the troops would immediately be punished with death. At that moment a pistol-shot rang out and the officer fell wounded ; whereupon a group of eight persons from whose midst the shot had come were seized and executed, although it was known to all that only one shot had been fired. This was the small beginning of the reign of "frightfulness" which subsequently became the admitted rule of German work in Belgium, increasing in ferocity as the invaders' prospects became more gloomy and culminating in the senseless acts of vandalism so numerous and so terrible that the accounts of them make (to Germany's everlasting shame) a separate entire section of this history of the war.

The reference above to "frightfulness" as

the "admitted" rule of German work in Belgium is based upon an official German statement of policy circulated by wireless telegraphy from Berlin for the information of the world at large. The statement was as follows :—

"The distribution of arms and ammunition among the civil population of Belgium had been carried out on systematic lines, and the authorities enraged the public against Germany by assiduously circulating false reports. They were under the impression that, with the aid of the French, they would be able to drive the Germans out of Belgium in two days. The only means of preventing surprise attacks from the civil population has been to interfere with unrelenting severity and to create examples, which by their frightfulness would be a warning to the whole country."

The opening sentence of this statement was a deliberate falsehood ; because the German commanders in the field had all seen the proclamations of the Belgian Government in the villages which they destroyed, urging the inhabitants to take no part in the fighting for their own and their neighbours' sakes ; and the concluding sentence—calmly and complacently issued by a Government which had admitted doing "wrong" by invading Belgium as an excuse for unspeakable atrocities committed upon Belgian men, women, and children who resented that wrong—threw such a lurid light upon the thing which the Germans of the day regarded as their national "conscience" as to horrify the civilized world.

CHAPTER IV.

THE GERMAN ARMY AND GERMAN STRATEGY.

THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES IN EASTERN EUROPE—GERMAN DECLARATION OF WAR ON RUSSIA—ATTITUDE OF FRANCE—THE BRITISH ULTIMATUM—THE POWERS AT WAR—GERMAN OFFENSIVE AGAINST FRANCE—THE GERMAN ARMY—WAR ORGANIZATION—CRITICISM ON THE GERMAN ARMY—GERMAN PLAN OF CAMPAIGN—ALTERNATIVE LINES OF ATTACK ON FRANCE—CONDITIONS IN 1870 AND 1914—THE ELEMENT OF TIME—NORTHERN LINE OF ATTACK—A QUESTION OF SPACE—DISADVANTAGES—ADVANTAGES.


THE first weeks of hostilities, with the remarkable exception of the fighting at Liège, were marked by few collisions of importance. This period was necessarily occupied with the work of mobilization and concentration, and the speed and success with which these great operations were completed amply testify to the power which modern conditions of transport and organization confer upon the masters of armies. Austria, the first to take up arms, was naturally first in the field. Her military preparations had commenced before July 25, the day on which she broke off diplomatic relations with Servia; on that day a mobilization of eight of her 16 army corps began, and on the 28th she formally declared war. On the same day her troops began to bombard Belgrade, already deserted by the Servian Government. This act seems to have decided the Tsar; on the 29th he signed the Ukase mobilizing the 13 Army Corps of the four southern districts lying opposite the Austrian frontier. Austria responded by mobilizing the whole of her army, a step which compelled Russia at midnight on the 30th to follow suit. On the 31st the German ambassador at St. Petersburg signified that unless Russia agreed within 12 hours to demobilize his Government would order a general mobilization by land and

sea. No reply being forthcoming orders for a general mobilization were issued by Berlin on August 1, at 5.15 p.m., and at 7.30 p.m. the German ambassador handed to M. Sazonoff the declaration of war. This step was hailed, both at Berlin and St. Petersburg, with savage enthusiasm. Not since 1812 had a war been so popular in Russia. During the following days skirmishes took place in the frontier districts between German and Russian, and later between Austrian and Russian, troops. But the time necessary to enable Russia to bring her masses into the field, and the defensive attitude assumed by the German Powers, prevented any important collision.

Meanwhile in the west of Europe events had moved fast. As early as the 25th July Germany had begun her preparations; on the 26th General von Moltke had returned to Berlin, and the great General Staff had commenced work in earnest. During the following days, although no public announcement had been made, the military authorities had taken advantage of their large independent powers to recall officers and reservists, and had taken steps which practically amounted to a veiled mobilization. On the 28th the German Fleet was reported to be assembling at Kiel and Wilhelmshaven; a day, that is, before the British Fleet left Portland. On the 30th "manœuvres" at



THE PRESIDENT OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC, M. POINCARÉ.



MAP OF FRANCO-GERMAN FRONTIER.

Strassburg were announced, and by Friday 31st the German covering troops were close to the French frontier.


The rapidity with which this opening concentration was effected offers a striking contrast to what happened in 1870. At that time the idea of a covering force in the modern sense scarcely existed. There is no evidence to show that on either side any considerable body of frontier troops was kept permanently in a state of preparedness higher than the rest of the main armies. Ten days at least elapsed before any serious collision took place, and the hostile offensive was not met on the border by a force powerful enough to check the enemy and gain time, but was evaded, as Moltke, had it been necessary to evade it,

would have done, by a concentration out of reach of the enemy, even at the cost of abandoning a considerable part of the frontier provinces. In 1914 the procedure was totally different. For many years it had been the practice both of Germany and France to maintain the corps localized on the frontier on an establishment which almost amounted to a war footing and capable of mobilization in a very short space of time; the German corps were held to be capable of action within 24 hours. By the end of July it was believed in France—and subsequent events appeared to justify the belief—that eight German corps were ready to march. These included, counting from north to south, the VIII., with its headquarters at Coblenz, the XVI. at Metz, the



THE RIGHT HONOURABLE H. H. ASQUITH.

[Reginald Haines.]



COBLENZ.


XXI. at Saarbrück, the XV. at Strassburg, the XIV. at Karlsruhe, the II. Bavarian in Lorraine and the Palatinate, reinforced by the XIII. from Stuttgart and the XVIII. from Frankfurt. With them was a very powerful force of cavalry. It is noteworthy, as showing that mobilization in Germany had begun some days before it was publicly ordered, that none of the infantry belonging to the above forces were employed in the attack on Liège which began very early on the morning of August 5. This was entrusted to other troops, including the VII., X., and later the IX. It seems to follow from this that two corps at least, which had nothing to do with the covering force on the side of France, must have left their mobilization areas little more than a day after war was formally declared. Luxemburg territory was entered very early on the morning of August 2, and Belgium only two days later.

In this trying situation the behaviour of the French Government was admirable. Well aware that in the event of war it must support Russia, and that the first blow of its formidable opponent would be directed against France, it yet decided, as a proof of the sincerity of its desire for peace, to run the risk of being attacked before its preparations were complete ; and in order to avoid the possibility of any premature collision it took the grave and exceptional step of withdrawing all its troops to a line 10 kilometres within the frontier. The mobilization of the covering troops was not begun till the 30th ; and the order for the general mobilization was not issued until the night of the 31st,

when the delivery of the German Ultimatum to Russia had been made known in Paris. The calmness and resolution of the French people were worthy of their rulers, and formed an extraordinary contrast to the hysterical exaltation of 1870. Such popular demonstrations as took place arose not from bellicose but from patriotic feeling. Everyone knew that the national existence was involved ; and all witnesses testify to the quiet self-devotion of the people, and to the smoothness and rapidity of the mobilization.


The steady coolness with which they faced this supreme crisis was the more admirable in that until August 2nd they could not be sure what attitude England would adopt. On that day, however, Sir Edward Grey was able to give the French Ambassador an assurance that, subject to the approval of Parliament, "if the German Fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give all the protection in its power." The enthusiastic reception of the announcement of this decision in England and throughout the Empire, and the refusal of the British Government to acquiesce in the German violation of Belgium, finally dissipated all French apprehensions. On the night of August 4 the world was aware that the whole might of the British Empire, directed with a singleness of purpose hitherto unknown, had been thrown into the scale of war.

This momentous event marks the outbreak of active hostilities in the West of Europe. On the same day on which the British time-limit



THE RIGHT HON. SIR EDWARD GREY.

H. Walter Barnett.



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN
AMBASSADOR IN LONDON,
COUNT MENSDOFFF.

expired Germany had declared war on France and Belgium; and her troops, which had several times violated French territory during the preceding days, definitely crossed the frontier of both states. On the morning of the 5th the attack on Liège begun, and the German mine-layer Königin Luise was sunk by British gun-fire in the North Sea. On the 6th the grim circle was completed by the Austrian declaration of war on Russia. Five Great Powers were now at war, and some 15 millions of men, if the reserve formations are included, were arming or already in movement.


It was pretty certain that the first great scene of conflict would be on the French and Belgian frontiers. So long as the numerical superiority of the British Fleet was maintained in the North Sea it was unlikely that the German Fleet would risk a general engagement; while on the Russian frontier the tardiness of the one combatant and the comparative weakness of the other militated against the probability of important collisions. But it was well known that in the event of a double war against Russia and France Germany would take advantage of the length of time required for the concentration of the Russian armies to spring upon the nearer, readier, and, as she hoped, the weaker of her two opponents; and would endeavour by a more rapid concentration to

surprise and overwhelm her in the midst of her mobilization. The adoption of such a plan was not merely sound, perhaps inevitable, from a strategic point of view, but it had also the recommendation that it would eventually bring the German armies into a theatre rich in supplies and well roaded, and, above all, famous for earlier victories. Three times during the 19th century had the Prussian soldier entered Paris and looked down from the heights of Montmartre on a prostrate France. The confidence inspired by these recollections would be the most valuable of all auxiliaries in an offensive operation which was to be carried through regardless of cost, at the highest speed, and with unflinching resolution. The attempt to realize this plan was made; but before we can follow the events by which it was marked we must say something about the army which was to essay it.

The German Army in its modern shape was simply the extension of the Prussian system throughout the whole of the German Empire. This process was not wholly completed at the outbreak of the war of 1870, but ever since the general Prussianization of all the German states from a military point of view went steadily forward; and both in general organization and in doctrine and spirit they bore a close resemblance to the central source of inspiration and control at Berlin. The division



THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR IN LONDON,
PRINCE LICHNOWSKY. [Lafayette.]



THE GERMAN IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR, DR. VON BETHMANN HOLLWEG.

of the fighting army into army corps, and their establishment as well as that of reserve formations of *landwehr* and *landsturm* on a territorial basis was a general characteristic of the whole system, as of most great armies. The number of army corps amounted to 25. The corps war-organization of 1870 had been modified and enlarged. Each corps still possessed two infantry divisions, most divisions two brigades, most brigades two regiments, and nearly every regiment three battalions, making a total, including a battalion of riflemen, of 25 in all. But on mobilization each corps formed a third or reserve division, presumably of about the same strength as the others and composed mainly of reservists who had recently left the colours. The artillery had been largely increased, and was attached in equal proportions to the divisions, the old corps-artillery which played so remarkable a part in 1870 having been abolished. A cavalry regiment was still attached to the bulk of the infantry divisions. The whole fighting organization, as in the case of other armies, had of course been complicated by the introduction of varied natures of artillery; not to mention machine guns, aircraft, and the huge impedimenta required to bring so elaborate a machine into effective action. Including its reserve division the average corps in 1914 probably averaged something over 40,000 rifles and sabres, and about 150 guns. In addition to the army corps there were formed about 10 independent cavalry divisions, consisting mostly of six regiments in three brigades, each provided with several batteries of horse artillery. Non-combatants, special troops, lines of communication troops and certain *landwehr* formations included, the total first line German army was computed at 2,300,000 men and 6,000 field guns; but very large deductions would have to be made in order to arrive at the actual number of sabres and bayonets available for the shock of battle. The movement and supply of so enormous a mass necessitated a vast number of assistants whose duties did not necessarily comprehend the business of fighting.

Opinions as to the real worth of this army had in recent years considerably varied. With the exception of the cavalry and horse artillery, in whose case it was three, the term of service with the colours was only two years; but its brevity was compensated by unrelenting work, and no one doubted that the physique and discipline were of a high standard. Its officer corps, then as always the heart and soul of the Prussian Army, was probably one of the

hardest-worked bodies of men existing. Its machinery for supply and movement was carefully studied and every detail that could ensure smoothness and regularity was thoroughly worked out. The higher commanders were accustomed to deal with large bodies, were trained to disregard loss of life, and to believe in resolute and united action; and vigorous subordinate initiative was taught as the leading principle of all command. The Staff-Officer remained, as he had done for at least a century, the driving-wheel of the whole organization, and possessed an authority probably unknown in other armies. The great prestige which he had won under Moltke was no sudden or ephemeral development. Lastly it may be added that, as at every period of the eventful history of the German Army, exactitude, obedience and a high standard of duty were characteristic of all ranks.

So far it was generally admitted that this great organization was a sound and formidable machine. Doubts, the justification of which could only be tested in war, had from time to time been expressed as to how far it was suited, individually and collectively, to the conditions of modern war. The criticism had been made that it was somewhat too much of a machine, and that organically and intellectually it showed signs of ossification. Stress was laid upon the dull and lifeless precision of the German private, and the antiquated nature of some parts of his armament and equipment. The rise of a French school of tactics and strategy, which attributed more importance to manœuvre and distribution of forces than to the uniform system of envelopment which had been a characteristic of Moltke's victories, challenged the adequacy of German doctrine in the higher branches of generalship; and the question as to whether the German system either in theory or practice was sufficiently elastic and adaptable was often raised. But in spite of all criticism there were not many who, had they been asked to say which was the best of the great armies, would not have chosen that of Germany. Its numbers and the fact that its leaders were impregnated with the spirit of the offensive were alone sufficient to render it a most imposing and formidable instrument of war.

Four-fifths of this mighty host were destined for the attack on France, the remainder being left, in conjunction with *landwehr* and other reserve formations, and such parts of the army as Austria could divert from Serbia, to contain and check the ponderous



THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE GERMAN ARMY, GENERAL VON MOLTKE.



THE GERMAN FOREIGN SECRETARY,
HERR VON JAGOW.

masses of Russia, until the overthrow of France released some of the corps for service on the Eastern frontier. The line of attack had long been decided on ; in fact, so far as can be seen, the Emperor William, less fortunate than his grandfather, had little choice. The conditions governing the invasion of France had greatly altered since 1870. Then, although Alsace and Lorraine were not in German hands, the Germans held, with the exception of Strassburg, most of the great bridgeheads on the Rhine ; and once the isolated fortresses on the Moselle were passed—and they did not of themselves enforce any obligation upon an invading army beyond that of observation or investment—the heart of France lay open to an advance through the plains of Champagne. Emerging from the almost impenetrable barrier of the Rhine they had been able to meet their opponents in a country suited to large movements of troops in which their superior numbers and resolute strategy had been used to the best effect. Once the great battles, with a view to which all Moltke's preparations had been made, had been won France lay at the mercy of the enemy. Moreover, and this entered largely into his plan of campaign, an advance to the South of Metz had offered a fair chance of separating at least a part of the French armies from their southern and south-western lines of communication and retreat and driving them to destruction

against the neutral frontier of Belgium. How well this anticipation was founded was shown by the catastrophe of Sedan.

Now, however, these favourable conditions no longer existed. The military advantages which Moltke hoped to reap from the annexation of the frontier provinces and the transformation of Metz into an impregnable *point de debouchement* and *place d'armes* were largely counterbalanced by the elaborate line of *forts d'arrêt* flanked and strengthened by the fortresses of Verdun, Toul, Nancy, Epinal, and Belfort, with which the French had more or less completely barred the central and southern parts of their eastern frontier. The Germans were therefore compelled either to force this line of defence, or to turn it and enter France from the north-east. The first alternative was of itself a somewhat desperate enterprise, not certain to be successful, and certain to cost much blood, which the invaders might be willing to lose, and a good deal of time which they were not. For in considering the different lines of attack open to the Germans it must always be remembered that in the case of a war with France or Russia time was the one thing they could not afford to waste. Their whole scheme was, considered in its simplest form, a huge operation on the interior line against divided enemies, only likely to succeed if the first could be defeated before the second came into action.



THE FRENCH PRIME MINISTER,
M. VIVIANI.



KING PETER OF SERVIA.



THE CROWN PRINCE OF GERMANY.

The second alternative, like all solutions of strategic problems, was attended by serious disadvantages. To throw the German Army on a line of invasion to the north of Metz and Verdun inevitably involved the violation of the Duchy of Luxemburg, a territory whose integrity was guaranteed under a treaty dating from 1867. And since the vast numbers of men employed necessitated a broad front of march it was pretty certain from the first that Luxemburg would not be the only state whose neutrality would be threatened. The breadth of the Duchy is only about 40 miles, and whether for purposes of march or battle could not be expected under modern conditions to accommodate the columns of more than three army corps abreast, or six in double line. To have piled up 12 or 15 corps in the space between Metz and the northern border of the Duchy, would have been an unthinkable military blunder and would not have saved the Germans from the accusation of violating neutral territory. It followed, then, that if the main attack of Germany was to be made to the north of Metz, a violation of Belgium in the neighbourhood of the Ardennes and Liège was a military necessity, however culpable from other points of view. The only remaining alternative, from the German standpoint a wholly inadmissible one, was to stand on the defensive between the Meuse and Rhine. Their plan of campaign involved the violation of both Belgium and Luxemburg in their first marches.

There were obvious disadvantages attendant on such a barefaced affront to international obligations. It was not likely that Belgium would consent to allow a free passage to the German

troops. Her army was mobilizing, her people were aroused; and Berlin was aware that by infringing the neutrality of Belgium, Germany was running a grave risk of obliging England to resort to arms. The entry of Great Britain into the struggle would be a terrible blow for Germany; that her Government preferred to face the risk rather than modify its plan of attack proves either that it considered that a decisive victory over France would neutralize or outweigh the hostile action of England, or that England, disunited at home and blinded by a genial sentimentalism, would suffer the violation of Belgium to pass with a protest.

Apart from these grave considerations, which involved not merely great strategic risks but the reputation of the German Government, certain strategic advantages were undoubtedly conferred by the Belgian line of advance. In the first place, as Clausewitz long ago had pointed out, it was, considered from a military point of view, the natural, that is to say the shortest and straightest, line of attack. As a matter of fact—it is a point of no strategic importance and is merely added by way of illustration—a straight line drawn from Berlin to Paris passes close to Mézières in rear of the Belgian frontier. In the second place the area of concentration of the main army would be based on, and might in some measure be



THE CROWN PRINCE OF AUSTRIA.

considered to be protected by, the great Rhine fortress group of Mainz, Cologne, and Coblenz. The great system of railways which had their junction in this part of the frontier, some of them deliberately built for the purposes of such a concentration, all favoured the northern alternative. In the third place the country between Verdun and Liège, badly roaded, broken and wooded though much of it was, was comparatively bare of fortresses, and offered a strategic screen behind which the invader might conceal his dispositions, and a terrain unfavourable to the action of the superior French artillery. The fortresses on the Meuse, Liège, and Namur were known to be technically strong, but their value would depend on whether the action of Belgium proved prompt and resolute, and on whether, if armed resistance was offered, their garrisons were strong enough to make the most of the forts entrusted to them. When Lord Sydenham reported on them in 1890 he had estimated the minimum of troops necessary to hold them at 74,000 men; and it was known to every one that the Belgians were short of men. The policy of a *coup de main* would at any rate be worth trying, for, as already pointed out, the first essential of German success was speed; and the loss of many men to an army so numerous was of little account compared with the secure control of the valley of the Meuse and the roads and railways which the fortresses commanded. If such an attack proved successful, if the Belgian Army could be shattered and dashed aside before French support could reach it, a prospect of great successes would open to the German arms. The barrier of the Ardennes and the Middle Meuse would be turned, the supports of the French left shattered, and the German right, freed from obstacles, and gathering weight and speed as it gained space to unfold itself, would

descend like an avalanche upon Paris, forcing the French armies to fall back, and so enabling its own centre and left to debouch from the woods of the Ardennes and to press their rear. The combination of momentum and envelopment obtained by such a movement would offer a fine vindication of German strategic doctrine and, what was more important, might be expected to result in the defeat and demoralization of the defending army. By the end of August the whole of north-eastern France might be overrun and the German hosts, for the fourth time in a hundred years, might look upon the spires of Notre Dame.

The feasibility of the plan still remained to be proved. If it succeeded it seemed likely to satisfy the test by which, we imagine, all strategy on the grand scale must be tried. That is to say, it might be expected not merely to achieve its nearer object, the defeat of the armies immediately concerned, but to dominate the whole campaign and neutralize any local failures in other parts of the theatre of war. No French successes in Alsace, even if pushed to the gates of Metz and Strassburg, would compensate for the driving of the main armies back on Paris. Once the invaders had forced their way to the borders of Belgium they would stand, strategically speaking, in the same position as Wellington and Blücher in 1815; and, like Wellington, they would possess the assurance that a movement upon Paris from the north-east would inevitably bring a successful French offensive towards the Rhine to a stop and compel the troops to which it had been entrusted to retire and succour the armies in the interior.

Such it may be imagined were the calculations of the great General Staff at Berlin, when they issued orders for the concentration on their western frontiers.



CHAPTER V.

THE GERMAN ARMY—1870-1914.

TRADITIONS OF THE ARMY—THE NEW ARMS—LITERATURE—MOLTKE—HIS COLLEAGUES—THE WAR OF 1866 AND ITS LESSONS—1870—PRUSSIAN STRATEGY—THE TACTICAL ENVELOPMENT—CRITICISMS—MECKEL—GENERAL EFFECT OF 1870 ON THE ARMY—THE GERMAN CONSTITUTION—INCREASES OF STRENGTH TO 1890—THE LAW OF 1893—FURTHER INCREASES—THE LAW OF 1913—APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF NATIONAL SERVICE—NUMBERS OF TRAINED MEN—THE AGE FACTOR—CATEGORIES OF TROOPS—ERSATZ RESERVE—FIRST BAN OF LANDSTURM—ONE-YEAR VOLUNTEERS—NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS—CORPS OF OFFICERS—PARAMOUNT INFLUENCE OF ARMY ON GERMAN SOCIETY—TERRITORIAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE ARMY—"INSPECTIONS"—ARMY CORPS—COMMANDING OFFICERS—FORTRESSES—THE MILITARY CABINET—WAR MINISTRY—FINANCE—READINESS FOR WAR—EMIGRANT LAW OF 1913.

THE rise and decline of armies is an aspect of universal history which never fails to interest, and with armies as with States the past has in it the seeds of the future. As it is impossible to understand the character and organization of the formidable enemy opposed to the Allies in 1914 without some knowledge of its development in the preceding decades, we propose to revert in greater detail to a subject already referred to in Chapter II. The most natural starting point is the war of 1870-1, at which time the German Army, after a period of laborious evolution, reached a remarkable standard of efficiency. Several factors had contributed to this result. In the first place, the traditions of the old Prussian Army had been revived by the study of the Seven Years' War. In the second, the traditions of the War of Liberation and the teaching of the school of Blücher and Gneisenau were still living. In the third, the idea of universal service introduced by Scharnhorst had been carried to a logical conclusion. The science of leadership, built up by a long series of distinguished soldiers, culminated in Moltke, who founded a school of which perhaps the most distinguished survivor was Marshal von der Goltz. The great "battle-thinker" found apt pupils amongst the Prussian aristocracy, who formed a military

caste steeped in the precepts of Clausewitz. Full-blooded manhood in Germany manifested itself in military study and military exercises, just as in England at the same period it began to manifest itself in athletics. Among the troops *esprit de corps* was fostered by a real territorial system by which the men of the soil were gathered together in their own districts, and were nourished and trained by and among the people to whom they belonged. The Silesians formed one corps, the Pomeranians another; the corps leader was a sort of military governor in his own province and the autonomy of the corps was carried to the point of equipping the troops out of local funds. The women were no less enthusiastic than the men. A sickly family "thinking of a coming war deplore the fact that they will have no relations in the Army." The mechanical genius of Nicholas Dreyse produced the first breech-loading rifle which was sufficiently strong to undergo the wear and tear of campaigning, and Krupp's cannon foundry yielded one of the first rifled breech-loading cannon. The mental activity of officers found vent in books and pamphlets of an astonishing variety and excellence, as, for example, the "Tactical Retrospect," written by a company commander after the war of 1866, in which the defects of the Army as discovered during this



THE CROWN PRINCE OF BAVARIA.

[E. O. Hoppé.]

brief campaign were freely exposed. More remarkable still, the thinker of the 'sixties became the man of action in 1870, avoiding the reproach so often levelled at arm-chair critics. Although since Waterloo the Prussian Army had rested on its laurels, it proved itself a trustworthy and efficient instrument in the hands of its great strategist. The published works of Moltke show that he had forecast almost every military situation that could arise in the case of a quarrel with neighbouring Powers, and his strategical conceptions have formed the starting point of most of the military thought of the past half century. This was very largely due to the fact that he was the first to grasp the potential effects of the railway, the telegraph, and of modern arms on the handling of great armies, and the modifications which these new factors had rendered necessary or desirable in the earlier practice of Napoleon. The view that his strategy was based on different principles to that of the Emperor has been strongly contested; certainly, so far as their practice was concerned, it would be possible to quote a good deal of evidence in favour of the opposite opinion. That Moltke was not afraid to adopt wide strategic fronts, and relied rather on envelopment than penetration of the hostile front as the means of victory, was probably due more to the practical changes in the conditions than to divergencies of fundamental theory. Like all great soldiers he was, as the Germans say, a realist; and as he said himself, strategy is a matter of "makeshifts," not of hard-and-fast system. Moltke was happy

in his associates, for he had the personal support in the field of King William, and as a general rule he saw eye to eye with Bismarck in questions of State policy, a necessary condition of all effective strategy. He had, moreover, at his disposal that remarkable administrator, Von Roon, who as Minister for War kept ready sharpened the sword which it was Moltke's business to use. It was, indeed, a galaxy of talent that took the field against the French in 1870; Steinmetz, "the lion of Nachod," Prince Frederick Charles, and the Crown Prince of Saxony commanded armies; Blumenthal, Stiehle, Sperling, and Stosch were the chiefs of the Army staffs; and amongst the corps leaders were Goeben and Werder, both of whom showed themselves capable of commanding armies, Manteuffel, who had led the Army of the Main in 1866, Fransecky, the hero of Maslowed, Constantin Alvensleben, who was to immortalize himself at Mars la Tour, Kirchbach, who had led the famous 10th Division at Nachod, and Skalititz, Tümping, Zastrow, Manstein, all well-tried as divisional commanders in 1866; the Bavarian generals, Hartmann and Von der Tann, and two Prussian generals, Von Beyer and Von Oberritz, the leaders of the Baden and Wurtemberg independent divisions. Moltke's immediate *entourage* included General von Podbielski, who served as Quartermaster-General, and the three "sous-chefs" of staff, Bronsart, Verdy du Vernois, and Brandenstein; and it was said that so perfect an understanding existed between them that if one was suddenly called away while drafting an Army order another could take up the pen and finish the document in the spirit of its author. They were, indeed, a "band of brothers." Major Blume, who afterwards commanded the 15th Army Corps, was chief of the Executive Department, and the present commander of the 8th Corps, von Bülow, was then a captain on the staff. Of these members of the General Staff in 1870 two became Ministers of War, six were given command of Army Corps or held the post of Inspector-General, two became generals, and four became major-generals.

The German Army had the advantage of entering upon the war of 1870 while its experiences of war in 1866 were still fresh; the earlier campaign was, in fact, a much-needed preparation for the later one. The well-known letters of Prince Kraft of Hohenlohe enumerate the principal changes that were effected within four years to make good the deficiencies that had been discovered in the war against Austria. It was found, for example, that the value of the Krupp gun in 1866 had been insufficiently realized



THE CROWN PRINCE OF GERMANY IN THE UNIFORM OF THE DEATH'S HEAD HUSSARS.

[*Central News.*]

through want of tactical training among the artillery officers. Kraft, who was a gunner himself—he commanded the artillery of the Prussian Guard Corps—is unsparing in his condemnation of his own arm. He says, “our artillery on almost every occasion entered upon the scene far too late and with far too small a number of guns.” Yet they had gone into action with a feeling of absolute certainty that nothing could resist them, for it was considered that ten Prussian guns would overcome 16 Austrian guns, so superior were the former to the latter in point of construction. With regard to the cavalry it had been found that Napoleon’s practice had been so far misread that the mobile arm was kept in large

masses in rear of the Army with the idea that it should be carefully preserved with a view to its possible employment as a reserve on the battlefield, a remark that applies equally to the so-called reserve artillery, which absorbed more than half of the guns of the Army and retained them a day’s march distant from the battlefield. Such is the influence of a mere phrase on the practice of war. The infantry alone escaped criticism, as indeed it might, since it won the decisive battle. In the words of the official history “the infantry fought almost alone.” But the success of the infantry was largely ascribable to the powerful influence brought to bear on the battle by the intelligence of the nation in arms.



GENERAL VON KLUCK.

[Record Press.]

A striking instance of the correction on the battlefield of the errors of peace training may be mentioned. Captain May, author of the "Tactical Retrospect," says: "When the needle gun (breech-loading rifle) at the commencement of the fifth year of its existence was first generally issued to the troops, a standing order, insisted on by generals who preached at all inspections and parades, was: 'Gentlemen, throw out very few skirmishers—only one section; that is now as efficient as an old sub-division; let all the rest be kept well in hand.' Experience, however, soon showed that the exact reverse of these theoretical rules, which appeared so judicious at the time, was the right practice. Above all things, every one sought to give full effect to the efficiency of his trustworthy arm. Why should they be held back? Why not strike with the full weight of the weapon in their possession? Thus they all dissolved themselves into a swarm of skirmishers, because in that formation the breech-loader can be best used, and because it was, besides, sufficiently analogous to a company column, which often stood more than ten deep and fired from all possible positions. And this would take place not so much at the word of command of their leader (who perhaps could only hear himself from the deafening noise of the guns and small arms) as from a natural consequence of the circumstances in which they were placed."

The Army of 1870, then, was the finished article which had been proved in its rough state in the furnace of Sadowa. 1870 showed how greatly it had benefited by its experience. The mobilization was carried out undisturbed by fears for what the enemy might do on the frontier. The concentration was effected at points which enabled the Supreme Command to defend the whole of 190 miles of frontier while acting in a mass offensively against the enemy's main army, and even the encounters at Spicheren and Wörth on August 6, which were spoken of afterwards as *hors d'œuvres* and were said to have ruined Moltke's plan for a great battle on the right bank of the Moselle, proved to be of considerable value in a tactical sense as enabling the troops to test their powers in non-committal actions against a foe who was known to be in possession of a superior fire-arm, the Chassepot. The manner in which all units marched to the sound of the cannon showed that the value of co-operation had been thoroughly realized. The artillery, determined to remove the stigma that rested upon their service, came into action early and in mass, and, where necessary, brought their guns up into the firing line to cope with the French rifle and thus cover the advance of their infantry. The German gunners received their guerdon when the French Emperor, an artillerist himself, remarked after Sedan, "In my artillery I feel myself personally conquered." The cavalry had begun to grasp the importance of its strategical mission—"Cavalry forward" was an injunction inscribed in almost every telegram in the early days of August—apart from its use on the battlefield; and the infantry, now screened by its cavalry and protected by its artillery, never hesitated to come to close quarters. The higher leading, generally speaking, was extraordinarily successful. This was due in the first place to Moltke, in the second to the fatuity of the French generalship; in the third to the loyalty with which the different commanders supported one another. It is comparatively rarely that we hear of friction between commanders and staffs, and when it occurred the obstructionist was quickly removed, as in the case of Steinmetz. In a general way harmony was preserved by the exercise of tact, of which Verdy du Vernois gives an early example. On July 31 the Crown Prince demurred to an order to advance on the ground that the Third Army was not yet ready for the field. A somewhat peremptory telegram was about to be dispatched from the Royal headquarters when Verdy du Vernois remarked: "I knew

that staff very well in the last war. If you wish to create strained relations with them during the whole of this campaign send it; but I am perfectly sure that they will be offended, and I think not without some cause. For a good reason there must surely be for their not yet fixing the date of starting." Moltke replied, "Well, but how are we to manage it, then?" Verdy then proposed that he should himself go to the Crown Prince's headquarters and personally explain the need for immediate action. And accordingly he journeyed from Mayence to Speyer, and returned within 72 hours to say that General von Blumenthal, who was the Crown Prince's Chief Staff Officer, had agreed to cross the frontier at Weissenburg on August 4.

Prussian strategy in 1870 may be summed up in four aphorisms:—

- (1) that errors in the original assembly of the Army can scarcely ever be rectified during the course of the campaign;
- (2) that no plan of operations can with safety go beyond the first meeting with the enemy's main army;
- (3) that the only geographical point to be considered is the point where the enemy's main army will be found;
- (4) that the enemy's main army is to be assailed wherever met.

The form of strategic attack generally used by Moltke was that called by some the turning movement and by others strategic interception. Bazaine's army was cut off from Paris before battle was delivered at Gravelotte; and Macmahon's army was completely surrounded before it was decisively attacked at Sedan. This form of strategic attack naturally led to that of tactical envelopment on the battlefield; and as in all the earlier battles, except Mars la Tour, the factor of numerical superiority was on the side of the Germans, the first condition of successful enveloping tactics was secured. For a general to attempt to envelop an army equal in number and quality to his own obviously exposes his over-extended line to the danger of being broken by the more compact masses of the enemy. This danger the Germans usually managed to avoid during the campaign of Metz and Sedan, and later on, when with armies inferior in numbers they had to oppose the numerous but ill-trained troops of the Republic, the superior quality of their own troops enabled them to adopt breadths of front which under other circumstances would have proved disastrous.



GENERAL VON HEERINGEN.

[International Illustrations.]

The general success of the envelopment in 1870 did not deceive them as to its limitations or as to the necessity of strong reserves. As Von Meckel, the future teacher of the Japanese, pointed out after the war, "depth and breadth of front stand in opposition to, and mutually control, each other. Broad fronts have great strength at the commencement of an action, but depth alone secures its being thoroughly carried out. . . . It is a common fault to undervalue the waste and the necessity of feeding [the front line] in a battle . . . and on many occasions during the last war we stood for hours on the brink of disaster, all our forces being used up . . . The greatest opponent of a judicious relation between depth and breadth is the desire to outflank. Though this is innate in all minds it must be combated."

A notable change was evident in the minor tactics of infantry. The tendency to dispersion which in 1866 startled the Prussian leaders as an unauthorized improvisation calculated to deprive the company commander of the force necessary to execute the assault had in 1870 been accepted as inevitable and the cry had arisen to "organize disorder," in other words, to methodize a form of tactics which, strictly considered, was no form at all. That it had the advantage of decreasing loss in a series of battles in which for the first time both sides were armed with breech-



GENERAL VON FALKENHAYN,
Prussian Minister of War.

[*Central News.*]

loading rifles was evident, but it was accompanied by a drawback until then unheard of, which was only revealed to the world by independent writers after the war, as, for example, the author of the famous "Summer Night's Dream." The example to which the writer, Meckel, called attention was that of Gravelotte, where, according to the Official History, 43 companies of different regiments were at one and the same time in the Auberge of St. Hubert. "You have seen the farmhouse and know the building is scarcely large enough to contain a single company on war strength, especially when you remember that the low garden was commanded from Moscow farm and under a heavy fire. Forty-three companies are more than 10,000 men. Where were the 9,800 men who had no room?" The explanation he gives is that "this epidemic of withdrawing from the battle begins with the game and spreading with pestilential rapidity rages over the battlefield like a fever." The writer emphatically declares that at his first battle in France, on reaching the scene late in the day, "the field was literally strewn with men who had left the ranks and were doing nothing. Whole battalions could have been formed from them. From where we stood you could count hundreds. Some were lying down, their rifles pointing to the front as if they were still in the firing line and were expecting the enemy to attack them at any moment. These

had evidently remained behind lying down when the more courageous had advanced. Others had squatted like hares in the furrows. Wherever a bush or ditch gave shelter there were men to be seen, who in some cases had made themselves very comfortable." In short, this kind of straggling was the consequence of teaching men to take cover in attack. "In dispersion it is difficult to be steadfast, in close order it is difficult to be weak. Under the leader's influence the example of the strong impels the whole. Among the leaderless the example of the confused and the cowards has the upper hand." Moreover, the vice of "extended order," as Meckel conceived it to be, produced another phenomenon, namely, "the effort of the lieutenant to release himself from company ties, and the similar effort of his captain to release himself from battalion ties, in order to seek opportunities of distinction by individual acts of heroism."

In these excerpts, as the reader will perceive, are raised many of those burning questions with which the British Army became familiar in the course of the South African War, and the solution of which was attempted in Manchuria in 1904-5 and in Europe in 1914. Without proposing to enter upon the later developments of the German tactical school, it is worth noticing here that as the war of 1870 proceeded there was a tendency to abandon the closer order of battle and to fight in more extended formations. How far this was due to the general nature of the operations, how far to the diminished capacity of the French troops, how far to the growing experience and confidence of the Germans themselves cannot be discussed here. But there is no doubt that in the concluding period of the war the German infantrymen had learnt to fight effectively and with far less loss to themselves in comparatively open order.

The army that recrossed the frontier in the spring of 1871, now truly a German Army, had on the whole vindicated the principles on which it had been formed and led. In spite of the friction which from different causes had arisen between some of its component parts, they had shared the same experiences and were therefore likely to respond to the same teaching. The war had prepared the way not merely to political but to military unity. The road to Prussian hegemony in soldiership as well as in statesmanship had been opened, and when the Army again entered the field it was to demonstrate the thoroughness with which the consolidation had been effected. We now propose to sketch the developments which the German military system underwent in the period between 1871 and 1914.

The great purpose pursued by Bismarck was the unification of Germany and the foundation of a German Empire under the lead and control of Prussia. He attained his end by the wars of 1864, 1866, and 1870. The results were then put on paper in the shape of a "Constitution of the German Empire," which became law in the spring of 1871. This Constitution laid down the main principles of military organization, and was supplemented, as regarded the relations between the most important of the German States, by military conventions concluded by Prussia with Bavaria, Saxony, and Wurtemberg.

It was laid down in the Constitution that every German capable of bearing arms belonged for seven years—in principle from the end of his 20th to the beginning of his 28th year—to the active Army. He was to pass three years with the colours and four in the reserve, and then, for five more years, belong to the Landwehr. From the end of 1871 the peace strength of the Army was fixed at one per cent. of the population, which was then just over 41,000,000.


The whole military forces were placed under the control of the Emperor, subject only to the measure of military independence preserved to some of the States in peace time. Even in Bavaria the Emperor was to have in peace time a right of inspection, involving the responsibility

for efficiency of the forces. In war he became altogether supreme. Bavaria retained her own military organization and administration, and her "contingent" consisted of two Army Corps, which were called, as hitherto, the I. Bavarian Corps and the II. Bavarian Corps. Saxony retained some autonomy in that she had a Ministry of War (but not a General Staff) of her own, and, as in 1870, gave her name to an Army Corps (the XII.). Wurtemberg had much the same rights as Saxony and provided the XIII. Army Corps. Baden, with no special rights, provided the troops of the XIV. Army Corps. Some other units were given a territorial character—for example, the 25th Hessian division.

The whole peace strength of Germany, after the French war, was one per cent. of a population of 41,000,000. It was actually fixed by a Law of 1874, for the period from January, 1875, to December, 1881, at 401,659 non-commissioned officers and men. There were 18 Army Corps—the Prussian Guard Corps, 11 Prussian Army Corps, the XII. (Saxony), the XIII. (Wurtemberg), the XIV. (Baden), the XV. (Alsace-Lorraine), and the I. and II. Bavarian. These 18 Army Corps comprised 469 battalions of infantry, 465 squadrons of cavalry, 300 batteries of field artillery, 29 battalions of garrison artillery, 18 engineer battalions, and 18 train battalions.



THE JULIUS TOWER, SPANDAU, WHERE THE GERMAN WAR CHEST WAS STORED.
[Underwood & Underwood.]



GENERAL VON EMMICH.

[Central News.]

The number of officers, as well as of officials of all sorts, was not fixed by law, but decided annually in the Budget.

In 1880 began the long series of increases, justified partly by the constitutional principle that the peace strength should be one per cent. of the population, but mainly by political considerations and the alleged strength of other countries. All the official explanations of later increases were, indeed, variations of the explanation given of the Bill of 1880 :—

Since 1874 considerable military reforms have been carried out in other States. These reforms are of capital importance for Germany. Bounded along an immense frontier by three great Powers and four smaller Powers, and accessible from the sea along a great stretch of coast, Germany must be constantly ready to defend her liberty and her security. It is absolutely necessary to increase the effectives and the number of units, unless we want the efforts made in time of peace to be rendered fruitless in time of war because of the numerical superiority and sounder organization which our enemies could set against us.

So the peace strength was raised, for the period 1881-1888, from 401,659 to 427,274, by the increase of the infantry from 469 battalions to 503, of the field artillery from 300 batteries to 340, of the garrison artillery from 29 batteries to 31, and of the engineers from 18 battalions to 19. It was also decided to give some annual training to part of the so-called Ersatz Reserve, which consisted of men who by good fortune or for some slight physical reason escaped their military service, but were liable to be called up in the event of mobilization. About 20,000 or

30,000 a year of these men were thus trained until 1893, when the training of the Ersatz Reserve was almost entirely abolished.

In 1886, two years before the completion of the period covered by the Law of 1880, the Government proposed fresh increases, calling attention once more to the increased strength of France and Russia and other neighbouring States. The Empire, "the child of a glorious war," must again be put in a position to enforce its policy when "the day arrived of the menace of an European conflict." Bismarck was at the time engaged in a fierce conflict with the German Catholic Party, and dissolved the Reichstag on account of its opposition to the new increases. After the elections the Law was passed in 1887. It increased the peace strength of the Army, for the period from 1887 to 1894, from 427,274 to 468,409, the infantry being increased from 503 battalions to 534, and the field artillery from 340 batteries to 364, the strength of the other arms remaining unchanged.

In 1890 the number of Army Corps was raised from 18 to 20 by the formation of the XVI. Army Corps in Lorraine and of the XVII. Army Corps on the eastern frontier, and a few months later the peace strength was again increased, for the period from 1890 until 1894, from 468,409 to 486,983. The infantry was increased from 534 battalions to 538, the field artillery from 364 batteries to 434, the engineers from 19 battalions to 20, and the train from 18 battalions to 21.

In 1893 came far more important changes, effected again only after a Parliamentary conflict and a dissolution of the Reichstag. The Government announced, once more with special reference to both France and Russia, that the gradual increases of the peace strength were no longer sufficient. The Empire must proceed "to utilize to the full all its resources in men." The Government said :—

We must adopt an organization involving the employment of all the men really fit for service. Only then shall we be able to face calmly the possibility of an attack. The system which consists in slow and steady progress must now be abandoned and give way to the immediate application of the principles upon which our military constitution rests. This application of principles will be pushed as far as the economic and financial resources of the Empire allow.

It was found impossible for the present to increase the number of Army Corps. The increase in the number of men taken up implied, therefore, some shortening of service with the colours, and colour service was to be reduced from three years to two with all arms except cavalry and horse artillery. The peace strength of the Army was increased from



GERMAN INFANTRY MARCHING THROUGH BERLIN.

[Central News.]

486,983 to 557,193. But the main effect of the reorganization was that the Army was prepared to mobilize with a larger number of young and well-trained men, the total being estimated at 4,300,000.

In 1899 the Government was again alarmed by the progress of France and Russia, and found a fresh argument in the Spanish-American War, which had "proved with terrifying clearness what a price has to be paid for lack of regular preparation for war in time of peace." The number of Army Corps was now increased from 20 to 23, by the formation of the XVIII. Army Corps at Frankfurt-on-the-Main, the XIX. (2nd Saxon) Army Corps, and a III. Bavarian Army Corps. The peace strength of the Army was increased by 16,000 men, apart from non-commissioned officers. The 23 Army Corps now comprised 625 battalions of infantry, 482 squadrons of cavalry, 574 batteries of field artillery, 38 battalions of garrison artillery, 26 battalions of engineers, 11 battalions of communication troops, and 23 battalions of train.


In 1905 there was a further increase of the peace strength by 10,000 men, together with an improvement of the provisions for the training of the reserves. There was a similar increase of the peace strength in 1911, and great technical improvements were effected, especially by the creation of machine gun companies and by a large increase of expenditure on instruction. The internal political situation was not then favourable for the Government, and it needed the Morocco crisis of 1911 to give full liberty to the appetites of the military authorities. Even then they were somewhat hampered by the competition of the naval authorities; and

there was open strife for a time between the then Prussian Minister of War, General von Heeringen, and the Secretary of State for the Imperial Navy.

There was a general election in Germany at the beginning of 1912, and the Government announced that it was necessary to have a Reichstag "ready to maintain the Army and Navy in a perfect state of preparation and to fill up the gaps in Germany's armaments." Although the elections resulted in tremendous Socialist victories, and the Imperial Minister of Finance, Herr Wermuth, resigned office, the



FIELD-MARSHAL VON DER GOLTZ.



OFFICERS OF THE DEATH'S HEAD HUSSARS.
The Crown Prince in the Centre.

military increases were obtained. The Law of 1912 raised the peace strength of the Army to 544,211, and the number of Army Corps was increased from 23 to 25 by the creation of the XX. Army Corps for the eastern frontier (Allenstein) and of the XXI. Army Corps for the western frontier (Saarbrücken). It was decided that the most important provisions of the Law of 1911, as well as of the new Law, should be carried out immediately, instead of being spread over the period until 1915. The Law involved a considerable reorganization and redistribution on both frontiers. It increased enormously the readiness of the Army for war, and was the greatest effort made by Germany since 1870. As regards numbers, the total peace strength became approximately 723,000, all ranks included, that is to say, 544,000 privates, 30,000 officers, 95,000 non-commissioned officers, 14,000 one-year volunteers, and 40,000 officers and others of the administrative cadre.

Nevertheless, the Law of 1912 was hardly in force before fresh increases began to be demanded and predicted. The inspired newspapers pretended to castigate the military authorities for their slowness, and the Emperor delivered a speech referring to the "thorough application of the principle of obligatory service." The new Bill itself very soon appeared. It proposed the increase of the peace strength from 544,211 to 661,176 privates, and the addition of 4,000 officers, 15,000 non-commissioned officers, and 27,000 horses. Adding the

administrative cadre and 18,000 one-year volunteers the total peace strength was raised to about 870,000 men. Most of the increase was to be effected immediately, although the Bill covered a period of three years. The number of Army Corps remained 25, but the various arms were ultimately to be raised to totals of 669 battalions of infantry, 550 squadrons of cavalry, 633 batteries of field artillery, 55 battalions of garrison artillery, 44 battalions of engineers, 31 battalions of communication troops, and 26 battalions of the train. We are dealing here only with peace strengths, but the ultimate effect of the Law of 1913 and its predecessors would have been, after the lapse of 24 years, to provide Germany with a fully trained reserve of 5,400,000 men. The Imperial Chancellor, in introducing the Bill in the Reichstag, said :—


The directing thought of the Bill is the adoption of military service for all, according to the resources of the population. In round numbers we must incorporate 63,000 more men annually. Their incorporation must, above everything, serve to raise the strength of certain troops. This increase of the strength of units will render mobilization more rapid, will facilitate the transition from peace to war footing, will give us younger reservists on mobilization, and will augment their number.

The Law was passed in June, 1913, together with the extraordinary financial "levy" which was mentioned in a previous chapter of this work. The great increase of numbers allowed battalions, batteries, and cavalry regiments to be raised to such a high establishment that not more than one or two classes of the Reserve would be

required to mobilize the first line. Hence, the quality of the active Army and its training in peace was improved, mobilization was accelerated, and the covering troops on the frontiers were made strong enough to take the field and deal a blow against an unprepared enemy without waiting for reservists from the interior. Although little definite information was forthcoming, it was evident that the number of units of the German covering troops and their effectives, whose business it is to protect the mobilization and concentration of the main armies, was to be largely increased. All German troops had increased strengths under the new Law, but the troops of 11 corps—six on the French frontier and five on the Russian frontier—had a higher establishment than the rest. One marked feature of the new plans was the strengthening of fortified places, especially Königsberg and Graudenz in the east.

Judging the Law of 1913 as a whole just after it had been passed, the Military Correspondent of *The Times* made the following very accurate estimate:—

There is no evidence of any marked change in the principles which have hitherto guided German military administrators, nor in the strategical use of the great Army which has been fashioned with such splendid continuity of purpose during the past 40 years. There is still the underlying design, academic though at present it be, to crush France by a vigorous offensive before the weight of Russia can be brought to bear. There is still a very plain temptation on military grounds to traverse neutral States in an offensive campaign against France. There is still the obvious intention to fight a defensive campaign at first against Russia, and this intention is made more manifest by the plans for improving the fortresses



A TROOPER OF THE DEATH'S
HEAD HUSSARS.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]

in East Prussia. The determination to wage offensive war with the utmost energy and ruthlessness remains to-day as always the central idea of the German strategist, and the main effect of the new naval and military laws is to second offensive policy by placing in the hands of German diplomacy a weapon fashioned for offensive war.

We have seen that, by the terms of the Imperial Constitution, every German capable of bearing arms was rendered liable to three years' service with the colours and four years' service in the Reserve, followed by five years in the Landwehr. We have seen also that, by the Constitution, the peace strength of the Army was fixed at one per cent. of the population, and that, by a series of Army Laws, the German Army between 1870 and 1913 kept pace with the growth of the population from 41,000,000, just after the Franco-German War, to the total of nearly 65,000,000 shown by the census taken at the end of 1910. We must now consider in more detail the application of the principle of national service.

Liability to military service began at the age of 17 and ended at the age of 45. Liability to active service began at the age of 20. The normal military record of a German citizen, recruited for the infantry, was as follows:—He joined the colours at the age of 20 and remained in them for two years. He then joined the reserve of the active forces for approximately five-and-a-half years, being called up for periodical trainings. He then belonged to the First Ban of the Landwehr for five years, and to the Second Ban of the Landwehr for six years. While in the First Ban he was liable to be called up twice for training of a week or fortnight.



THE KAISER IN UHLAN UNIFORM.


[Record Press.]

In the Second Ban of the Landwehr he was not liable to training but could volunteer for training. Leaving the Landwehr at the age of 39, he was enrolled in the Second Ban of the Landsturm until the end of his 45th year. In the cavalry and horse artillery the period of active service was three years instead of two, followed by only about four-and-a-half years in the reserve of the active Army, only three years in the First Ban of the Landwehr, and, finally, eight years, instead of six, in the Second Ban of the Landwehr.

The development of this system, which was very different from the original idea of universal and uniform service of three years with the colours, four years in the active Reserve, and five years in the Landwehr, was marked by the following stages:—In 1888 it was observed that Germany, with the 12 years' service system, had only 12 classes to set against the 20 classes of France and the 15 classes of Russia. It was therefore considered necessary to increase the number of men available in the event of mobilization by using a part of the Landwehr in the reserve formation. It was accordingly decided to lengthen the period of service with the colours, in the active Reserve and in the Landwehr from 12 to 19 years, to re-establish a Second Ban of

the Landwehr, and to lengthen the period of service in the Landsturm by three years. In this way service with the colours, in the active Reserve, and in the Landwehr ended at the age of 39, instead of at the age of 32: and the liability to service ceased at the age of 45, instead of at the age of 42.

In 1893 came the reduction of service with the colours from three years to two, except in the cavalry and horse artillery. We have explained that the main effect of the Law of 1893 was to enable the Army to mobilize with a larger number of young and well-trained men. There was in this no intention whatever to reduce the burden of military service, and all efforts to do so were throughout resisted with the utmost energy. Again and again in the following years the Socialist Party in the Reichstag attempted without the least success to get service in the cavalry reduced from three years to two. The only purpose of the reduction of the period of colour service of unmounted troops was to secure the training of a far larger proportion of the population. Although there was an annual available contingent of about 465,000 men, it was not possible, under the system of universal three years' service, to take up more than from 175,000 to 178,000. The remainder



THE ALEXANDER GRENADIER GUARD REGIMENT, OF WHICH THE TSAR WAS COLONEL. THE TSAR AND THE KAISER IN THE FOREGROUND.

[Sport & General.

were left at home or subjected to a short training of little military value. The authors of the Law of 1893 calculated that, with shortened service, there would be about 229,000 instead of 175,000 recruits a year, and that the ultimate result would be 24 classes of trained men, making a total of about 4,300,000. The ultimate effect of the Law of 1913 would have been, as already stated, to increase this number to 5,400,000.

So much for the increase in the number of trained men. Almost as much importance was attached to the consequent lowering of age of the troops destined to form the main field armies. The war of 1870 had shown grave defects in the troops of the Landwehr—lack of physical and moral force under great strain, a large proportion of sick, and insufficient vigour in attack and stubbornness in defence. The annual contingents being increased, it became less necessary to call up the older men. If, for instance, on the three years' system, it had been necessary to fill the reserves of the field armies with men from the oldest class of the First Ban of the Landwehr, men of from 32 to 33 years of age, these same places would in future be taken by men from 25 to 28 years of age. Where it had previously been necessary to go back to the 13th class, it would in future be necessary to employ only 8 classes.

We have spoken hitherto of the normal case of the recruit taken up at the age of 20 and passing through all the normal stages to exemption from service at the age of 45. At no time, however, did the numbers recruited exhaust all the available resources. There were considerable numbers of men who obtained total or temporary exemption from service—apart from the exclusion from the Army of common criminals and of men who remained totally unfit for five years after the commencement of their legal obligation to military service. The main causes of exemption were, of course, physical, but there was a large measure of consideration for men with peculiar family or business ties, as well as for men destined for careers in which they would be seriously handicapped by the interruption of their studies for the purpose of military service. Upon the whole, however, there was very little disposition to avoid military training, even in cases where exemption could be obtained.

The untrained men of the German Army belonged to the Ersatz Reserve or the First Ban of the Landsturm. The Ersatz Reserve consisted, first, of men who were liable and fit for service but who, owing to the excess of the



DUKE ALBRECHT OF WURTEMBERG.

[Central News.]

supply of recruits, had not been embodied by the age of 23; secondly, of the various classes of men who for one reason or another had been allowed to postpone their military service; and, thirdly, of men suffering from slight physical defects, but regarded as "moderately fit" for service. The importance of the Ersatz Reserve lay in the fact that upon it in a large degree depended the filling up of the depôts after the active and reserve units of the field armies had been mobilised; upon these depôts formed of cadres from the active army, the Ersatz, and the annual contingent of recruits, depended the replacing of casualties in the fighting formations. The First Ban of the Landsturm consisted (1) of all boys over 17 years of age who had not begun their military service; (2) of young men who were permanently unfit for service in the field, but who could be used as workmen or for purposes for which their ordinary occupations specially fitted them; and (3) of young men who would have been embodied in the Ersatz Reserve, but were rejected owing to excess of numbers.

Over and above the ordinary troops thus recruited and distributed there was the very important class (in 1913 about 18,000) of so-called one-year volunteers (*Einjährige*). They consisted of practically all the sons of well-



GENERAL ULRICH VON BULOW.

to-do classes, who had had a *Gymnasium* education and had passed the examination on leaving school which was the one and only certificate of aptitude for the University and subsequently for any of the superior branches of Government service. Armed with this certificate and with sufficient means to provide their own food and equipment, they were allowed to serve in the Army for one year only, and enjoyed great privileges during the period of their service. They could choose their own year of service up to the age of 23, or, for any reasonable cause of delay, up to the age of 26 or 27. They could select, moreover, the arm, and in many cases the regiment, which they wished to join. They formed, afterwards, the main source of supply of officers and non-commissioned officers of the Reserve.

The number of non-commissioned officers in 1914 was about 100,000. As in almost all other German walks of life, they bore a great variety of titles, but they could be divided for practical purposes into a superior class and an inferior—the *Feldwebel*, or sergeant-major, and the *Vizefeldwebel*, who wore swords with the officer's knot, and the *Sergeant* and simple *Unteroffizier*, who had not this distinction. The great majority of the non-commissioned officers rose from the ranks, and were either men who had volunteered at the age of 17 or had re-engaged at the end of their two or three years of

military service. Men with any special aptitude, who during their service showed an inclination to rejoin, were given special instruction for the duties of non-commissioned officers. A minority—perhaps one-quarter—of the non-commissioned officers came from special schools, which were of two kinds—preparatory schools for boys of 15, who remained two years, and “schools for non-commissioned officers,” which took the pupils from the preparatory schools, and any other candidates between the ages of 17 and 20 who had good recommendations and a good elementary education. Those who passed through both schools could become non-commissioned officers at the age of 19.

The quality of the non-commissioned officers was certainly very various. The general level of education, both general and military, was high, but system was more powerful than initiative, and especially among the younger non-commissioned officers there was a lack of real discipline combined with a taste for authority which developed easily into brutality.

The corps of officers of the German Army was composed in the main of two classes of candidates, “cadets,” who had received all their education in the special cadet schools, and youths who, at the end of their ordinary school education, had joined the ranks as *Fahnenjunker* with a view to obtaining commissions. The second class, which formed about two-thirds of the whole, enjoyed preliminary advantages in proportion to their educational attainments, and the Emperor William had always endeavoured to raise the general level by giving special advantages to those who had passed the “abiturient,” or leaving, examination of the public schools. A small percentage, about five or six per cent., had passed one year at a university before entering the Army. Two tests had to be satisfied by every candidate, whatever his origin. He had to pass the general examination qualifying him for a commission. His nomination had also to be approved by a vote of the officers of the regiment which he was to join. This requirement was maintained with absolute rigour, and served to uphold the very strong class distinctions in the different arms and even in different regiments of the same arm. It was an absolute barrier to the entrance, for instance, of Jews, whether as officers or reserve officers.

The cadets were for the most part sons of officers or of Civil servants of the higher grades. Having obtained a nomination they entered a cadet school at the age of 10, passed a preliminary examination at the age of 17, and then, normally, served with the colours for six

months as non-commissioned officers. Thence they passed into a war school, and obtained their commissions at about the age of 19. Trained to arms as it were from the cradle, and imbued with military traditions and military doctrine, the officers who came from the cadet schools retained the stamp throughout their lives. Curiously enough, the first cadet companies formed in Prussia in 1686 were composed of French children whose families had emigrated after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes. When the French supply of candidates fell off, Frederick William I. reorganized the corps by bringing all the schools together in Berlin. Frederick the Great improved the system, especially by mitigating the severities of the training and treating the boys, as he said, "not like farm hands but like gentlemen and future officers." In the Seven Years War he employed as officers cadets hardly 14 years old. The schools were kept up with varying success. After the war of 1870 there was a great increase in the number of candidates. The Berlin cadets were established all together in the famous cadet school at Gross-Lichterfelde. There were cadet schools also at Bensberg, Cöslin, Karlsruhe, Naumburg, Plön, Potsdam, and Wahlstadt.


The great Army Law of 1913 involved, as we have seen, an addition of no less than 4,000 officers. Matters were so arranged as to secure a considerable improvement in the rate of promotion. For some years discontent had been growing among the officers themselves, and the congestion in the lower ranks of the officers' corps of this enormous Army which had seen practically no war for more than 40 years, caused grave misgivings as to its real efficiency in the field. The statistics of 1910 and 1911 showed that, on the average, Prussian officers had to wait from 14 to 16 years for promotion to the rank of captain, and from 11 to 12 years more for promotion to the rank of major. In Bavaria promotion was considerably more rapid, but for the young Prussian officer the main hope was to find his way into the General Staff, where advancement was sure.

We have now reviewed the main elements in the composition of the great German military machine. It is easy to realize that its working affected closely the whole fabric of society, and that the claims and the spirit of the Army pervaded everything. Although the wars of 1864, 1866, and 1870 were but a faint memory to the greater part of the population, the military spirit was kept alive by every possible means, in the schools, in the Army itself, and in politics. As regards the corps of officers, tradition was



GENERAL VON HAUSEN.

enormously strong, and it was well supported by family and personal interest. The Army was ever the most important of all professions, and every attempt to lower its position was resisted with the utmost vigour. All the well-intended and ingenious proposals which emanated from Great Britain and other countries for reduction or limitation of armaments were of necessity doomed to failure, because the German Empire was saturated with the belief that the future belonged to the strong, and that the only way to keep Germany strong was not only to train every available man for service in the field, but to keep the whole nation in the strong military grip of Prussia and to maintain as the head and the mainspring of the State the Prussian military caste. Notwithstanding all theories of equal opportunity, and even the sincere efforts of the Emperor William to check the growth of luxury in the Army and especially in "crack" regiments, social gradations continued to be reflected nowhere so accurately as in the German Army List. Commissions in the Prussian Guard, for instance, and especially in the more exclusive regiments, such as the famous regiment of Gardes du Corps, were the undisputed preserve of the great land-owning families. And so down to the humblest line regiment in the dullest and least desirable frontier garrisons. If the prevailing motive at the top of the scale was the determination to retain power—and power in the Army meant power throughout the



GERMAN SIEGE GUN.

[Topical.]

State—the prevailing motive lower down in the scale was pride. For some years before the Great War the Army had begun to be infected by the luxury and materialism which had come of too rapid prosperity and increase of wealth. But the great majority, especially of regimental officers, were keen, hard, simple, and devoted soldiers, whose only reward for their work was the proud position which they enjoyed. On the other hand, the level of real intelligence was not high. Like people in so many other spheres of life in Germany, the officers were often well-instructed without being well-educated, cocksure and self-satisfied without being intelligent. Judged even more by the officers than by the men, the German Army was an Army which badly needed some sharp lessons from experience and especially from defeats.

Throughout the officers' corps ran an almost universal, if at most times good-natured, contempt for civilians as such, and a conviction that, while political freedom must be tolerated to a certain extent, there were well-defined limits beyond which freedom must not go. The field of German politics was dotted with landmarks and boundaries defining the points at which "the military" would as a matter of course intervene. The Army devoted its special attention on the one hand to the growth of Socialism and on the other hand to any culpable moderation in dealing with the frontier populations—Alsations, Poles, and Danes. In the year before the war the famous Zabern affair afforded a peculiar

illustration of the fact that the Army, and not the Government or the Civil Administration, was the supreme force in the provinces which Bismarck had taken from France. Similar tendencies were at least as strong in Posen and even in Schleswig-Holstein. As for Socialism, it was one of the great resources of military argument—just as, for the matter of that, "militarism" was one of the great resources of Socialist argument. Year after year the Reichstag debates on the Army estimates consisted of sham fights between the Prussian Minister of War, whoever he might be, and the Socialist leaders. The Socialists carried on an incessant campaign against the brutal treatment of recruits, a campaign which had some, but not in latter years very much, foundation in fact. The Minister of War invariably railed against the perils of Socialism in the Army, and accused the Socialists of sowing the seeds of mutiny and even of treason. Both parties to these disputes knew very well that the Army was in no danger whatever from public opinion and that in the hour of need every German would rally to the flag.

As to German feeling generally, it would be too much to say that the Army was universally popular, but military service was accepted as a matter of course, and with absolute belief not only in its value for the country's defence but in its vast importance as a training for civil life and for all organized effort. The Socialist party itself based its unequalled organization upon military standards, and the

training of the whole youth of the country at an impressionable age to regard themselves as part of one great machine was the root of most of the order and discipline that pervaded German life and was so impressive and so deceptive. It was especially deceptive as regards the "peace-loving" character of the German people, and concealed realities that were all too horribly revealed as soon as the German people went to war. From the Army the whole people learned the beliefs and habits that were afterwards the strongest in daily life. They learned to control and also to obey, to organize and be organized, and to accept as in the nature of things a systematization of life that was nothing but a reflection in every sphere of the spirit and methods of the Prussian Army.

We have seen that at the outbreak of war the German Army consisted of 25 Army Corps. Since the increases and changes effected in 1913 they

were grouped in eight "inspections." These inspections were at Danzig (General von Prittwitz und Gaffron) for the I., XVII., and XX. Army Corps; at Berlin (General von Heeringen) for the Prussian Guard Corps, the XII. Army Corps, and the XIX. Army Corps; at Hannover (General von Bülow) for the VII., IX., and X. Army Corps; at Munich (Prince Rupert of Bavaria) for the III. Army Corps and the I., II., and III. Bavarian Corps; at Karlsruhe, the capital of Baden (the Grand Duke of Baden) for the VIII., XIV., and XV. Army Corps; at Stuttgart, the capital of Wurtemberg (Duke Albert of Wurtemberg) for the IV., XI., and XIII. Army Corps; at Saarbrücken (General von Eichhorn) for the XVI., XVIII., and XXI. Army Corps; and at Berlin (General von Kluck) for the II., V. and VI. Army Corps. The peace distribution and composition of Army Corps is shown in the accompanying table:—

PEACE DISTRIBUTION AND COMPOSITION OF THE GERMAN FIELD ARMY*
ON OCTOBER 1, 1913.

Corps.	Corps H.Q.	Infantry.					Cavalry.							Artillery.					
		Divisions.	Brigades.	Regiments.	Battalions.	Jäger Battalions.	Brigades.	Regiments.	Squadrons.	Regiments.				Brigades.	Regiments.	Brigade-Divisions.	Bat-teries.		
										Cuirassiers.	Dragoons.	Hussars.	Uhlans.				Horse-Jägers.	Field.	Horse.
Prussian Guard	Berlin ..	2	5	11	33	2	4	8	40	2	2	1	3	—	2	4	9	24	3
I. Corps	Königsberg ..	2	4	8	24	—	3	6	30	1	1	—	2	2	2	4	9	24	3
II. "	Stettin ..	2	4	9	27	—	2	4	20	1	2	—	1	—	2	4	8	24	—
III. "	Berlin ..	2	4	8	24	1	2	4	20	1	1	1	1	—	2	4	9	24	3
IV. "	Magdeburg ..	2	4	8	24	1	2	4	20	1	—	2	1	—	2	4	8	24	—
V. "	Posen ..	2	5	10	30	1	2	4	20	—	1	—	2	1	2	4	8	24	3
VI. "	Breslau ..	2	5	10	30	1	3	6	30	1	1	2	1	1	2	4	8	24	—
VII. "	Münster ..	2	5	10	30	1	2	4	20	1	—	2	1	—	2	4	8	24	—
VIII. "	Coblenz ..	2	4	8	24	—	2	4	20	1	—	2	—	1	2	4	8	24	—
IX. "	Altona ..	2	5	10	30	1	2	4	20	—	2	2	—	—	2	4	8	24	—
X. "	Hannover ..	2	4	8	24	1	2	4	20	—	2	1	1	—	2	4	8	24	—
XI. "	Cassel ..	2	4	8	24	1	2	4	20	—	1	1	—	2	2	4	9	24	3
XII. (1st R. Saxon)	Dresden ..	2	4	8	24	2	2	4	20	1	—	2	1	—	2	4	9	24	3
XIII. Corps	Wurtemberg ..	2	4	9	27	—	2	4	20	—	2	—	2	—	2	4	8	24	—
XIV. "	Karlsruhe ..	2	5	10	30	—	2	4	20	—	3	—	—	1	2	4	8	24	—
XV. "	Strassburg ..	2	4	8	24	2	2	4	20	—	2	1	—	1	2	4	8	24	—
XVI. "	Metz ..	2	4	8	24	—	3	6	30	—	2	1	1	2	2	4	8	24	—
XVII. "	Danzig ..	2	4	8	24	1	2	4	20	—	—	3	—	1	2	4	8	24	—
XVIII. "	Frankfurt-on-Main ..	2	4	9	27	—	2	4	20	—	3	—	1	—	2	4	8	24	—
XIX. (2nd R. Saxon)	Leipzig ..	2	4	8	24	—	2	4	20	1	—	1	2	—	2	4	9	24	3
XX. Corps	Allenstein ..	2	4	8	24	1	2	4	20	1	2	1	—	—	2	4	9	24	3
XXI. "	Saarbrücken ..	2	4	9	27	—	2	4	20	—	1	—	3	—	2	4	10	24	6
I. Bavarian	Munich ..	2	4	8	24	1	2	4	19	2	—	—	—	2	2	4	8	24	—
II. Bavarian	Würzburg ..	2	4	8	24	1	2	4	20	—	—	—	—	2	2	4	9	24	3
III. Bavarian	Nürnberg ..	2	4	8	24	—	2	4	18	—	—	—	—	4	2	4	8	24	—
		50	106	217	651	18	55	110	547	14	28	23	25	20	50	100	211	600	33
		669								110				633					

*The above table is compiled from Löbél's *Jahrberichte*, 1913. Fortress artillery, pioneers, railway and telegraph troops, flying corps, and train battalions are omitted.



GERMAN TELEPHONE RANGEFINDER.

[Central News.]

The Generals-in-Command were Baron von Plettenberg (Prussian Guard); von François (I.); von Linsingen (II.); von Lochow (III.); Sixt von Arnim (IV.); von Strantz (V.); von Pritzelwitz (VI.); von Einem (VII.); Tülf von Tselpe und Weidenbach (VIII.); von Quast (IX.); von Emmich (X.); Baron von Scheffer-Boyadel (XI.); von Elsa (XII.); von Fabeck (XIII.); von Hoiningen (XIV.); von Deimling (XV.); von Mudra (XVI.); von Mackensen (XVII.); von Schenck (XVIII.); von

Kirchbach (XIX.); von Scholtz (XX.); von Bülow (XXI.); von Xylander (I. Bavarian); von Martini (II. Bavarian); and Baron von Horn (III. Bavarian).

Apart from the eight army inspectors there were an inspector-general of cavalry in Berlin, with inspections of cavalry at Posen, Stettin, Strassburg, and Saarbrücken; an inspector-general of field artillery in Berlin; an inspector-general of garrison artillery in Berlin, with inspections at Berlin, Strassburg, and Cologne; an inspector-general of engineers and fortresses in Berlin, with inspections at Berlin, Posen, Strassburg, Mainz, and Thorn; an inspector-general of communication troops in Berlin, with inspections of railway troops, military telegraphs, and military aviation and aeronautics; a train inspection; and an inspection of machine guns.

There were also military governors and commandants at the following strong places:—Altona, Borkum, Cuxhaven, Geestemünde, Heligoland, and Wilhelmshaven on the North Sea; Danzig, Friedrichsort, Kiel, Königsberg, Swinemünde, and Pillau on or near the Baltic; Breslau, Glatz, and Glogau in Silesia; Posen, Thorn, Grandenz, and Feste Boyen, and other barrier forts along the eastern frontier; Metz, Bitsche, and Diedenhofen (Thionville) in Lorraine; Neu Breisach, Hünningen, Freiburg, Strassburg, Germersheim, Mainz, Coblenz, Cologne, and Wesel along the Rhine; Cüstrin on the Oder; Ulm and Ingolstadt on the Danube.



GERMANS TAKING OBSERVATIONS.

[Record Press.]

The Emperor, who became supreme in war, was supreme in peace also, except for the degree

of independence retained after 1870 by the Bavarian army and to some extent by the Saxon and Wurtemberg forces. Apart from the Great General Staff, which is dealt with elsewhere, and the "inspections" already enumerated, the Emperor's functions were performed through the Ministry of War and through his Military Cabinet. The existence of the Military Cabinet, whose head was at all times the Emperor's chief agent and mouthpiece, was a frequent subject of controversy and the charge of dual control and of interference with the powers of the Imperial Chancellor (who was responsible for the Ministry of War as for all other Departments of State) and of Parliament was often made. In reality serious difficulties only arose in times of political crisis, which were always in Germany to a peculiar extent times of intrigue, and the Emperor's Military Cabinet, no less than his Naval and Civil Cabinets, was a necessary part of the machine of "personal" government. It was the business of the Military Cabinet to report to the Emperor on all military questions and to form a channel of communication between him and the generals in command of army corps, and also to deal with promotions, transfers, and other personal questions.

The Ministry of War was the supreme administrative authority of the Army responsible for recruiting, equipment, commissariat, fortifications, pay, and mobilization. It was



GENERAL VON EINEM.

divided into some half-dozen departments, which were subdivided again into sections.


The finances of the Army were managed through a central bureau (*General Militärkasse*)



GERMAN SIEGE GUN IN TRANSIT.

Topical.







COLOUR-SERGEANT, ALEXANDER
GRENADIER GUARD REGIMENT.


[Ball.

in Berlin, with a branch for each army corps district. As soon as the Finance Law for the year had been passed the Ministry of War fixed the distribution of the credits, and communicated with the Army through the *Intendantur* of each army corps. So the funds passed down to the smallest administrative units—a company, or a battery, or a squadron. All the administrative services of the Army were governed by minutely detailed regulations, and the whole machine was constructed with a view to smooth and uniform working in peace time—an aim which was certainly attained—and to the utmost possible speed and precision on mobilization.

There was, indeed, no army that ever existed which was so sure to be found completely ready when war began, so perfectly able to strike at once with all its force. Only defeats, and a series of defeats, could seriously upset such an organization. Only a long process of attrition could dangerously disturb the elaborate preparations for the concentration and movement of troops, and for supplying them always and everywhere with all that they would need in the field.

The organization of the Army was immensely assisted by the perfection of the general organization of the State services—for example, railways and telegraphs. Not only was the Army ready to assume control of these services, but the services were ready to be taken under military control. Immediately after the war of 1870 the Army began to pay special attention to the training of railway troops, able both to manage existing railways and to construct new ones. The establishment of military control of the postal and telegraph systems was effected without the least difficulty or confusion. Within an hour or two of the dispatch of the ultimatums to Russia and France and the declaration of the "state of imminent peril of war," the telegraph offices all over Germany were in the hands of the military, working indeed at higher pressure but without any disturbance.

Not content with universal service at home, the German Government in 1913 passed an important Law definitely linking up rights of nationality with the performance of military service. It was always one of the bitterest blows to German pride that the vast majority of German emigrants were finally lost to the country. The provision, hitherto existing, that residence abroad for more than 10 years involved loss of German nationality unless the emigrant



GENERAL VON HINDENBURG.



GERMAN SIEGE HOWITZER.

[Record Press.]

took special steps to preserve his German status was repealed. On the other hand, loss of nationality was rendered certain in the case of Germans who failed to perform their military service

within a fixed time of having been declared deserters. Special facilities and extensions of time, however, were granted to Germans living abroad.



CHAPTER VI.

THE GERMAN ARMY IN THE FIELD.

THE RESERVE FORMATIONS AND THEIR USE—THE "SUDDEN MAXIMUM"—SPEED IN ACTION—THE GENERAL STAFF—VIOLENCE IN EXECUTION—STUDY OF DETAIL—EXPANSION IN WAR—ESTIMATE OF AVAILABLE NUMBERS—USE OF RESERVES—THE EMPEROR AND HIS MOLTKE—COMMANDERS—THE ARMY CORPS ORGANIZATION—CAVALRY AND RESERVE DIVISIONS—INFANTRY AND MACHINE-GUN TACTICS—CAVALRY TACTICS—ARTILLERY TACTICS—ARTILLERY ARMAMENT—GERMAN HEAVY HOWITZERS—OTHER TROOPS—SUPPLIES—HOSPITALS—MECHANICAL EFFICIENCY.

THE peace organization of the German army gave, of course, a very inadequate notion of its full strength when mobilized for action. Behind the units which figured on the peace establishments, even after their completion to war strength, were huge reserves, and the intended composition and employment of these reserves—whether in the form of duplication or triplication of active army units or of attachment of newly-formed reserve units to each Army Corps, or, again, of their grouping in fresh and independent Army Corps of their own—was, as a French student remarked but a short time before the war, "the great secret of the Supreme Command." For that reason it was somewhat futile to condemn, on the authority of Clausewitz himself, the two-unit organization (regiments paired in brigades, brigades paired in divisions, divisions paired in Army Corps), for nothing would be simpler than to convert the binary system into a ternary one, by adding a reserve regiment to each brigade, a reserve brigade to a division, and so on at the moment of mobilization.

These, and similar possibilities of variation, however, must be considered as the unofficial student's reservations forced upon him by the imperfection of his data rather than as matters kept open for eleventh hour decision by the German authorities. The use to which reserve

formations would be put was, as we have said, the secret of the higher command. But it was certainly settled both in principle and in detail long before the war. Similarly, while to outsiders it appeared doubtful whether Germany would employ the vast masses of able-bodied men who had received no training, no such doubt existed in the confidential mobilization schemes.

This mobilization scheme presented the sharpest contrast with that of Great Britain. For the characteristic of the latter was that it was based upon the assumption of a long war, in which the British Army, small at first, would be expanded by an elaborate machinery of recruit depôts and reserve battalions at home, until at the end of the war its strength was at a maximum. Under the German system its strength was at its greatest in the first days and at its lowest at the close of a war. Continental critics were well aware of this difference, and, as most of them subscribed to the ruling opinion that the war would be a brief shock of extreme violence, they reproached Great Britain with keeping too large a proportion of the available trained men in reserve formations, destined only to fill gaps in the first line and meantime idling at a moment when every soldier's place was at the decisive point. Such was the reproach. Whether it was well or ill deserved we need

not inquire. It was connected only indirectly, if at all, with the other favourite reproach that British citizens would not take the "manly resolution" of adopting compulsory service; and, indeed, it was only natural that a Continental Army which developed its whole power in a fortnight or three weeks should read with amazement that with 120,000 odd serving soldiers at home and some 140,000 regular reservists, besides special reserves and territorials registered for foreign service, Great Britain could only produce, at the outset, an Expeditionary Force of 170,000 men.


No army in the world represented the theory of the sudden immediate maximum better than the German, not even the French, for the doctrines of strategy held in honour at the *École de Guerre* were based upon the "offensive return," and by that very fact admitted that every day had a to-morrow, whereas the ideal of the *Kriegsakademie* was "the day," i.e., the battle without a to-morrow, complete and all sufficing. The question for the French was, whether a short service national army would be capable of enduring till their to-morrow came. And it was the chief virtue of the German theory of war that it was, in theory at least, based upon the human nature of citizen-soldiers, men capable of one effort of maximum violence and possibly little else. In the event the French proved their case by proving that the staying power of human nature, when fortified by a just cause and an honest anger, was far greater than the German theory admitted. But, bearing in mind the likelihood of Germany's having to fight for existence on "two fronts" and the consequent desire to bring the struggle on one of these fronts to the speediest possible




HERR KRUPP VON BOHLEN UND HALBACH.

issue, the German theory of war had much to recommend it. The bases of that theory, in principle and in detail, will be discussed later. Our present concern is to show the mutual relations of the theory and the army that was to put it into practice.

The theory demanded, first of all, speed in action on a large scale—not so much actual speed of manœuvre or of march as reduction to zero of the waste of time that would result from imperfect arrangements for the larger movements of Army Corps and armies—and



NEW GERMAN BOMB-GUN.



BOMB-GUN READY FOR FIRING.

sound staff-work was the essential condition for securing this speed. How successfully this condition had been met 1870 and the *Kaisermanöver* of the years of armed peace showed. In respect of what may be called its business side the German General Staff had no superior in the world. It is recorded that the casualty and ammunition returns of the troops that fought at Gravelotte and St. Privat, on August 18, 1870, were in the hands of the general headquarters before dawn on the 19th, to serve as the basis for Von Moltke's next decision. More than this no staff could do. But even this staff had its imperfections, both on service (as in the cases of the lost dispatch of Rezonville and the army orders of Wörth) and on manœuvres, and if its occasional errors were to be neutralized this had to be done by the troops. Hence the over-marching so often noted and criticized on manœuvres.


The possibility of over-marching the men was itself another means of obtaining speed. The condition of weary blankness to which it reduced the men was accepted as a necessary evil. What mattered was the punctual execution of the programme laid down at all costs. But here again it was minutely careful organization of regimental detail rather than the pace of the individual that was relied upon to produce

the result. Thus it was that in 1870, in modern manœuvres, and in 1914 alike the ground covered by German units was astonishing, even though the troops in themselves were slow and heavy.

The theory demanded, further, extreme violence in execution—that is, an output of power so great that it would have wrecked delicate machinery. Simplicity and strength, therefore, were just as characteristic of the German Army system as thorough organization.

Lastly, as the attempt to produce by envelopment a day of battle that needed no morrow of pursuit required great extension of front, and therefore either extraordinarily high development of the lateral communications or, in the alternative, deployment at the outset in accordance with a preconceived and unalterable plan, it followed that the German Army and all its material auxiliaries, such as railway platforms and loop lines, could and had to be arranged and prepared in peace in accordance with plans and time-tables studied and considered at leisure—in accordance, in fact, with the "Fundamental Plan."

On these foundations the German Army organization was built up until 1912. After that year, indeed, there was a noticeable tendency to develop it on different lines, owing to the rise of new military Powers to the south-



GERMAN MILITARY MOTOR CAR. GUN IN POSITION FOR FIRING AT AEROPLANES.

east of Austria and to the "speeding-up" of the Russian Army. But up to the declaration of war in 1914 the tendency had done no more than round off the old system as a preparation for a new one, and in point of organization the army that took the field in that year was, substantially, the army that had been conceived 20 years before and slowly matured. What other qualities and possibilities had been sacrificed to the perfection of the organization the story of the war itself will show in due course. But the military machine, as a machine, was strongly built, powerful, speedy, and well oiled.

Let us see, first, how the peace organization of the active army was supposed to function on mobilization. At any given moment the infantry—to take the most important arm first—consisted of the professional officers and non-commissioned officers and two-year contingents of conscripts. The peace establishment of the infantry battalion stood in 1914 at about 740 for certain corps* and 670 for the rest. To complete to a war establishment of about 1,080, no corps required more than 35 per cent. of reservists,† and some needed only 20 per cent. In other words, hardly one year's contingent of reservists was needed for the completion of the active unit to war establishment. Cavalry, as in most other countries, had one more squadron in peace than in war—in this case 5 to 4—and it rode out of barracks for field service with few or no reservists, either men or horses, in its ranks. In the artillery, the serious defect of low horse establishment had been removed, and the foot (heavy) artillery had been increased, both as to number of units and establishment, an increase which was to have no small influence on the war. These few details will serve to show the care that was taken to make the first-line army as professional as was humanly possible within the limits imposed by citizen recruiting and short service. It is true that the increased establishments referred to were recent—they formed, in fact, the greater part of the changes consequent upon the Balkan wars—but it is equally true that they took effect upon the army of 1912. It was as though a rebuilding of the old edifice upon new lines had been begun by the strengthening of the structure as it stood.

Another portion of the peace mechanism provided the cadres for reserve units.

*About 45 per cent. of the infantry were on the higher establishment.

†Very small deductions need be made for unit, as the establishment is a minimum and not a maximum; 8 to 9 per cent. additional conscripts being taken in yearly to meet "wastage."



GENERAL VON MOLTKE.
Chief of the Great General Staff of the German Army.

Following the example of France, Germany had provided her active peace regiments with supernumerary officers of the higher ranks, whose future task it was to form the thousands of reservists whom the mobilized active unit did not need (viz., the four classes aged 25-28) into reserve regiments. Up to 1913 it had been intended to form one reserve battalion, but the increase of recruit intake and establishments in 1913 set free enough reservists for the formation of two reserve battalions per active regiment. And not only the reserve, but also the Landwehr of still older men, had its expansion mechanism. The majors administering Landwehr districts became, on mobilization, commanders of Landwehr battalions.

In sum, the units of the principal arms in 1914 could be estimated with fair accuracy as follows:—

—	Battalions of Infantry.	Squadrons of Cavalry	Batteries of Field Art.*
Active ..	669	550	633
Reserve ..	434	} About 300†	300†
Landwehr	310		§

*Including horse artillery batteries.

†Would probably include Landwehr men to some extent, as reservists were required to man the ammunition columns of the mobilized active army.

‡Reserve squadrons, i.e., drafting depôts, of active regiments not included.

§Lack of horses would make the mobilization of these batteries very difficult.



PRINCE VON BÜLOW. [Topical.]

Formations of older men (Landsturm) for local defence scarcely concern us, except in so far as they released Landwehr units for line-of-communication service near the front. In respect of this branch, the German organization was in no way superior to that of France and other belligerents, more stringent administration of the liability lists being counterbalanced by the lack of that local initiative which in this local service is worth more than bureaucratic efficiency.

As regards the total military force at the disposal of the Emperor, an estimate of 1913 gave :—

Active army reserve, and Landwehr, all trained (3,700,000 gross), net ..	3,100,000
Ersatz reserve (surplus of annual contingents—i.e., men of active army and reserve age, who, though fit, had never served)	900,000
Others liable, mostly untrained, of all ages and trained men over 36 (gross about 5,000,000), net, say	3,000,000
	<hr/>
	7,000,000
	net

Of these trained men, the units of the active army, reserve and Landwehr (1,403

battalions, 850 squadrons, 933 batteries, *plus* engineers, train, &c.) would absorb about 2,100,000, or somewhat less, leaving one million trained men, as well as nearly the same number untrained in hand. More than half of these 1,900,000 would be available for replacing casualties in the active army, even after all garrisons, railway guards, &c., had been provided for on a liberal scale, both in officers and in men.

Now this capacity for sustained war at first sight appears to be opposed to the first objects of German organization—the sudden blow of maximum violence. The discrepancy is, however, only apparent, for however boldly Germany staked the whole of her finest troops on the chance of crushing her western neighbour in three weeks, she had to make allowance for the needs of “containing” that neighbour when the active regiments hastened eastward to deal with the Russians. Just as in the first stage little more than reserve formations would be told off to delay the Russians while the active army crushed France, so too in a second stage, not only had the gaps in her active army, now opposed to Russia, to be filled, but extra reserve formations had to be provided on a grand scale in order to hold France down when conquered.

A single active army—as nearly professional and as independent of reservists as possible—two sets of reserve formations, one to go west with the Active Army and to remain in the west, the other to hold the east until the Active Army could be transferred thither; in addition, coast defence troops, fortress garrisons, and railway guards, and unformed masses of individuals to replace casualties in each and all of these categories of service units—such, in brief, seems to have been the composition of the German Army in 1914.

The effective command of these millions was, as in 1870, vested in the Kaiser, who as “Supreme War Lord” (*Oberste Kriegsherr*) of the Empire enjoyed powers, even in the kingdoms of other members of it, such as not even the Tsar exercised over the Russian armies. He was both King and commander-in-chief, as every Hohenzollern ruler had been before him. His experience in handling troops on manoeuvres was probably as great as that of any man living, and his favourite *finale*, the charge of cavalry masses, though ridiculed in other countries, was regarded by some few level-headed critics as a proof of nerve and judgment, for men who can handle 50 or 60 squadrons at the gallop are, and always were, rare in any army. What was more doubtful than his cavalry qualities was his

capacity as supreme director of millions. Of the cold, steady mind, the shrewdness, the sense of proportion of Moltke, he had given no evidence. It was fortunate for Prussia that her modern military system had been designed at a time when the ruling Hohenzollern was not a first-class soldier, and needed a chief of the great General Staff to "keep him straight." The institution of this office had had as its result, first, the effacement of the King as initiator of strategical and tactical operations; secondly, the possibility of selecting the best general of the Army, irrespective of seniority, as the real director of operations (since he was only an adviser to the King and not a commander set over his seniors); thirdly, the intimate correlation of peace-preparation and war-action, in that the same officer and his staff managed both; and, lastly, the combination both of authority and of responsibility in the head of the State. This peculiar method of command, tried in two wars, had succeeded. But William I. was both a veteran of the campaigns against Napoleon, and a man of remarkable solidity of character, and his Moltke was a very great soldier. No one could prophesy an equally easy working of the system when the commander-in-chief was both imaginative and erratic and the chief of staff an ordinary general. But the Germans pinned their faith to the system of combining the man of highest authority with the man selected for greatest technical ability. The system—always the system!

For the purpose of operations the General Headquarters then consisted of the Kaiser and the Chief of the General Staff. The units immediately controlled by them were styled armies, and numbered I., II., &c. In many cases, though not in all, the army commanders were the "Army inspectors" of peace. For some

years before the war the 25 Army Corps had been grouped for purposes of inspection and training under these inspectors, of whom latterly there were eight. It had been assumed that these generals would command armies composed of the army corps with which they had dealt in peace. This was not in all cases done. But the principle remained, and the forces in the field were divided into armies, each under its own army commander and consisting of three or more army corps and one or more cavalry divisions, according to the part entrusted to each in the "fundamental plan."

The army corps, without reserve formations incorporated in it, was the basic unit of the Army. In peace time it consisted of two divisions, each of two infantry brigades (= four regiments = twelve battalions);* one cavalry brigade, and one field artillery brigade. To one or other of the divisions were attached a light infantry battalion, a pioneer battalion (equivalent to the British field units of Royal Engineers), and a battalion of train (Army Service Corps).

As a rule each corps, division, &c., was recruited and stationed in its own area, and from this fact had resulted a considerable advantage in speed of mobilization, since the unit's reservists were close at hand. But the absorption of all the Polish, Alsatian and Lorraine recruits in the units of the V., XV., and XVI. corps was naturally dangerous, and these corps drew recruits from all over the Prussian dominions, as also did the *Corps d'élite* of the Guard; as, however, these units were frontier corps, they stood on an exceptionally high peace footing and needed few reser-

* This statement held good in the case of 15 corps; the others contained 9, 10 and, in the case of the Guard, 11 regiments. A corps with 10 or more regiments formed an extra brigade.



UHLANS.

vists, so that their more general recruiting did not impair their rapidity of mobilization.*

In close connexion with this territorial recruiting stood the organization of "Landwehr districts" above mentioned, whereby the closest touch was maintained between the recruits of the district, its serving soldiers, and its reservists of all ages. It had formerly been the practice to split up the units of each corps in many towns, with a view to preserving this local touch; but in more recent years the risk of small isolated units falling into a stagnant condition had been seen, and though the system was retained, it was supplemented, at great expense, by the provision in each corps area of a central training camp, in which the troops spent the summer in company.

*The former objections to the employment of Hanoverians in the X. Corps had practically ceased to be valid, and that corps was to all intents and purposes territorially recruited.

































In war, one division of each corps gave up its cavalry brigade and its horse artillery, which went to form part of a cavalry division,* and the other brigade was broken up so as to give each division of the corps a regiment of divisional cavalry.

















Thus cleared of the units that belonged to it only for purposes of peace recruiting and administration, the normal corps consisted of two divisions and an extra battalion of infantry, two cavalry regiments attached to the divisions, two field artillery brigades,† one to each division, and technical and departmental troops, as shewn in the diagram annexed.

*There had been prolonged controversy on the subject of the permanent cavalry division, but, except in the Guard, no organized cavalry division existed in peace.


†These were far larger units than the British Field Artillery "brigade," which was a lieutenant-colonel's command of three batteries, whereas the German was a major-general's command of two field artillery regiments.

ORDRE DE BATAILLE OF A NORMAL CORPS


   				   			
   				   			
Infantry Regiments and Machine Gun Companies				Infantry Regiments and Machine Gun Companies			
Inf. Brigade		Inf. Brigade		Inf. Brigade		Inf. Brigade	
Field Artillery Brigade				Field Artillery Brigade			
F. Art. Regt.		F. Art. Regt.		F. Art. Regt.		F. Art. Regt.	
F. Art. Group	F. Art. Group	F. Art. Group	F. Art. Group	F. Art. Group	F. Art. Group	F. Art. Group	F. Art. Group
							
							
Group Am. Column	Group Am. Column	Group Am. Column	Group Am. Column	Group Am. Column	Group Am. Column	Group Am. Column	Group Am. Column

   				   			
1 Cav. Regt.				1 Cav. Regt.			
							
1 Pioneer Company				1 Pioneer Company			
							
1 Telephone Detach ^t				1 Telephone Detach ^t			
							
1 Bridging Train				1 Bridging Train			
							
1 Sanitary Company				1 Sanitary Company			


CORPS TROOPS




DIVISIONAL TRAINS ETC.




CORPS TRAINS ETC.



DIVISIONAL TRAINS ETC.



ORDRE DE BATAILLE OF A CAVALRY DIVISION



A Reserve division, whether forming the third division of an active corps or grouped with other reserve divisions, was similar in strength and organization to an active division, except that it had only one regiment of field artillery (6 batteries) instead of two. The larger units of the Landwehr, grouped by themselves or with reserve units, varied in composition according to the resources available on mobilization and their special tasks.

The strength of the army corps of 25 battalions, eight squadrons, and 24 field batteries, with its combatant and non-combatant auxiliaries, was, according to *Lehnert's Handbuch* for 1913, 41,000 all ranks with 14,000 horses and 2,400 vehicles, guns included. That of a cavalry division, without auxiliaries other than those shown in the diagram (*) was 5,000 men, 5,300 horses, and 200 vehicles inclusive of guns. It will be observed, therefore, that the German army corps was practically equivalent to two British divisions, but that a German cavalry division was little more than half as strong as, and much less completely equipped in technical troops than, the British. Nor had the German division any heavy guns, although the army corps was usually provided with one heavy howitzer battalion. The equipment of the Germans in machine guns was also less complete. We have hitherto considered the units of each arm simply as blocks to be arranged in large and small boxes called corps, divisions, and brigades. It remains to describe their structure and their working in rather more detail.

The infantry regiments, commanded by a full colonel, had three battalions, each commanded by a lieutenant-colonel or a major, and a machine gun company. The battalion had

four companies, commanded by mounted captains, and the company three platoons, under subalterns. The war strength of the company in officers and men was 270, which gave about 250 rifles for the firing line. Thus, broadly, the strength of the 12-company regiments was 3,000 rifles.

The machine gun company of the regiment had six guns, the same proportion to the battalion as in the British Army. But the different organization must be noted, for it had reference to a different idea of the uses of machine guns. Whereas in the British and French Army these weapons were scattered by pairs amongst the battalions at the outset with a view to aiding the development of maximum fire power from a minimum number of men, thus economizing defensive forces for the benefit of the eventual counter-attack, the German machine guns were massed in a group and regarded as a *reserve of fire*, which enabled the local commander to dispense with human reserves and to put his whole force of rifles into action from the first without fear. Here is an example of tactical doctrine and formal organization dovetailing into one another. The machine gun is a compendium of some fifty rifles, and was so regarded in all armies; in the French and British it was deployed at the outset in order to allow the equivalent number of men to be reserved, and in the German it was reserved in order to allow these men to be deployed at the outset. The German infantry machine guns were conveyed on the march in a wagon, and when unpacked for action were fitted underneath with sleigh-runners and dragged across country.*

(*) The provision of a cavalry train was another controversial subject in Germany. There was much to be said for it, but it is worth noting that in Great Britain the cavalry train introduced in 1911 was abolished in 1913.

*The cavalry machine gun battery (one per division) was somewhat differently organized.



GERMAN FIELD BATTERY.




THE PRUSSIAN GOOSE STEP.

The weapon of the infantry soldier was the excellent long rifle of 1898, with a box magazine taking a clip of five cartridges at a time.

In the infantry company a certain number of buglers, range-takers, and signallers formed a small party under the captain's orders, distinct from the platoons—an arrangement that had been copied by the British Army from the German a short time before the war.

The ruling idea of infantry tactics was the development of the greatest possible fire-power, which it was sought to produce by forming very strong firing lines at long range so as to open fire simultaneously when more effective ranges were reached. Behind this strong firing line came supports, also deployed, so as to be able to fill up the gaps along the length of the firing line as men were shot or straggled away for safety. Not dash, but sheer power, was the ideal. Even the bayonet charge was regarded as merely a way of "presenting for payment the cheque drawn by rifle-fire," as the sequel

rather than the culmination of the infantry attack. In the interests of this theory the Germans had their infantry formations principally selected, if not exclusively, with a view to rapid deployment. The old "company column" of 1870—platoons in line one behind the other—was freely used under the name of "column of platoons," and a new "company column" had been introduced which affords yet another example of the dovetailing of doctrine and organization. In appearance it was exactly the same as a French or British "line of platoons in fours," but whereas in the armies of the Allies it was a formation for manœuvring under fire in Germany it was used to reduce the time of deployment to a minimum, so as to show that powerful fire-front to which the Germans pinned their faith as rapidly as possible. Their confident belief in the power of fire to win battles has already been mentioned in connexion with machine guns, and it will be sufficient here to note that it underlay all their severely practical formations, from that of the




GERMAN MILITARY MOTOR-CAR, ARMED WITH A KRUPP GUN FOR FIRING AT AEROPLANES.

[Central News.]

division on the march down to that of the platoon under shrapnel fire.

The unit of the cavalry, as always, was the squadron of about 150 sabres—"lances" would be a better expression, since the whole of the German cavalry, and not the Uhlans alone, were armed with the lance. The regiment on service had four squadrons of this strength, commanded by captains with subalterns in charge of the "troops," of which there were four to the squadron. No arm of the service had been the object of more severe criticism and attack than the cavalry, and the events of the South African War and the Manchurian Campaign had not been encouraging to the champions of the old knee-to-knee charge, in which for a generation before 1900 the Germans had excelled all others. Even in Germany the orthodox views on cavalry had been rudely challenged, and so high an authority as Bernhardt had openly

joined the heretics. At one time, only a couple of years before this war, it had even been seriously proposed that the German trooper should be armed with the rifle and bayonet. In this instance, then, German tactical ideas both official and unofficial were in a state of flux, and no certain indication as to the details of cavalry action could have been discerned in advance. There were, of course, general principles, such as that of reconnaissance by cavalry masses as the best basis of general strategic dispositions—a principle which the opposite party flatly denied—but in so far as these were true there was nothing new about them, and in so far as they were new the doctrines of the Bernhardt school were at least questionable. What the special quality, the differentia, of German cavalry was to be was then unknown. Formerly it had excelled on its own solid ground in the horsemastership and individual riding that Schmidt, Rosenberg,



CONCEALED GERMAN ARTILLERY.

[*Central News.*]

Seufft-Pilsach, and cavalry leaders of their stamp had made the basis of the grand charge. Now, not only had its enemies learned as much, but it was doubtful whether the grand charge would figure in the new cavalry tactics at all. The regimental organization of the field artillery is shown in the diagram. For each infantry division one regiment was available, each of two groups (*Abteilungen*) of three six-gun batteries and a light ammunition column. In one of the two regiments a howitzer group was substituted for one of the gun groups. Each battery had, in addition, an "observation wagon," from the ladder of which its captain directed the fire. To each gun one battery wagon was allotted, but all these wagons, collectively called the echelon (*staffel*), marched in rear of the guns and only three were normally brought up alongside the guns in action. Herein the German artillery procedure presented a sharp contrast to the more up-to-date methods of the French and the English, whose batteries always had one wagon per gun and sometimes more in the fighting line, as well as a second and even a third in the wagon line. This comparative poverty of immediate ammunition supply the Germans expected to make good by means of the light ammunition column, which was organized on the basis of one wagon per gun. The British and German systems may thus be compared:—

Wagons per battery—

German firing battery, 3; *staffel*, 3; light ammunition column, 6=12.*

British firing battery, 6; wagon line, 6; brigade ammunition column, 6=18.*

As in the case of the cavalry, so in that of the artillery, tactical ideas in Germany were in a state of flux. But whereas in the case of the cavalry the disputants on both sides were well abreast of the times, in that of the artillery an unfortunate blunder of the higher authorities had compelled the arm to lag behind the same arm in other countries, and that at a period in which artillery was developing with unheard of rapidity. In 1896 the German Government decided to rearm its field batteries with the C/96 gun, a breech-loader that was probably better than any gun of corresponding date in other armies. This was carried out at enormous expense almost immediately. But in 1897 France rearmed with an entirely new class of gun, the quick-firer, and it soon became evident that artillery tactics and even tactics in general had been revolutionized. Germany, found



MEMBERS OF THE GERMAN RED CROSS CORPS.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]

wanting for once in that shrewd foresight with which she is generally credited, had to face the fact that her brand-new guns were out of date. But as it was impossible to spend fresh millions on a rearmament there was nothing to be done but to watch and wait. Lest *moral* should suffer it was asserted that the .96 gun was "practically" a quick-firer, and that no revolution in tactics, artillery or other, had come about in consequence of the new French weapon. Thus the methods and instructions of field artillery training remained in the breech-loader era while other armies were successively following the lead of France. The points of the quick-firer are somewhat technical, but they can be summed up roughly in one phrase—the steady carriage and the free-recoiling gun. The anchoring of the carriage made it possible to fire with far greater speed, since the gun-carriage did not leap back on firing, and had not to be re-layed at each round, as of old. It made indirect fire from behind cover comparatively easy, since the carriage accurately kept its position and angles once measured from an observing station held good in action. The recoil of the gun along the set path of its guides or runners was so smooth that the accuracy of fire was greater than it had ever been. And, lastly, the gun-carriage remaining steady, the men serving the gun could take cover behind a gun-shield and had not at every round to stand clear of the wheels. In every one of these important points the German gun, good

*Plus gun-limbers in each case; the observation wagon of the German battery also carried some ammunition.



GERMAN TRANSPORT.

of its kind as it was, was totally wanting, and its tactics had necessarily to conform—or rather were prevented from following the progress of other artilleries. Presently the crisis passed as a means was found of converting the guns so as to recoil on an anchored carriage. It became “96/NA,” a true quickfirer, though, as was to be expected, not a very successful one. In power and general quality it was inferior to the gun of any European Power’s first line army, and equivalent, or nearly so, to the British Territorial Army’s converted 15-pounder. One advantage, however, it possessed over better models—it was very light to man-handle in action. What other possibilities had been sacrificed to this no one but the designers could tell. But the advantage, so far as it went, was incontestable. It must be noted however that the gun limbered up and travelling was quite as heavy as other field-gun equipments elsewhere. In other respects, such as speed of ranging and accuracy of shrapnel fire under normal conditions,* ease of switching batteries on to successive targets, &c., the Germans were at a very great disadvantage, and if the infantry that underwent its fire in 1914 spoke of it with respect, it was chiefly because time-shrapnel fire on a large scale had never been experienced by that infantry. Destructive bombardment of accurately located trenches by German field-guns was occasionally, if not frequently, recorded, but in its function—the chief function

of field artillery—of covering the infantry’s advance to the assault, the cool shooting of the British infantry on the defensive proves it to have failed.


But if the field gun and its tactics were below the most modern standards, the howitzers, both great and small, were of the most modern and formidable types, and it is probable that most of the effect achieved by the German artillery in the war was the work of the howitzers.

The field howitzers (4-in. calibre), as we have said, formed part of the field artillery of the divisions and were organized in the same way, in a group (*abteilung*) of three six-gun batteries and ammunition column. The heavy howitzers were, however, manned by the foot artillery (corresponding to the British Royal garrison artillery). A heavy field howitzer battalion horsed for field service with an army corps consisted of four four-gun batteries of 6in. (15c/m.) howitzers with two extra observation wagons to enable the whole to work in two two-battery groups. The battery of four guns had an observation wagon, four first wagons with the guns, four second wagons in the *staffel*, and a light ammunition column. The mobility of these weapons was roughly that of the 60-pounder long gun of the British Army.

Heavier still were the mortars*, of 8.4in. and, for siege purposes, of 11in. calibre, on special wheeled carriages, of which the wheels were equipped so as to give a good bearing both on

*Hence, probably, the desperate efforts made by the Germans to take ranges by means of spies, reported by British and other soldiers in the west.

*A certain number of batteries were equipped with 4in. and 5in. long guns instead of heavy howitzers and mortars.



FORTIFICATIONS OF THE RHINE FRONTIER.



GERMAN FIELD POST-OFFICE.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]

the road and on the ground when firing. This device had been so far perfected that the great 11in. howitzers (mortars) which had hitherto required concrete beds were brought into action before the Belgian fortresses on their own wheels.

The horse artillery, of which 11 groups were provided for the service of 11 line cavalry divisions, were organized in four-gun batteries. The gun was simply the field gun stripped of the gunners, their kits, and various other weights, and not a lighter piece in itself as was the British horse artillery gun.

The foot artillery allotted to fortresses and the fortress engineers falls outside the scope of the present chapter, which deals with field armies and field units only. Little need be said, too, of the field engineers, who were styled pioneers, except that the sharp division of the whole technical arm into fortress and barrack engineers and field pioneers is in complete contrast to the organization of the British royal engineers, who form one large corps, of which all parts are officially considered

to be interchangeable. Shortly before the war it had been suggested that the German system should be adopted in Great Britain, but the controversy which grew out of the suggestion showed a very strong opposition to the proposal, and while pioneer battalions are absolutely indispensable in undeveloped countries such as India, there was certainly nothing in the performances of the German pioneer companies in 1870 to warrant acceptance of the dual organization by others.

Another point to be noted is that all such branches as telegraphy, air service, and railway troops were in Germany completely separated from both the engineers and the pioneers, and formed a class by themselves as "communication troops" (*verkehrstruppen*). How far these communication troops entered into the composition of the army corps the diagrams above indicate; the remainder were, of course, allotted to the service of lines of communication. Cyclists, other than those employed as dispatch riders, had been for many years regarded with disfavour in Germany. A short time before the war, however, their utility for certain combatant services was at last admitted, and detachments (of the strength of a small company) were formed by the light infantry battalions (*jügers*) as infantry supports for the advanced cavalry divisions.

Signallers, other than telegraphists, were an ill-developed branch in Germany as elsewhere, for it was only in the British Army that visual signalling had been brought to any high degree of usefulness. In Germany, as late as five years before the war, flag signalling had only been used for communication between butts and firing points at target practice.

Supply was controlled by the train and the staff officers representing that branch of the service on the staffs of armies, corps, and divisions. In general, local resources were used as far as possible, but there was of course a full organization for supply from the rear, and in the soldiers' haversacks there were two or more "iron" rations as emergency supplies. The complete break with horsed transport traditions that had been possible for Great Britain, with her small Army and her large resources in motor lorries, was not so for Germany, whose mechanical transport vehicles, in spite of heavy subsidies from the State, were not numerous enough to deal with the supplies of her huge forces in the British way. In its broadest outline, therefore, the system of supply from the rear was a construction of horsed magazines and "road-trains" (petrol tractors with trucks) analogous to that of the British Army between

*Rather because only 22 were available under the previous six-gun battery organization for 33 cavalry brigades than from general acceptance on tactical grounds of the four-gun principle, which in other countries had rapidly grown in favour since the adoption of the quick-firer.

1905 and 1911, with the exception—an important one, as all staff officers know—that there seems to have been no accumulation of stores at an “advanced depôt,” but a daily dispatch to one or more changeable “railheads.” Such magazines as there were in the neighbourhood of the fighting area were “field depôts” for the storage of requisitioned supplies. Infantry companies, &c., were furnished with travelling kitchens. The train was as usual divided into baggage sections and supply portions, and the latter were organized and their wagons packed by sections of one day’s food each.

The system of medical aid in the field differed from that of the British Army chiefly in the greater development of the regimental aid post system and the absence of the clearing hospital, which in the British system was intended to free the field ambulances of wounded at the earliest possible moment. The German system, in short, was one of field hospitals rather than one of field ambulances.* But the main point, the principle of evacuating wounded as fast as possible and placing them in line of communication or base hospitals, was common to both—indeed to all—armies. The ammunition supply of the infantry was secured first by company ammunition wagons, whose contents—as in the British service—were brought to the firing line by the incoming supports and reserves ;

*Field hospitals formed part of the trains and not, as did British field ambulances, of the first-line transport.



PRINCE OF LIPPE.

[Central News.]

and secondly by the divisional ammunition columns*, which formed the most advanced portion of the train, half a day’s march behind the troops.

The organization of these auxiliary services

*Not the light ammunition columns of the artillery, as in the British service.




GERMAN INFANTRY CELEBRATING SEDAN DAY IN BERLIN.

[Central News.]

was, in short, minute and thorough. But it was certainly questionable whether it was up to date.

The same might indeed be said of the fighting troops themselves. Foreign observers who had attended the *Kaisermanöver* year after year were agreed upon the fact that the German Army was a wonderful machine. But many if not most of them noted at the same time

that the elements of the machine—the human beings, the short-service citizens—had been sacrificed to mechanical efficiency, and that if the fate of a modern battle, as all asserted—Germans as emphatically as any—depended upon the qualities of the individual soldier, the German Army would fall far below the reputation for invincibility that it had arrogated to itself.



CHAPTER VII.

THE GERMAN THEORY OF WAR.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT SINCE 1870—PRUSSIANIZING THE ARMY—LARGE AND INEFFICIENT VERSUS SMALL AND EFFICIENT ARMIES—WAR ON TWO FRONTS DETERMINING FACTOR—THE BATTLE WITH "NO MORROW" OR "BATTLE OF REVERSED FRONTS"—THE NAPOLEONIC AND 1870 EXAMPLES—CLOSE GROUP AND DEPLOYING OF CENTRAL RESERVES IMPOSSIBLE—THE "TIDAL WAVE" ENVELOPMENT—MOLTKE'S PRACTICE—OBJECTIONS TO THE "TIDAL WAVE" THEORY—NEED FOR ACCURATE INFORMATION AS TO POSITION OF ENEMY—MEANS OF OBTAINING INFORMATION—AIRCRAFT—USE OF CAVALRY AND MACHINE GUNS—THE GERMAN RAILWAYS—NECESSITY OF A WIDE STRATEGIC FRONT AND CONSEQUENT NEED FOR INVADING BY LUXEMBURG AND BELGIUM—MOVEMENTS OF CORPS HAD TO BE SIMULTANEOUS AND ACCORDING TO A TIME-TABLE—DANGER OF COUNTERSTROKES—PROTECTIVE DETACHMENTS—INITIATIVE OF COMMANDERS RESTRICTED—GERMAN TACTICS ACCOMPANYING THE "TIDAL WAVE."

ON land, the conflict of Germany with France and Great Britain was a conflict not only of principles and of men and of weapons, but also one between different ideas on the methods of conducting military operations. Some of the differences were derived from and others governed the principles, the men, and the arms. If, therefore, we are to understand the operations of the war aright, it is necessary to realize the nature of the rival, almost opposed, theories of war which were put into practice in those operations.

It has already been remarked that the German organization stands in closer relation to the German doctrines of strategy and tactics than the French organization to the French principles. For in Germany the Government through its police-like bureaucracy has a far greater hold on the individual citizen than in France, and it had had that hold for so long that several successive army systems based upon it had come and had their day and gone again. In other words, purely strategic and tactical considerations could be allowed for in the forms and framework of the Army to an extent that would not have been possible in a community less wealthy (like Japan) or one more in-

dividualized (as in the case of France), or one in which defence problems were manifold in kind and varying in degree (as in Great Britain). Germany's military problem, on however great a scale it seemed to be set, was in reality a simple one, and simplicity and power were the main elements of the military system adopted to solve it. Nevertheless, traditions and matters of external and internal policy had their effect here as elsewhere upon the military system, and it was not a slight one.

To begin with, 1866 and 1870 had imbued the German Army and the German people at large with a conviction that, in general, their organization—a single-line army which was a compromise between the regular professional type and the national militia type—was that most suited to the circumstances of a European War of the future, and the fact that other nations copied their system more or less slavishly after 1870 made of this conviction a creed of self-satisfaction. When from time to time German officers preached that the Empire was in danger, it was not in the belief that matters were really in that case, but with the intention of improving still more upon their formidable war engine. The bible of this tradition was the Official History of the 1870 war. But the authorities



GENERAL GALLIENI.
Military Governor of Paris in 1914.

and observant officers of all ranks who had been through that war knew well that the army of 1870 was imperfect in many vital points, and, as a first reform, the authorities set about imposing the Prussian military institutions upon the South German contingents, in the name of simplicity, and *sous-entendu* in that of power, since it was not only the want of homogeneity but also the lack of discipline and "drive" in battle that had made those contingents so feeble. The process of forming the homogeneous army was neither easy nor pleasant, for it involved putting strict officially-minded Prussians in the midst of easy-going Southerners as comrades in field and mess; and in one respect it was even necessary to infringe upon the historic territorial system of recruitment, since it was obviously impossible to put Hanoverians *en masse* into the X. Corps, or Alsatians in the XV.

This process of Prussianizing the Army was practically completed in about 30 years, and thus, when the Great War came, it had taken effect for 15 years or so.

There were yet other things to be done. The tactical results of 1870—the first war in which breech-loader met breech-loader—were hard to digest, and it is safe to say that for many years no two groups of officers held exactly the same opinions on the most serious

questions of tactics. No authority in the world has less liking for chaos than the Prussian, but authority was powerless to deal with the men of 1870—whom it had so well taught to exercise "initiative"—and the old 1812-1848 drill-book was retained for parade purposes till 1888, while outside the limits of the barrack square all was opinion and controversy. When homogeneity of organization and type was fairly well completed, homogeneity in the tactical sphere was still far distant. Each master-mind evolved his own tactical theories, and the rest followed agape. In those days there were giants—Bronsart, Verdy du Vernois, Meckel, Scherff, Boguslawski, Hoenig.

The phenomena which these men set themselves to examine were the same for each, the battlefield phenomena of 1870, the "dissolving" effect of rifle fire, and above all the problem of preventing, under the new conditions of warfare, the wholesale skulking of unwounded men.*

Time after time in the earlier battles one-third and more of the men nominally engaged had been missing as unwounded stragglers—runaways in some cases, but chiefly skulkers who, after lying down to fire, were "deaf to the call of the whistle" when their comrades rose and pushed forward, and who lay cowering or, worse still, kept up a fusillade against all troops that approached them. The problem of these "squatting hares" (*Drückeberger*) dominates the military thought of the eighties and nineties, and at the close of this epoch two broad ideas, understood rather than expressed in words, had taken shape in men's minds. One was that, human nature being human nature, the only way in which to ensure that all the available brave men were brought into action was to bring into the army every possible man, even at the cost of shortening the term of service and lowering the physical standards, since no test really told except the psychic test of battle itself. Tactically (according to the supporters of this school of thought) the mass was to be handled in the simplest possible fashion—quietly deployed in full strength at the outset, and then at the proper moment launched in full sudden violence to drive through to victory by its inherent worth alone. All manoeuvres and dispositions were to be made in view of the one purpose of giving effect to the will power of those private soldiers who possessed it. Of the rest some would be carried on by their brave comrades, and as

**Massendrückebergertum* is the technical term invented by the Germans for this phenomenon.

for the remainder, who encumbered the battlefield, matters would be no worse after all than in 1870.

The other school, or rather the other tendency (for the word school is too definite and formal), had as its starting point the principles of Frederick the Great; it was proposed to sacrifice quantity to quality and initiative to hard discipline, and to seek victory with a smaller army trained to mechanical perfection. For the supporters of this school the secret of victory was speed of onset coupled with crushing volleys* during the advance. At the same time those leaders who knew 1870 from the company and battalion point of view, and were now risen to higher rank, no longer influenced the company and battalion training upon which controversy then centred. Younger men had taken their places, and it was these who found themselves in the superior commands when the war of 1914 broke out. Below them again was one generation after another, from major to subaltern, which knew nothing of 1870 at first hand, and in their case experience of the realities of the battlefield no longer operated as a check upon attempts to harden extreme theories into practice. Those "realities" were indeed brought into the light by the published works of Meckel, Hoenig, and others, but they were regarded by some of the new generation as an almost treasonable attack upon the sacred and also profitable legends of 1870.

Those who looked upon them calmly, however, tended to regard them as proving the case for the small, iron quality-army. But the controversy, as a controversy, entered on a new lease of life owing to the introduction of the magazine rifle with its smokeless powder; when first introduced it threatened to chastise with scorpions the errors and weaknesses that the rifles of 1870 had only beaten with whips. Some held that the Frederician discipline was more than ever necessary, and others that nothing but the thin-swarm method of attack could cope with the fire power of the new weapons.

But the former class had the prestige of war experience and the latter, with few exceptions, had not, and the theory of the thick-volley firing line was practically in possession of the field, when a new set of conditions—this time political—arose to confirm it.

Before the time of which we are speaking the game of diplomacy had been played between the



GENERAL D'AMADE.

[H. Waller Barnett.]

league of the Three Emperors and the Triple Alliance, with Bismarck as "honest broker," and a war with France was the focus to which all ways of German military activity converged. But at that moment of military development the Franco-Russian understanding hardened into alliance and Germany was faced with a new problem—the "war on two fronts"—one to which the Austrian and Italian alliances were no more than a contribution or aid. The shape that German strategy and war doctrine was to take, then, depended chiefly upon the time which the immense Russian Empire would need to bring its forces into action. Hitherto this had been inordinately long, but now French capital was employed for Russian strategic railways, and the Russian Army, instead of being a peace army distributed through the whole Empire, became a frontier army, with seven-eighths of its strength permanently stationed in Poland and the Balkan provinces. The danger then was really simultaneous action of France and Russia on the two frontiers. But this danger was rather in the future than in the present. Many years must elapse before Russian mobilization could be "speeded up" to anything approaching that of France or Germany, and there was, therefore, so far as the generation of 1890-1910 was concerned, an appreciable interval

*Not literally the old Frederician volleys, but what are now called "bursts of fire."

between the French side of the possible war and the Russian. That interval it was proposed to use for the crushing of France, whose mobilization period was two days longer than the German,* and an army that could overwhelm France in a month or six weeks and still be fit afterwards to deal with the Russians had to be an army of high quality and training.

But if the conditions of foreign politics favoured the supporters of the quality-army, those at home told almost as much in favour of the quantity-army. While the population had been rapidly growing, the proportion of the recruit contingent taken in annually had not increased. The "universal service" theory had become a farce in practice, since not much more than one-third of the available recruits were taken, and the others were allowed to go scot free. The result was, on the one hand, a separation of army and nation and an unfair method of recruiting which was creating discontent and disaffection, and, on the other hand, too few men were undergoing the education of military discipline which the Government regarded as its safeguard. But unless the peace establishment of the Army was considerably increased, which was impossible, the only

method of passing more men through the ranks was the reduction of the term of colour service, and accordingly the two years' term was introduced instead of the old three years', except for cavalry and certain other branches. These conditions, of course, tended to support the adherents of the quantity army.

But both the external influences which made for the quality army and the internal which produced the quantity army were equally powerful, for their needs were equally imperative. And so the attempt was made to produce the quantity army by conscription and to make it, when produced, into a quality army by ceaseless, ruthless intensity of training.

From these antecedents and in these conditions the modern German doctrine of war grew up. Before it came to its test in 1914, however, the army which was to be its instrument had begun over again the cycle of progress. The population continued to increase, while the Army strength and the recruit contingent to furnish it remained much the same. Even with two years' service—a minimum that Germany, with her internal political difficulties, dared not reduce—by about 1905 less than half the able-bodied men were being taken into the Army. More and more, then, the notion of the small quality army was gaining ground, while to produce it on a two years' term meant an intensive training which dulled the men by its monotone intensity. But Russia, meanwhile, though temporarily put out of action

* Owing chiefly to the fact that the French Army was recruited generally, the regiments drawing their recruits without regard to territorial connexions, whereas in Germany the recruiting system was (save in case of Hanoverians, Alsations, &c.) strictly local, all reservists, therefore, living within easy reach of their regiments. The German system was tried in France in the régime of General André, but was a failure.



THE KAISER INSTRUCTING HIS GENERALS.

by her Japanese war, began—from 1910 especially—to organize not only her troops but her administrative services, and General Sukhomlinov's reforms rapidly brought the day nearer upon which Russia could feel sure of concentrating all her forces in three weeks. Thus approached the really simultaneous war on two fronts, not to be met by two successive blows, however fierce they might be and however highly-tempered the army that delivered them. The limit was reached in 1912, when the rise of Serbia and Greece made it apparent that something less than the whole Austrian Army would be free to serve in Galicia. A halt was called in expenditure on the Fleet. Money was voted to the Army and the peace establishments enormously expanded with a view (1) to reducing the number of reservists required to complete the "active," or highly-tempered, army to war strength; and (2) to providing a cadre of active officers and non-commissioned officers for the reserve formations.

The development of these reserve formations, which has already been alluded to in an earlier chapter, was the most important feature of recent military reforms in Germany. Viewed in one aspect, it was a partial return to the principle of two-line armies, discredited since 1870; viewed from another, it was an attempt to secure the working of the previous war-plan and war-theory by the old army, by keeping the ring clear for it, under new conditions that had not been allowed for in the original scheme. It may be assumed, then, that the blow upon France was delivered in accordance with the doctrines accepted and the plans prepared in accordance with them.

The exact terms of the doctrine or creed are unknown. All that had become known about it before the war was that there was a confidential "instructions for higher commanders," revised in 1910, distinct from the Field Service Regulations of the Army. That being so, the only foundations for what were necessarily guesses were (a) manœuvre practice; (b) trend of opinions in German military literature; and (c) the location of the strategic railway stations. These however, taken together, afforded plenty of trustworthy evidence, and the character of the doctrine itself, its plainness and its scorn of artifice and variants indicated that the facts could be trusted as premises for a conclusion.

Its aim was the "battle with no morrow," the complete and self-sufficing decisive victory. As we have seen, temporizing in any form had become less and less possible as against France in proportion as the Russian mobilization had become more rapid. If, then, a new Sedan had been



GENERAL DE CASTELNAU.

[Pierre Petit.]

the ideal of the generation of Verdy du Vernois and Bronsart, Moltke's confidential assistants, how much more was it that of the newer generation whose problem demanded speed above all else, and whose manœuvre experience had not told them the limits imposed by human nature upon the process of speeding-up, nor brought home the fact that in war an army marches not to the "stand-fast" of a field day but to the strain of battle.

Policy thus demanding the single decisive victory at the earliest possible date, strategy, called upon to find the means of achieving it, answered with the "battle on reversed fronts." If the German Army could place itself in rear of the French, the French would *ipso facto* be in rear of the Germans—that is, in each case, the army would be cut off from its mother country. Obviously such a battle would be decisive enough, since the retreat of the beaten side into hostile territory instead of friendly would be sheer dissolution, not to mention that the descent of one side upon the enemy's rear would inevitably break up or capture his wagon trains of all sorts. It is true that this is a double-edged weapon, for the Germans would expose their wagons—or more strictly speaking their lines of communications—to the same fate. But it was held that success in this



GERMAN FIELD ARTILLERY.

[Central News.]

extremely dangerous game would go to the side which showed the most desperate resolution and driving force, and compelled the enemy to submit to it, or to try to evade it, rather than to answer it with its like. German authorities spoke of the battle with reversed fronts as the purest form of strategy—as indeed it is, for it plays for nothing less than the annihilation of one side or of the other—but though, with Von der Goltz, they went on to assert that such strategy needed the German Army to execute it, the fact was rather that the German Army needed such strategy. Exceptional circumstances call for strong measures.


But whereas in Napoleon's days it was quite feasible, with a compact army in a theatre of war spacious relatively to the army's area within it, to bring about a battle with fronts reversed as at Marengo, Ulm, and Jena, in the modern war of citizen masses its achievement was by no means so easy. In 1870 the great battle of Gravelotte-St. Privat was fought with fronts reversed, but it was not the Prussian armies as a whole that brought about the decision, but the few brigades that were still in hand after the French right flank had been found and their whole front engaged. In the case of Sedan it was only the forward

plunge of McMahon's army that enabled the Crown Prince to get in his rear; far from deliberately manœuvring for the purpose, the German Army III. simply found itself in a position to cut the Marshal from Paris, and did so.*

The possibility of a group of armies on the modern scale passing completely round another similar army was, to say the least, doubtful, and the problem had to be tackled in a different way. Instead of by passing round, it was to be achieved by advancing in a long deployed line, the flanks of which would, it was expected, lap round those of the more closely grouped enemy, wherever he was met with. This theory of *envelopment* was the basis of all modern German strategy.


Envelopment is simply the surrounding of the enemy. Supposing that enemy to be stationary (as the French were at Sedan) there are two ways of bringing this about—(a) by advancing in a close group until the enemy is met and then deploying the central reserves out to one or both flanks so as to swing them in upon the enemy's rear; (b) by starting from a very wide front and gradually converging

*The operative strategy of the Sedan Campaign was far from being as simple as this, and still repays the closest study as a piece of "staff work." But as regards theory alone, the above generalization is correct enough.



GERMAN MEDICAL CORPS AND FIELD KITCHEN CROSSING A PONTON BRIDGE.

[Central News]



PHASES OF A GERMAN " ENVELOPMENT " MOVEMENT.



GERMAN INFANTRY ABOUT TO ATTACK.

[Central News.]

upon the enemy's assumed position. Both methods had been tried on several occasions, the first tactically and on a small scale at Wörth in 1870 and strategically on a big scale at Mukden; the second in 1866, 1870, and at Liao-Yang in 1904. Each had successes and also failures to its account. But with armies of the size that a Franco-German conflict would bring into line the first method was almost, if not quite, impossible owing to the time which the massed central reserves would take to work away to the flanks before they could overlap the enemy and swing in upon his rear. The only form of offensive in which it could be employed was, in fact, the counter-offensive which could be initiated on the basis of a fairly clear military situation, and the counter-offensive and even the delayed offensive

were forms of war in which the Germans, situated as they were with respect to Russia, could not have indulged in if they had wished to do so.

The German envelopment, then, would start from a very wide base on the frontier itself—or rather on the line of railheads where the troops were detrained—and thence converge upon the enemy. It is questionable whether Moltke himself ever accepted this principle *in toto*. In 1866 a strategic deployment of this kind was forced upon him by the lie of the Prussian railways, and many were the risks run in carrying it forward to an issue of decisive victory. In 1870 the tendency to envelop certainly appeared on every occasion, but it was coupled with constant striving on Moltke's part to keep his forces in hand and to avoid over-extension. His ideal, if he had one—and he himself defined strategy as a “system of expedients”—was a line of closely grouped masses each so far separated from its neighbours as to have elbow room not only for plain deployment for battle but for manœuvre as well. But those who regarded themselves as the inheritors of the Moltke tradition based themselves frankly upon the dispositions of 1866, which only came to a happy issue through the enemy's internal dissensions, and of August, 1870, which completely failed in the attempt to envelop the French Army on the Saar. In 1914, then, there was more “system” than “expedients.” In other words, the standard enveloping strategy was *preconceived*—based upon peace-time studies and preconceived ideas as to how the enemy must act according to the rules of the game.

As Moltke remarked, “One must always credit the enemy with doing the right thing.”


But such a saying, axiomatic as it looks, must on no account be treated as an axiom




A CUIRASSIER WITH CARBINE.

It was all very well for Moltke to say so, but he himself had on more than one grave occasion, in 1866 and 1870, seen his best-laid schemes crumble to nothing because the enemy did not take the correct military course—as it appeared to Moltke on the data before him. From this it is no great step to the belief that the enemy must do as our best general tells him, and the expression of this belief is the doctrine that by rapidity and violence of action we can compel an enemy to conform to our own moves. That doctrine and the doctrine of envelopment were the two principal articles of the German military faith before the war.

Their connexion it is important to realize. It is true that with the small armies and slow travelling of Napoleon's day the seizure of the initiative by sudden violence was quite possible in combination with a close, deep grouping of the forces. But modern conditions of national recruiting and railway transport had, as we have already observed, made this form the instrument of the reserved counter-attack. The side which aimed at the speediest decision could make no use of a form in which the depth of the army during its advance was five or six days' marches. The deployed line, or




(A.)



(B.)

'tidal wave,' on the other hand, was a form that gave the minimum depth for a given force, hence a minimum time for deploying to the front for battle, and consequently the speediest decision one way or the other. By the same token, it gave the widest possible front for the given force, and, therefore, the greatest possible chances of overlapping the enemy's front and so of ensuring by envelopment the completest decision.

On the other hand, an army deployed to its greatest possible lateral extension was irretrievably committed to the direction then given it. It could not regroup itself to meet new situations on account of its very length. If the point at which the enemy was met lay upon one flank of the line (diagram *a*) instead of at the centre, as had been presumed



GERMAN WAR ROCKET PHOTOGRAPHY.

The Camera is fitted to a parachute which is fired into the air like a rocket.
 1. Sighting. 2. The Rocket fired. 3. One of the photographs obtained.

[News Illustrations.]



GERMAN CAVALRY TAKING UP POSITIONS.

[Central News.

(diagram *b*), the attempted envelopment might, and with an active adversary would almost certainly, come too late. If, again, the enemy's group lay completely outside the sweep of the enveloper's flanks, the latter would have struck the blow in the air, exposed his flank and rear before reaching the enemy's, and, in short, squandered the assets of his initiative to no purpose. If, again, the enemy were after all in the area presumed, the enveloper would have no small difficulty in so timing his marches as to achieve his purpose, for the enemy, retarding his advance by rearguards, would detain some of the oncoming columns far longer than others.

These disadvantages of the enveloping method being recognized, let us see how the side that intends to adopt it can neutralize, or attempt to neutralize, them.

It is clear, first of all, that everything, or nearly everything, depends on the accuracy of the forecast which determines the direction of the line's advance. A part of this information can be collected, classified, and studied in peace. The remainder must be observed during the course of the operations themselves, either by one or more of the following means: a detachment of all arms carrying out a "reconnaissance in force," and holding the enemy, when found, long enough to ensure that the information gleaned will be still valid at the time of the action based upon it; or cavalry masses flung out far ahead to ascertain the general outline and apparent movements of the

hostile group; or air reconnaissance; or, lastly, the reports of spies, newspaper checkers, and other individual agents. Practically all these means are employed by all armies, for information is of very high importance for the working of any form of strategy; it is in the relative utility of these means that we find divergencies of doctrine. Air reconnaissance being an unknown factor, no definite weight could be attached to it before the war, for, considering the magnitude of the stakes, it would have been sheer gambling to allow great resolutions to depend upon aircraft reconnaissance. Apart from the fact that both airships and aeroplanes were hardly out of the experimental or embryonic stage of their development, aircraft, even if they had been perfect, could not have seen into the mind of the hostile general, or taken prisoners with tell-tale regimental numbers on their buttons and caps and divisional colours on their shoulder-straps. Spy reports, &c., on the other hand, were neither more nor less trustworthy than they had been in past wars; they were, in fact, a constraint for all armies. The divergencies of method referred to lay in the relative importance assigned to the detachment of all arms and to the cavalry mass for the service of information. In France and Great Britain, as we shall see, the two were combined; in Germany, however, it may safely be said that the mixed detachment was anathema, and that the securing of information during the operations was the task of the cavalry alone.

In spite of the legend of the "ubiquitous Uhlan," expert opinion was agreed, even in Germany, that the performances of the reconnoitring cavalry in 1870 were mediocre. In France, after the revival of Napoleonic studies had shown that even the famous squadrons of Mura^t could not give the Emperor a firm basis for his manœuvres, it was held that the capacity of cavalry for useful strategic reconnaissance was limited by the nature of the arm itself. "Cavalry can reconnoitre, but it cannot hold,"* that is, by the time that the cavalry reports had reached headquarters and action had been taken on them they were out of date and misleading, since the enemy was meantime free to move. In Germany, on the contrary, it was considered that cavalry reports, transmitted with all the speed that wireless and motor-cars made possible, were good enough to go on. Certainly the German form of strategic deployment admitted of no other, since the attempt to obtain information by large detachments of all arms would be contrary to the principle of the simultaneous onset of all parts of the line, to which allusion will presently be made.


*Colonel F. N. Maude, C.B.

At the same time, attributing the inability of the old-fashioned cavalry to penetrate an enemy's screen to their feeble fire-power (though nowhere was the shock action of cavalry held in higher honour than in Germany), the Germans did their utmost to increase it; carbine, pistol, horse artillery gun were all developed and made use of, and it is significant that the machine-gun, long regarded with suspicion on the Continent, was first adopted by Germany as a fire auxiliary for her cavalry.* At one time, 1912-13, there was even a proposal to give the trooper a bayonet, and finally cyclists—another arm that German military opinion had formerly thought useless—were grouped into companies for the fire-support of the cavalry.† These innovations might be looked upon as a tentative concession to the notion of the all-arms detachment, but it is more accurate to regard them as attempts to fortify the one-arm reconnaissance by enabling it to keep to its main task.‡ This main task,

*Infantry machine guns came later—indeed, the formation of infantry machine gun companies was only just completed at the outbreak of war.


†It was also proposed to attach the light infantry (Jäger) battalions to the cavalry.

‡In battle the Germans, like other Powers, used their cavalry to contribute to the volume of fire as well as for shock action.



IN THE KRUPP WORKS AT ESSEN.

[L.N.A.]



FRENCH FORTRESS ARTILLERY.
Charging a 95 mm. gun.

as we have seen, was the discovery of the enemy's grouping. As a rule, the defeat of the enemy's main bodies of horse was a necessary preliminary, but in all cases the main body of the German cavalry was meant to pierce the protective cordon which surrounded the enemy and to hold the gap for the safe return of the patrols that were immediately pushed into the enemy's area.

One requisite for a successful envelopment then was information. But it was admitted that information would not necessarily be forthcoming at the very outset, and an army situated as the Germans were could not wait. So, in the first instance, the long line was directed upon the area in which the enemy were supposed to be moving. In the determination of this area the cavalry naturally played a smaller part than peace-time study and careful agent work. But its part in cutting out, one after the other, wrong hypotheses as to the enemy's position in that area was expected to be very considerable. When all was said and done, however, it was not believed that the cavalry could do more than help to clear up the situation. The real beginnings of the envelopment were in the railway lines of Germany.

In this fact—so German authorities considered—lay the best guarantee of all. Not only were numerous through lines of railway transport and railheads provided with platforms for the detrainment of guns and animals* essential for speed in the operations, but they

ensured a simultaneous controlled start of the whole line by marking a limit which every corps could reach within a given period, and further enabled the whole frontier line to be taken as the forward edge of the zone of concentration.* The extent of frontier intended to be taken into this zone was not easy to foresee. That portion of it adjacent to the French frontier was comparatively narrow, and on both sides portions of it were closed—whether partially or completely war alone could prove—by barrier forts. In France the gap of Épinal-Toul, in Germany the gap of Delme-Mutzig were the only really clear avenues of hostile approach. Therefore, though the numbers of troops on both sides were continually growing, and progress in armament too was enabling a force to fight on an ever wider and wider front for the same numbers, the opposed fronts of battle were equally strong against direct attack and equally difficult to turn without violation of Luxemburg, Belgian, and Swiss neutrality. Now these new conditions told rather against Germany than against France, for the latter's war doctrine did not favour extension of fronts and the former's did so. As civilization knows to its cost, Germany thought it necessary to expand the front of concentration so as to take in practically the whole of her frontier line from Emmerich to Basle. It is not credible that a doctrine of war that was no more than skin-deep, a peace-time strategical essay, would have brought this about. It must therefore be held to be finally

*They did not, however, contribute it, but were rather detrimental to secrecy, for railway works are constructed and run openly in peace. It was possible for any foreign staff officer, therefore, to work out time tables for the concentration.




FRENCH FORTRESS ARTILLERY.
Officers watching effect of fire.

*As every traveller knows, ordinary German railway stations have no platforms in the British sense.

proved, what other evidence had already indicated more and more strongly, that according to German ideas the envelopment *must* start by converging marches, and not be developed from an initial close grouping.

Whether or not such procedure was correct under the circumstances was a question upon which strategists were by no means agreed. Some of the most eminent held that by extending the zone of concentration along the Luxemburg-Belgian frontier the Germans sacrificed in speed what they gained in width, in that the entry of the enveloping wing into France was delayed by the amount of time required for its traversing of Belgium, so that to ensure simultaneous onset it became necessary to hold back the central or Franco-German frontier portion of the line for an appreciable number of days. But the German soldiers believed it to be the correct procedure is evidenced by the price that they were prepared to pay for it.

Before discussing the mechanism of the envelopment, let us consider for a moment this factor of simultaneity. We have noted that it is essential to the working of the German type of envelopment that the taking of contact with the enemy should be practically simultaneous at all points. This is necessary, because, in the first instance, the front of deployment is as wide as nature allows, and each of the nuclei that form at the railheads presents a separate weak target for the blow of a better prepared enemy, and in the later stages the deeply-disposed opponent will have detachments called protective troops pushed out in all dangerous directions. We shall have to deal at greater length with this combination when we come to discuss the French doctrine in which it played an important and even dominant part. Here it only need be pointed out that these protective detachments would delay those portions of the long deployed line of the Germans which they met, while the rest progressed with less retardation. If that line was to be kept intact, therefore, parts of it must be held back and others pushed on, regardless of the purely local circumstance of each part. But such a theory, which might have been possible with nonchalant professional armies of the eighteenth century kind,* was less securely based when the army to execute it was a high-tension citizen army. If it was a reproach to the French school of strategy that its methods overstrained the instrument, in some respects at any rate the German doctrine was



FRENCH ARMOURD TRAIN CAR.
The upper picture shows the Observation Tower raised.

in no better case. The soldier is influenced chiefly, if not entirely, by the local situation; and though a professional would shrug his shoulders if told to attack an obviously impregnable position or to abandon a pursuit, a citizen soldier would not be so philosophical. In August, 1870, for instance, Moltke intended his right and centre armies to lie low for five days on the Saar until the Crown Prince's left army could come into line with them and commence the envelopment of the French right. But on the very first of these five days the units of these centre armies were moving about amongst themselves, and on the third day a piecemeal attack by parts of these mixed-up commands ended in the defeat of a French detachment at Spicheren and a general advance over the Saar. Not only was the Crown Prince's army unable to come up in time for the projected envelopment of the area of the Saar, but also the French Army was—save for the detachment above mentioned—not in that area at all.

*If they had possessed numbers and manoeuvring capacity, which they did not.

The instance just quoted shows further that timing is quite as important an ingredient of success as is direction. For not only the central armies, but those on the flanks as well must be pushed on or held back so as to form a continuous line with its neighbours, and the wing armies have to choose the exact moment for swinging in, lest the enemy, instead of standing spellbound as the magic circle formed itself round him, should retire in time and leave the enveloper facing inwards on the circumference of an empty circle—than which no more ludicrous position can be conceived* either in strategy or in tactics. And there were more dangerous, if less absurd, possibilities than this. If the wing that was to envelop went too far before swinging, the enemy could counter-attack the dormant centre, and, if it swung too soon, a mistake in the choice of enveloped area would expose it to be taken in reverse. *Qui tourne est tourné.*

The dilemma was, in short, this. Nothing but a fierce simultaneous onset upon every hostile body that presented itself would prevent an opponent from manœuvring for a counter-stroke, but this attack all along the line was itself dangerous, if not fatal, to simul-

taneous action. But all these questions were mere details of greater or less importance according to the circumstances of the case and the skill and resolution of the leaders. The one great and controlling principle in this form of strategy is its finality. All means tending to the decisive issue are deployed at the outset in a formation that gives either the maximum victory or the maximum disaster. For the long deployed line once launched is incapable of manœuvring in any new direction or meeting any new emergency. Once and for all the die has been cast. These being some of the purposes, advantages, and risks of envelopment, we may sketch very briefly the mechanism of execution, first in the strategical and then in the tactical sphere.


The first phase is the selection of the front of initial concentration, which is as broad as circumstances allow, to ensure of the overlap later, and also because the broader the front the greater the number of through railway lines available and the shorter the time required to concentrate. This line of railheads is so chosen that its flanks are safe by position from a swoop of the enemy's readiest troops, and if no natural obstacle is available the railheads are slanted back *en échelon* on the exposed flank so as to increase the time of marching and to place the inner and more forward railheads on the flank

*Grand Duke of Mecklenburg before Nogent-le-Rotrou, 1870. Japanese at Mukden.



FRENCH MOBILIZATION.
Drawing up Orders in a Railway Car.

[Topical.]




FRENCH HEAVY ARTILLERY.

of an enemy desirous of attacking them.* The second phase—which is hardly distinguishable from the first—is the protection of the central railheads against the immediate and direct onset of the enemy's readiest frontier forces during the period of concentration. In 1870, leaving no protective forces in advance of his centre, Moltke was compelled on the first threat of a French offensive to put back the line of railheads from the Saar to the Rhine, a step which, taken in the very middle of the delicate phase of concentration, produced a most dangerous situation.† From 1871 onwards therefore the Germans so far accepted the idea of protective detachments that a very powerful force in a high state of readiness was maintained on the frontier districts at all times. The disadvantages attaching to such a force—its liability to attack before the main armies had gathered, and the necessity of mobilizing in two stages—were accepted with it. These were inconveniences, but hostile interference with the strategic deployment when the latter was preparatory to a simultaneous advance would be a disaster.

For, as we have seen, the flanks of the line were, in the first instance, *écheloned* back, while during the advance they must be level with the centre, and as the moment for their swing came nearer they must be *écheloned* forward. Simultaneous action, difficult enough to obtain on a level line, might seem to be more so when the flanks had to move faster than the centre. Yet if the direction of the advance had been well chosen, the centre, full in front of the enemy's main body, would automatically be slowed down enough for the

wings to *échelon* themselves forward. One difficulty neutralized the other, provided only that the supreme command had made his choice correctly. But, as we know, his decision was founded upon a preconceived idea and supported by a certain amount of cavalry information, and, therefore, liable to error. In this *écheloning* out of the flanks, as in all other details in the act of envelopment, the straightforward working of the plan depended wholly upon correct premises. Suppose that one of the wings met with sharp opposition that slowed it down to the pace of the centre, the whole system would never succeed in forming the forward crescent that was the immediate prelude of envelopment. It would remain a line, and a thin line at that.

GENERAL BONNAL.
The eminent French strategist.

*The protective troops in front of the centre alluded to a little later do not extend far enough to the flanks to afford direct protection to the whole long line of railheads.

†That it had been foreseen and its details fixed beforehand made little or no difference. It was nothing less than the plan of operations itself that was thrown out of gear by the variant.



M. MESSIMY.

French Minister for War at the outbreak of hostilities.

and the solid counter-attacking mass would roll it up. The deployed line cannot retrieve its mistakes.

Another factor, which is strictly speaking of the moral and not of the mechanical order, is the necessity of restricting the initiative of subordinate commanders. Every student of 1870 knows that the history of that war teems with examples of reckless acts of initiative, sometimes fruitful, sometimes dangerous, but always bearing the stamp of official approval. The heavy precision of the Prussian mind had

had to be educated to display "initiative," and it gave out its lesson, once learnt in season and out of season.* By 1914 this freedom had been almost wholly withdrawn. The form of envelopment having been chosen, and its attendant difficulties of timing accepted, the least that could be done was to restrict the subordinate initiative that had caused most of the mistiming of 1870. No army did more hearty lip-service to the god of initiative than the German. No army allowed less of it in practice. The commander with initiative as understood and encouraged in Germany was simply what in Great Britain would be called the "thruster," the man of energy who, somehow, anyhow, carried through the set task within the set limits. The initiative of a Kameke or a Schkopp, the initiative which without reference to the higher authorities evolved new plans of general battle whenever confronted with local emergencies, had been altogether suppressed.

Yet another point of German procedure may be noted before we pass on to the tactical outcome of this strategy. As has been remarked, the long deployed line is incapable of manœuvre, meaning by manœuvre-capacity the power of moving in any direction and not merely forward and back. A change of front, say from south to east, would take for a line 100 miles long swinging on one of its flanks as a

*It might be suggested that the acts of barbarity which so utterly disgraced the army in 1914 can be attributed in part at least to the same psychology as these acts of initiative of 1870—a mentality which is not capable of *nuances*, but can only take in its lesson if it is put in its crudely absolute terms and reproduces it exactly as learnt.



FRENCH FORTRESS ARTILLERY—22 CM. MORTARS.




A VIEW OF THE BATTLEFIELD NEAR SEZANNE.

[L.N.A.]

fixed pivot no less than ten days of ordinary marching (the outer-flank troops having to move along an arc of 150 miles). Certain German writers, therefore, Bernhardi amongst them, had proposed to use the principle of *écheloning* in cases of change of front with the pivot at the centre. This obviously shortens the time of wheeling through a right-angle, the arc being now 75 miles, equivalent to five days.* But while one half of the line swung forward the other would have to swing back, and it was perhaps doubtful how far the moral of modern national armies would be affected by a retrograde movement that neither was compelled by the enemy nor had any obvious advantage. And naturally the advantages of the great arm's length swing as well as its disadvantages were halved by this procedure. Without entering into any discussion of this highly technical point, we simply note it as one of the methods at the German strategists' disposal. The type, or rather the tendency of the Germans' tactics was in complete accord with their tendencies in strategy. It would be more accurate to say that the strategy from the detrainment on the line of railheads to the inward swing of the flank armies was simply the first chapter of the same book. Even in 1870 this was true to some extent. But then the numbers available were comparatively small and the density of the battle-grouping comparatively great, so that the armies converged more sharply than was the case in the war with which we are concerned. In 1914 the thin battle-front of the deployed millions was almost as long as the line of railheads itself, and the lines of advance of the various armies were almost parallel. More than ever, in these conditions, the strategy and the tactics


are simply part i. and part ii. respectively of the same work. Did our space permit it would be interesting to discuss the several methods by which the battle and the approach were made to dovetail into one another—for in this branch and in this branch alone* of the art of war the Germans appeared to be theoretically ahead of their opponents. But it must suffice, as a prelude to our brief study of the German battle, to mention that the greatest possible attention had been paid to the smooth and quick deployment of long marching columns. In France and Great Britain the word deployment is used in two senses—in its true meaning for the forming combatant lines on the battlefield and more loosely for the arraying of masses in a general line before action. The Germans, on the other hand, distinguished carefully between *Aufmarsch* (march

*Not strictly true, for the *échelon* movements of armies, however, had also been practised more often and were valued more highly by the Germans than by others.



PART OF A BATTERY OF 155 MM REMAILHO Q.F. GUNS.

*There were also certain technical advantages attaching to this procedure in the matter of preventing the wagon trains of one corps from impeding the fighting troops of another.



A FRENCH INFANTRYMAN SHOWING MODERN EQUIPMENT.

[Topical.

up to the field) and *Deployieren* (deployment on the field), and the intermediate stage, too, had a designation of its own, *Entfaltung* (unfolding), which was the process by which the thirty-mile deep marching columns of the army corps on the main roads broke up into smaller columns moving on all available by

roads and even across country preparatory to the deployment proper. The high training of corps and divisional staffs in the management of the *Entfaltung* made itself felt in the early stages of the war, in which time after time we find the Allies taken aback by the rapidity with which the enemy developed his huge masses from their columns of route.

By this well-managed transition the Germans were brought out of the domain of strategy into that of tactics. In that field their constancy of strategy was expected to reap its reward. The theory of the enveloping battle is that under modern conditions the number of men susceptible of useful employment on a given frontage is small, and that no good purpose is served by piling up reserves behind the fighting line, since only one rifle per yard of front can be effective. Granting, though not admitting, this proposition, then it follows that every increment of force beyond that required to establish and to maintain a firing line of one rifle to the yard (with its immediate aids of artillery) can only be employed towards the flanks. Only superiority of fire can justify assault and ensure victory, and superiority of fire is gained by a superior number of rifles* in action. Now, yard for yard, the maximum number of these rifles is the same on both sides. Superiority therefore can only be obtained by contriving the convergence of fire

*This proposition, again, is not one that would be accepted without many reservations in Great Britain.



FRENCH OFFICER INSTRUCTING HIS SOLDIERS BEFORE GOING INTO ACTION.

[Record Press.



FRENCH INFANTRY IN ACTION.


[Record Press.]

from a wider arc than that held by the defence. Extension towards the flanks and incurving of the line thus extended are therefore the main characteristics of the German battle, and the logical extreme to which they tended were of course complete envelopment of a smaller defending circle by a larger attacking circle. Such a result, even if only partially obtained, gave, so the Germans held, the greatest chances of victory, and as we have seen, the victory of envelopment is definitive, a "crowning mercy," as Cromwell would have said.* It was admitted, at the same time, that the issue might be definitive defeat, but as, tactically, envelopment and convergence of fire went hand in hand, victory was much more likely than defeat.

The attempt to realize superiority of fire is made not only by deploying on the outer arc, but by all available means, whether on the front or the incurving flanks. Most of the characteristics to which we have already alluded in the province of strategy appear also in that of tactics—methodical advance during the *entfaltung*, methodical and complete preparation during the initial stage, and then the fierce simultaneous onset in maximum force and at maximum speed upon a spellbound adversary. We have watched the component masses of the army advancing first in deep columns along the main roads, then in shallower columns on all available tracks, the wings first echeloned back, then coming up into line, and then drawing out forward for the decisive blow. The columns are preceded by very small advanced guards

which are purely for local defensive purposes and as soon as the enemy is met with spread out as a screen for the deployment, carefully avoiding serious encounters. Under cover of this—the adversary of course being presumed to have been dazed by the tremendous sweep and power of the approach marches—the masses of artillery trot forward and spread out in their positions, reserving their fire until the highest authority on the ground speaks the word. It is with these artillery masses rather than with the small advanced guards that it is sought to forestall the enemy in possession of ground, and it is under cover of the same organs that the infantry establishes itself on the outskirts of the battlefield.

Here appears the factor of timing—nothing is launched until everything is ready. Whether



*Worcester has been called by the eminent German critic Fritz Hoenig the "archetype of Sedan."



ZOUAVES WORKING MITRAILLEUSE.

[Topical.]


the Germans would not lose in this phase a good deal of the momentum that they had gained in the rapid and powerful strategical advance was questionable. But, for good or evil, matters were so ordained, for the need of simultaneous general action overrode all local considerations. The Germans would sooner withdraw their advance guards altogether than reinforce them.

Intimately connected with these special features of the German doctrine, and indeed more important than any of them, is the absence of reserves. As we have seen, the Germans held that over and above a certain small number of men to the yard and the appropriate gun power in support of them, no force could make its action felt in the front-to-front engagement. They must, therefore, be employed on the flanks, and it is better to place them there in the first instance, by converging marches from a previous still wider front, than to march them out from behind the centre after contact has been made there. Hence it follows that the only functions of a reserve in the centre were that of a reservoir to keep the firing line up to strength and that of acting as small change to deal with local emergencies as they occurred.* The whole of the artillery likewise are given over to the divisional commanders, the corps commander retaining nothing but some technical troops in his own hands. This theory was acted upon in all its risky simplicity until about 1912, when the extreme danger of deploying

all available means in front of a mere false position or advanced guard of the enemy was so far recognized that reserves of fire—not be it observed, of *men*—were constituted in the shape of machine-gun batteries (companies) and heavy artillery units at the disposal of the higher commanders. But this was the only precaution taken; in general the old doctrine remained unchanged. While the unit might be, and was, disposed in successive lines, no two self-contained units with different functions were disposed one behind the other.* Every man behind a given part of the front was simply a second or third or fourth instalment of the effort already begun on that part of it. Behind the front, then, was no *manœuvring* body whatever.

Fast, smooth deployment, precaution against premature or partial engagement, and absence of reserves, then, are the elements of the German battle. Suppose now that it proceeds as arranged, undisturbed by counter-attack. The fully-arrayed Germans need not hurry. The enemy is bound to accept the fight—he cannot, so they said, break away and manœuvre, once he has been subjected to the sudden intense fire simultaneously opened by all the concealed batteries of the attack. The firing line of the frontal attack can form itself methodically, at a range well beyond that at which decisive losses can be inflicted on it, and wait for the

*Save in so far as the process of developing the frontage might momentarily place a marching wing unit in rear of a fighting frontal unit.



FRENCH MOUNTAIN ARTILLERY.

[Topical.]

*In one *Kaisermanöver* after another such tiny reserves as 1/10 and 1/12 of the total are found.



A FRENCH GUN TRAVELLING OVER ROUGH GROUND.

[Topical.]

enveloping or decisive attack to come into line with it. In this waiting phase, which may be—and in the event was—prolonged over days, a great strain is put upon the discipline and endurance of the rank and file, subjected night and day at irregular intervals to gusts of shell fire and all the time to the fear of the next gust. But supposing that this test—for which the iron “Old Prussian” discipline has prepared them—is passed successfully, then the whole line, centre and wings together, deployed at 1,000 yards or so from the enemy in its “principal fire position” opens the decisive attack, fighting its way in by sheer battering volume of fire from gun and rifle. As the fresh wing will necessarily progress faster than the tired centre the line automatically becomes a crescent, and the envelopment and convergence of fire, already half effected thereby, will become more and more pronounced until it is complete and triumphant. The final

assault is merely the act of “cashing the cheque drawn by fire-power.”

This is the full envelopment by both flanks in which there is no pursuit, as there is no enemy free to run away. But it is possible and likely that only one flank of the adversary will be successfully enveloped. But the course of events is practically the same. A pursuit will be necessary, and in its reckless vigour every man and horse must be used up in the pursuit, but once the enemy begins to break up, under the stress of partial envelopment and consequent pursuit, the decisive and complete envelopment is only a matter of days. Such, then, were the German conceptions of modern war and the tendencies to be foreseen in putting them into practice—the long line held completely under control up to the proper moment and then launched with all possible speed and violence, without partial engagements, feints, or adroit individual strokes of any kind.



H.R.H. THE PRINCE OF WALES.

Campbell Gray.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE BRITISH ARMY.

REVIEW OF THE HISTORY OF THE ARMY—EVOLUTION WITHOUT REVOLUTION—CARDWELL'S LINKED BATTALIONS—THE PROFESSIONAL ARMY AND THE CITIZEN ARMY—THE NAPOLEONIC WAR—THE NINETEENTH CENTURY—PROGRESS OF THE VOLUNTEER MOVEMENT—THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR—CONSEQUENT CHANGES IN THE REGULAR ARMY—THE SOUTH AFRICAN WAR—THE HALDANE REFORMS—DRAFTS AND ESTABLISHMENTS BETWEEN 1904-1913—MOBILIZATION—RESERVES—TERRITORIAL FORCE—OFFICERS AND RESERVE OF OFFICERS—WAR OFFICE ORGANIZATION—FIGHTING ORGANIZATION OF THE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE—THE INFANTRY DIVISION—AUXILIARY SERVICES—LINE OF COMMUNICATION—SUPPLY—MOTOR TRANSPORT—MEDICAL SERVICE—THE CAVALRY DIVISION—"AN ENEMY NOT TO BE DESPISED."

THE British Army was the result of centuries of slow development, at no period of which there had occurred any event or reform so comprehensive as to deserve the name of revolution. Organized originally for King's garrisons overseas and King's retainers at home and long styled by constitutional usage "guards and garrisons," the Regular Army had grown up regiment by regiment precisely as needs presented themselves, and had been reduced regiment by regiment whenever a need passed away or the political and social circumstances called or seemed to call for economies.

It began with the small remnant consisting of two regiments only, which the Restoration Government of 1660 took over from the Army of Cromwell. To this were added regiments of men who had shared exile with the King—in the nature of things a very small body. The King himself was a "King upon conditions," and one condition exacted by public opinion was that there should be no repetition of the military occupation of England by Cromwell's major-generals. It was the acquisition of Tangier, which came as Catherine of Braganza's dowry, that first called for an increase which Parliament would admit. Similar small increases followed, each with its own occasion to sanction it, and were considered so formidable to liberty

as to interest Parliament in cancelling them after such occasions had passed. In larger emergencies Great Britain raised emergency armies in much the same way as other countries had done up to the time of the introduction of the "standing army" by Louis XIV. and Louvois. These emergency armies were largely foreign troops, taken into pay temporarily, a procedure that to the 18th-century conceptions of statehood and nationality was not in the least shocking, but rather wise. But some were British, and although at the peace superfluous British regiments were disbanded at the same time as the foreign regiments were given back to their masters, yet at the end of each war a few regiments managed to weather the storm of retrenchment, just as a century before temporary regiments in the French Army were now and then "given the white flag," which placed them on the permanent establishment. This practice was, as regards the French, already 150 years old when Charles II. came to the throne in England, and the French had obtained a long start in the formation of regular and permanent armies. In so far as the King was able by a process of "here a little there a little" to expand the force at his personal disposal at home, he followed the French fashion, which in due course was succeeded by the Prussian fashion, placed beyond cavil and criticism by Frederick the Great.

These French and Prussian influences, as well as the peculiar conditions which made the British Army a group of "guards and garrisons," still possessed not a little significance even in 1914, when the circumstances of Great Britain had undergone great transformations. They were responsible, in fact, for three of the most marked characteristics of the Regular Army—its oversea service, its close regimental system, and its strictly professional type.

Up to the time of the Indian Mutiny these characteristics were far more marked. But when oversea garrisons on a really large scale had to be found, it became gradually clear that one characteristic interfered with the other. The Prussian and French armies, which gave the British their regimental system, had no such drain upon them; while, on the other hand, if fresh men had constantly to be found for the Colonies and India, the essence of the regimental system—the long-service private soldier—was forfeited so far as troops at home were concerned. In fact, the regimental system in its ordinary working broke down utterly when the smallest additional transfer of force from home to abroad or *vice versa* was required. For a century before that date there was no better means of finding the annual Indian draft of men from home, or of reinforcing the home forces for war, than the clumsy expedient of inducing men by a bounty to transfer from one regiment to another.

We have said that the Army had evolved gradually without any single event or reform that could be called a revolution. If any reform could be considered as a contradiction to that statement, it would be the reform which Mr. Cardwell introduced of linking the old single-battalion regiments by pairs for purposes of drafting and routine of reliefs. The working of this system, which was still, in 1914, the basic system of the Army, will be examined in due course. It has been misunderstood, in the Army and out of it, and it is all the more important, therefore, that the reader should have a clear view of the conditions that it had to meet. For the present it will suffice to note that it only achieved its ends by boldly affronting the old close regimental spirit. Battalions with traditions of their own were amalgamated into two-battalion regiments with no traditions at all.

But the regimental system survived, and enough of it still remained in the first years of the 20th century to complicate the drafting question, and also that of promotion, to a degree that Continental armies, with their uniform organizations and uniform service,

could never realize. The drafting question, the reader will find, absolutely dominated our Army problem. The promotion problem was simpler, yet its solution was certainly not in sight in 1914. Whereas in Continental armies an officer, above all an exceptionally good officer, practically never spent his career in one regiment, in Great Britain transfers were few, and usually limited to the simple case of man-for-man exchanges—which was quite in accord with the general competitive outlook between regiments. In consequence the rate of promotion was very unequal in the various regiments, notably after the South African War of 1899-1902, in which many men of equal ages and in the same regiment were almost simultaneously promoted. In the case of the rank and file transfer without consent was a form of punishment.

That the regiment, thus conceived as the soldier's one home, possessed the fullest measure of *esprit de corps* goes without saying. With all that that virtue implies the fine regiments of the Expeditionary Force can without hesitation be credited. Yet it is important to note that there were certain directions in which the strength of that *esprit de corps* affected unfavourably the administration and war-readiness of the Army at large. Of the strictly professional spirit of the Regular Army it is hardly necessary to adduce examples. Although the Militia and Volunteer battalions were "affiliated" to the Regular regiment of their county, in practice the tie was only nominal,* and there were cases in which no Regular battalion had visited its county for a century and more. Voluntary enlistment for service in any part of the world and for any cause in which the Government wished to use it meant that the Army was the recruit's career and business. It was not a national duty imposed upon the citizen as such, but in its essence, contract service.

Now, such an Army is a precious possession, and Great Britain was fortunate in that she was the only European Power which had force in hand which could be used for the lesser emergencies. It has been aptly remarked that the continental military machinery will only work at full power. Taking this phrase in the sense in which it was meant, the military advantage of Great Britain was the capacity to work effectively, if not economically, at all powers. A grand battle on the Continent, the maintenance of internal order at home, war upon a kinglest in a tropical forest, and punishment

* Save in so far as the Militia was used as a "feeder" for the Army.



FIELD MARSHAL EARL ROBERTS.

(W. & D. Downey.)

of a high mountain tribe—all these tasks were understood to be within the capacity of the infantry battalion that found itself "next on the list for duty" at any given moment.

Services so different as these imply that it is service for service's sake, and not service on behalf of personal beliefs and passions, that is the main-spring of a professional army. The British professional army went into action against savages or against Boers with as much bravery as against Napoleon or the Kaiser, and we as a nation have the best reasons for realizing the truth of the remark of M. Psicharri's French officer who, in contrasting the motives

of the "colonial" or adventurer army with those of the "Metropolitan" or national army, said that it was "a vulgar error to attribute more patriotism to the former than to the latter"; that it was "a sublimated conception of fighting in itself as an ideal" irrespective of victory and defeat which inspired the colonial army*.

But if we recognize that it is not primarily patriotism but high adventure that drives the professional soldier to affront the manifold chances of his service, we must accept it as a necessary consequence that when the greatest and gravest emergencies—the emergencies that

* The original is here condensed and paraphrased slightly.



BRIGADIER-GENERAL H. H. WILSON.

[H. Waller Barnett.]

enlist the ordinary citizen—arise, fundamental difference of character between the Regular forces and the citizen forces will make itself felt, however patriotic the soldier may be, and however anxious the citizen in arms may be for pay, separation allowances, &c.—however completely, in short, their formal outward regulations and terms of service may be assimilated and unified. In effect, a citizen army is definitely marked off from a professional army, even though, as in the case of modern European armies, it is trained in barracks for consecutive years, and even though, as in the American Civil War, it goes through three years on hard warfare, a citizen army it remains. The question of voluntary or compulsory service, which agitated Great Britain for some years before the Great War, bears only indirectly upon this larger question. A nominal compulsion if combined with substitutions, but only so, will produce the professional type, the *armée de métier* of the Second Empire, for example; for the substitute is simply a volunteer with a bounty, and the “principal” who pays him to serve in his stead is a citizen whose ideal may be patriotism, but is certainly not war and adventure. And the citizen army is even more an army animated by what is

called its voluntary spirit, since it is essentially an army fighting *ad hoc* for a great and personally inspiring cause, and short of that cannot be used at all. So that when compulsion is applied to such a force in peace it must, to succeed, have the certainty that the voluntary spirit will be wholly operative in war.

If, then, a nation is to have a professional army of the British type, it should also possess for those graver emergencies a separate army based upon the citizen serving not as an agent of the community, still less as an agent of the Cabinet, but strictly as a member of the community. Continental armies, organized for the great emergency and for that alone, can regard their different categories of armed forces as one in kind though various in degree of fitness.* But the British was necessarily a “two-line army”—an army consisting of two different parts, each self-contained.

Now the professional army is always for its numbers the most costly form, whether it be a purely voluntary one, showing the whole of its expenses on the State's budget, or a conscript substitute one in which part of the burden of cost is laid directly upon the individuals who pay substitutes to serve for them. In the given two-line organization therefore it is to be expected that the expenditure for the uniforms, arms, training facilities, permanent cadres, &c., of this second line will be kept as low as possible. The more professional the first line then the less completely trained the second line can be. But both must be employed, and must also expand on the outbreak of a war of great and deep significance. The only precedent in modern English history for such a war was the Napoleonic, and it is interesting to see how the problem of expansion was dealt with then.

The conditions differed from the modern in this much, that in 1793-1815 there was no balance maintained between the Regular Army at home and that abroad—it was, of course, in the days of the “volunteering” system above mentioned—nor was there any Army Reserve, since in the existing small Army service was practically for life. But thanks to the Militia organization it was possible, in a series of wars that extended over more than half a generation, to develop the Regular Army at home into an expeditionary force, each battalion of which, on going abroad, left behind it a draft-producing

*Although even here the necessity for greater technical efficiency for war—for instance, the preparedness in certain frontier troops—had gone far enough to suggest to advanced students the possibility of a return to the old *armée de métier*.

battalion of the Regular Militia. This Militia was raised nominally by compulsion, but in practice by substitution. Insurance societies which were formed to protect their members against the luck of the ballot were able to pay handsome bounties to substitutes, and it was far more profitable for a man who intended to enlist to do so in several stages, at each of which he obtained money in some form, rather than to go direct into the line for the single bounty. Behind this Regular Militia, which closely corresponded with the later Special Reserve, there was the Local Militia of 1808, equivalent to the modern Territorial Force, in which personal service was compulsory and substitution forbidden. This was purely a home-service force, formed out of the Volunteers previously existing, and there is no evidence that it found any reinforcements for the Regular Army, though a certain number of its men volunteered for the Regular Militia.

After the peace the Militia of both kinds was disbanded and ceased to exist, though Yeomanry belonging to it were from time to time called out in aid of the civil power in the troubled years of 1820-1850. All foreign and Colonial wars and emergencies from 1815 to 1859 were strictly of the kind to which a professional army, and only a professional army, was adapted, and although the Militia was re-created, and embodied in the Crimean War, it was voluntarily enlisted from the same classes as those which recruited the line direct. It became an ante-chamber of the Regular service, and as such gradually ceased both to be recruited from citizens or to represent in any way the idea of service as a duty to society. Into its place stepped the Volunteers, who had primarily been formed, or had rather formed themselves, to meet the most serious danger that had threatened Britain for centuries—the first Napoleon at the head of the best professional army in the world and a navy numerically equal, or even superior, to the British Fleet. But, unlike previous emergency forces, this did not vanish when the emergency passed. On the contrary, it grew into a permanent force, with its own settled habits and traditions and a strong tie of membership to assist or replace the purely military cohesion that its intermittent trainings could not be expected to give.

While this process of solidifying the temporary Volunteers was going on, the Regular Army was itself undergoing great changes. The Franco-German War of 1870-1871 had revealed the prowess of the short-service national army; its great aptitude for the changed technical conditions of warfare, its extraordinary numerical

strength, and its intensive training. None of these things made it a type of army that could serve the purposes of a Colonial Empire, but its numbers and flexibility at any rate were factors in its favour that had to be taken into account and answered by like factors in any professional army that might be called upon to face it. The only way of increasing the numbers of that professional army was to divide the period of the soldier's service into colour service and reserve service. To those unfamiliar with the working of the Army system it may seem to be a mere truism to say that the war strength of the Army depends on the annual intake of recruits; yet it is a fact that critics of the system frequently sought to increase that strength by other means, such as changing the periods of service, re-enlisting reservists, &c. It is therefore important to make it clear that the real gain from short service is the great increase in the number of vacancies to be filled annually, and therefore a great increase in the intake of recruits, establishments and cost remaining unaltered.*


The short service principle was not, of course, applicable in its entirety. To begin with, service in the professional overseas Army could not be made incumbent upon the citizen as such. Further, when a man enlisted for Army service he did so with the intention of rendering service for a reasonable number of years, and not with that of receiving training as quickly as possible in view of a future emergency; and, lastly, the cost of changing the whole of the rank-and-file *personnel* abroad every three years or so was prohibitive. A compromise therefore was adopted. The period of liability and of pay for that liability was fixed at 12 years, of which six or seven were spent with the colours and six or five in the reserve.†

At the same time the linking of the single battalions was carried out, and to each regiment thus formed was affiliated one or more Militia battalions, which were closely associated with the depôts of the Regular battalions, and so occupied a middle position between the old self-contained citizen force and the pure draft-producing agency, the function of the latter tending constantly to develop in importance at the expense of the former.

This system—professional Regulars, half at home and half abroad; Militia, half drafts for Regulars, half agricultural volunteers; Volunteers, townsmen thoroughly organized in

* Thus on an establishment of 100,000 men always present with the colours 25,000 recruits a year could be taken for four years' service, 50,000 for two years', and 200,000 for six months'.

† The periods have varied slightly, and in one case, to be referred to presently, a much shorter term of colour service was introduced. The periods vary also according to the arm of the service.



GENERAL SIR HORACE SMITH-DORRIEN
(Newman)

battalions and loosely grouped in brigades, and a Regular Army Reserve—was the system in force when the next great occasion for expansion came in the South African War of 1899-1902. The expansion required proved to be too much for the system, especially in respect of mounted men. Battalions of Militia and companies of Volunteers who offered to serve abroad were sent out to reinforce the infantry and to set free a large number of infantrymen who had been trained in mounted infantry work. Moreover, a very large part of the Yeomanry—the light cavalry of the Volunteers*—was sent out, and fresh regiments raised *ad hoc* constantly followed them. Other contingents of mounted troops were raised in the Dominions and Colonies; South Africa of course included.

These various forms of "expansion," with their unavoidable overlapping and the technical difficulties, both of handling and of administration, owing to the dissimilarities of organization, terms of service, pay, and training, led, after the war, to a re-examination of the whole military system. After various unsatisfactory experiments had been made, a fresh system was matured and brought into operation by Mr. Secretary Haldane in 1907-1910.

Under this system, the Regular forces at home were re-grouped and permanently organized as an expeditionary force of six divisions and a cavalry division; the Militia in

its old form was abolished and replaced by the Special Reserve, a force destined on mobilization to form a reserve battalion upon which the Regular Army fighting overseas could draw steadily for reinforcements; and the Yeomanry and Volunteers were re-formed as the Territorial Force of all arms and branches, with a complete divisional organization analogous to that of the Regular Army. This was the Army system in force at the outbreak of the great war, and it is now our duty to describe it in some detail.


For the infantry of the line, half of which was at home and half abroad, the period of service was seven years with the Colours and five in the Reserve. This division of the twelve years' liability had been found by experience to give the best mean between the length of service necessary to allow the drafts and reliefs to work well and the shortness of service necessary for the production of a large Reserve. After the South African War, which had been carried through, with a little assistance from India, chiefly by the home Army and the Reserve, the value of the latter had become so conspicuous that the drafting problem was allowed to fall into the background. Three years' Colour and nine Reserve service was introduced in 1902 for the express purpose of building up a great Reserve. But the conditions of a man's eligibility for service in India—(a) age 20; (b) service at least one year; (c) not less than four years to run before expiry of Colour



MAJOR-GENERAL ALLENBY.

(Gale & Polden)

*Though officially a distinct force.



FIELD MARSHAL GENERAL SIR JOHN FRENCH.

[R. Haines

service—obviously made it impossible for any soldier enlisted on these terms to be sent to India at all. It was hoped that between two-thirds and three-quarters of the men would voluntarily “extend their service,” and had that hope been realized no difficulty of course would have arisen. But it was not realized, and the working of the drafts broke down so badly that nine years’ Colour and three Reserve had to be adopted in order to redress the balance. Finally, the former seven-five term was reintroduced.

But it was not only the years immediately concerned that were affected by these changes of terms. Until the last men enlisted on the three-nine year terms of 1902 finally passed out of the Reserve in 1914, the routine smoothness with which the recruiting branch had been working in the nineties could not be restored, and just before the Declaration of War the recruiting system was being taxed to the utmost to make good the great efflux of both the nine-

year men of 1904-5 and the seven-year men of 1906-7.

Inseparable from the question of drafts was that of establishments. The Indian battalion was on a war footing, 1,000 in round numbers, permanently, the home battalion on an establishment of about 750. Now when a battalion went abroad to relieve its sister battalion it had at the same time to increase its establishment, and as the battalion due to come home included, in the nature of things, very many soldiers in their last year of service, *i.e.*, due for discharge, it could leave behind but few for the newcomers to take over. The battalion going out, therefore, would have to provide most of its own extra men. Further—and this was always the *cruz* of the problem—it could not take with it men less than 20 years of age, nor recruits. If, therefore, it was to stand on its new footing in trained men over 19, it must have been over-filled with recruits two years beforehand, and—as the home establishment

then governed it—serving soldiers must have been dismissed prematurely to the Reserve to make vacancies for these recruits. Under these rigid conditions it was possible, and even frequent, for a battalion at home to be below establishment and yet closed to recruiting, and, worse still, these premature discharges to the Reserve might have to take place at a moment unfavourable for recruiting—as was the case in 1912-1913, when in order to make room a very large number of men who would be trained and available for drafts in 1914-15 serving soldiers were prematurely sent to the Reserve by the thousand, though recruiting was far from brisk at the time. Hence there occurred a shortage in the Regular Army, which alarmed the nation not a little, but was, in fact, largely the result of the violent disturbance of the seven-five year term in 1902 and of the limiting conditions of establishment and qualification for Indian service.

Under these conditions the establishment of a home battalion was practically determined by the numbers of the annual draft for India. In the days of "volunteering," as we have seen, there was no large force of units at home, and the units abroad were fed from depôts. But after the battalions were linked, those at home found the draft for their "links," and as they were the only available expeditionary force it was impossible to regard them as



MAJOR-GENERAL PULTENEY.

(Elliot & Fry)

mere depôts. It was therefore settled that the home battalion should consist of three sets of men destined for three annual drafts of 150 each, to be sent out as each set becomes qualified, plus 300 men who would grow to maturity in, and remain throughout their service with, the home battalion, which without them would be in the condition described by Lord Wolseley as that of a "squeezed lemon."

All this administrative and actuarial work had been reduced to a science by the recruiting branch, and short of disturbing reforms the system worked with a certainty that would hardly be credible under an apparently haphazard system of voluntary enlistment, were it not that the laws of probability act with the greater certainty when the numbers dealt with are large and the causes influencing them manifold, diverse, and independent.

In the case of the Expeditionary Force as it stood at the Declaration of War in August 1914, the far-reaching effect of the previous disturbances was completely neutralized by two simple expedients—the lowering of the foreign service age limit to 19 and the abolition of the mounted infantry, which was replaced by additional cavalry, made available by withdrawals of Imperial troops from South Africa in 1912-13. The latter step alone meant that perhaps 50 picked men per battalion remained with their units, and the former made



MAJOR-GENERAL ROBB.

(Gale & Polden)

available 100 to 200 men per battalion who would have been too immature for a tropical or sub-tropical war. Mobilization therefore was carried through without a hitch, and the Special Reserve battalions were at once ready to absorb the surplus Regular reservists.

In the case of the Guards, who were not employed on foreign service in peace, there was no draft question to complicate matters. The term of service therefore was three and nine years, and an enormous Reserve was thereby created.*

The Royal Artillery and the Royal Engineers were each a single corps. Men enlisted for Garrison Artillery could not be posted to mounted corps, and in the Engineers there was an elaborate classification of men according to their trades. But apart from these complications drafting presented no problems for the scientific arms, indeed no Engineer units at all were stationed in India.†

In the cavalry of the line men were enlisted for the "corps" of Hussars, Dragoons, &c., and allowed to express preference for particular regiments within these corps. This arrangement



LT.-GENERAL SIR DOUGLAS HAIG.

[J. Russell & Sons

*In all calculations of Reserve strength it is important to note, on the authority of Sir C. Harris, the Assistant Financial Secretary of the War Office, that "wastage," year for year, was not appreciably greater in the case of reservists than in that of men with the Colours.

†Had some grouping of infantry regiments been practicable the example of the Royal Artillery shows that many if not most of the complications previously described would have been removed. But this reform, though suggested and supported by high authority, failed to penetrate the strong walls of the regimental castle.



GENERAL SIR IAN HAMILTON.

[Elliott & Fry

at once removed most of the complications of drafting, and as cavalry is an arm always maintained on a high peace footing, there were no serious changes of establishment to be prepared for when units went abroad. In consequence, the mobilization of cavalry regiments at home presented no special difficulty. Each regiment, on proceeding on active service, left behind it a reserve squadron which absorbed recruits and surplus reservists and continued to feed its unit throughout the war, in the same way as a special reserve unit of infantry.*

In the horse mobilization of the mounted branches both of the Field Force and of the Territorial Army there was the same thoroughness and attention to detail. Whereas in the South African War the lack of system had been quite as marked in the matter of horses as in the matter of men, when the European War broke out it found the authorities in all grades prepared to deal with the situation, for the rapid growth of motor traction in the intervening years had drawn public attention to the horsing problem. The peace establishments of the Army in horses had been increased, the system of "boarding-out"† had been introduced, first tentatively and then on a larger

* There was no draft-finding Special Reserve Cavalry.

† Boarded-out horses were Government-owned animals additional to the ordinary peace establishment, which were lent to farmers and others and maintained by them.

scale, civilian buyers had been appointed in readiness for emergency, and above all a really useful census of horses had been taken.

Built up on these principles of organization, the Regular Army on October 1, 1913, was distributed as shown below:—

DISTRIBUTION OF THE REGULAR ARMY.

	Infantry.	Cavalry.	Horse & Field Artillery.	Garrison Artillery.	Engineers.	Flying Corps.	A.S.C.	Departments.	Colonial troops.	Indian troops in Imp. pay.	Total.
ON HOME ESTABLISHMENT											
United Kingdom	51,442	10,573	13,640	6,728	5,978	822	4,848	5,161	—	—	99,192
Ireland	14,409	2,052	4,072	733	1,277	—	889	850	—	—	22,282
Channel Islands.. ..	1,355	—	—	299	35	—	11	35	—	—	1,735
Total	67,206	12,625	17,712	7,760	7,290	822	5,748	6,046	—	—	125,209
ON INDIAN ESTABLISHMENT											
	54,584	5,595	10,971	4,463	377	—	—	538	—	602	77,130
ON COLONIAL ESTABLISHMENT.											
Gibraltar	1,830	—	—	1,387	396	—	85	179	—	—	3,877
Malta	4,172	—	—	1,577	410	—	109	229	437	—	6,934
Egypt and Cyprus	4,543	633	180	193	163	—	104	217	—	200	6,233
Ceylon, Straits Settlements and China Stations	4,069	—	—	1,699	458	—	120	300	521	6,267	13,434
South Africa	3,660	1,137	453	292	520	—	282	482	—	—	6,826
Various, on passage, &c. ..	3,168	—	—	846	399	—	57	270	2,867	—	7,607
Total	21,442	1,770	633	5,994	2,346	—	757	1,677	3,825	6,467	44,911
Grand Total	143,232	19,990	29,316	18,217	10,013	822	6,505	8,261	3,825	7,069	247,250

The Army Reserve, the strength of which had fluctuated considerably in consequence of the various changes in the terms of colour service, consisted of:—

STRENGTH OF THE ARMY RESERVE
ON OCTOBER 1, 1913.

	A.	B.	D.	Total.
Cavalry	—	6,967	3,708	10,675
Horse and Field Artillery ..	670	13,694	4,645	19,009
Garrison Artillery	—	6,023	259	6,282
Engineers	426	4,079	959	5,464
Infantry	4,234	62,510	23,382	90,126
Various	493	10,823	2,218	13,534
Total	5,823	104,096	35,171	145,090

Section A consisted of Reservists who had undertaken to rejoin the colours if required on an emergency short of general mobilization; Section B (with C) comprised all who had enlisted for short service (3-7 years) and had discharged their active duties. Section D consisted of men who after the expiry of their 12 years total term had re-enlisted for a further four years in the Reserve.

The Special Reserve, which consisted almost entirely of infantry,* was created from the remains of the Militia to act as the "Regular Militia" battalions had acted in the Napoleonic wars, as feeders for the Line in war. All ranks were liable for foreign service in war, and the term of enlistment was six years. Incorporated with the

Militia elements of the force was the "regular establishment," which carried on the work of the regimental depôt and trained the recruits there. This force, however, had in peace times failed to attract sufficient recruits. It was generally thought by the classes likely

to join that pressure was brought to bear on "S.R." recruits while at the depôt to enter the Regular Army; and in fact many thousands of men annually joined the Special Reserve in order to bring up their physical and other qualifications to the Regular standard before passing into the Line, or in order to see "how they liked the life" before committing themselves finally. These men were, of course, potential Regulars, and not part-trained Reservists.

The Territorial Force since its reconstruction had had a troubled history. Upon it had centred many criticisms that might have been directed against the Army system as a whole. Its weaknesses were naturally more in evidence than those of the Special Reserve, or those which were the outcome of drafting difficulties in the Regular Army. Since it was pre-eminently the national army, embodying the idea of duty service, those who advocated and worked for compulsory military service focussed their efforts upon it. Whether this volume of criticism affected its material training is doubtful, but at times certainly it did affect the *moral* of the force, and from first to last it almost controlled the recruiting. Further, the local recruiting authorities were in many cases too much absorbed in the business administration of the units under their charge to be able to deal with recruiting in the more scientific spirit of the Recruiting

*At one time a large force of Field Artillery Special Reservists was enlisted for the manning of ammunition columns. But these were no longer required when Army Service Corps motor transport took over this duty.



**BRIGADIER GENERAL
SIR PHILIP CHETWODE.**

(H. Walter Barnett.)

Branches of the War Office; unnecessarily wild fluctuations of intake — alternate “booms” and “slumps”—were the result. In some years one-seventh, in others as much as one-third of the Territorial Force would be due for discharge, and the problem of making good the deficiency in advance of its occurrence was a hard one. In the result the force was considerably short of its peace establishment of 315,438, though it was never much below 250,000.

The term of service in the Territorial Force was four years, re-engagements being allowed. The training liabilities were ten to twenty drills per annum, two weeks' continuous training in camp, and a musketry course. When the Territorial Force was created, it was intended to form a Reserve for it as soon as possible, and to that end re-engagements of time-expired men were at first discouraged. Owing, however, to inelastic regulations by which comparatively few men were qualified to pass into this Reserve*, and to the sudden popularity of the new National Reserve, the Territorial Force Reserve was little more than a list of officers who, while leaving their regiments on change of residence, &c., wished to continue in the force against the day of mobilization. Far more satisfactory was the condition of two other auxiliaries of the Territorial Force, the National Reserve and the Voluntary Aid Detachments. The former numbered over 200,000 old soldiers and sailors divided into three categories, (1) registered for general service; (2) registered for home service; (3) not available for service under arms. The provision of officers for these various forces was regulated thus:—

In the case of the Regular Army, officers were appointed (a) from cadets trained at the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich (for Artillery and Engineers), or at the Royal Military College, Sandhurst (for other arms), to which institutions they were admitted in some cases by Governmental or headmasters' nominations, in the rest by competitive examination; (b) from

*Another branch of this Reserve, which was provided for but never formed, was the “Technical” Reserve, a register of men available as local guides, superintendents of works, &c.



VIEW OF SALISBURY PLAIN.

(Daily Mirror.)

among University students, after examination and preliminary military training in the Officers Training Corps ; (c) from Colonial candidates trained at the Royal Military Colleges of Canada, Australia, &c.

In the case of the Special Reserve and the Territorial Force, officers were appointed either after service in the Officers Training Corps or direct from civil life. The O.T.C. was composed of senior division contingents belonging to the Universities and junior division contingents belonging to the public schools. The total strength of cadets in the O.T.C. was approximately 25,000, of whom about 5,000 in the senior division were undergraduates of military age available for immediate service. The officers of the corps were drawn from the Special Reserve and the Territorial Force. There were practical and written examinations in military subjects for cadets, as well as drill and camp training.

In the general organization of the Army the principle had been adopted since the South African War of separating as far as possible command and training from administration. To that end the General Staff of the Army was made distinct from other branches of headquarters and staffs; the administration, equipment, &c., of the Territorial Force was placed in the hands of a County Association, and that of the Regular Army in the hands of a special general officer subordinate to the Commands-in-Chief in each region, but endowed with wide powers of Administration. The central administration of the Army was divided into four main departments. The General-Staff dealt with *operations*, the Adjutant-General's Staff with *personnel*, the Quarter-master-General's with *matériel*, and the Staff of the Master-General of the Ordnance with *armament*.

The Army at home, including the Special Reserve and the Territorial Force, was grouped by divisions and brigades into large "commands" under generals commanding-in-chief, each of whom had under him a general staff branch, under a brigadier-general or colonel, and a major-general or brigadier-general in charge of Administration. The London district was separately organized. For recruiting and record purposes, or, so far as concerned the Regular Army and Special Reserve, the Commands, except Aldershot, were sub-divided into districts. Under the Army Council and directly reporting to it were the Inspector-General Home Forces and the Inspector-General Oversea Forces (who was also

Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Command, but had no jurisdiction in India). These officers with their staffs were charged with the duty of constantly moving about amongst the troops and satisfying themselves of the efficiency of their training for war.

Such being the general organization of the British Army at home, we now come to consider the fighting organization of its parts as constituted for military operations.

The unit of infantry was the battalion, commanded by a lieutenant-colonel. In 1913 the previous organization of eight companies of about 120 each had been replaced by one of four companies of about 240, commanded by a mounted officer, major or captain, with a second captain, and a subaltern in command of each of the four "platoons" of 60 men into which the company was divided. The battalion included, further, a machine gun section of two guns, a section of signallers, medical officer and bearers, &c. Its first line transport, which immediately accompanied the troops on the march, comprised eight company ammunition mules and six ammunition carts (one of which was for the machine guns), two tool carts, two water carts, four travelling kitchens (one per company), and a medical cart. The armament was the "short Lee-Enfield" of 1903 and bayonet. The men's equipment was made not of leather but of strong webbing, of the same grey-green colour as the uniforms. The baggage and supply wagons of the infantry formed part of the Train. The brigade of infantry consisted of four battalions under a Brigadier-General, which had a small reserve of tools, and also a brigade ammunition



ARMY MOTOR CYCLISTS.

[Sport & General]



LONDON SCOTTISH RIFLES.

reserve formed by assembling some of the battalion carts.

The cavalry regiment consisted of three squadrons, each of about 150 sabres, divided into four troops, and a regimental machine gun section of two guns. The squadron was commanded by a major, with a captain as his second. The first line transport included squadron baggage wagons, squadron ammunition carts, and squadron tool carts, and for the regiment a wagon-carrying raft equipment for the hasty crossing of streams, and a cook's vehicle corresponding in cooking capacity to about two of the travelling kitchens used by the infantry.

The Cavalry Brigade consisted of three such regiments. The armament of the cavalry was sword, rifle, and in some cases lance. The equipment was light and stripped to bare essentials, but the cloth puttees worn by the men since the loose individual skirmishing of the South African War were less satisfactory for the knee-to-knee charge that was to be expected in European warfare. The Field Artillery unit was the so-called "brigade" (corresponding to the "group" of foreign armies and to be differentiated from the brigade in the larger sense). Each brigade, whether of 18-pounder q.f. guns or of 4·lin. q.f. howitzers, comprised a brigade headquarters with telephone equipment, and three six-gun batteries. For each gun there were two ammunition wagons, one of which, in action, was placed close beside the gun itself. Both guns and wagons were six-horsed flexible double carriages, composed of body (or gun-carriage) and limber, which gave them a balance, and therefore a mobility, which compared with that of the "General Service" wagon in much the same way as a hansom compares with a "four-wheeler."

In the Horse Artillery the "brigade" consisted of two batteries only. The distinctive mark of this branch was speed, owing to the lighter gun (12-pounder q.f.), and to the fact that most of the gunners instead of being carried on the gun, gun limber, or first wagon, as in the case of the Field Artillery, rode separately.

Heavy Artillery also accompanied the field army. A heavy battery consisted of four 60-pounder guns,* manned by the garrison artillery and drawn at a walk or slow trot by eight heavy draught horses apiece.

To each "brigade" of field or horse artillery guns was attached a "brigade ammunition column," which provided a third full wagon for each gun, and also a reserve of rifle ammunition for the infantry. The howitzer brigade and heavy battery ammunition columns were similar, except that they provided no rifle ammunition. Another reserve of ammunition behind this was provided by the Divisional Ammunition Column, this also under artillery charge, and behind this again was the Motor Ammunition Park, to be alluded to presently.


The field units of the Royal Engineers were:—The "field squadrons" or field troops, the signal squadrons and signal troops attached to cavalry divisions or brigades, the field companies and signal companies attached to divisions, and the bridging trains and signal sections at the disposal of commanders of higher formations. The details of the Signal Service cannot here be described, and it must suffice to mention that the units of this service included wireless telephone and telegraph operators with their equipment, as well as flag and lamp signallers and dispatch riders, mounted on horses or motor-bicycles. Wireless was employed chiefly to connect General Headquarters with

*Not howitzers, as was almost always the case in the Continental heavy artillery.

the fast-moving cavalry in advance; telegraphs (air-line or ground cable) were for general work, and telephones for communication on the battlefield itself.

The bridging trains were simply a great mobile reserve of pontoons and trestles, to be used by the field companies when the bridging equipment of the latter proved insufficient. The field squadrons, field troops, and field companies were the most important and generally useful of the engineer organizations. They provided for bridging, for demolitions, for

Such were the constituent parts of the division. The division itself was commanded by a major-general, whose staff, like all higher staffs, was divided into a general staff branch, an adjutant-general's branch, and a quartermaster-general's branch. It consisted of three infantry brigades, three field artillery brigades, one field howitzer brigade and one heavy battery, with a divisional signal company, two field companies Royal Engineers, and one squadron of cavalry, in all 18,073 men, 5,592 horses, 76 guns, and 24 machine guns.



expert supervision of infantry working parties, and for water supply.

The Army Service Corps units in the field fall into two distinct branches, the horsed "trains" and the mechanical transport "columns."

The medical service in the field centred around the Field Ambulance. Each unit of that name included three "tent" and three "bearer" subdivisions, each self-contained and therefore separable from the rest for the benefit of outlying detachments, flying columns, &c.

The catalogue of the necessary auxiliaries to the fighting troops, in itself meaningless to readers unacquainted with the military system, included a complete and up-to-date organization, which we may briefly describe under the three headings of baggage and supply, ammunition, and medical aid. But before it is possible to do so a few words must be said as to the working of the lines of communication of an army.

Perhaps no Army in the world had its lines of communication services so well organized in peace as the British. The reason is simple



60-POUNDER IN ACTION.

[Sport & General.

enough, *viz.*, that it was accustomed to fight in ill-developed countries where the Army must create the resources of civilization before it could use them. Duties on the line of communication were administrative, controlled by an Inspector-General of Communications ; and defensive (for the protection of the line itself), controlled by the "commander of L. of C. Defences." At the safer end of the line lay the base, generally a port, and at frequent intervals along the line were small posts for traffic control. Sometimes an advanced *dépôt* was formed at some distance up the line, where emergency reserves of stores were accumulated, but the "line" extended far in front of it. At "railhead," the variable point at which railway traffic ceased, there were no accumulations of stores, a day's requirements being sent daily by train to be taken thence by the motor lorries of the "supply columns" to the troops.

This motor-transport was a new system, unlike that of any other army, and had been

introduced in 1911. In it a complete break had been made with the traditions of the old horse-and-cart supply system. Horse transport was now used purely for *distributing*, the *conveyance* of supplies to the areas occupied by the troops being performed wholly by motor transport.

The daily run of the motor lorry being taken at 90 miles, the army could advance to a distance from its railhead of 45 miles—or rather to a distance such that "refilling point," where the horsed trains took over the contents of the lorries daily for distribution, should not be more than 45 miles. But if a new and nearer railhead could be chosen for next day this distance could be by so much exceeded.* The new system thus gave greater range and flexibility to the army's operations. It also cleared the roads in fear of the troops of the vast convoys of horsed wagons which formerly gravely impeded the army's manœuvres.

*As there were no stores accumulated at railhead, this point could be changed at four to five hours' notice.



IRISH GUARDS.

[Sport & General.



DUBLIN LIGHT INFANTRY.

[Sport & General.

To give a practical example. On a Thursday evening the men of an infantry battalion would have Friday's bread and cheese in their haversacks (*plus* a preserved ration for emergencies), and the travelling kitchens (called "cookers") Friday's meat, groceries, &c. At that time the wagons of the train allotted to the service of the unit would be empty, waiting to meet the motor "supply columns" on Friday. These supply columns themselves would be at railhead, waiting for the rations to be railed thither from down the line. At 3 a.m. or so on Friday these railway trains would have discharged their contents and the lorries would be on their way at a speed of ten miles an hour to meet the empty wagons of the train at "refilling point." Thus for the first time in the history of war it had become possible for fresh meat and bread to be supplied to a distant army. The meat that our battalion would eat on Friday even-

ing was probably alive on Wednesday morning 100 miles away down the line.


This, however was not the only, or indeed the principal, method of supply. As far as possible the resources of the country traversed by the army were utilized by requisitioning. Until a few years before the war the British Army, with its 18th-century tradition of regarding the civilian as a spectator in the Government's wars, and its experience of wild colonial campaigns, had been quite unfamiliar with this resource; but latterly much study had been devoted to it and ample provision of motor-cars had been made for the requisitioning officers.

The replacement of ammunition was conducted upon a somewhat similar system. At various posts along the line of communication were depôts of the Army Ordnance Corps, which forwarded ammunition as required to



QUEEN'S OWN OXFORD HUSSARS.

[Sport & General.



GENERAL SIR CHARLES DOUGLAS.

(Russell & Sons.)

railhead, where the motor-lorries of the divisional ammunition park took it over for conveyance to the horsed distributing agency

(corresponding to the trains above-mentioned) called the Divisional Ammunition Column. This column was generally broken up into sections, each following at some distance one of the artillery brigade ammunition columns, which were the actual issuers to batteries and to infantry brigades.

In both these cases the governing principle was that no one should have to go back for food, and no one to retire to fetch ammunition. In the medical service the same thing is observable—persistent effort to keep the front in working condition. In this case the principle was that of “evacuation.” The nearer a hospital to the front, the clearer it was kept. This of course served both the interests of the army, which, in theory, should never be compelled to forgo its field ambulances in an advance after battle, and those of the wounded man, who was removed as far as his condition would allow from the area of conflict and hurry, to recover in quiet. The working of the organization was briefly this:—A wounded man* was taken by the regimental stretcher-bearers (the bandsmen of peace time) to the “aid post,” where the regimental medical officer

*Every soldier had a “first field dressing” in his pocket.



GORDON HIGHLANDERS.

[Sport & General.]



MAJOR-GENERAL SIR ARCHIBALD
MURRAY.

[Speaight.]

In some cases cavalry brigades were formed without being allotted to a cavalry division. Such brigades were given a battery of horse artillery, and enough of other services to

render them self-supporting and self-contained bodies.

The food and ammunition systems differed from those of the infantry divisions, in that the motor-lorries delivered food direct to the "cookers" of the regiments and ammunition direct to the brigade ammunition columns, there being no "train" or divisional ammunition column. The ambulances, too, were differently organized, to provide for the special needs of cavalry, which had to fight over wide areas and at great distances in front of the main body.*

The war strength of a cavalry division was 9,269 men and 9,815 horses, 24 guns, and 24 machine guns.

The whole Expeditionary Force as organized in 1914 consisted of six divisions, one cavalry division, and one (or two) unallotted cavalry brigades, with additional troops styled "army troops" at the disposal of the higher commanders, besides the line of communication troops both for administration and for the defence of the line. The army troops included

*It should be noted that all baggage and supply vehicles of cavalry were drawn by four horses of the "vanter" or ordinary military type, whereas those of the greater part of the army were drawn by two heavy cart horses each.



BRITISH TROOPS AT HAVRE.

[Daily Mirror.]



FIFTH LANCERS.

[Sport & General.

the squadrons of the Royal Flying Corps, each squadron being subdivided into three "Flights" each of four aeroplanes with their attendant motors and stores.

Taken all in all, the organization and equipment of this force was on a more elaborate scale than that of Continental units of corresponding

strength. This, and the professional character of the Army, in no small degree compensated for its small numbers, and the German critic who in 1913 remarked that the British Expeditionary Force was "not an enemy to be despised" (*keine zu verachtende Gegner*) was nearer the truth than perhaps he realized



CHAPTER IX.

THE ARMIES OF THE DOMINIONS.

IMPORTANCE OF SEA POWER GENERALLY UNDERSTOOD—LACK OF ORGANIZATION OF IMPERIAL LAND FORCES—THE VALUE OF A STRIKING FORCE—THE DOMINIONS IN ADVANCE OF THE MOTHER COUNTRY—NATIONAL OBLIGATION REALIZED AND ENFORCED—DEMOCRACY AND NATIONAL SERVICE—POPULARITY AND SUCCESS OF THE EXPERIMENT—CANADA—AN ARMY IN EMBRYO—CHARACTER OF HER MILITARY INSTITUTIONS—THE AUSTRALASIAN AND NEW ZEALAND SYSTEMS—DEFENCE SYSTEM OF SOUTH AFRICA—A DIFFICULT PROBLEM—ENGLISH, DUTCH, AND NATIVE—FRONTIER AND INTERNAL DEFENCE—THE DEFENCE ACT OF 1912—THE RALLY OF THE DOMINIONS—MEN—SUPPLIES—UNANIMITY OF EMPIRE.

WHEN the war broke out it found Great Britain and the Dominions organically unready, so far at least as military preparations were concerned, to put even a small proportion of their potential strength into the field.

The Navy was ready, as it always had been ready. There a sound instinct had warned the British peoples to maintain at all costs the margin of strength which was considered necessary. It was a bare margin, reckoned merely by the number of ships available, but it was indefinitely increased by the spirit of their crews, men who through years of waiting had

always kept their will fixed on the single object—that of preparation for the day of trial.

In a sense, too, the Navy was representative of the maximum effort of the whole British peoples. The Dominions had for some time recognized the debt they owed to its protection. Australia had gone far to complete a squadron of her own. The battle cruiser *New Zealand*, the gift of the Dominion whose name she bore, was attached to the Home Fleet. Canada had made it perfectly clear some years before that she intended to bear all that she could of the burden imposed on the people of Great Britain by the building of new ships and the



CANADIAN TROOPS. THE QUEEN'S RIFLES.

[Daily Mirror

cost of their maintenance and equipment. Unfortunate domestic differences had compelled the Western Dominion to postpone her offer to provide three Dreadnoughts for the British Fleet. But it was perfectly understood in the British Isles that the will to help was there, even though the power to give it concrete form had been suspended by differences of opinion about the exact shape which the help should take. South Africa, only recently recovered from a period of overwhelming financial depression, and still more recently engaged in the task of forming and establishing the Union of her four self-governing Colonies, had not been able to do much for the Navy. But she had contributed yearly a sum towards its upkeep, small in amount but intended as a proof that she had not forgotten what was due from her. There was never any doubt that when the Union of South Africa found itself in a position to do something more substantial it would be done willingly and quickly, for no Dominion owed more, or was more conscious of its debt, to the Navy than South Africa.

There had, then, in the years before the war been many signs that Naval Defence would, if time was given, be organized on a truly Imperial basis. There had been no such signs in the case of Land Defence. No uniform system of raising troops had been adopted. Elementary principles were matters of dispute. The need of military organization for the Empire as a whole was more often denied than affirmed. Even within the British Isles popular opinion was, on the whole, opposed to any effort to provide Great Britain with an Army sufficiently strong to give her an equal voice in a European war. While the peoples of the Continent had been straining every nerve for years to arm and train every available man for the decisive day, Great Britain and the Dominions had deliberately abstained from any such attempt. It was an axiom of British policy that what was required for each part of the Empire should be for internal defence alone, and though it was vaguely admitted that the Regular Army might be required to provide an Expeditionary Force, it was thought that this need not be large in numbers so long as its material was good, its equipment efficient, and its transport adequately organized.

These negative theories were, of course, based on a principle thoroughly sound in itself, though limited in its application, because its consequences inevitably required time to show their decisiveness. History had taught the British

peoples that control of the sea was the first essential of their existence as a nation. That secured, they might wait with confidence upon the outcome of any European war, however widespread it might be, and whatever might be its immediate results. Control of the sea, under the new conditions created by the naval ambitions of Germany, had involved a stupendous effort for its maintenance. It had been maintained, but at the cost of obscuring another principle, more immediate in its application, though more limited in its effects, yet equally sound if the experience of the Napoleonic wars was to be regarded as valid. This principle was that Great Britain, though she could secure herself from invasion and could protect her commerce by means of her Fleet, could exercise no real influence upon the result of a European war unless she was prepared to take her place on equal terms with the combatant nations. The corollary was equally clear, but had equally been obscured. It was that when the Continental nations were imposing on all their men capable of military service the duty of bearing arms, Great Britain, if she wanted to intervene on equal terms with them in war on the Continent, must follow their example, so far at least as was necessary to secure as many recruits for her Army as her military advisers thought necessary. Needless to say, nothing of the kind had been done. Famous generals who had fought and won British battles in all quarters of the globe warned the British people again and again that some form of compulsory military service should be part of the duties of citizenship. These warnings fell on deaf ears, so far as they were addressed to the people of the British Isles.

In some of the Dominions, however, there had been, for some years before the war, a clearer realization of the essentials of military defence. Australia, New Zealand, South Africa had all begun the organization of citizen armies. These armies were all based on the same principle. The State required all male citizens as they grew to manhood to be registered for military service. Service was not in practice exacted from all thus registered. In South Africa, for instance, registration was merely the means by which the State enabled itself to ascertain the numbers which were available in the last resort. From those thus registered volunteers for military training could be called for. If the number of volunteers proved insufficient the State held the ballot in reserve. But the number of volunteers was not insufficient. On the contrary, in the first year the number of those who volunteered for training



AUSTRALIAN COMMONWEALTH HORSE.

[Topical.

greatly exceeded the estimate made by the authorities of the number likely to be available. In Australia, though every male between certain years was liable for service, the number of exemptions was in practice large. This was chiefly due to the difficulty of training men in sparsely populated areas. In New Zealand, where the country was more closely settled, the proportion of exemptions was considerably less than in Australia.

The details of the different systems will be described later. For the moment the important thing is to insist on the fact that in three of the Dominions the principle of compulsory military service had been adopted by Parliament and put into practice before the European war began. In Great Britain the popular theory had been that compulsory service was a form of slavery unworthy of free Britons, a tyranny imposed on the unfortunate peoples of the Continent by the ambition of monarchs or by the fears of republican governments trembling at the thought of the consequences that such ambitions might entail for them. In Australia, in New Zealand, in South Africa, the same ideas prevailed for many years. They were dissipated by experience. It became clear, as soon as compulsory military training was given a trial, that a free and self-governing people might deliberately recognize the obligation of each citizen to equip himself for the defence of his country, might call upon each to fulfil that obligation, and in doing so might confer substantial benefits upon itself.

In each case, however, a strong stimulus was required before the experiment could be tried. In each case, when once it was recognized that the effort involved in the adoption of military training had to be made, political differences were suspended and men of all parties cooperated in the determination to make

the experiment a success. In each case the success of the experiment led to an unexpected revelation of social benefits in the new system, suggested indeed by writers and thinkers in Germany, but up to that time altogether unrealized by English observers. The motives for the adoption of compulsory service in the three Dominions were very similar, and quite foreign to the traditional beliefs of the British peoples. Australia and New Zealand suddenly realized that they were isolated outposts of Europe, set in an ocean ringed by Asiatic peoples who had begun to show unmistakable signs of waking to the realities of world power. The leading men in both countries were no longer content to trust entirely

HON. SAMUEL HUGHES,
Canadian Minister of Defence.

[Topical.



NEW ZEALAND MOUNTED RIFLES.

[Topical.

to the protection of the British Fleet. The fear of Asiatic invasion, or perhaps rather of Asiatic migration from overcrowded countries into their empty lands, took hold upon them. Once convinced that there was real danger of this, they set themselves to provide for their own defence by land and sea. When war broke out in Europe their plans were still incomplete, but enough had been done to prove that the scheme to which they were committed was well conceived and offered them at least a prospect of being able to give some account of them-

selves if they were ever challenged. In South Africa the motive power of the Defence Act was the clear necessity of providing for the security of a country in which the native population outnumbered the European by five to one. Not that there was any suggestion of turbulence or sedition among the natives. But self-respect made self-defence a primary duty, and it speedily became evident to public men of all schools of thought that the Union of South Africa could not rely longer on the protection of Imperial troops.

CANADA.

Canada, when Great Britain went to war, was less completely organized than Australia, South Africa, and New Zealand, although her potential strength was far greater. The reason for this condition of affairs was obvious. She had only two possible enemies who might invade her territory, and the possibility of invasion by either of these was very remote. Japan was the ally of great Britain, and neither from her nor from the United States was an attack within the range of practical politics.

It was no surprising, therefore, that her army was in an embryonic condition, and that time would be required for the purposes of expansion and training. Nevertheless, the embryo was very much alive, and everything was to be expected from the resolute patriotism of her hardy sons. Like other parts of the Anglo-Saxon race her people were not military but warlike; and her military institutions, though small in themselves, were supplemented by the bold, active, and



THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL'S BODYGUARD (CANADA).

[Topical]

self-confident spirit of the mass of the population.

The strength of the Canadian Permanent Militia—Staff, Cavalry, Artillery, Engineers, and Technical Service Corps all included—was about 270 officers and 2,700 other ranks. These forces trained throughout the year and completed every year the course of musketry laid down for the Regular Army in the British Isles. The "Active Militia" had a nominal strength of about 3,850 officers and 44,500 other ranks. But in practice the regiments and corps of this force were considerably below their theoretical strength. Even so, much had been done to improve the Army in the years immediately preceding the war. The Officers' Training College at Kingston was an admirably efficient institution, and there had been a marked improvement in the attendance of the Active Militia at training, drills, and camps. The conditions of service demanded from the Cavalry, Artillery, and Army Service Corps 16 days' training a year. From other arms and departments 12 days annually were required.

Besides the Active Militia, there were three other semi-military organizations in Canada. The Royal North-West Mounted Police were organized in 12 divisions, under the Dominion Government, with headquarters at Regina. They consisted in all of about 650 men and were trained as cavalry. Rifle associations, about 430 in all, with something like 24,000 members ready in an emergency to serve in the Militia,



SIR ROBERT BORDEN,
Prime Minister of Canada.

were spread throughout the Dominion. Finally, there were about 270 cadet corps with a total of about 20,000 cadets, divided into senior cadets (14 to 18 years old) and junior cadets (12 to 14 years). There were, therefore, a considerable number of men and boys who were more or less familiar with the idea of discipline and with the business of the soldier.


AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND.

If there was superficial irony, there was also deep significance in the fact that Australia and New Zealand—pioneers among the British peoples in every democratic experiment—should also have been the first to establish a system of compulsory citizen service. Observers of the progress of democratic institutions had already noted this as another proof that the most complete self-government exacts ultimately a more rigid self-discipline than any other form of organized freedom. The people of Germany had been drilled to military service by the iron determination of the ruling class, backed by the teaching of professors who had developed the doctrine of national efficiency to its last word in a severely logical progression. The French had been compelled by a sure insight into the essentials of national existence to follow the example of Germany.

This Franco-German rivalry had imposed on the whole of Europe a corresponding submission to the dictum that the life of a people depends on its military efficiency. Only Great Britain, secure in her command of the narrow seas, absorbed in the problem of relieving for the poorer classes the stress of economic competition, had refused to admit the validity of this dictum. So far from following her example, Australia and New Zealand had begun to train their young men to arms, and had arrived, though by a quite different road, at the same conclusion as the German professors—that national military service was a discipline beneficial to the race. After barely two years' experience of the national training system, this was the conclusion at which Australia and New Zealand had come. The remaining opponents of the system were few and were no longer


listened to. This was shown in an article contributed to the Empire Number of *The Times* (published on May 25, 1914) by one who had had special opportunities of studying the effects of national military training in Australia and New Zealand. His conclusion was that "the ordinary citizen of Australia and New Zealand . . . regards it as so self-evident as not to be worth discussing that the only possible way to secure either the numbers or the efficiency required for national defence lies in the enforcement of the duty of military training upon the whole body of citizens. . . . The moral value of discipline has come to him as a new revelation, too fresh and too vivid to be accepted as merely in the ordinary course of things."

The same authority may be quoted upon the details of the Australasian system. Its chief characteristics, in his opinion, were "the early age at which it begins, the number of years for which it is enforced, and the limited time devoted to continuous training in any one year." Australia and New Zealand began to train their boys at the age of 12. The training continued till they reached 25—a period of 13 years. But in each year not more than 16 days of service, or their equivalent in half-days or shorter periods of drill, were required. From the age of 12 to 14 the boys were trained as junior cadets, receiving 90 hours' instruction in physical exercises and elementary drill a year under the education authorities. At 14 they became senior cadets, passed under military control, and, till they were 18, had to do four



THE HON. T. ALLEN.
New Zealand Minister of Defence.

whole-day drills, 12 half-day drills, and 14 night drills per year. At 18 they entered the Citizen Force, and for seven years were required to do 16 days' training (made up in part of half-day or night drills), with not less than eight days spent continuously in camp in each year. For this they were paid 3s. a day and upwards. At 25 their period of training closed. Those who chose to enter the technical branches of the service at 18—naval service, artillery, engineers, and other special corps—had to do 25 days' service a year. Of this, 17 days in



GROUP OF ALL UNITS, CAPE COLONY.

[Topical

each year had to be continuous training on board ship or in camp. "The total length of service," to quote again the same authority, "is thus some $6\frac{1}{2}$ months in the infantry and mounted corps and $8\frac{1}{2}$ months in the technical corps. This is considerably longer in the aggregate than that demanded by the Swiss system, which only asks 152 days of the infantry and artillery and 180 of the cavalry. But the Swiss training does not begin till the age of 20 and opens with a continuous recruit training of 65 days for infantry and 90 days for cavalry, followed by repetition courses of 11 days every second year for 14 years." "From the military point of view," he adds, "it would undoubtedly be an improvement if at least one longer period of continuous training could be given. This would in all probability also be supported for reasons of convenience by the community as a whole."

Two other essential elements in the Australasian system of national military training, as it existed at the outbreak of war in Europe, must also be described briefly

First, the forces of Australia were organized on what is technically known as the "Area" plan. This had been recommended by Lord Kitchener in a report to the Australian Government which had formed the basis of the necessary legislation. Australia was subdivided into some 200 training areas, each under the supervision of an "area officer." The numbers of men under training in each area varied with the density of the population. Again, every ten areas were grouped under a superior officer, responsible in peace time for the co-ordination of the work of training, and designated in war time as brigade major for the forces of the ten areas. In New Zealand the "area system" was also the main principle of the organization, but the grouping differed in minor details.

Second, great attention had been paid to the training of officers. The aim of the organizers of the system had been the combination of a democratic principle of selection and promotion with the most rigid tests of efficiency. A training college for officers had been established at Duntroon, close to Canberra, the site of the Federal capital which was under construction. To this ten cadets from New Zealand were admitted each year in addition to about 33 from Australia. The age of entry was from 16 to 18. The total number of cadets in the college was about 160. No charge was made for their training. On the contrary, they received £30 on joining and an allowance of



THE HON. E. D. MILLEN.
Australian Minister of Defence.


5s. 6d. per day. In return, the authorities were able to exact a high standard of efficiency and to require from each cadet entering the college an undertaking—given by the parent or guardian—of service in the Permanent Military Forces for at least 12 years from the date of joining the college. The course of instruction was exacting. Special attention was paid to the training of character. The cadet, on completion of his training, was guaranteed a commission and pay at £250 a year, and was required to spend his first year of service in Great Britain as a member of some unit of the Imperial Army.

The Australasian systems had not reached their full maturity at the beginning of the European War, but it was estimated that when their full effects were operative they would provide a total of about 150,000 men, with from four to 11 years' of full training behind them. The object of these citizen forces was the defence of their own countries, and they formed no part of any systematic organization for Imperial Defence, though probably the Imperial Defence Committee had taken them into account when considering the military strength which the Empire could command at a moment of crisis. Whether this was so or not, the crisis, when it came, found the Australasian people ready and eager to send men to the help of the Mother Country.

SOUTH AFRICA.

In South Africa, just as much as in Australia and New Zealand, the defence organization had been expressly designed to meet special local needs, without much thought of Imperial requirements as a whole. This was natural. When war broke out the South African defence scheme had been in existence as a working organization barely two years. Its full effects were still to be seen. But it had progressed so far that the Government of the Dominion were able to set free the Imperial troops—to the number of about 6,000—which were still in the country, undertaking themselves the whole duty of local defence.

This was no small achievement, for the work of organizing National Defence in South Africa had been peculiarly difficult and delicate. It had been necessary to make provision for equal conditions of service for English and Dutch, to elaborate the composition of a force in which they should serve side by side, and to provide with the utmost care against anything that might cause friction between them. The Defence Act was passed by the South African Parliament during the Session of 1912. Ten years before Boer and Britain had been at war throughout the country. Those ten years had seen the re-settlement and re-stocking of a devastated country. It had seen the triumph of British methods of dealing with a people whose land had been conquered, whose homes had been burnt, whose people had been compelled to accept the will of Great Britain. The work that had been done in those ten years



THE RIGHT HONOURABLE SIR
EDWARD MORRIS.
Premier of Newfoundland.

[J. Russell & Sons.]

must stand as an imperishable monument to the genius of Great Britain for winning the respect, the loyalty, and even the affection of peoples whose territory has passed into her possession. The Transvaal and the Orange Free State had been part of the Dominions of Great Britain only for ten years. In that time their people had become loyal citizens of Greater Britain. The Government of the Dominion was actually in the hands of Dutch-speaking South Africans.



THE NEWFOUNDLAND NAVAL RESERVES

The author of the Defence Act was General Smuts, who had fought against Great Britain ten years before. The Commandant-General of the Citizen Force was General Beyers, another Boer general of conspicuous ability. And in the ranks of the force English and Dutch served side by side—all thought of race distinction obliterated—all equally ready to do their utmost for the Empire in the crisis that had come upon it so suddenly.

But the task of combining Dutch and English in one homogeneous force had not been the only difficulty which those who had designed the scheme of National Defence for South Africa had had to meet. The European population of the Dominion was small, the native population large. The natural increase of the natives was greater than that of the Europeans. The distribution of the European population was also a difficulty. A few large cities—Cape Town, Johannesburg, Pretoria, Durban, Bloemfontein—absorbed a very large proportion of the white people of the country. The rest lived on scattered farms, at considerable distances from each other, separated in such a way that it was difficult to provide for their training except by means of an excessive number of small units. Yet these difficulties were balanced by some advantages. South Africa had known many wars. Its early days had seen constant conflicts of white men against the natives. These had happily passed away and left a native population contented on the whole with its conditions of life and extraordinarily loyal and devoted to the British Sovereign. Later wars between English and Dutch had left a white population trained to arms by the stern discipline of actual warfare and equipped with a knowledge of the meaning of modern war far in advance of that of any other part of the Empire.

The organization of the South African Defence Force had naturally been adapted to these conditions. It was the work of practical men who knew the nature of the material available. The force which was required was one that would safeguard the position of the white population. Its organization was not directed in any sense against the native peoples, who were perfectly peaceable and loyal. But it had in view the possibility—however remote—of a change in the attitude of the natives. If such a change should come, if the native tribes should grow discontented, if some revolutionary leader should arise and win them over to discontent and hostility, then it might be necessary in the future, as it had been in the past, for the Europeans to defend them-



GENERAL THE HON. J. C. SMUTS,
Minister of Defence Union of South Africa.

selves, their institutions, and their civilizations, against an organized attack by natives who, for all their amazing progress, were still in the mass barbarians. Little, naturally, had been said about this while the Defence Act was before Parliament. There had been no necessity to talk about it. Such a threat to European civilization in South Africa was a remote contingency. But it was still a contingency, and provision had had to be made against it.

There were two other reasons why South Africa should have created a Citizen Army for her own defence by land. First, her frontier on the north-west marched with that of German South-West Africa. In a European war, if the British Navy should prove unable to guard all the oceans of the world, it might have been possible for Germany to pour troops into German South-West Africa and to invade the Union of South Africa by that route. This, too, was a remote contingency, but provision had to be made against it. Secondly, troops were needed in South Africa—as in other countries—to safeguard law and order in the last resort against internal disruption. The industrial conditions, especially in the Transvaal, where the gold-mining industry had collected a large number of artisans and labourers in a relatively small area, made the country specially liable

to sudden outbreaks of social unrest. And the railways, which were essential to the life of the people, because food had to be imported and transported to the inland districts, were State-owned railways worked by labourers and artisans, who were naturally subject to periods of acute discontent. Less than a year after the Defence Organization had been set on foot these industrial conditions caused a great upheaval. It was suppressed by the help of Imperial troops. Six months later it broke out again. This time the Defence Force was an instrument ready to the hands of the Government. It was at once called into being. Its members responded with marked alacrity and the disorders were suppressed without bloodshed. To have been able to use with such efficiency an organization so recently begun, to have dispensed, in this second trial, with Imperial troops, the Government must have had full confidence in the work which the Defence Act had given them the power to do. Their confidence was not misplaced.

What South Africa required, then, was a mobile and efficient force, ready for mobilization at any moment, not very large in numbers at first, but with ample reserves available if they were required. The Defence Act of 1912 aimed at the provision of such a force. A small body of permanent mounted men was maintained, ready for service at any moment and in any part of the Union. These mounted troops were available for police duty in the outlying districts during peace time. If war broke out, reserves were available to do police duty while they were on active service. Next came the organization known as the Active Citizen Force. This was obtained by a system of registration and volunteering, with the ballot in reserve. The "area system," as in Australia and New Zealand, was the basis of this organization. In each area all males between the ages of 16 and 25 were compelled to register themselves. A certain number of volunteers were called for from among those registered. If in any area the number of volunteers was insufficient, the Government had the right to ballot for the men it required. In practice this power proved unnecessary. The number of volunteers for service in the two years during which the system had been working before war came upon Europe had largely exceeded the number estimated as likely to be available when the details of the system were being worked out.

The training of these volunteers was similar to that adopted in Australasia. But although founded upon the cadet system, it did not give

such definite recognition to that system as the Australasian organizations did. The course of training prescribed by the South African Defence Act of 1912 was to extend over four years. In the first year the days of training required were not to exceed thirty; in the other three years they were to be limited to twenty-one. In the first year there were to be not more than twenty-two days of continuous training; and in each of the other years not more than fifteen days of continuous training. Days of non-continuous training were carefully defined. Each day was to be made up of either "a period of instruction or exercise lasting eight hours"; or of "two periods of instruction or exercise each lasting four hours"; or of "six periods of instruction or exercise each lasting one hour and a half."

Such was the organization of the Active Citizen Force. It was, of course, supplemented by provisions for training officers (South Africa had naturally a large number of men equipped by actual war experience for command); for coast and garrison defence and for artillery training. But it was also backed by an elaborate organization of trained and partially-trained reserves. Men who had completed their four years' training (there were no such men when war broke out, as the Act was only passed in 1912) were to be drafted into Class A of the Reserves, where they would remain till they were over forty-five. Men registered who had not volunteered for service or who, having volunteered, were not accepted, were trained to shoot in Rifle Associations. These formed Class B of the Reserve. Thus every male between sixteen and twenty-five passed through the hands of the Government either as a member of the Active Citizen Force or in one of the Rifle Associations. Males under twenty-one who were registered but did not volunteer for service had to pay £1 per annum to the Government and were still liable to be called on to serve by ballot if the number of volunteers was insufficient. Men in Classes A and B of the Reserve, when they reached forty-five, were to pass into what was known as the National Reserve until the age of sixty.

The whole force thus organized was under the control of a Council of Defence, appointed in practice by the Ministry in power. This Council exercised advisory functions without executive power. It acted as a body assisting the Minister of Defence and was composed of men who were experts in military matters, irrespective of their political opinions. In South Africa, as in Australia and New Zealand, the defence organization was the work of all

political parties. The usual conditions of Parliamentary life were suspended while it was under discussion. All cooperated in devising the best possible system, considering the needs of the country, and the advice of men like Field-Marshal Lord Methuen, who was then Commander-in-Chief of the Imperial Forces in the Dominion, was asked and freely given. The result was that the system established under the Defence Act of 1912 had the full support of the whole country and had given every promise of providing the Dominion with an efficient and adequate force for its land defence at the moment when Great Britain was plunged into war.

Such were the organizations of the Dominions for their internal defence. If there had been no organized system before the European War of raising and training troops for the defence of the Empire, it was speedily clear that when the crisis came Great Britain could rely upon them for their utmost efforts in the common cause. The South African War, fifteen years earlier, had gone a long way to prove this. But there had then been nothing like the spontaneous rally of all parts of the Empire to the help of Great Britain that marked the declaration of war against Germany. The people of the Dominions seemed to realize, with an instinctive insight which was the best testimony to their patriotism, the full extent of the issues involved. Offers of help in men, money, and supplies came pouring in. Canada immediately offered 20,000 men and let it be known that if more were required they would be forthcoming. Within a month another 10,000 had been added to this number, and the pressure of men clamouring to go to the assistance of the Old Country swelled the recruiting lists of the Government of the Dominion. Australia also offered 20,000 men. In her case, too, this number was speedily augmented by the addition of an Infantry and a Light Horse Brigade. New Zealand's first offer was 8,000 men, and she, too, made it known that more would be sent if they were needed. South Africa released at once the Imperial troops within her borders, thus showing the value of the Home Defence Force that she was creating. Besides these 6,000 Imperial troops—a true contribution to the common cause—there were offers from all parts of the Union for service in additional special contingents. Australia, Canada, and New Zealand at once undertook the whole cost of equipment and maintenance of their contingents.

To these offers were added numberless other acts, equally valuable and equally welcome

as showing the intense devotion of the oversea peoples. The Royal Australian Navy was placed under the control of the Admiralty, while New Zealand and Canada also made free gifts of all their available resources in ships and men. The New Zealand, the magnificent battle-cruiser which had been presented without condition of any kind to the British Fleet, was already on service in Home waters. Canada put her two cruisers, the Niobe and the Rainbow, fully equipped for service, under Admiralty orders for purposes of commerce protection. Her Government also purchased two submarines to be used in the same way and for the same purpose on her Pacific coasts.

Thus the doubts that had been entertained by many observers of the development of the armies and naval forces of the Dominions vanished at the first threat to the integrity of the Empire. Without a moment's hesitation, with a magnificent unanimity that will live in the records of British honour, each of the



TYPE OF CANADIAN SOLDIER, LORD STRATHCONA'S CORPS. [Topical]

Dominions threw its immediately available strength into the scale. The new worlds redressed, in a new sense, the balance of the old. They "let everything go in," and set themselves at once to continue their efforts until success should be assured. Their public men expressed this far-sighted determination in words of resolute enthusiasm. Differences of race, minor contentions of party, doubts, hesitations, complaints about the inertia and slackness of the people of the British Isles—all disappeared in a night. The first morrow of war found the whole Empire, in the inspiring words used by the King in his Message to the Dominions, "united, calm, resolute, trusting in God."

The resources of a country engaged in a great war do not consist only in the numbers of its armed men or the spirit of its citizens. The women of Canada equipped a hospital ship for the British Navy. Newfoundland, unable to provide an army out of her small population, did nobly in raising 500 men for service abroad, while she increased her Home Defence Force by 500 men and her naval reserve by 400. In many of the great cities of the Empire funds similar to that initiated by the Prince of Wales in Great Britain were started and met with the most open-handed support. In Australia a fund of this kind was specifically devoted to the purchase of food supplies for the British Isles. In Canada, gifts of food in many kinds were immediately organized. The Dominion led the way with 1,000,000 bags of

flour, the first instalment of which reached Great Britain less than a month after the declaration of war. Similar gifts in kind were made by the Provincial Governments. In such acts of beneficent generosity private citizens vied with public bodies, and in both public and private generosity the other Dominions did their best to rival Canada. A complete list of all such offers of aid to the Mother Country would be difficult to compile. The examples given are sufficient to show the splendid spirit which animated the Self-Governing Dominions in the hour of crisis.

Most conspicuous of all was the absolute unanimity of all races within the Empire in support of the Mother Country. The French of Canada, the Dutch of South Africa, were heart and soul with their fellow-citizens in support of the British cause. The native races of South Africa lost no time in giving equally striking proofs of their loyalty. Amid all the anxieties of the moment these proofs of the success of British policy were welcomed with profound gladness in Great Britain. There had been many who, in earlier days, had doubted whether the Empire would endure the strain of a great crisis. All such doubts were now resolved. The people of Great Britain prepared themselves for the long trial of an unexpected war with all the more confidence in the final success of their arms since the very first result of that trial had been to prove the essential soundness of their Imperial policy and the strength of the fabric based on that foundation.



CHAPTER X.


THE NATIVE INDIAN ARMY.

BRITAIN'S POSITION IN INDIA—SUPPOSED SOURCE OF WEAKNESS—INDIAN TROOPS AT MALTA—EFFECT OF GOOD GOVERNMENT IN INDIA—EMPLOYING COLOURED TROOPS AGAINST WHITE FOES—THE GURKHAS—THE SIKHS HAVE FIRST PLACE—WHAT IS A SIKH ?—THE PUNJABI MUSALMANS—THE PATHANS—BALUCHIS AND BRAHUIS—THE BRAHMANS—RAJPUTS AND MAHRATTAS—MADRASIS—THE DOGRAS—DIFFICULTIES OF CREED AND CASTE—THE LOYAL NATIVE STATES' CONTINGENTS—NO NATIVE FIELD ARTILLERY—ABOLITION OF THE "COLOUR LINE" IN WAR.

BY the possession of India, Britain at the outbreak of the great European war occupied a unique position among the empires. A comparatively small European country herself, relying for self-defence chiefly upon a powerful Navy, she was at the same time the ruler of vast Asian territory with an extended land frontier. It is true that along practically the whole of this frontier the Himalayas, with the spurs and buttresses of minor mountain ranges, constituted a mighty barrier; but it was a barrier which had many times been pierced by successful invasion within historical times and the burden of maintaining it in an efficient state of defence had been heavy. Heavy too had been the burden of maintaining peace within the borders of India, where rival nations with jarring creeds seemed ever ready to fly at each other's throats and only likely to unite in a common effort to shake off our yoke. Thus, although we had always set ourselves the task of governing India so justly and sympathetically that her peoples might be on our side in the day of trouble, our position in Asia had always been regarded by our prospective enemies in Europe as a source of weakness. It is true that Lord Beaconsfield, by bringing Indian troops to Malta on an occasion of crisis, gave the world a hint of future possibilities; but his bold stroke was derided as a theatrical *coup*, and other European nations had continued to regard India as a country where the great Mutiny would be surpassed

in horror by the upheaval that would inevitably follow the entanglement of Britain in a great war. At the outset of the present conflict the German Press confidently relied upon trouble in India as a large factor on their side.

But in the meantime the sympathetic justice of our rule in India had been doing its silent work; and the superficial splashes of sedition in densely-populated centres were as nothing compared with the steady undercurrent of loyalty all over the peninsula, which had resulted from the transparent sincerity of our efforts to govern India in her own best interests. Yet the very success of these efforts had brought to the surface new difficulties, arising directly from our anomalous position. We, a free and independent people, were governing—by the power of the sword in the last resort—a larger people that was not free and independent. The more they learned of the goodness of our Western civilization and the higher, especially, we raised the standard of our native Indian Army, the stronger became the pressure upon us from below, seeking some outlet for the high ambitions which we ourselves had awakened. Looking only at the military side of the question, no one conversant with the facts could fail to see that the time was at hand when we could no longer deny to a force of British subjects, with the glorious record and splendid efficiency of our native Indian troops, the right to stand shoulder to shoulder with their British comrades in defence of the Empire, wherever it might be assailed.



MAP OF THE WORLD, SHOWING BRITISH, FRENCH, AND GERMAN POSSESSIONS.




TYPICAL GURKHA RIFLES.

[Underwood & Underwood]

We British are constitutionally the last people in the world to take unfair advantage in sport, commerce or war of our opponents. The instinct which made us such sticklers for propriety in all our dealings made us more reluctant than other nations would feel, to employ coloured troops against a white enemy. But the very success of our rule in India had been based upon our conscientious disregard of colour. The very value of our dusky native troops lay in the fact that they had proved themselves worthy, in victory and defeat, to fight by the side of our own white men. So, even if our active alliance with the yellow people of Japan in the Far East and the employment of dusky French Turcos in Belgium could not have been quoted as precedents for ignoring colour in this war, it would scarcely have been possible and certainly not wise for us to refuse to our native Indian Army the privilege of taking its place beside British troops against the Germans.

What, then, was this native Indian Army, of which we have such good reason to be proud? To begin with, the average Englishman, who talked about the Indian Army, generally fell into a large error at the very outset; because he almost always began to sing the praises

of the "little Gurkhas." With them he usually mentioned the Sikhs; but it was only as if the little Gurkha cast a large Sikh shadow. The substance of his admiration was always for the former. Far be it from us to undervalue the splendid fighting qualities and the glorious military record of the Gurkha. The ten regiments of Gurkha Rifles—little, stocky men in dull green uniforms, all looking exactly alike, "as if they had come out of a quartermaster's store"—are probably surpassed in fighting value by no block of ten regiments of their kind in any other army. The names of Bhurtpore, Aliwal, Sobraon, Delhi, Kabul, Chitral, Tirah, Burma, and China appeared among their records, a glorious summary of British military history in Asia; and if some European names are to be added now, there is no doubt that the additions are equally honourable and well deserved. But this was no reason why Englishmen, in speaking or writing of the native Indian Army, should put the Gurkha (even with the Sikh for a shadow) first and the rest almost nowhere, seeing that, strictly speaking, the Gurkha did not belong to the native Indian Army at all. He was a mercenary, a subject of the independent Kingdom of Nepal, in which we had by treaty—a "scrap of paper" which has been faithfully observed by both sides since 1814, when General Ochterlony's soldierly generosity to a brave enemy converted the defeated foe into a loyal friend—the right to recruit these active little hillmen for the army in India. Cheery and self-confident, with none of the shyness and reserve which embarrass acquaintanceship with the natives of India, the Gurkha exhibits a natural aptitude for making friends with the British soldier. Stalwart Highlanders were always his especial chums: and on our side Tommy Atkins was never slow to reciprocate the friendship of these smart little Nepalese, whose fidelity to the British had been so often shown, notably at Delhi, where they fought on with us until 327 out of a contingent of 490 were killed. No Briton can visit the monument on Delhi's famous Ridge without willingly grasping a Gurkha hand in friendship whenever it is proffered. All the same, when we talk of the Indian Army proper, we must not give the Gurkha the first place. Nor did his employment in Europe raise the same permanent world-wide issues which were involved in putting our Indian fellow-subjects by the side of the British soldier in the fighting line against the Germans. Incidentally it may be mentioned that the Gurkha is a Hindu, but is free from many caste prejudices of his co-religionists.



GROUP OF INDIAN OFFICERS, with Orderlies, etc., and British Staff Officers in mufti.

[Sport & General.]

On the other hand he is a great believer in devils.

Undoubtedly the first place among the races and castes which compose our native Indian Army must be given to the Sikhs. Not only were they the most numerous among the native wearers of his Majesty's uniform, but, without any disrespect to the other factors of our Army, they might be described as the backbone of British military prestige in the East. It was always understood, of course, by our enemies that there was the British soldier, supported by the British Fleet, to be reckoned with: but, in the East, British soldiers were—compared with the vast interests which we had to safeguard—few and, through difficulties of distant transport and other causes, very expensive. We were, therefore, peculiarly fortunate in having, in the Sikhs, material for our Army which, for trustworthiness and courage, for confidence in its British leaders and stern devotion to duty, for discipline and soldierly skill, could not be surpassed. When Ranjit Singh, the "Lion of the Punjab," lived, mutual respect and courtesy marked the relations between our Indian territories and the warrior dominion which he had established over the Land of the Five Rivers; but after his death restless spirits among the Sikhs forced war upon us, and it is admitted in our military annals that if the enemy had been better led the varying fortunes of our Sikh wars might not have ended finally in our favour. But so it was; and, like the Gurkhas, the Sikhs quickly turned from formidable foes to staunch friends. From the date of the Sikh wars, when the strongest provinces of our modern India were still foreign territory, there was no great episode in the history of British arms in India which is not enrolled upon the colours of Sikh regiments. In all Asia there was scarcely a mile of British territory which had not known the Sikh soldier or policeman. Clean, tall, and magnificently

bearded, with an upward sweep which took beard, moustache, whiskers, and hair, all together, under the turban, the Sikh looked the embodiment of the high soldierly virtues which he possessed, with a suggestion of the tiger's ferocity, should his passions be let loose. The desperate stands which small parties of British Sikhs have made against hopeless odds are chronicled among the glorious incidents of British history in India—one such was the occasion of the establishment of the "Indian Heroes' Fund" some years ago—and so truly were the Sikhs bred to the fighting type that it is scarcely an exaggeration to say that whenever you saw a man in the uniform of a Sikh regiment, you saw a man who would be a steady and courageous comrade to you in the worst circumstances of war.

Who, then, is the Sikh? As enlisted in our Indian Army, the Sikhs were neither a race nor a sect. Nor, although they were Hindu by origin, could they be described as a caste. Every Sikh enlisted in our service was a Singh, meaning "lion," i.e., a member of a fighting brotherhood. No one was born a Singh and no woman could become one. Each man was initiated into the faith—a purer faith than Hinduism, involving little more than worshipping God as "the Timeless One" and reverencing the Gurus as His prophets—by certain rites on reaching the prescribed age. Thenceforward he was bound by vows to avoid idolatry, to abjure alcohol and tobacco, and to cultivate all the manly virtues. His hair was never cut. Cattle were sacred to him. Love of military adventure and the desire to save money have been well described as his ruling passions. Of course, the Singh was human and sometimes, especially among the higher classes, the vows of abstemiousness might sit lightly on his conscience; but, take him all in all, the Sikh

soldier of to-day is a worthy representative of the warrior fraternity which raised the "Lion of the Punjab" to his great military eminence. Into the differences between the Sikh clans, such as the Jat Sikhs and Mazbi Sikhs, there is no need to enter here; but the latter provided us only with some Pioneer regiments, and when we spoke of a Sikh sepoy or sowar, it was almost always a Jat Sikh that we meant. The name "Jat," pronounced "Jut," meant that the Sikh was by descent a "Jat," pronounced "Jaht," a strict Hindu caste of the Punjab plains. From this caste, a race of superb horsemen from childhood, some of our finest Indian cavalry was recruited, and Indian military history is full of gallant incidents to the credit of the Jat horse. One regiment, the 14th Murray's Jat Lancers, retains the caste name in its official title.



INDIAN CAVALRY: a Typical Sowar.

[Topical.

Next to the Sikhs in numbers in the British service, and therefore before the Gurkhas, the Punjabi Musulmans must be placed. They were, of course, Mahomedans, though not of a fanatical kind. They were of mixed descent, but uniformly strict in observance of their religious obligations. They were, however, very tolerant of the religious beliefs of others and gave very little trouble in cantonments. Good all-round soldiers, easy for any real soldiers to be friends with, the Punjabi Musulmans deserved a much higher place than was usually given to them in British esteem, seeing that, next to the Sikhs, they were the most numerous class of natives in our Army and it was they who had been recruited to fill the places of abandoned regiments of other less useful races. "Sikhs, Punjabis, and Gurkhas, side by side with their British comrades"—this quotation from a Mutiny record placed the three most distinguished and valuable elements of our Indian Army in their proper order; and it was to be hoped that one result of the use of Indian troops in European war would be to bring home to the British public that the Indian Army did not entirely consist of the Gurkha with a Sikh shadow, but that, next to the Sikhs, the Punjabi Musulmans deserved the highest place in our esteem and gratitude.

Not far behind the Punjabi Musulmans an accurate judge of the fighting values of the native factors of our Indian Army would probably have placed the Pathans. These—although hastily-raised Pathan levies did grand service for us in the Mutiny—were a comparatively recent addition to the fighting strength of our Indian Empire, representing as they did the gradual spread of British prestige and the influence of the Indian rupee over the wild fastnesses which make the natural frontier between India and Afghanistan. Formerly the "Gate of India" on the North-West Frontier used to stand open for any sufficiently bold and powerful invader. Assyrians, Persians, Greeks, Arabs, Afghans, Tartars, and others—at least thirty distinct invasions, all more or less successful, of northern India, besides innumerable plundering forays, are recorded in history; but, although it is true that, when this great war broke out in Europe, the Pathan still found his shortest cut to wealth and honour through the rocky defiles between Peshawar and Kabul, it was only as a recruit for our Army that he came. With strong features, which support his claim to be a descendant of the lost tribes of Israel—a claim almost substantiated, too, by the fact

that his names reminded us always of the Old Testament, as Ishak (Isaac), Yakub (Jacob), Yusuf (Joseph), and so on—the wild Pathan was a very unkempt and unclean looking person. But, on the other hand, he had almost all the soldierly virtues in a high degree. He was a bad enemy—one of the worst—but a good friend; and his record in British service was splendid, both for dare-devil dash and dogged endurance. He was the ideal skirmisher in difficult country. His language was the guttural but easily-learned Pushtu, and in religion he was a Mahomedan of the most fanatical kind. He was a sharp weapon which needed careful handling; but a British officer who knew how to handle his Pathans would be followed cheerfully to death anywhere.

From the Pathans, whose very name conjured up memories of all the stormy history of our hard-fought North-Western Frontier of India, the mind's eye naturally travelled down that frontier to the land of the Baluchis, increasingly employed in our frontier line. Here, too, the mountain barrier was pierced by passes which lead from Afghanistan to India; but compared with the stormy torrent by which our military position at Peshawar, with its flying buttress in the Ali Masjid Fort, had so often been shaken, the stream of fitful human traffic which flowed slowly past our Quetta stronghold might be regarded as a peaceful backwater; and to some extent this was reflected in the character of the native troops, Baluchis and Brahuis, which we derive from this region. Devout, but not fanatical, Mahomedans, they made cheery, tough, and courteous warriors, serving always with credit to us and to themselves. Fine, well-set-up men, the Baluchis always made a good show among other troops; and they were as useful in the field as amenable in cantonments.

Turning now to the Hindu regiments, we come at once to an element which, for exactly opposite reasons, needed as careful handling as the fiercely fanatical Moslems of the North-West Frontier. The leading infantry regiment on the Indian Army list was the 1st Brahmans, and the 3rd regiment was Brahman also. These Brahmans are Hindus of the Hindus, so fenced round with holy caste restrictions that it was high testimony to the sympathetic skill of our military administration that these fine old regiments still retained their pride of place in the Army List. It was not too much to say that if by any mischance in peace the men of a Brahman regiment and a Pathan regiment were left together without

any control there would not be a man left alive in the weaker corps, whichever that might be, on the following day. War makes large differences, of course, for Brahmans and Pathans are both human and both soldiers at heart; but against the extended employment of the very highest Hindu castes always had to be set the difficulties which religious restrictions imposed upon them. Nevertheless, the Brahmans had done good service, both in Afghanistan and Burma.

Other high-caste Hindus who supplied our Indian Army with splendid fighting men were the Rajputs and the Mahrattas. Both names loom large in the history of India; and probably there was no living race of men who had more reason to be proud of their lineage than the Rajputs. Their very name meant "of Royal blood," and in no community had the pride of ancestry worked so strictly to keep the blood pure from age to age. The story of Chitor, where the beleaguered Rajputs killed all their wives and children and perished, fighting, to a man themselves rather than give a Rajput princess as wife to Akbar, the mighty Moslem Emperor of Delhi, makes one of the bloodiest and most glorious pages in the history of the world's chivalry; and the modern Rajput, although he might be only a foot soldier in our Indian Army, was instinct with the spirit of his race.¹ Great credit might our government of India take from the fact that the oldest of our Rajput regiments, the Queen's Own Rajputs, still held its place as the second corps of infantry in the Indian Army List. High-caste Hindus, proud, pure-blooded warriors, the Rajputs were not men whom we might fear to place before the most determined European foe, if caste restrictions could be observed unbroken.


Much that has been said of the Brahmans and Rajputs applies to the Mahrattas, who were also Hindus and inclined to be fanatical in all matters affecting their caste and creed. This was the natural result of their history of almost ceaseless warfare against Mahomedan invaders. Holding their mountain strongholds of the Western Ghauts against all assailants and occupying the plains on either side of the great hills, the Mahrattas were a power to be reckoned with in the destinies of India; and our Mahratta wars were protracted, difficult, and costly. Now, in our service, these high-spirited mountaineers, although not great in stature, nor thick-set in physique, made very tough, good fighters.

Of the remaining Hindu elements in our Indian Army, only two need be mentioned. The Madrasis, natives of the Madras province,

were a dwindling factor. Intelligent and well-educated as a class, they had impressed many of their British officers with a high sense of their value as fighting men; but this opinion had not been reflected in the military policy of the years before the war. It was only natural that officers who had devoted their lives to perfecting a regiment should take a pride in its merit; and in no service in the world, perhaps, was this tendency more marked than among the British officers of the Indian Army, who were entrusted with material which varied in every detail. Hence it arose that the "shop" talk of a British officer of a Gurkha battalion was often almost intolerable to officers of other units; while the nickname of one brilliant frontier corps as "God's Own Guides" is eloquent of the mental suffering which a mixed mess had often endured when an officer of the Guides was fairly started talking about his men. So the Madras sepoy had enthusiastic defenders of his reputation as a fighting man; but, even if all that his apologists said was true, it could not be suggested that in finding more room for the Dogra the Army suffered by the loss of the Madras. For the Dogra, who was also a high-caste Hindu, filled three entire regiments, besides "class" squadrons or companies of many others. He was the typical stalwart yeoman of the Punjab, recruited from the sub-Himalayan regions of the North-west. Like the Mahrattas, the Dogras had retained their spirit as fighting Hindus by constant contact with Mohamedan neighbours; but their Hinduism was not fanatical. In many respects they resembled the Sikhs. Patient as

their own bullocks under hardship, they were sturdy and manly, courteous and brave. Perhaps it was the wide horizon of the Punjab plains and the community of interests which must be felt by all dwellers therein, who were equally at the mercy of the weather which God sends to them, that had given to the Punjabis, whether Musulman or Hindu, that broader spirit which rendered possible the rise of the Sikh brotherhood with its pure religion and high ideals. However this may be, it is certain that in the Dogras of the Punjab we had a Hindu factor of great military value, resembling in many ways that of their neighbours, the Punjabi Musulmans.

From this brief review of the materials from which our native Indian Army was drawn we can see that it was composed of pure-blooded races with fighting traditions, of proved service, and splendid conduct in the field, in every way worthy to be welcomed as comrades by the British troops who were to serve with them against the King-Emperor's enemies. We can also see that those upon whom the duty fell of selecting Indian units to serve with our own Expeditionary Force in Europe had an invidious and difficult task. Not only was there *embarras de richesses* in the wide range of varying merits to be considered; but there were also the practical obstacles, much greater in the case of some units than of others, of bringing into the close cohesion necessary for distant service the mixed force selected. This difficulty was not lessened by the natural desire of the authorities to recognize the self-sacrificing loyalty of the rulers of the Native States



GROUP OF MAHOMEDAN OFFICERS AND MEN, LANCERS AND INFANTRY.

by giving to their Imperial Service Troops a chance of distinction by the side of our own regiments on European service. In our native infantry regiments each battalion had from thirteen to fifteen British officers in addition to sixteen native officers, whereas the Imperial Service Corps of the Native States were commanded entirely by native officers with British advisers only. Although the troops themselves might fairly be described as crack corps, the want of British officers would undoubtedly be felt in employment on any large scale in Europe. The readiness of the Imperial Service Troops, however, to fall into line for the defence of the Empire was fine evidence of the status which our British Government of India occupied in the native mind; and even in the case of our own Indian troops it must always be remembered that the best native soldiers, especially in the cavalry, did not really serve for their pay, but, as befits men of good family, for military honour.

Another point to be remembered in connexion with the Indian Army is that it could not have furnished a complete field force of natives alone. So far as the cavalry and infantry are concerned the native regiments might always be trusted to give a good account of themselves, even without any "stiffening" of British troops; but the instinct of self-preservation, engendered in the mind of British rulers in India through the experience of the Mutiny, insisted upon the paramount necessity that artillery in India shall be entirely in British hands. There were indeed twelve mountain batteries, in which service is so popular, especially among the Sikhs, that they could always command recruits of exceptional physique and the highest quality, with the result that in our frontier wars the little guns were always served to the admiration of all beholders; but with this exception there were no native gunners in India. Horse, field, and garrison artillery were solely British.

In any case, therefore, a force in which Indian troops were included must necessarily have been a composite force, although in the thirty-



A VETERAN SUBADA-MAJOR OF
THE 45th RATTRAY'S SIKHS.

nine regiments of cavalry and 130 regiments of infantry, in addition to the mixed Corps of Guides and the ten regiments of Gurkha Rifles, there was ample material from which to select as fine a contingent of the two arms as any general officer could desire to command. The real difficulty was to make the selection and at the same time to remember the claims of the loyal Native States, and to disappoint the legitimate ambitions of the bulk of the eager troops as little as might be. And of course only those to whom the task was given were cognisant of all the circumstances which influenced the selection. It was made with a care appropriate to the occasion; for the occasion was the most momentous which had occurred in the history of the Indian Army—momentous not only for that Army or for India, but also for the world at large, as definitely erasing the "colour line" in war.



CHAPTER XI.

THE RALLY OF THE EMPIRE.

MORAL AS WELL AS MATERIAL SUPPORT—OPINION IN CANADA AND AUSTRALIA—THE KING'S MESSAGE TO THE DOMINIONS—EFFECT OF SIR EDWARD GREY'S SPEECH—THE CANADIAN AND SOUTH AFRICAN PRESS—THE KING'S SECOND MESSAGE TO THE DOMINIONS—LOYALTY OF INDIA—LORD HARDINGE'S SPEECH IN COUNCIL—INDIAN RULING PRINCES' OFFERS OF MEN, PERSONAL SERVICE, AND MONEY—STATEMENT IN PARLIAMENT—THE KING-EMPEROR'S MESSAGE TO INDIA—THE EMPIRE UNITED.

IMPORTANT as were the offers of help, both of men and of provisions, which the Self-Governing Dominions and the Indian Empire made to the Mother Country almost immediately after the outbreak of the war, the knowledge that these great daughter-nations were morally convinced of the justice of the British cause was a factor of even more far-reaching importance. Great as was the necessity of organizing and expanding the Imperial forces, and thus creating an extra army or armies to reinforce the British Expeditionary Force in France, urgent as was the need of taking advantage of the prompt offers of help which came from all parts of the Empire, the necessity of convincing the Self-Governing Dominions and the Empire at large of the righteousness of the cause for which Great Britain was fighting was more imperative still. For in the long run the consciousness of the justice of the principles for which a people is fighting alone can ensure the massing of material force sufficient to secure material victory.

Evidence that the case for Great Britain was fully understood and thoroughly approved, not only by our own peoples but by the bulk of the neutral States of the world, was not long in presenting itself. The Dominions as a whole had satisfied themselves that the British cause was just before Sir Edward Grey had made it plain by his speech of August 3 that the British Government had

done everything short of sacrificing the honour of the country to avoid war. In the words of Sir Richard McBride, the Premier of British Columbia, "Should it unfortunately develop that Great Britain is compelled to engage in hostilities, Canada will automatically be at war also"; while in Australia Mr. Fisher, the ex-Prime Minister, declared, "Should honour demand the Mother Country to take part in hostilities, Australians will stand beside her to the last man and the last shilling." These sentiments found expression in the offers of help of men and material which have been described in the preceding chapter. To these offers the King replied by a message to the Overseas Dominions:—

I desire to express to my people of the Overseas Dominions with what appreciation and pride I have received the messages from their respective Governments during the last few days.

These spontaneous assurances of their fullest support recall to me the generous, self-sacrificing help given by them in the past to the Mother Country.

I shall be strengthened in the discharge of the great responsibility which rests upon me by the confident belief that in this time of trial my Empire will stand united, calm resolute, trusting in God.—GEORGE R.I.

Sir Edward Grey's speech produced its inevitable effect throughout the Empire. In

the words of Sir James Whitney, the Premier of Ontario :

The momentous crisis we are now facing makes it plain what Canada's course must be. That course is to exert our whole strength and power at once on behalf of the Empire. I know my fellow Canadians too well to doubt they will respond with enthusiastic loyalty to the appeal. Sir Robert Borden has all Canada behind him if steps must be taken to join in fighting the Empire's battles, because the contest is forced upon Great Britain. It is our contest as much as hers, and upon the issue of events depends our national existence. Never before in our history has the call to duty and honour been so clear and imperative, and Canada will neither quail nor falter at the test. The British Government have done everything possible to avoid war and sought peace with an earnestness worthy of responsible statesmen. But a dishonourable peace would prove disastrous to the Empire. We should be unworthy of the blood that runs in our veins if we sought to avoid an inevitable conflict. I rejoice at the evidences of Imperial unity displayed on all sides, and if our cause is to preserve liberty and to resist unjust aggression, it will evoke all that is best and noblest in the Canadian character.

Not the least remarkable of the utterances of the Dominion statesmen was that of General Botha, fourteen years before the ablest and the most dreaded of the Boer leaders. In the course of a speech delivered on September 9, he said that at the request of the Imperial Government his Government had decided to undertake operations in German South-West Africa. Then he continued :—

There could only be one reply to the Imperial Government's request. There were many in South Africa who did not recognize the tremendous seriousness and great possibilities of this war, and some thought that the storm did not threaten South Africa. This was a most narrow-minded conception. The Empire was at war ; consequently South Africa was at war with the common enemy. Only two paths were open—the path of faithfulness to duty and honour and the path of disloyalty and dishonour. A characteristic of the South African people was their high sense of honour, and they would maintain their reputation for honourable dealing untarnished. To forget their loyalty to the Empire in this hour of trial would be scandalous and shameful, and would blacken South

Africa in the eyes of the whole world. Of this South Africans were incapable.

They had endured some of the greatest sacrifices that could be demanded of a people, but they had always kept before them ideals founded on Christianity, and never in their darkest days had they sought to gain their ends by treasonable means. The path of treason was an unknown path to Dutch and English alike. Their duty and their conscience alike bade them be faithful and true to the Imperial Government in all respects in this hour of darkness and trouble. That was the attitude of the Union Government ; that was the attitude of the people of South Africa.

Nor was the Press of the Dominions less emphatic in the position it assumed. Before the outbreak of hostilities the *Toronto Globe* said :—

Of one thing let there be no cavil or question ; if it means war for Great Britain, it means war also for Canada. If it means war for Canada it means also the union of Canadians for the defence of Canada, for the maintenance of the Empire's integrity, and for the preservation in the world of Great Britain's ideals of democratic government and life,

while an article in the *Cape Times* after the publication of Sir Edward Grey's speech gave a fair example of the effect of that utterance in the South African Union :—

We shall fight to save Europe from the threatened tyranny which has troubled her peace since the German Empire was first founded upon blood and iron, to guard for ourselves and for those who have put their trust in us the heritage of freedom, and, above all, to redeem the solemn pledges given many years ago that the might of Britain should be interposed to shield the weaker nations of Western Europe against aggression. Never did a nation go into war in a cause better fitted to draw together the peoples that have learnt to know liberty under the British Flag . . . Britain has stood for peace until the arrogance and madness of the German Emperor have forced the sword into her hand. Germany has deliberately taken the rôle of international highwayman, and the highwayman, sooner or later, meets his deserts.

The sentiments felt by the whole Empire were finely expressed in the further message which the King issued to the Governments and people of his Self-Governing Dominions :—

During the past few weeks the peoples of My whole Empire at Home and Overseas have moved with one mind and purpose to confront and overthrow an unparalleled assault upon the continuity of civilization and the peace of mankind.

The calamitous conflict is not of My seeking, My voice has been cast throughout on the side of peace. My Ministers earnestly strove to allay the causes of strife and to appease differences with which My Empire was not concerned. Had I stood



H.M. THE KING.

[W. & D. Downey.



SIR PERTAB SINGH,
the Veteran of the Indian Expeditionary Force.
[Lafayette.]

aside when, in defiance of pledges to which My Kingdom was a party, the soil of Belgium was violated and her cities laid desolate, when the very life of the French nation was threatened with extinction, I should have sacrificed My honour and given to destruction the liberties of My Empire and of mankind. I rejoice that every part of the Empire is with me in this decision.

Paramount regard for treaty faith and the pledged word of rulers and peoples is the common heritage of Great Britain and of the Empire.

My peoples in the Self-Governing Dominions have shown beyond all doubt that they wholeheartedly endorse the grave decision which it was necessary to take.

My personal knowledge of the loyalty and devotion of My Oversea Dominions

had led me to expect that they would cheerfully make the great efforts and bear the great sacrifices which the present conflict entails. The full measure in which they have placed their services and resources at My disposal fills me with gratitude, and I am proud to be able to show to the world that My Peoples Oversea are as determined as the People of the United Kingdom to prosecute a just cause to a successful end.

The Dominion of Canada, the Commonwealth of Australia, and the Dominion of New Zealand have placed at My disposal their naval forces, which have already rendered good service for the Empire. Strong Expeditionary forces are being prepared in Canada, in Australia, and in New Zealand for service at the Front, and the Union of South Africa has released all British Troops and has undertaken important military responsibilities the discharge of which will be of the utmost value to the Empire. Newfoundland has doubled the numbers of its branch of the Royal Naval Reserve and is sending a body of men to take part in the operations at the Front. From the Dominion and Provincial Governments of Canada large and welcome gifts of supplies are on their way for the use both of My Naval and Military forces and for the relief of the distress in the United Kingdom which must inevitably follow in the wake of war. All parts of My Oversea Dominions have thus demonstrated in the most unmistakable manner the fundamental unity of the Empire amidst all its diversity of situation and circumstance.

GEORGE R.I.

Even more striking and not less spontaneous were the expressions of passionate loyalty to the Throne and Empire which came from India. Assurances of Indian support were unanimously forthcoming, and as early as August 6 *The Times* Correspondent in Bombay was able to announce that the military Princes of India had placed the whole of their resources at the disposal of the Emperor. Later on in the Viceroy's Council Lord Hardinge, speaking of the employment of the Indian Army in the War, said:—

It was, moreover, with confidence and pride that I was able to offer to his Majesty the first and largest military force of British and Indian troops for service in Europe that has ever left the shores of India. I am confident that the honour of this land and of the British Empire may be safely entrusted to



LORD HARDINGE OF PENSHURST,
Viceroy of India.

[Elliott & Fry.

our brave soldiers, and that they will acquit themselves nobly and ever maintain their high traditions of military chivalry and courage. To the people of India I would say at this time, let us display to the world an attitude of unity, of self-sacrifice, and of unswerving confidence under all circumstances in the justice of our cause and in the assurance that God will defend the right.

A summary of the various offers of service, money, and so forth made by the rulers of the native States was given in a telegram from the Viceroy dated September 8, which was read by Lord Crewe in the House of Lords, and by Mr. Charles Roberts, Under-Secretary of State for India, in the House of Commons on September 9:—

Following is a summary of offers of service, money, &c., made in India to the Viceroy. The Rulers of the Native States in India, who number nearly seven hundred in all, have with one accord rallied to the defence of the Empire and offered their personal services and the resources of their States for the war. From among the many Princes and Nobles who have volunteered for active service, the Viceroy has selected the Chiefs of Jodhpur, Bikaner, Kishangarh, Rutlam, Sachin, Patiala, Sir Pertab Singh, Regent of Jodhpur, the Heir Apparent of Bhopal, and a brother of the Maharaja of Cooch Behar, together with other cadets of noble families. The veteran

Sir Pertab would not be denied his right to serve the King-Emperor in spite of his seventy years, and his nephew, the Maharaja, who is but sixteen years old, goes with him.

All these have, with the Commander-in-Chief's approval, already joined the Expeditionary Forces. The Maharaja of Gwalior and the Chiefs of Jaora and Dholpur together with the Heir-Apparent of Palanpur were, to their great regret, prevented from leaving their States. Twenty-seven of the larger States in India maintain Imperial Service Troops, and the services of every corps were immediately placed at the disposal of the Government of India on the outbreak of war. The Viceroy has accepted from twelve States contingents of cavalry, infantry, sappers, and transport, besides a camel corps from Bikaner, and most of them have already embarked. As particular instances of generosity and eager loyalty of the Chiefs the following may be quoted:—Various Durbars have combined together to provide a hospital ship to be called "The Loyalty" for the use of the Expeditionary Forces. The Maharaja of Mysore has placed Rs.50 lakhs at the disposal of the Government of India for expenditure in connexion with the Expeditionary Force.

The Chief of Gwalior, in addition to sharing in the expenses of the hospital ship,



THE MARQUESS OF CREWE,
Secretary of State for India.

[Elliott & Fry.



THE MAHARAJA OF MYSORE.

[Sport & General.]

the idea of which was originated with himself and the Begum of Bhopal, has offered to place large sums of money at the disposal of the Government of India and to provide thousands of horses as remounts. From Loharu in the Punjab and Las Bela and Kalat in Baluchistan come offers of camels with drivers, to be supplied and maintained by the Chiefs and Sardars. Several chiefs have offered to raise additional troops for military service should they be required, and donations to the Indian Relief Fund have poured in from all States. The Maharaja of Rewa has offered his troops, his treasury, and even his private jewelry for the service of the King-Emperor. In addition to contributions to the Indian Fund some Chiefs—namely, those of Kashmir, Bundi, Orchha, and Gwalior and Indore—have also given large sums to the Prince of Wales's Fund.

The Maharaja of Kashmir, not content with subscribing himself to the Indian Fund, presided at a meeting of 20,000 people held recently at Srinagar and delivered a stirring speech, in response to which large subscriptions were collected.

Maharaja Holkar offers, free of charge, all horses in his State Army which may be suitable for Government purposes. Horses also offered by Nizam's Government, by Jamnagar, and other Bombay States. Every Chief in the Bombay Presidency has placed the resources of his State at the disposal of Government, and all have made contributions to the Relief Fund.

Loyal messages and offers also received from Mehtar of Chitral and tribes of Khyber Agency as well as Khyber Rifles.

Letters have been received from the most remote States in India, all marked by deep sincerity of desire to render some assistance, however humble, to the British Government in its hour of need.

Last, but not least, from beyond the borders of India have been received generous offers of assistance from the Nepal Durbar; the military resources of the State have been placed at the disposal of the British Government, and the Prime Minister has offered a sum of Rs.3 lakhs to the Viceroy for the purchase of machine guns or field equipment for British Gurkha Regiments proceeding overseas, in addition to large donations from his private purse to the Prince of Wales's Fund and the Imperial Indian Relief Fund.

To the 4th Gurkha Rifles, of which the Prime Minister is honorary Colonel, the Prime Minister has offered Rs.30,000 for the purchase of machine guns in the event of their going on service. The Dalai Lama of Tibet has offered 1,000 Tibetan troops for service under the British Government. His Holiness also states that Lamas innumerable throughout length and breadth of Tibet are offering prayers for success of British Army and for happiness of souls of all victims of war.

The same spirit has prevailed throughout British India. Hundreds of telegrams and letters received by Viceroy expressing loyalty and desire to serve Government either in the field or by cooperation in India. Many hundreds also received by local administrations. They come from communities and associations, religious, political, and social, of all classes and creeds, also from individuals offering their resources or asking for opportunity to prove loyalty by personal service. Following may be mentioned as typical examples:—

The All India Moslem League, the Bengal Presidency Moslem League, the Moslem Association of Rangoon, the Trustees of the

Aligarh College, the Behar Provincial Moslem League the Central National Mahomedan Association of Calcutta, the Khoja Community, and other followers of Aga Khan, the Punjab Moslem League, Mahomedans of Eastern Bengal, Citizens of Calcutta, Madras, Rangoon, and many other cities, Behar Landholders' Association, Madras Provincial Congress, Taluqdars of Oudh, Punjab Chiefs' Association, United Provinces Provincial Congress, Hindus of the Punjab Chief Khalsa Diwan representing orthodox Sikhs, Bohra Community of Bombay, Parsee Community of Bombay.

Delhi Medical Association offer field hospital that was sent to Turkey during Balkan War; Bengalee students offer enthusiastic services for an ambulance corps, and there were many other offers of medical aid; Zemnidars of Madras have offered 500 horses, and among other practical steps taken to assist Government may be noted the holding of meetings to allay panic, keep down prices, and maintain public confidence and credit. Generous contributions have poured in from all quarters to Imperial Indian Relief Fund.

These great and splendid offers of service were acknowledged by the King-Emperor in the following terms:—

To the Princes and Peoples of My
Indian Empire:


Among the many incidents that have marked the unanimous uprising of the populations of My Empire in defence of its unity and integrity, nothing has moved

me more than the passionate devotion to My Throne expressed both by My Indian subjects, and by the Feudatory Princes and the ruling Chiefs of India, and their prodigal offers of their lives and their resources in the cause of the Realm. Their one-voiced demand to be foremost in the conflict has touched my heart, and has inspired to the highest issues the love and devotion which, as I well know, have ever linked My Indian subjects and Myself. I recall to mind India's gracious message to the British nation of good will and fellowship which greeted my return in February, 1912, after the solemn ceremony of My Coronation Durbar at Delhi, and I find in this hour of trial a full harvest and a noble fulfilment of the assurance given by you that the destinies of Great Britain and India are indissolubly linked.—

GEORGE R.I.

It is unnecessary to dwell upon the tremendous significance of these documents. The British Empire went to war for justice, mercy, and righteousness, knowing that those great principles of human government were not merely endorsed by its united conscience but that in India not less than elsewhere they had been put to the practical proof and had not been found wanting. Indian loyalty owed its existence not only to the monarchic instincts of its peoples and to their martial pride, but to their gratitude for the benefits of British Government and to their determination to uphold at all costs the Empire to which they were so deeply indebted.





FIELD-MARSHAL EARL KITCHENER, Secretary of State for War.

[From the painting by Angelo.]

CHAPTER XII.

THE BRITISH THEORY OF WAR.

ADVANTAGE OF PRACTICAL EXPERIENCE—LORD KITCHENER ON THE IMPORTANCE OF FEEDING SOLDIERS AND OF COVER—SMALL ARMIES WITH LONG TRAINING—INDIVIDUAL EFFICIENCY—QUALITY RATHER THAN QUANTITY—INDIA AS A TRAINING GROUND—THE WELLINGTON TRADITION—CRIMEAN WAR—INDIAN MUTINY—LORD ROBERTS AND LORD WOLSELEY—SOUTH AFRICAN WAR

WHILE German and, to a large extent, French strategy had been based mainly on tradition and theory controlled by peace manœuvres, the British strategy was the outcome of practical experience in numerous and various theatres of war. The campaigns, it is true, in which the British Army had been tested were against barbaric and semi-civilized coloured races or against the half-organized nations in arms of the Transvaal Republic and the Orange Free State, and only a few living Britons (*e.g.*, Sir Evelyn Wood, Lord Kitchener, and Sir Ian Hamilton) had taken part in or observed with their own eyes wars on the Continental scale. A large proportion of the British troops, however, had been under the fire of modern weapons, and in the South African War very many officers had learnt what their men could and could not do in face of the terrible instruments of destruction created by science during the latter half of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century.

Thus Lord Kitchener, addressing the 1st Punjab Rifles in March, 1906, remarked as follows :—

You must not get into the way of thinking that men can go on fighting interminably. Men get hungry, men get thirsty, men get tired. In real warfare, where many hours of hard marching and fighting may pass before you achieve success, you have to ask yourselves at the critical moment : Can I trust my men, with gnawing pains of hunger in their stomachs, with a depressing sense of having suffered casualties, and with fatigue in all their limbs ; can I trust them to press upon the retreating enemy and crush him ? And therefore I say to you officers—Look after your men's stomachs. These field days of two or three hours' duration do not bring the lesson home to you with sufficient force. Men cannot fight well unless

they are fed well, and men cannot fight well when they are tired. I have more than once on active service taken the ammunition out of my ammunition carts and loaded up the carts with bully beef. . . . Gentlemen, I wish to add a word about the behaviour of your men in the field. Colonel Western, without a word or a suggestion from me, spontaneously came up and said, " I think the men are taking cover very intelligently." Cover, as you know, is all-important in modern warfare, and soldiers who know how to take advantage of every possible cover on the battle-field have learnt one of their greatest and most valuable lessons.*

Doubtless the German leaders would have acquiesced in the above observations, but few of them had had the facts driven into their souls on the battle-field. Lord Kitchener's audience must have felt that they were in the presence of an artist and not of an art-master of war. Like the Russian and Serbian, the British generals had made war, and, as Napoleon said, " It is necessary to have made war for a long time to be able to conceive it."

The Russian and Serbian generals had also handled men in action, but they had been dealing with a material substantially different from that with which the British officer worked. The Slav soldiers were conscripts ; the British were volunteers ; the former had had a short, the latter a long training. The British officers alone had at their disposition forces similar to the small, highly-trained, professional armies of the 17th, 18th, and the early 19th centuries.

*This lesson had been thoroughly learnt by the British troops. " The English," wrote a German officer to his parents on September 17, 1914, " are marvellously trained in making use of the ground. One never sees them, and one is constantly under fire." Here is an extract from another letter found on a German officer :—" With the English troops we have great difficulties. They have a queer way of causing losses to the enemy. They make good trenches in which they wait patiently. They carefully measure the ranges for their rifle fire, and they then open a truly hellish fire on the unsuspecting cavalry. This was the reason that we had such heavy losses."



**MAJOR-GENERAL SIR CHARLES
FERGUSSON, commanding 5th Division.**

[H. Waller Barnett.]

The result was that British strategy and tactics differed in many respects from Continental. Compared with other European Armies, the British corps resembled the legions which guarded the frontiers of the Roman Empire during the first two centuries of the Christian Era, with this important distinction, that the army of Augustus and Trajan was recruited mostly in the provinces, whereas the bulk of the British Army was composed of citizens drawn from the British Isles. A British general was unable, as Continental generals were, immediately to tap an immense reserve of more or less disciplined soldiers and he was consequently obliged to husband his resources. "I can spend a hundred thousand men a year," said Napoleon, who often spent more. No British general before the Great War could have ventured to talk in that fashion. The British aims had perforce been to inflict a maximum while suffering a minimum loss in war, and to render the individual soldier and the tactical units superior to those produced under a universal military service system. The second of those aims was admirably expressed in the *Infantry Training* manual issued by the General Staff:—

The objects in view in developing a soldierly spirit are to help the soldier to bear fatigue, privation, and danger cheerfully; to imbue him with a

sense of honour; to give him confidence in his superiors and comrades; to increase his powers of initiative, of self-confidence, and of self-restraint; to train him to obey orders, or to act in the absence of orders for the advantage of his regiment under all conditions; to produce such a high degree of courage and disregard of self that in the stress of battle he will use his brains and his weapons coolly and to the best advantage; to impress upon him that, so long as he is physically capable of fighting, surrender to the enemy is a disgraceful act; and, finally, to teach him how to act in combination with his comrades in order to defeat the enemy.

Like Alexander, Hannibal, Marius, Sulla, Caesar in Ancient, and like Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne, Frederick the Great, Lee, and Stonewall Jackson in Modern times, the great captains of the British nation relied on quality rather than quantity. They did not believe that God was on the side of the big battalions, and it was significant that the campaign of Napoleon most admired by Wellington was that of 1814, when the French Emperor with a small army, by his manœuvring and through the superior merits of his troops, held at bay for many weeks the enormous hosts of the Allies and inflicted a crushing defeat on Blücher between the Marne and the Seine. The business of a British commander was to fight with every natural and artificial advantage on his side. In other words, he trusted by his art, and the art of his men, to overcome the hordes of a modern Attila. British generals,



**MAJOR-GENERAL SNOW,
commanding 4th Division.**

[Elliott & Fry.]

contrary to the fond belief of the Kaiser and his advisers, were thoroughly up to date. They had studied with particular attention the Russo-Japanese and Balkan Wars, and the Kaiser was to find that the British Army, though "little," was very far from being "contemptible."

The British practice of pitting small armies against large continental armies dated from the Hundred Years War. During the struggle with Louis XIV., the next occasion on which we exerted a decisive influence on the Continent, the British contingent and Marlborough were perhaps the chief cause of the victory gained by the Allies over the French monarch. But at the opening of the French Revolutionary Wars our troops, whose prestige had been lowered in the American War of Independence, did not at the outset distinguish themselves. In his first encounter with the French Wellington had to help to conduct a retreat before them. Fortunately the efforts of Abercrombie, Moore, and others to raise the standard of efficiency in our Army were successful, and at the battles of Alexandria and Maida it was clearly demonstrated that the British could hold their own against forces trained by Napoleon himself or under his direction. Fortunately, too, in India we had acquired a unique training ground for our soldiers. Encamped among a vast and then hostile



MAJOR-GENERAL SIR WILLIAM ROBERTSON, Director of Military Training.
[From a painting by J. St. Helier Lander.]


population the British garrison had to struggle fiercely for its existence, and in the struggle characters as daring and resourceful as any produced by the French Revolution were developed. One of them, Wellington, was destined to destroy the reputation for invincibility gained by the Marshals of Napoleon. While the Prussians (who, be it remembered, rose against Napoleon only when he had lost his Grande Armée in Russia) were cowering before Davout, French leaders whose mere names struck terror throughout Germany and Austria-Hungary were being worsted by Wellington. The strategy and tactics of Wellington in Portugal, Spain, and the South of France were, in 1914, still sources of inspiration to British soldiers.

The infantry of Wellington, as Marbot points out, shot better than the French, and a bayonet charge by them was almost irresistible. Wellington in India had predicted that against British infantry the tactics of Napoleon would be unavailing. If on the defensive, Wellington was accustomed to await the attack of the French with his infantry drawn up in lines and under cover. When the enemy's columns had been shattered by musketry and artillery fire they were attacked with the bayonet. But it must not be forgotten that for every defensive battle the Iron Duke fought five on the offensive, and the masterly manoeuvres by which from 1813 onwards he drove the French from Spain belong purely to this class.

As a strategist, Wellington was equally remarkable. His march to and crossing of



GENERAL SIR HENRY HILDYARD,
late Commander-in-Chief in South Africa.



VICKERS' LATEST QUICK-FIRER.

Firing 600 rounds per minute.

[By courtesy of Vickers, Ltd.]

the Douro in front of Soult, whom Napoleon called "the first manoeuvrer of Europe," is a model of its kind. By constructing the lines of Torres Vedras and devastating Portugal he ensured the failure of Masséna's invasion in 1810. Napoleon, who earlier had sneered at Wellington as a "Sepoy General," expressed to Foy his admiration of the methods employed by the British generalissimo on that occasion. Wellington's sudden pounces upon and stormings of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajos in 1812 were masterly. His advance in 1813 against the French lines of communication, and the skill with which, availing himself of the command of the sea, he shifted his base from Lisbon to Santander, was as brilliant a feat as Napoleon's campaign of Marengo. In the Waterloo campaign he had few of his Peninsular veterans with him, and the majority of his troops were Belgian, Dutch, and German soldiers. According to Lord Roberts, Wellington made no mistake in 1815, and, had the Prussian army been also placed under his command, it is improbable that the French Emperor would have succeeded in winning, as he did, a battle (that of Ligny) after he had crossed the Sambre. The value set upon Wellington by contemporary Prussians may be gathered from the fact that, according to report, years later, when war between France and Prussia seemed imminent, the Prussian Government offered the command of its forces to the Iron Duke.

Between Waterloo and 1914 a British army appeared only once on the Conti-

nent. In the interval between Waterloo and the Crimean War a wave of commercial prosperity had swept over the country. The warning of Wellington that steamboats had altered the conditions of warfare and that our islands might be invaded fell upon deaf ears. Like Lord Roberts in the years preceding the Great War, the Duke was pronounced by demagogues to be in his dotage. Our Army was quite unprepared when the Crimean War broke out, and though the British infantry at the Alma and Inkerman and the British cavalry in the charges of the Heavy and Light Brigades exhibited the same stubbornness, energy, and courage they had shown in the Peninsula and at Waterloo, the reputation of the British Army was not increased. A year after the conclusion of peace the Indian Mutiny broke out, and the British soldier, divorced from a civilian-encumbered War Office, astonished the world by his sublime courage and resourcefulness. The officers and men who fought at Mons and on the Marne remembered the capture of Delhi and the raising of the siege of Lucknow, just as the Nicholsons, Havelocks, Outrams, and Hodsons remembered Assaye, Albuera, Quatre Bras, and Waterloo.

In the Indian Mutiny two soldiers who were to keep the Army abreast of the times came to the front—Lord Roberts and Lord Wolseley. The latter had distinguished himself in the Crimea. From the respect in which he was held by officers of unquestionable ability, there can be no doubt that he was one of the

foremost captains of the age. Like Havelock, he had studied profoundly the campaigns of Napoleon, the lessons taught by Lee, Jackson, and Grant in the North and South War, by Moltke in the Sadowa and the Gravelotte-Sedan campaigns were not lost on him. It is interesting to note that, while Moltke cast a disdainful eye on the deeds of the American generals, Lord Wolseley (as also Colonel Henderson) examined with sympathetic attention their achievements. Lee, in Lord Wolseley's view, was greater than, Jackson (according to Colonel Henderson) was as great as, Napoleon. Such *obiter dicta* might smack of exaggeration, but they were characteristic of the independent attitude of British military men. Napoleon was admired in Great Britain, but he was not worshipped as he was in Prussia. The blind admiration felt for Napoleon by Imperial Germany would not have been tolerated in our military circles. "You think that Wellington is a great general because he defeated you," said Napoleon, for the purpose of heartening his men, to Soult on the morning of Waterloo. The Prussians, because they had been so often routed by Napoleon, had deified him. It was Lord Wolseley who superintended the metamorphosis of the British from a Long into a, comparatively, Short Service Army, from one led by men who had purchased their commissions into one with officers selected by competitive examination.

We turn now to Lord Roberts, whose

brilliant march to Candahar brought him prominently before the public. No one had done more than he to convert the private and non-commissioned officer into the chivalrous, clean-living, and intelligent soldier who was to win the admiration and affection of the French Allies. As a strategist and tactician, Lord Roberts had been always alertly appreciative of new factors in warfare. His orders issued, and his speeches before the Boer War show that he accurately calculated the effect of the modern artillery, of smokeless powder, and of repeating rifles on the battle-field. After the battle of Colenso he was dispatched with Lord Kitchener to South Africa. He took over the command of a half-dispirited army which had not been trained to meet mounted infantry who were also marksmen. The *Spectator*, a representative organ of British opinion, was then hinting that the war might last 20 years. Lords Roberts and Kitchener landed at Cape Town on January 10, 1900, and by February 18 Cronje had been out-manceuvred and surrounded at Paardeberg. The surrender of Cronje a few days later led to the raising of the siege of Ladysmith and was followed by the occupation of Bloemfontein and Pretoria. Seldom in history has the arrival of two men on a theatre of war wrought a transformation so sudden. One may be permitted to wonder what would have happened if Von der Goltz and the younger Moltke had been set the same problem! Lords Roberts



A VICKERS 75 M.M. GUN.

[Vickers, Limited.]

and Kitchener had not been deputed to prepare for the campaign, and, until the Boer War, if we except the skirmishes of Laing's Nek and Majuba, the British Army had had no experience of fighting against white men armed with modern artillery and rifles. Lord Roberts's bold march from the Modder River to Bloemfontein and the turning movements by which he subsequently drove the Boers from their kopjes decided the struggle. After his return to England he had striven successfully to impress on the Army the paramount importance of accurate shooting, unsuccessfully to rouse the nation to a sense of the German Peril.

Among the other officers who, with Lord Wolseley and Lord Roberts, prepared the British Army for a European war may be mentioned Sir Evelyn Wood (also the first British Sirdar of the Egyptian Army), General Sir Henry

Hildyard (first Commandant of the Staff College and afterwards Commander-in-Chief in South Africa), Sir Edward Hamley (the author of an original text book on the Art of War), Colonel Henderson (also a Commandant of the Staff College), and Colonel Repington. Standing entirely in a class by himself was "Chinese" Gordon, a Nelson on land. If, as Napoleon asserted, the moral are to the material factors in war as three to one, Gordon's services to his country cannot be overrated. The avenger of Gordon was Lord Kitchener, whose direct and indirect influence on the Army which fought in the Great War, was of the most decisive kind. He was not permitted by the politicians to superintend the preparations for it.

In our next chapter we shall give a brief biography of this extraordinary man.



CHAPTER XIII.

THE FRENCH ARMY.

THE FRENCH ARMY AFTER WATERLOO—CAUSES THAT CONTRIBUTED TO ITS DECAY—SOCIAL—LEGISLATIVE—POLITICAL—MILITARY—THE REGENERATION—LAWS OF 1872 AND 1889—THE LOI DE DEUX ANS 1905—LAW OF 1913—FRANCE'S LAST CARD—NUMBERS AND CATEGORIES OF FRENCH ARMY AT OUTBREAK OF WAR—DISTRIBUTION IN TIME OF PEACE—MOBILIZATION—EMPLOYMENT OF RESERVE FORMATIONS—WAR ORGANIZATION OF FRENCH ARMY—TRAINING—THE NEW SCHOOL—MINOR TACTICS—INFANTRY—ARTILLERY—CAVALRY—THE OFFICERS—STAFF—LITERATURE—INVENTION—THE HIGHER COMMAND—DECREES OF 1911—CHARACTER OF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT—PROGNOSTICATIONS UNJUSTIFIED—FRENCH UNITY—GENERAL PLAN OF CAMPAIGN—THE DEFENSIVE PHASE—DIFFICULTIES OF MODERN STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE—FRONT OF GERMAN CONCENTRATION AND LINES OF ATTACK—LORRAINE AND BELGIUM.

“**W**HEN the successes and failures of the French Republic during the past five and thirty years are placed on record by a competent historian, not the least merit which will justly be claimed for the Republican regime will be that it restored the military power of France and established a sense of security unknown to any previous generation, or any former rule.” So wrote *The Times* Military Correspondent in March, 1906, a year after the “Loi de deux ans” had registered the final triumph of the principle of national service. By way of illustration of the justice of this judgment we propose to recall the general causes which led to the failure in 1870, and then to enumerate rapidly the principal phases through which the Army had passed from that fatal year down to the moment when it again entered the field.

The catastrophe of 1870 is attributable not so much to the merely technical inferiority of the French armies and their generals, as to causes which had been operative during the whole of the half century which followed Waterloo, to cankers which had eaten deeply into the life and had perverted the vision of the nation itself. Napoleon I. left many legacies to France—some good, some bad; but none more ruinous than that loathing of the idea of national service which the long and

appalling orgy of his wars had implanted in the French mind. The splendid energy of 1793 was dead; the population was physically and morally exhausted; the ruthless spendthrift, whose superhuman powers of will and intellect had alone made his system possible, was gone. The result was an inevitable and violent reaction, which his weak and nerveless successors were powerless to control. Whereas to Prussia military service appeared as the instrument which had helped to restore her independence and her national existence, for France it was associated with unbridled and wasteful aggression indulged at the cost of unceasing and universal misery and ending in gigantic disasters.

Nor was it this feeling alone that was responsible for the collapse of 1870. The tendencies of the time were largely accountable. Men saw in the alleviation of the burden of military service the logical consequence of the prevailing political and social dogmas. The pacifist preached the brotherhood of man, and saw in the railway, not a fresh and powerful instrument in the hands of the general, but a new avenue of intercourse between the nations. Economists preached the wastefulness of war and the advantages of material prosperity. “Get rich,” was the advice of one of the most famous of French



GENERAL JOFFRE.



GENERALS JOFFRE, CASTELNAU (Chief of Staff), and PAU.

statesmen. Politicians harped on the necessity of retrenchment. Demagogues protested against the sacrifice of the people to the ambitions of princes. The individual was exalted at the expense of the State. Luxury and indifference grew apace, and with these grew selfishness. The consequence was that when at last France found herself at handgrips with a civilization in many ways less generous and less enlightened but of harder fibre than her own, she was morally and nationally, as well as technically, unprepared.

It is hardly to be wondered at that the French soldier did not take himself very seriously in such an atmosphere; a high standard of efficiency is scarcely possible for an army when the nation it is intended to defend is disposed to regard it as a relic of barbarism. The French Army lived on its past; its victories in the Crimea and in Italy, so far from teaching it the necessity of studying modern conditions, had only confirmed its belief in its own invincibility. The more serious-minded of its officers were ridiculed as "officer-professors," the rest were thoroughly well satisfied and generally lazy. Worst of all, it had for a long time ceased to be a really national body. The rage for retrenchment and the hatred of personal service had resulted in a series of measures which had gradually deprived it of its best

elements and had tended to degrade the military profession in the eyes of the people.

After the fall of Napoleon the system had been, in theory at least, voluntary. The hated word "conscription" was banned; but when volunteering failed to produce the requisite number of men the Government was allowed to complete the necessary annual contingent by men chosen by lot, and denominated *appelés*. The supply of volunteers was so small that the *appelés* soon came to constitute by far the larger portion of the recruits; the system in fact developed into a sort of limited conscription. This plan was thoroughly unsatisfactory. Whatever value it possessed was minimized by all sorts of limiting provisions. In the first place exemptions, often quite unjustifiable, were granted; and these, by favouring the men of a higher social scale and members of the learned professions, tended to remove from the Army the more intelligent classes of the population. In the second the period of service was rendered largely illusory by the grant of extensive furloughs to the men in the ranks, and by the creation of a second class in the annual contingent which was allowed to remain at home without training unless the Minister of War thought fit to call it up. After 1832 the fixing of the numbers of the contingent was left to the Chambers, and, as



M. ETIENNE,
a former Minister of War.

[Richard Stanley & Co.]

economy was preached in and out of season, this second class was practically never trained at all. The same vicious principle reappeared in the provisions for the "tirage au sort" embodied in the law of 1872, and was not finally removed till 1889. Last and worst of all, the law of 1818 had introduced the fatal principle of *remplacement* or substitution, by which an *appelé* was allowed to find a substitute to take his place on payment of a sum of money. It was inevitable that the well-to-do classes would take advantage of this; and, as a result, the bulk of those who could afford it evaded their national obligations. The substitutes naturally belonged to the poorer and less-educated sections of the population, some to the very lowest. *Agences de remplacement*, known as "*Marchands d'Hommes*," arose for the purpose of exploiting the increasing popularity of substitution; and the fact that in some cases the substitute was better fitted to be a soldier than the man whose place he took did not prevent the demoralization attendant on a system which fostered unpatriotic selfishness. The nation was degraded by this avoidance of its duties; the Army was degraded by the lowering of the standard of its *personnel*. As the century advanced substitution became more and more common; in the contingent of 1869 out of a

total of 75,000 men there were no less than 42,000 substitutes.

Yet another downward step was taken in 1855, when in order to lighten the "blood-tax" it was enacted that men should be allowed to re-engage, the inducement to do so being a premium paid by the person whose place the re-engaged man was to take into the Government Chest. The results were that all responsibility of the original *appelé* for his *remplaçant* ceased; that the idea of personal service, in one form or the other, was finally lost; that the Government now dealt directly with the *Agences de remplacement* and shared with them the odium attaching to their business; and that the re-engaged men who served for the sake of the money remained in the Army long after they were unfit for duty, and so prevented younger men from taking their places.

It is not necessary here to refer in detail to the well-intended but unrealized reforms of Napoleon III. Six weeks after Königgrätz he announced his intention of re-organizing the Army, and a high commission of Ministers and soldiers was constituted and sat at Compiègne. It was determined that the numbers of the Army must be increased, and the military members asked for 1,000,000 men, to be divided into the now familiar sections of field army, reserve, and territorial army. But the



M. MILLERAND,
the French Minister of War.

plan was objected to by the politicians as likely to arouse resistance in the country, especially in view of the fact that Europe was at peace and that the Exhibition of 1867 was in close prospect. The result was that the original scheme was mutilated, and what remained was still incomplete when Marshal Niel, one of the few Frenchmen of real energy and insight then in authority, died. The great feature of the plan, the organization of the Garde Mobile, which was to be a sort of second line army, was never carried out. The re-engagement system (known as "exoneration") was abolished, although its baneful effects were still felt in 1870. Lastly, the period of colour service was shortened, and the formation of a reserve was begun; but before the full benefits of this measure could be felt the war of 1870 broke out. It found the discipline of the rank and file weakened by extended furloughs; the officers lazy and lacking in authority and without the confidence of their men; the generals for the most part ignorant of the higher branches of their profession; a staff unpractised in the handling of troops and consisting either of aides-de-camp or clerks. When we add to this that the French Army was heavily outnumbered and constantly outmanœuvred, that none of its arms knew their proper work, and that the arrangements for supply and mobilization were lamentably deficient, the wonder is not that they were beaten, but that they managed to put up so gallant a fight. Whatever else the war proved, it certainly failed to demonstrate the superiority of the individual Prussian over the individual French soldier.

The fearful lesson of 1870 recalled the French nation to its senses. In July, 1872, was passed the first of the great laws which have contributed to place the defences of the country on a worthy footing. Substitution was abolished and the principle of universal compulsory service was reintroduced, the period of service with the colours being five years, followed by four in the Reserve, five in the Territorial Army, and six in the Territorial Reserve. But the application of the principle was still not absolute; the annual contingent was divided by lot into two portions, and in time of peace one of them was let off with only one year of service in the Active Army. The previous exemptions of whole classes, such as bread-winners, teachers, and so forth, were still allowed in time of peace; and conditional engagements for one year only were permitted to students and apprentices. It was hoped by this arrangement to combine

an army of veterans with a really numerous and truly National Army; indeed, in some of its features it was a realization, on a far larger scale, of the principles which had underlain the scheme of Marshal Niel. The measure was very far from commanding general approbation. Its acceptance was mainly due to Thiers, who was strongly convinced that a short-service army could never be efficient. General Trochu was in favour of a three-year system; and there was a strong minority who were wholly opposed to the idea of a National Army, and were in favour of the retention of the principle of substitution. After-developments proved the General to have been right. The law of 1872, though a great advance on its predecessors, showed grave defects. The "tirage du sort," which condemned one half of the contingent to five years service and allowed the other to escape with 12 months, was felt to be wholly inequitable; and strong objection was also taken to the "volontariat conditionnel," a provision under which any man could escape with a year's service by paying 1,500*f*. So many could afford this sum that the numbers of the fully-trained men were seriously reduced. Both these provisions were abolished in 1889, when a three-year system was made obligatory on all, and service in the Reserve was raised to seven, in the Territorial Army to six, and in the Territorial Reserve to nine years respectively. It was anticipated that this measure would ultimately raise the total number of trained men from two to three millions.

But in the years which followed a factor, which far transcended in importance these internal arrangements, began to press more and more heavily upon France. This was the alteration of the balance of population in favour of Germany, and with it a growing disparity in the peace-effectives of the armies, and consequently in the capacity for expansion in time of war. Other things being equal, the larger the peace effectives the more numerous is the annual contingent which can be trained, and the larger become the accumulated reserves. As late as 1893 the peace effectives of France and Germany were practically equal, 453,000 to 457,000; but from 1899 onwards the equipoise was lost and in 1905 the figures were stated to be 109,000 in Germany's favour. The means of neutralizing this inferiority, which was the result of natural causes and beyond the reach of legislation, was the principal preoccupation of French statesmen and soldiers in the years preceding the Great War. The Russian Alliance, however valuable from the point of view of the general position of France



GENERAL PAU.

in Europe, was not by itself sufficient to redress the balance, because the slowness of the Russian concentration made it possible for Germany to attack France before her ally was ready. It was therefore decided to carry still further the principle of universal service and, by imposing on her people a heavier proportionate demand than Germany with her larger population found it necessary to make, to restore as far as possible the numerical equality of the two armies. This was the object of the "*Loi de deux ans*," which was passed in March, 1905, and came into operation a year later. It was intended to develop to its utmost limit the recruiting capacity of the nation. The term of service with the colours was reduced to two years, but service in the Army Reserve was increased to 11, to be followed by six years in the Territorial Army, and six in the Territorial Reserve. Thus every Frenchman from the age of 20 to 45 became liable for service. No exemptions, except on grounds of physical unfitness, were granted, although certain modifications of a reasonable character were introduced, and the hardships inflicted on separate families were diminished by doles. It was calculated that these arrangements would bring the peace effective up to about half

a million of men, and would in time produce an active army and a territorial army, amounting, inclusive of their reserves, to about 2,000,000 apiece. Thus did the need for self-preservation at last compel the French people to accept a system in which "military service was equal for all," and so to fulfil the principle of the law of March 4, 1791, that "the service of the Fatherland is a civic and general duty."

But these efforts, great as they were, were not long to suffice. Early in 1912 the peace effectives of the German Army had been raised; by the end of that year enormous increases had been decided on. By October, 1913, the proposals had become law. Whatever weight is to be attached—and without doubt there was much to be said from a German point of view—to the argument that Russian military expansion had rendered these additions a vital necessity to the security of the Empire, it was impossible on that ground for France to remain indifferent to them. The question was not, as in 1905, so much one of further developing her total resources of men—indeed, as has been said, her recruiting powers had already been strained to their utmost limit by the law of 1905—but of having a sufficient proportion

of trained men ready at any moment. It was anticipated that the German peace-effectives would, under the new proposals, eventually be raised to about 870,000, to which France could only oppose about 567,000; and it was of vital importance that she should find some means of securing herself against the sudden attack of superior numbers. The only way of doing this was to keep each annual contingent a longer time with the colours, an expedient necessarily entailing a larger expenditure and heavier sacrifices. The *Conseil Supérieur de la Guerre* decided unanimously in March, 1912, that the sole means of diminishing efficaciously the dangerous difference between the French and German peace strengths, of reinforcing the troops on the frontier without disorganizing those in the interior, of ensuring adequate training, and of coping with the accelerated mobilization of Germany, was to introduce three years' service with the colours strictly and rigorously for all ranks and all branches. "There is something," ran the Preamble of the Bill which embodied this proposal, "which dominates all contingencies, which triumphs over all hesitations, which governs and decides the individual and collective impulses of a great and noble democracy like ours, namely, the resolute will to live strong and free and to remain mistress of our destinies."



GENERAL MICHEL.

This proposal, in spite of all kinds of opposition, was eventually carried in 1913. Every Frenchman found fit for service had in future to pass three years in the Active Army, eleven in the Reserve, and seven each in the Territorial Army and the Territorial Reserve. Thus the total liability for service was extended by three years, an arrangement necessarily carrying with it a considerable eventual increase in the reserve, and raising the peace strength to 673,000 men. Henceforth the recruit was to be incorporated at the age, not, as had hitherto been the practice, of 21 but of 20; an alteration calculated to minimize the effects of the additional year of active service on his future career. The first to come under the new law was the class of 1913. In order to obtain the number of instructors necessary for the increased size of the contingent, special bonuses were offered as an inducement to non-commissioned officers and old soldiers to re-engage; and it was anticipated that by the spring of 1914 the Army would have assimilated its recruits and would be able to mobilize satisfactorily. From a military point of view it is important to observe that under the new arrangement the infantry on the higher establishment on the frontier were raised to 200 per company, and those in the interior to 140, respectively four-fifths and rather over one-half of their war strength. The cavalry regiments were fixed at 740; the field



GENERAL PEKIN.

[Henri Manuel, Paris.]



A MITRAILLEUSE ON THE BACK OF A MULE.


[Topical.]

batteries at 140 and 110, respectively about seven-ninths and two-thirds of their full complement. The increased annual cost was reckoned at £7,000,000, the non-recurring cost at £29,000,000. From the broad numerical point of view, as *The Times* Military Correspondent said at the time, the Law was France's last card. But the new burden had its compensations. It was calculated to give greater security in the first days of mobilization, a somewhat larger reserve and, had time been allowed, a longer period of training to her rank and file than was the case in Germany. Unfortunately its full effects were not obtained when war broke out.

At the commencement of the campaign, France possessed, inclusive of the Territorial Army and its Reserve, fully 4,000,000 of trained men. This enormous mass may be roughly divided into six different categories, each averaging close on 700,000 men. These consisted of the peace establishments of the Active Army, that portion of the Reserve (about half of the whole) required to bring the Active Army up to war strength, the remaining portion of the Reserve, the formed troops of the Territorial Army, the dépôts, and finally the surplus. The comparative values of the last five sections may roughly be gathered from the fact that the Army reservists were liable to be called up twice in 11 years for one month's

manœuvres; the men of the Territorial Army once in seven years for a fortnight's training; the Territorial reservists were subject in seven years to one muster of a day. The territorial distribution, which formed the basis of the war organization, consisted of 20 army corps districts, including one in Algeria. These districts again were divided, so far as the infantry were concerned, into districts each furnishing one regiment; but cavalry, engineers, artillery, and the chasseur or rifle battalions were recruited throughout the army corps district, and a large proportion of these troops were located not in the part of the country in which they were raised, but wherever the requirements of instruction or strategy rendered necessary. Thus the bulk of the cavalry and the chasseurs were permanently located on the eastern frontier, and the engineers were assembled for purposes of training at special centres. With these exceptions each army corps district comprised all the elements required to form an army corps; each was mobilized in its own territorial area and thence proceeded to the point allotted to it in the plan of strategic concentration.

Mobilization, of course, comprised not merely the Active Army and its Reserve, but the whole of the Territorial Army and its Reserve. Broadly speaking the scheme involved the following processes. The peace establishment of the Active Army was to be raised to war strength



PLAN OF THE MAUBEUGE FORTRESSES.

by the incorporation of a number of reservists about equal in number to the men already serving with the colours. The remaining Army reservists were to be formed into reserve units corresponding to those of the Active Army, with the result that in war time the units of the Active Army would be doubled. These Reserve units were to be officered partly by Active, partly by Reserve officers, and, it would appear, were to receive in addition a certain proportion of non-commissioned officers from the Active Army. If this Reserve Army were employed at the front the total troops in the first line would consist of an active army of 1,400,000—1,500,000 men, and of a Reserve Army of about half that number, *i.e.*, about 2,100,000 in all. The remaining 2,000,000 odd of the Territorial Army and its Reserve were to be formed into three bodies of about equal strength. First of all the Territorial Army proper was to form units corresponding with those of the Active Army and the Reserve. Secondly, *dépôts* were to be organized to replace casualties in the active and reserve regiments at a fixed ratio per unit, giving, it was anticipated, about three men at the *dépôts* for every eight in the field. The remaining men of the Territorial Reserve were available as a last resource for the replenishment of the *dépôts*, and for subsidiary purposes of all kinds. In this way it was possible to provide not merely for a powerful fighting line, but for its maintenance at full strength, and for the auxiliary services

in its rear; in a word, for a national organization capable of sustaining a war. Everything that forethought and infinite supervision of detail could suggest was done to make the enormous business of mobilization easy and rapid. Special care was bestowed on the boots of the infantry which were served out, not new, as was the case in Germany, but sufficiently worn to be comfortable, so as to ensure that the exceptional marching powers of the French soldier should be developed to the utmost. The cavalry regiments were maintained on practically a war footing and required comparatively little preparation. The main difficulty was in the case of the artillery and train, the mobilization of which involved the accumulation of great masses of *matériel*, and a considerable expansion and redistribution of *personnel*.

The method of employment of the French Army remained a secret; everything depending on the use that would be made of the reserve and territorial formations, or, to speak more exactly, on whether the reserve divisions would be attached to the army corps or formed, either with or without the addition of territorial troops, in separate army corps of their own. The possibility of variations of this kind, as had been recognized by the Japanese, the German, and other modern armies, could be reckoned on as one of the most effective means of producing great strategic surprises. That is to say, while every unit in the

original Jäger army corps was known to anyone who chose to study the ordinary text-books, the position, numbers and composition of troops not formed until mobilization could only be guessed at and gave opportunities for secret concentration and unexpected attack. The normal formations in the French Army closely resembled the German. The ordinary infantry regiment contained three battalions, each of 1,000 men, in four companies; the normal brigade two regiments; the normal division two brigades; the normal army corps two divisions. To these, as was the custom in the case of the Jäger battalions, might be added a battalion of chasseurs. The corps cavalry consisted of a brigade of two regiments, the divisional cavalry of one squadron per division. Only in the artillery organization was there a marked difference from the German arrangement. Whereas in the German Army Corps the artillery was equally divided between the infantry divisions, in the French the corps artillery was retained, and numbered 12 batteries, that of the divisions being nine batteries apiece. The batteries only contained four guns, a numerical inferiority which it was believed would be amply compensated by the great superiority of the gun itself, and by the special skill possessed by the French artillerymen. Inclusive of gunners the normal army corps numbered between 30,000 and 40,000 combatants and 120 guns. A reserve of light and heavy howitzers marched with the different armies. They did not form part of the artillery of the army corps, but were intended to be retained in the hand of the army commander.

The only remaining units that require mention here were the eight independent cavalry divisions and the African troops. The normal cavalry division numbered six regiments, divided into two or three brigades, in which heavy, medium, and light cavalry were fairly evenly distributed. The heavy cavalry consisted of the ever-famous Cuirassiers, the number of whose regiments was the same as in the days when they won immortal renown under the great Emperor; they still wore the beautiful helmet and cuirass and carried the long thrusting sword. The dragoon regiments, classed as medium cavalry, were armed with the lance. Attached to each division were two batteries of horse artillery, armed with the field guns, but with mounted detachments, and some galloping machine guns. The African infantry consisted of four regiments of Zouaves, each of five battalions, and four of Algerian Rifles or "Turcos," each of six; there were ten light

cavalry regiments, six of Chasseurs d'Afrique, and four of Spahis. The Turcos and Spahis were black troops commanded partly by French, partly by native officers. All the infantry were armed with the Lebel, a serviceable but somewhat antiquated type of magazine rifle. Each man, following the old French tradition, seems to have carried some 60lb., an enormous weight likely to tell severely under the exhausting conditions of modern fighting. Inclusive of the rations carried by the soldier, the army corps took with it eight days' supply, which was constantly replenished by the railways in the rear. The solution of the problem of the transport of supplies between the rail-heads and the armies had in the years preceding the war been greatly facilitated by the introduction of motor-lorries. It was found that a comparatively small number of these vehicles sufficed for the daily supply of an army corps, and rendered the massing of endless trains of horsed wagons in the rear of the troops unnecessary. The practical advantages of the new system need no illustration.

Thus far we have confined ourselves to the history of the construction and organization of the national army—a history which justified the proud boast of the French Minister of War in 1908: "*L'Armée Française, c'est la France.*" We must now turn to its training. Since 1870 the French Army had undergone a moral and intellectual revolution. At that melancholy period it is hardly too much to say that the methods of French leadership had tended to discard or depress all the grand traditions and qualities that had made the French Army the most famous of modern history. From top to bottom it was characterized by a tendency to exaggerate the defensive power of modern weapons, by a neglect of the theory and practice of the higher art of generalship, and by a tentative and piecemeal employment of all the arms; a combination of weaknesses which made resolute and effective action on the battlefield impossible, and rendered inoperative those moral factors to which the great warriors of the past had been accustomed to appeal. But during the years of recovery after the Franco-Prussian War, and especially during the first decade of the 20th century, there had arisen a generation which took a juster and more inspiring view of the special capacities of the French soldier. The adoption of a national system and the knowledge that upon its soundness would henceforth depend the existence of France as a great Power had placed at the command of the Ministry of War all that was best in the French people and the French mind. The result was




A GROUP OF ZOUAVES.




TRANSPORT OF A FRENCH HEAVY GUN.



FRENCH TROOPS MARCHING THROUGH PARIS.



HUY.



PLAN OF THE LILLE FORTRESSES.

the development of a national school of tactics and strategy, complete, coherent and well-fitted to the bold and ardent character of the troops. We do not propose in this place to discuss the French theory of strategy and grand tactics, or to compare it with that which prevailed in Germany. We shall deal with these all important subjects in a later section of this work, and for the present shall content ourselves with a brief description of French minor tactics.

These tactics were, in accordance with tradition and national temperament, dominated by the idea of the offensive; but they found their technical justification in the superior armament of the artillery and the special support which that arm was expected to afford to the infantry. This, in the opinion of the French, made it possible for them to assign to infantry fire a less important place in the preparatory stages of an action than was regarded as permissible in the German Army. The business of the infantry was to "conquer and win ground"; it had two means of action, "fire and forward movement";

"the only object of fire was to prepare for the resumption of a forward movement." Fire, that is, was to be a means, not an end; and the idea of a stationary defensive was not admitted. This theory of infantry action was intended to be realized by a system of manoeuvre and distribution which, while it insisted on the use of mass at the decisive point, aimed at combining perfect elasticity and adaptability with careful economy of men and ammunition. With these objects in view, long range firing, except under special conditions and when carried out by picked shots, was discouraged; the distant zones were to be crossed as rapidly as possible, in close bodies when shelter was forthcoming, in small groups when it was not. The aim of the assailant was to get to within fixed-sight range before firing a shot, or nearer still if it was possible to do so: and for the same reason the deployment of the firing line was to be delayed until further advance without firing became impracticable. Only the troops necessary for the special purpose were to be deployed, the premature

expenditure of men in open formations being regarded as one of the most serious of faults. Once, however, a firing line had been constituted, it was to be rapidly reinforced, so that the fire should grow heavier and the line more dense the nearer the moment of the decisive attack approached. Fire was not to be continuous, but, as in the case of the artillery, was to be delivered in gusts, "sudden, brief, vicious and violent," according as a target presented itself. The preparation for the attack was to culminate in an overwhelming short range fire upon the whole of the defender's position, preventing the action of his reserves and weakening his fire sufficiently to allow of the advance of those of the assailant. The final assault was to be delivered in mass upon the decisive point; rapidity and the bayonet rather than fire effect being relied on in this last phase of an action. To the commander was left the selection of objectives, the distribution of the troops, and the choice of the time and place of the final attack.


This method of attack was well calculated to appeal to an ardent and intelligent infantry, and to judge from the manoeuvres it was well understood and executed. Its forms at least had historical sanction. They bore a distinct resemblance to the cumulative and tempestuous attack of the French infantry in the best days of Napoleon. The swarms and chains of *tirailleurs*, the quick and supple action of small columns, the final advance of heavier masses were all characteristic of the tactics of the Grande Armée. That the moral and physical qualities of the men were still the same was not doubted. "There are practically no limits," wrote *The Times* Military Correspondent in 1906, "to the demands which can be made upon the endurance of the French infantry by a leader who understands them, and whom they trust."

In support of this quick and daring infantry the French possessed what was generally regarded as the best artillery in Europe. The gun was a true quick-firer; its rapidity, thanks largely to the arrangement known as the independent line of sight,* astonished those who had seen it in practice. It was a powerful and accurate weapon throwing shrapnel or high-explosion shell of about 15lb.; its only weak points being that it was somewhat heavy and that the shield with which it was fitted was rather small. Its

technical superiority, combined with the greater handiness of the small battery, seemed amply to justify the belief of the French that four such guns were at least equal to six of the older German type. This belief was strengthened by their confidence in their tactical methods. The principles on which they were based were much the same as those which governed the action of the infantry. Here also economy in guns and ammunition was insisted on, while at the same time it was clearly understood that at critical moments the artillery should not hesitate to expose itself to heavy rifle fire, and should advance at all costs if the infantry required its support. Indirect fire was employed whenever possible, and no guns were sent into action unless the tactical situation demanded it. Long range fire, as in the case of the infantry, was unusual; 4,000 yards was rarely exceeded, the view of the authorities being that in Europe opportunities for long-distance shooting would rarely occur. Within that range various forms of fire were carefully practised, the object being not merely to hit a visible object, but to make defined zones of ground, whether invisible or not, untenable or impassable. Very accurate ranging, carried out slowly and followed by a deliberate fire, as in the case of the German artillery, was not a characteristic of the French gunner, all such elaborate procedures in his view being unsuited to the conditions of the battlefield. He regarded the *rafale*, that is, a sudden tempest of shell, lasting for a few seconds and sweeping a given area, as the more effective method of the two. The expenditure of ammunition involved by such a procedure was provided for by an exceptionally large supply, amounting, inclusive of that carried in the army corps park, to about 500 rounds per gun. Tactically the batteries accompanying an army corps in action were destined for separate action, the Corps Artillery (12 batteries) being intended to crush the opposing artillery, the divisional batteries (18) to shatter the hostile infantry. Naturally such a rule was made subject to infinitely varying conditions, but the definition of the two different tasks that would fall to the lot of artillery and the detailing of special units for the accomplishment of each, are typical of the French love of clearness and precision. It was generally agreed that the tactical combination of the artillery and infantry was exceptionally well managed, and that the science of the officers and the courage and endurance of the rank and file of the artillery left nothing to be desired.

In many respects the French cavalry of 1914

*The principle of this contrivance is that the work of regulating the elevation and the sighting is greatly quickened by being divided between two men instead of, as in older systems, being entrusted to one.



was the best France ever produced. The riding was good, the horses excellent, and if, according to British ideas, the French horsemen were too much inclined to trust to shock-action and too little to the rifle, no one doubted that they fully realized the importance of their strategic mission, and the truth of the old dicta that "Cavalry is made for action" and that "any decision is better than none." For them, also, the principle of economy of forces, late deployment, and strong reserves held good; and special attention was devoted to the business of scouting.

Everything in the case of the French, even more than in that of other armies, depended on the leadership, and doubts were sometimes expressed as to whether the French officer-corps, especially in its higher branches, would prove equal to its task. France did not possess, like Prussia, a military aristocracy, a special class set apart by tradition and by its social status for the task of leading armies. But the high standard maintained in all parts of the Army, to say nothing of the witness of history, seemed a sufficient answer to such

dubitations. The training appears to have been sound and thorough, at any rate as far as the officers of the first line were concerned. All candidates for commissioned rank, whether they passed through St. Cyr or the Ecole Polytechnique (the Sandhurst and the Woolwich of France), or were promoted from the ranks, had first to serve as privates and had then to pass qualifying examinations. The final examination was competitive as well as comprehensive. Promotion from the rank of major and above it was entirely by selection, in the lower ranks it was decided partly by selection and partly by seniority. The officers of the Reserve and Territorial Army were not required to satisfy so high a technical standard; but all had to serve six months with the colours, and were liable to be called up for instruction every two years. The Staff of the Army, whose weakness largely contributed to the disasters of 1870, had immensely improved. All candidates for the Staff had to pass a competitive entrance examination at the Ecole Supérieure de la Guerre, an institution corresponding to our Staff College, and after passing another at the termination of the course, went through a



BELGIAN SCOUTS ON THE BATTLEFIELD OF WATERLOO.

two-years' probation on a staff, being attached during that period to other arms than their own. Thenceforward they spent their time, as did Prussian Staff officers, alternately with their unit and on staff duty, every step in promotion being preceded by two years' service with their unit. There is ample evidence to show that their work in all branches was done very efficiently and very rapidly. A striking, if not an unimpeachable, witness to their high qualities is to be found in the large amount of important literature produced during the last 20 or 30 years by individual officers. Maillard, Langlois, Bonnal, and Foch, not to mention others, were men whose historical and professional studies influenced thought in perhaps a greater degree than any other military writers of the age, and with hardly an exception were far superior to anything produced during the last 30 years in Germany. This literary activity was very characteristic of the renaissance of the French Army; and it is significant that the new school of writers, throwing aside the decadent ideas of the Second Empire, drew their inspiration not from Germany, but from that supreme repository of military instruction, the theory and practice of Napoleon. Nor did French military thinkers confine themselves to this work of tactical and strategical re-

construction. Hand in hand with it the scientific genius of the nation led the way in military invention. The French were the first to re-arm their artillery with a quick-firing gun; and in aviation they had strong claims to be considered the pioneers of the world. It was not merely its generous heart and fiery soul that made the army formidable in 1914; with these there also moved to battle that other tutelary spirit of France, her clear and splendid intelligence.

The question of the higher military command was one that for many years had exercised the minds of Frenchmen, and the solution offered by the decrees of 1911 was not entirely satisfactory. Down to that year the business of preparation for war was in the hands of the Conseil Supérieur de la Guerre, a body presided over by the Minister of War, which could be summoned at any time by the President of the Republic, and whose deliberations could on those occasions be attended by the Prime Minister and the Minister of Marine. It consisted generally of a committee of ten, and included as its Vice-President the Généralissime appointed to direct the principal group of the French armies in time of war, besides several officers destined for the command of separate armies. The defect of this system was that none of its members

were in close touch with the General Staff, or possessed any staff of their own corresponding with the importance of their missions. By the Presidential decree of 1911 these deficiencies were repaired. The chiefs of the new Army staffs were formed into a General Staff Committee under the Généralissime, to whom was accorded the title of Chef d'Etat Major-General. In time of war he was to be seconded by the Chef d'Etat Major de l'armée, who was intended to remain by the side of the Minister of War as the representative of the General Staff. At the same time the work of the General Staff was redistributed, the division dealing with preparation for war being placed under a Sous-Chef d'Etat Major, this officer being destined in time of war to act as chief of the staff of the Généralissime in the field. The Chef d'Etat Major-General (or future Généralissime) and the Chef d'Etat Major de l'armée (or the future adviser of the Minister in war time) were included among the members of the Conseil Supérieur. These arrangements made it possible for the Généralissime personally to direct the chiefs of the separate army staffs, and at the same time to share in the work of the Conseil Supérieur and exchange views with the destined Commanders of the Armies, a combination which, it was hoped, would smooth the way to a community of views and policy and would provide all the commanders with suitable staff organs of their own. The plan seemed a cumbrous one, but it was probably the only means by which the General Staff could be brought into line with the Conseil Supérieur, a matter which the military, constitutional and political significance of that body rendered essential to the wellbeing of the Army. The peculiarity of the relation of the Army and of the civil Government is brought out by the fact that the Minister insisted on his right to appoint Army commanders, and that the decree of 1911 actually restricted their tenure of these all important posts to a single year. The advantages possessed in these matters by a monarchical Government of the Prussian type over a Republican system are obvious and require no comment. A good deal of criticism both in and outside France was directed to considerations of this kind in the years before the war. It was said that the discipline and spirit of the Army was sapped by anti-militarist propaganda, that its *personnel* was of unequal quality, that the nation was rent by political divisions, that the successive governments were weak and unstable, and that the good of the Army, especially in the matter of the higher command, was constantly

sacrificed to intrigue. When war came it was at once evident that these views were far from being justified by the facts. In face of the national danger divisions disappeared to a degree that those who knew France best would a few weeks earlier have pronounced impossible. Anti-militarism became voiceless and was abandoned by its foremost advocates, including the lamented M. Jaurés, who was assassinated as a "traitor" after he had made it known that he renounced his ordinary views as inopportune and unpatriotic. How far General Joffre, a soldier of great Colonial distinction and wide experience of high command, and his subordinates would prove equal to their task, and how far the French Army itself would prove worthy of its old renown, the events of the campaign alone could show. But of the nature of the dominant motive none could doubt for a single instant. Frenchmen had but one object, the preservation of their beloved country; and but one thought, how best they might serve her interests.

A word must be said in conclusion as to the general plan of campaign. Its opening phase was bound to be of a defensive character, although the defence, concordantly with the national temperament and French military theory, was certain to take an active form. France's policy, and her earnest wish to avoid war if war could be avoided with honour, forbade the assumption of an aggressive attitude, even if her inferior numbers and the expected slowness of the Russian concentration had not rendered an offensive impossible from a military point of view. She could not expect her Ally seriously to affect the situation before the 20th day of mobilization, and for the first 30 days at least she could not count on any diminution of the hostile forces directed against herself. She knew that she would be obliged for a more or less indefinite period to devote her energies to repelling a superior enemy. It was consequently obvious that she would be compelled, at any rate until the enemy's main line of attack became certain, to submit in some measure to his initiative and so to distribute the bulk of her forces as to render them available to meet the impending blow wherever it might fall. Such a task is one of the hardest that war can demand of an army and a nation. There was a good deal to be said for the view, which was current in Germany, that from the technical as well as from the moral point of view the rôle of the defender had been made more difficult by modern conditions. According to this school




REPUBLICAN GUARDS IN PARIS.

[Daily Mirror.

of thought, the view of Clausewitz that the defender would always have on his side the advantages of concealment and time, and that the assailant would always be exposed to the risk of discovery and of premature commitment, was less applicable than of old. The enormous size of modern armies, the immense breadth and depth of fronts, whether in the theatre of war or on the battlefield, and the consequent difficulty of accurate observation, were believed considerably to have reduced the advantages of that deferred form of action which the great Prussian author, writing of days when armies were comparatively small and visible, regarded as outweighing the moral advantages of the offensive. Most of the experience of 1870 and 1905 seemed to prove that the advantage had passed to the army which was powerful enough to take the offensive, to seize the initiative, to be first on the spot. On the other hand it was held in France that the counter-attack was a tremendously powerful weapon, perfectly capable of giving victory to the defenders, providing that there were forthcoming on the part of their commanders the knowledge, judgment, and resolution necessary to enable them to profit by the mistakes and the exhaustion of the assailant; and on the part of their people the intelligence and endurance necessary to enable them to

understand and to wait. Such were, in brief, the two strategic theories which circumstances and policy were destined to bring into opposition on the French frontiers.


To find the means, in accordance with their strategic theory, of carrying on an effective defensive until the moment when a successful Russian advance would enable them to assume the offensive, was the task of the French commanders. Broadly speaking, the possible front of the main German concentration extended roughly from Aix-la-Chapelle, close to the meeting of the Dutch, German, and Belgian frontiers, to the point of the Vosges at Schirmeck, west of Strassburg, a breadth of about 180 miles; and whatever the probabilities it would be impossible to say, until the form of the concentration was fairly defined, exactly the point where the real effort would be made. All that could be safely predicted would be that once begun, and from whatever point, it would be pushed forward as fast as possible and as straight as possible upon Paris, that is to say that the main fighting was bound to take place somewhere within the triangle of Liège, Strassburg, and Paris, or close to its sides; an area which, from the French point of view and speaking purely geographically, would be covered by a preliminary concentration from



DINANT.

Maubeuge to Toul (a breadth of 150 miles). But, while admitting that it would be necessary to occupy in some degree the whole of this portion of the frontier, not to mention the spaces towards Lille on the one flank and Belfort on the other, anything like an equal distribution of force along it would obviously be a negation of all modern strategic teaching, a return to the cordon system condemned a century ago. The French concentration had to be fixed with a view to certain definite strategic eventualities. These were comparatively few. It was evident for years before the war that only two main alternatives, already referred to in Chapter 2, were open to Germany. It was certain, owing to the lie of French and German territory, the arrangement of the German railways, and the

distribution of the French fortress system southward and in rear of Epinal, that no large concentration would take place in Upper Alsace; but that, while leaving sufficient troops between Strassburg and the French frontier to retard any attempt at a French offensive from the south, the Germans had to choose between a grand offensive from Lorraine (Thionville-Metz-Schirmeck) or one from the front Metz-Aix-la-Chapelle, passing through the neutral territory of Belgium and Luxembourg. The first involved the storming of the French barrier forts between the fortresses of Verdun-Toul and Nancy, and could best be met by a concentration of the main French Army on that formidable front, and in the gaps on its flanks. Such a concentration, which





MAP OF FRANCE SHOWING THE TERRITORIAL DISTRIBUTIONS OF THE FRENCH ARMY.

was rendered feasible by the strength of the covering troops, might be expected to enable the French Army to accept battle under very favourable conditions, for the front of the position would be enormously strong, and the fortresses would afford excellent pivots for out-flanking operations, or for counter attacks if the enemy endeavoured to turn them. The northern alternative was by some regarded as even more unfavourable to the German Army, on the ground that the passage through Belgium, and the capture of the Belgian fortresses, would occupy more time and cost more men than even the storming of the Verdun-Toul defences. In any case it was certain that even if the Belgian resistance was negligible, some days must elapse before the invading hosts could reach the French frontiers; while, if it was vigorous, it might even be possible for the French Army to join the Belgian Army and operate in conjunction with its Ally. Nor was it to be forgotten that the intervention of a British Army was more likely to take place in the event of a violation of Belgium than otherwise. From the French point of view, moreover, the

existence of neutral territory offered another important advantage. It was hardly likely that Germany would invade neutral territory unless she meant to make serious use of it. The news of the violation of Belgium, therefore, seemed calculated to set doubts at rest as to the zone which the Germans had chosen for their main effort, and therefore to indicate the direction in which the main French concentration would have to take place. Beyond this nothing was certain. The strength of the Belgian resistance, the stopping power of the fortresses, the intended lines of advance and the relative distribution of the German troops, as well as the total strength of the hostile force in the northern area could only be cleared up by the operations themselves. In one other important respect the French were lucky. The neutral attitude of Spain, and especially of Italy, freed them of all apprehensions on their south-eastern and southern frontiers. It was from the first possible for them to accumulate a considerably larger force of troops on their western frontier than could have been reckoned upon with any safety in the plans drawn up in time of peace.



CHAPTER XIV.

THE FRENCH THEORY OF WAR.

HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF FRENCH STRATEGY SINCE 1870—INFLUENCE OF NAPOLEON; HIS FOUR MAXIMS—THE "GENERAL RESERVE"—CRITICISMS ON NEO-NAPOLEONIC STRATEGY—THE FLANK ATTACK AND ENVELOPMENT DOCTRINE—SHRAPNEL AND THE "CANON DE 75"—THE "MASS OF MANŒUVRE"—IMPORTANCE OF MANŒUVRES—PROTECTIVE DETACHMENTS—STRATEGIC ADVANCED GUARDS—THE "MANŒUVRE UPON A FIXED POINT"—CONCENTRATION ON A FLANK—THE LOZENGE FORMATION OF NAPOLEON—COLONEL DE GRANDMAISON'S CHAIN OF INDEPENDENT MASSES WITH RESERVES—FRENCH TACTICS.

THE conceptions of modern warfare held in France were very different from the German ones, though the forms in which these were expressed in practice possessed certain outward similarities, which deluded some people into imagining that there was much in common with, and little difference in, the rival doctrines. It was not so. For though the French and the German infantries formed their outposts, assaulted with the bayonet, drilled and carried out many other operations in practically the same way, yet as to the ideas and objects which these forms were meant to realize they differed fundamentally.

After the defeats of 1870 France was for years the very humble pupil of Moltke, and, moreover, foreseeing that her mobilization was bound to take longer than that of Germany, she had resigned herself to meet the naked simple offensive of her neighbour with a naked simple defensive. The expression of this negative doctrine was the lines of fortresses and barrier forts Lille-Valenciennes-Maubeuge, Verdun-Toul, and Epinal-Belfort-Besançon with their *trouées* or gaps that were intended to "canalize the flood of invasion." This conception hardened during the troubled years in which France was settling down to the new system of republican government and personal military service. But from about 1888 a new current of ideas set in. For one thing, the advent of smokeless powder seemed to challenge the data of 1870,


and for another, a peculiarly brilliant group of military thinkers, men who had been ardent young soldiers in the disasters of *l'année terrible* and had come to maturity in the study of their disasters, came at the psychological moment to positions of influence. These men set to work to discover the key of Prussia's successes, and found it in the fact that Moltke had gone back to Napoleon. So back they too went to the Emperor. The archives were ransacked. Volume after volume of original documents, edited and annotated, were published by the new military history section of the General Staff, and a new doctrine began to take shape. It was in the spirit of this doctrine, tempered by a more recent intellectual revolt against the more extreme advocates who had sought to apply it in season and out of season, that the French took the field in 1914.

This doctrine, sound in itself, found a favourable *milieu* for its propagation. The conditions imposing a momentary defensive upon France still existed in 1890-1900, but the army and the people, less and less influenced by memories of defeat as the years went on, were chafing at the Germans' assumption of a monopoly of offensive spirit. And, more important for once than moral conditions, the material advances in armament due to smokeless powder were about to place the French Army in possession of the very weapon which was needed to give effect to the doctrine.

The bases of the doctrine were four aphorisms

of Napoleon in which his system of war was concentrated: (1) "One can never be too strong at the decisive point"; (2) "Engage everywhere, and then see"; (3) "Be vulnerable nowhere"; (4) "Manœuvre only about a fixed point." The first of these is in direct conflict with the German principles of lateral expansion and equal density at all points at the moment of crisis. As we have seen, the German view was that men over and above the number required for maintaining one firing line could not usefully be put into action in one area. The

after an interval of years and controversy, by the British General Staff, whose definition of the assault as the "culmination of gradually increasing pressure" on a selected portion of the enemy's line may be taken as one of the best expressions of the principle. This phrase is a definite assertion that greater pressure (subjectively) should be exercised at some points than at others, and that the greatest pressure of all should be applied at a chosen point. The principle may be represented diagrammatically thus, each line representing



French, on the contrary, sought to reproduce, with all necessary modifications, the Napoleonic blow of concentrated thousands upon a selected point, and in that view they were followed,

fighting troops at the standard minimum density and the point chosen for attack being opposite the left centre.

The corollary of this principle was the notion of the "general reserve" as a separate body; in French practice this body was over one-third, and in British "at least half" (in some cases) of the total available force. Now, opponents of the "new French" theory could argue plausibly enough that nothing like this proportion of force could be reserved while the rest was called upon for days together to sustain the whole fury of the German onset. They could point to frequent instances in Napoleon's own campaigns and elsewhere in which the decisive attack at the selected point was delivered by a comparatively small portion of the forces on the ground, the rest having been used up in holding and wearing down the enemy. And when, as sometimes happened on manœuvres, the Napoleonic forms as well as the Napoleonic idea were used, they could carry all level-headed soldiers with them in denouncing as absurd a theory which asserted that masses of men shoulder to shoulder and line upon line could live for five minutes under the fire of modern weapons. They could assert, moreover, that superiority of fire was essential to success, and ask in what way the rear lines (other than those used as reservoirs to replace casualties) could contribute to the obtaining of this superiority. But what these critics failed to see was the fact that it was not their own type of battle at all that was intended to be produced. Subject to the adoption of suitable formations—which, as we have just



FRENCH SOLDIER WITH NEW SERVICE EQUIPMENT.

[Topical.]



FRENCH ARTILLERY.
A 75 mm. Gun en route.

[Re-ord Press.]

observed, were not always seen on manœuvres—none of the criticisms summarized in the above lines will bear close examination. The remedy for absorption of force in the wearing-down engagement lay in the great principle of “economy of force.” If the effective density with modern arms was one rifle to the yard (*plus* reservoirs) the front of an army fighting on the French principle was just as capable of resistance as that of an opponent fighting on the German, and every man economized in the non-decisive areas was a man more for the general reserve, or the “mass of manœuvre,” as the French more correctly termed it. Further, field fortification was an aid to economy of force that Napoleon had never enjoyed.*

Rough field defences had enabled Lee at Richmond (1862) and Chancellorsville (1863) to deliver crushing blows with his mass of manœuvre while the rest of the line was held by an absolutely trifling force, and this lesson at least was learned by Europe from a war which it had been fashionable to call a conflict of armed mobs. In short, the very factors which were supposed to authorize and compel the Germans to expand laterally equally allowed French and British generals to form a substantial “mass of manœuvre” in rear of the front—or *elsewhere*, for the Napoleonic attack might be delivered either on the centre or the flanks, and indeed under modern conditions (size of armies and length of fronts) the latter was the more likely alternative.

But there was this vital difference between the envelopment as conceived in Germany and the flank attack as conceived in France. The

former was, as we know, based upon a pre-conceived idea and a prearranged programme while the latter was initiated not in the phase of strategic concentration, but subsequent to contact. For the Germans the “zone of manœuvre” was the open country in front of their advanced guards; for the French that term implied the zone behind them, in which the “mass of manœuvre” could move freely. It is in this, and its consequences upon the battlefield, that we seem to find the answer to those opponents of the French doctrine, who asserted that, superiority of fire being essential, no man was being usefully employed while he did not contribute to that result. Napoleon himself said that fire is everything. But superiority of fire in his sense was a local and temporary, but overwhelming, accompaniment, and not a preparation, of the decisive attack. This being so, the decisive attack was, as the British regulations above quoted say, a culmination. How, then, was to be obtained the increment of fire power that would make this general reserve, engaged after contact, effective, given the fact that along the whole front one rifle per yard and a proportion of guns were already in action?

The answer is in the material advances above alluded to—viz., the coming of the time shrapnel. In Napoleon’s day, with short-range muskets, the prelude of the smashing “decisive attack” was the launching of a mass of field batteries which galloped up to a range at which, immune from bullets, they could deliver their terrible “case” and “grape” shot. Often a portion of the enemy’s line was so thoroughly destroyed that the assaulting infantry marched into it with their arms at the slope. But the coming of the infantry rifle

*Owing to the time and labour required in his day for the construction of works that had to present a material barrier to assault and not simply a certain amount of cover for riflemen as is the case nowadays.



FRENCH ARTILLERY CROSSING A ROAD.

presently forbade the guns to drive up to case ranges, and the part of artillery in the attack was for a long time insignificant. Even in 1870, effective as was the Prussian field artillery, its rôle was simply the *preparation* of the attack by methodical bombardment with common shell.* To cover the assault, as distinct from preparing it, artillery had to reproduce the effect of case-shot with some long-range projectile. This projectile, of British origin, was the shrapnel with time fuse. For technical reasons which cannot here be discussed no satisfactory time fuse could be designed for use in modern rifled guns for many years after the introduction of the latter. Nor was the rapidity of fire that was needed to cover the Napoleonic attack feasible at the new long ranges until the gun itself (or rather its carriage) had been revolutionized. This was achieved by French designers in 1897, and with the appearance of the famous "canon de 75" Napoleon's tactics came to their own again.

The increment of fire-power being thus obtained, the French doctrine formulated for tactics by General Langlois, even before the introduction of the "75," was placed on secure ground. But though the Napoleonic principle be admitted, it still remains to be seen whether the proper point for its application can be discerned, and, if so, on what grounds.

This brings us to the second point of doctrine, "engage everywhere, and then see," a point upon which there was almost as much contro-

versy as over the first—with which, of course, it is integrally connected. The theory was that, information having been obtained from the cavalry and other sources sufficient to define the enemy's limits—more was not expected—the troops told off to the "engagement" (as the French "Field Service Regulations" of 1913 called it) would advance and engage him wherever found. A general line of contact would thus be formed, upon which the French advanced guards would seek to press sufficiently hard to compel the enemy to develop his forces. This "engagement" might take days, perhaps a week or more, and it would impose on citizen-soldiers of a sensitive race a most severe test of endurance and solidity. Many critics indeed asserted that the Napoleonic battle would break down on this weakness alone if on no other. But it is fair to point out that even in the German war-theory much the same strain would be imposed on the men concerned. The only difference which told against the French lay in the fact that to carry out the mission of "engagement" the troops would have to make ceaseless local attacks in order to wear down the enemy and compel him to feed his firing line, whereas in the case of the German doctrine the infantry at least was (in the interests of timing) kept out of action until the general advance sounded. This was evidently not a small disadvantage against the French. But it must be assumed that the French generals knew their countrymen, and it is the fact that though the doctrine had in recent years been subjected to a good deal of criticism, this particular part of it was made an article of faith by the 1913 edition of the "Service en Campagne," above quoted.

*Owing to the technical deficiencies of the German gun (already dealt with in a previous chapter) many traces of 1870 procedure still lingered in 1914.

Granted the necessary solidity, then the course of the battle would go on from engagement to serious frontal fighting with attack and counter-attack, and thus the fighting itself would, by cutting out, one after the other, the alternative hypotheses that had been formed as to the enemy's grouping, afford enough evidence for the timely placing of the "mass of manœuvre." At the proper moment the battle would in the environs of the selected area grow in intensity by fresh feeding of the firing line, until in the selected area itself it would culminate in a fierce attack by every available man and gun of the reserve, the men advancing as fast as possible, halting to fire as little as they could help, and covered by an appalling rain of time shrapnel from every gun that could be brought to bear. This is the phase tersely described by Napoleon as the *évènement*.

But, as Napoleon remarked, all this requires *un peu d'art et quelques évènements*. Germans excepted, there were few soldiers who denied the decisive effect of this attack, if it got home, for when you break the enemy's centre you turn two flanks and roll them up outwards. Controversy, however, never reached finality, even in France, as to the *peu d'art*. As we have seen, the German doctrine was wholly destitute of arts, and the question was, Was it practicable, with modern armies, to finesse with men's lives? Was the *moral* of the citizen-soldier such that he would calmly give his life in a fight which he knew to be a non-decisive part of the *ensemble*? Moreover, allowing for the characteristic "emptiness of the battle-field" due to the use of smokeless powder, and for the consequent difficulty of distinguishing

between false positions and real, advanced lines and main, was it certain that any tentative, non-decisive engagement of forces would either reveal or pin the opponent? To these questions the answers were, if not exactly negative, at least doubtful. Accordingly it was laid down that every attack was locally a "decisive" attack, that no troops should be put into action for any other purpose than to close with the enemy, and that the great Napoleonic *évènement* must be, as the British regulations above-mentioned say, the culmination of gradually increasing pressure. But in that case, bearing in mind that the preliminary fighting would take days and the placing of the "mass of manœuvre" yet more days, would national short-service troops be capable of fighting time after time on ground where they had failed once, twice, and thrice? Although in fact the French regulations of 1913 accepted the "engagement" for good or evil, still these risks were evident enough to make it desirable to ensure in every other way possible the freedom of action of the commander who disposes of the mass of manœuvre. This was sought in two ways, defined by the two remaining Napoleonic aphorisms that we have quoted—"be vulnerable nowhere" and "manœuvre only about a fixed point." Freedom of action the Germans expected to obtain by stunning or dazing their opponent. Not so the French, who held that only positive freedom secured by means within his own control was of any use to the commander. But before stating these means in general terms* let us understand

*The expanded theory and the executive detail may be best studied in the *Principes de la Guerre* of General Foch, who in 1914 commanded the Nancy Corps.



FRENCH ARTILLERY. Placing in position a 75 mm. Gun.

what we mean by freedom of action. It is freedom to carry out an *intention* without hostile interference. The later the intention is formed the more serious the risk of the interference with it, and the larger the detachments that must be placed as advanced guards, flank guards, and rearguards to prevent it, the smaller, accordingly, will be the force available for carrying out the intention itself when formed. It was the tendency to wait for too many data before taking a definitive resolution that gave rise to the criticisms of the doctrine which arose within the French Army itself about 1910. Nearly all of these alleged that in the attempt to be "vulnerable nowhere" French generals were far too lavish in the use of protective detachments. Further, with the million-armies of the present day, action taken cannot become effective until a period of days has elapsed, and if the army, already in contact with the foe, is not to be overstrained, it must be taken very early—practically on the first reasonable data to hand.

The most dangerous case of infringed liberty is that which occurs when an army is caught in a state of "inevitable unreadiness"* half-concentrated, over-dispersed in rest quarters, and so on. In this case almost any proportion of detachments from main body is justified—witness the placing of no less than six French frontier army corps permanently on a war footing in peace time in 1913. And even so, the commander is rarely able to wait upon events before committing himself to an

"intention," and that intention as often as not is simply one of self-defence.

None of this, however, alters the fact that the French doctrine, construed reasonably, does—and in war did—give the only guarantee of freedom of action that can really be depended upon. Whether in certain cases freedom is not bought at too high a price is doubtful. But in general the doctrine as formulated by General Bonnal and General Foch held its own against criticism, and the events of the war of 1914 showed that almost any sacrifice of men and ground was better than the forcing of the commander's hand. An initial defensive, coupled with the preservation of the army at all costs, was imposed upon France by broader political and military circumstances. Unofficial criticism might question the application of the principle of self-contained protective detachments, but it could not alter the fact of their necessity, nor of their value, when rightly employed. For in France the defensive was regarded as the auxiliary of the offensive. The mission of the protective detachments was not simply to protect, but to offer a bait. Their authors confidently expected that by rearguard-like fighting they could not only gain time for offensive dispositions to be made elsewhere, but also provoke the enemy into deploying in a wrong direction, draw him across the front of the main body, and generally play the part of will o' the wisp. It is questionable—and it was questioned by the younger critics—whether these manoeuvres, applicable enough to the old small armies, had not something of the character of minor chicanes about them when regarded

*This aspect of the question is dealt with at length in Major-General Aylmer's work "Protection."



FRENCH PATROL GUARDING RAILWAY LINE.

[Record Press.]



ZOUAVES.

[Topical

from the point of view of the million-army. But, on the other hand, it is certain that smokeless powder and long-ranging weapons have made rearguard actions. Smokeless powder and long-ranging weapons have enabled a rearguard to keep at a distance the pursuing enemy in a way which was in former times impossible.

The offensive counterpart of the protective detachment (*couverture*) is the "strategic advanced guard"—another focus of controversy. Its rôle is that defined in the last of the aphorisms which we have used as our texts, "Manœuvre only about a fixed point."

Never officially recognized by the French regulations, though partially accepted by the British and Italian, the strategic advanced guard was nevertheless the corner-stone of the "New French" doctrine. It was a very large force of all arms—in Napoleon's campaigns an army corps, in our own times a whole army—which preceded the main body by as many days' marches as its own capacity for fighting unaided permitted. It was handled strategically on the same principles as the famous Prussian advanced guards of 1870 were handled tactically, with the exception that in the hands of a first-class leader like Lannes it never committed itself so deeply as to involve the main army in its affair without direct orders to that effect from the Emperor. In the absence of

such orders, it was merely a potential protective detachment, latent if the enemy did nothing and active if he tried to advance. But its proper purpose was very different. It was with its cavalry* to find, and with its infantry and artillery to engage, the enemy's main body, thereby giving the Emperor the "fixed point" upon which to build up his manœuvre. It had, further, by hard fighting, and if necessary by sacrificing itself, to hold the enemy's attention and effort for the time needed for that manœuvre without support from the "mass of manœuvre," every regiment of which the Emperor jealously reserved.

In the great majority of cases the sacrifice was not in vain. There are few of Napoleon's victories which are without any trace of the idea, and when it failed it was because the movements of the main body, by reason of weather or unforeseen emergencies, were delayed beyond the calculated time.

The action was perfectly familiar to the Prussians, for it had not escaped Clausewitz's observation,† and one of the most magnificent examples of its working had been given by Constantin von Alvensleben, when with the 3rd Corps on August 16, 1870, he engaged the whole of Bazaine's army single-handed in order to prevent it from marching away until

*Often two or more divisions.

†Though Clausewitz was far from suspecting its importance.

Prince Frederick Charles should have gathered his scattered army for a decisive blow upon it. But the idea had been deliberately rejected *in toto* by the more modern Germans, who disbelieved in the power of modern armies, fighting at long range, to fix one another, and in the power of modern unprofessional troops to fight at a sacrifice. How little they expected from the "combat of fixation" may be gauged from the fact, already alluded to, that they engaged their artillery alone in the phase of battle to which it applied, keeping their infantry back until the real general attack was ripe. The only effective fixation they held was the previous overpowering of the enemy's will by the speed and power of their strategic advance. In short, they contributed nothing, either by way of objection or acceptance, to the controversy which centred on the strategic advanced guard. The whole "order of ideas" was different.

The application of the theory to the first phase of a Franco-German war was admitted to be difficult if not impossible, owing to the fact that the armies were almost in face of one another at the outset, whereas in proportion to their length, and therefore to the time-relations of manœuvres based upon the advanced guard, the main bodies should have been separated by

a hundred miles or so for an army of three or four corps to have elbow room for action as strategic advanced guard. It was when the armies had fallen apart again after a first clinch that this organ would come into play, and if at that point the huge masses became divided up into smaller bodies, each with its own theatre of war and set of tasks, Auerstädt and Friedlands would become possible.

Intimately connected with the theory of the strategic advanced guard (though it dated from the purely defensive period of French military policy) was the idea, which had many ardent supporters and many fierce opponents, of fixing the concentration area of the French armies well back from the frontier and somewhat to a flank—at Dijon, for example. Many of the partisans of the strategic advanced guard considered that this retired concentration, coupled with skilful handling of the (then) three frontier corps as a strategic advanced guard and strategic rear guard by turns, would infallibly result in the Germans being drawn so far westward from Lorraine as to be cut off by the offensive from Dijon. But neither General Bonnal himself, nor Langlois nor Foch (both of whom commanded the Nancy Army Corps) seem to have shared in this opinion, since, as Moltke remarked *à propos* of the Silesian



FRENCH CYCLISTS' COMPANY.

[Topical.]





Diagram showing the "lozenge" with the first corps used as strategic advance-guard. (See pp. 273-4.)

concentration of 1866, "one does *not*, in practice, abandon rich provinces." If, however, the main armies of the Germans were to pass through Belgium, a broad belt of country would be open between the initial concentration areas, and in that belt a great French advanced guard might well operate with a view to provoking the Germans into a premature *Entfaltung* in a more or less doubtful direction.


In combination with these protective or provocative detachments, the main army

itself was to be grouped, according to the accepted doctrine, in a deep lozenge formation similar to that which Napoleon adopted in the Jena campaign of 1806.

This great lozenge, preceded by its strategic advanced guard, would advance in the direction where the enemy was *a priori* most likely to be found. If the advanced guard came into contact, the head of the lozenge would reinforce it on one flank within 48 hours, the flanks of it would come up into line within four or five days,



The "lozenge" formation and its uses.



FRENCH MOTOR AMBULANCE.

[Record Press.]

and the rear group would be still in hand. If the advanced guard missed its target, or only came into touch with its extreme flank, then the rôle of advanced guard would fall to one of the flank masses of the lozenge itself, and the original advanced guard would become part of the mass of manœuvre. The virtue of the lozenge formation, in a word, is its capacity for changing direction—a capacity which the long deployed line of the Germans almost entirely lacked. And the virtue of the strategic advanced guard, from whichever side of the lozenge it emerged, was that it provided a fixed point about which this supple mass could manœuvre.

Of all criticisms of the strategic advanced guard, none was as serious as that which pointed out that its flanks would be overlapped by superior forces before the head of the lozenge could act. This danger was admitted, but minimized by the allotment to it of almost all available cavalry, which by the combination of its fan-wise reconnaissance, its fire power, and its shock action would prolong the front to either flank sufficiently far to compel the enemy to make long turning movements and so to waste the critical hours.

As compared with its defensive counterpart, the protective detachment, the strategic advanced guard, whose very mission it was to affront superior numbers of the enemy, undoubtedly ran more risks, since it was off

well as endurance for a given time that was expected of it, and it could not break off the engagement so readily.* On the other hand, the troops composing it did enjoy all the moral advantages of the sharp offensive, whereas those of protective detachments were condemned to the disillusionments of retreat. These differences of principle and intent were explained, so far as the French Army was concerned, in the regulations of 1913, which made it clear that the detachment with a separate temporary mission was a self-contained force while an advanced guard was integrally connected with its main body, since "it cannot be admitted that a leader would send troops against the enemy without his having the intention to fight."

The accompanying diagram shows how a strategic advanced guard extended its flanks for protection in this manner (formations and distances being of course no more than indication of the general tendencies). It illustrates also how, instead of being a self-contained body additional to the lozenge, as at one time it was conceived to be, it has become simply an advanced portion of the head of it, specially disposed for its special functions and dangers.

It shows, moreover, that in practice there was no real discrepancy between the advanced

*German advanced guards, as we have seen, were deliberately kept small in order that they should not be tempted by any consciousness of their own strength to engage at an inopportune moment.

guard and lozenge type of strategic advance and that which Colonel de Grandmaison (the intellectual leader of the revolt against the tendency to multiply advanced guards and protective detachments) proposed, viz., a chain of independent masses, each disposed internally according to its own needs in echelon, lozenge or otherwise, and all together forming a long line with reserves massed behind at one point of it. The Grandmaison conception was better suited to the management of the huge armies of to-day than a crude reproduction, on five times the scale, of Napoleon's "battalion square of 200,000 men." But it shared the characteristic principles and incorporated the characteristic forms of the Napoleonic method, of which indeed it was simply a special case. The outstanding features of French tactical methods of course expressed the same doctrine. In the battle as a whole, fire superiority was not regarded as the condition of success as it was in Germany. On the contrary, it became the accepted idea in France and in Great Britain that the chief use of fire was to *cover movement*, and that it was but an auxiliary to the actual assault. Hence came the characteristic division of the attacker's artillery, not "counter batteries" whose mission it was to account for the enemy's artillery and "infantry batteries" which were to support the infantry advance with their full fire-power at every stage, and, above all, in the final assault. Hence, too, the development of infantry formations* in close order that could live and move in the zone of hostile artillery fire by fitting into even the smallest covered lines of approach and need only extend for fire action of their own at the very limit of cover. Hence also the "burst of rapid fire" from rifle and from gun in which the British Army excelled friend and foe alike. And hence, the tremendous violence of the action of the "mass of manœuvre"—its surprise effect, its speed,

*Irregular lines of platoons or half-platoons in fours or file. Characteristic also of British infantry tactics.



GENERAL CHEVENET.
Military Governor of Belfort.

and its overwhelming weight of "covering fire." Such a blow was only possible when enough data had been obtained to ensure it against being a blow in the air, and the advanced guards had to pay for this insurance. It was only possible when the commander-in-chief was insured against anxieties in other directions, and the protective detachments had to ensure this by resisting to the utmost limit of their powers and their ground. And it was only possible when all ranks, whether in the "wearing-down" engagement or in the swift decisive attack, were imbued with the desire to close with the foe.



CHAPTER XV.

THE STORY OF LIÈGE.

THE "BIRMINGHAM" OF BELGIUM—ITS STORMY HISTORY—PHYSICAL AND ARCHITECTURAL BEAUTIES—BELGIUM'S BAVARIAN QUEEN—GERMANY'S CHECKED PLAN—FIRST ATTACK ON LIÈGE—MISEMPLOYMENT OF MASSED INFANTRY—SKILFUL BELGIAN DEFENCE—THE DECISIVE BAYONET—THE ERROR OF GERMAN DISCIPLINE—STRENGTH AND WEAKNESS OF LIÈGE—FACTS ABOUT THE FORTS—SECRET GERMAN WORK IN LIÈGE—GENERAL LEMAN'S NARROW ESCAPE—MASSACRE OF LIÈGE CITIZENS—DISINGENUOUS STATEMENT FROM BERLIN—INTERNATIONAL LAW MISAPPLIED—DISHONESTY OF THE GERMAN CASE—PARALLEL OF THE SELF-RIGHTEOUS BURGLAR—GOLDEN OPPORTUNITY NEGLECTED BY THE GERMANS—EVIDENCE OF ATROCITIES AT LIÈGE—EXCUSE FOR BELGIUM—GENERAL VON EMMICH AND HIS TASK—VALUE OF INITIAL BELGIAN SUCCESSES—TERRIBLE SLAUGHTER OF GERMANS—THREE ARMY CORPS BROUGHT TO A STANDSTILL—INEXORABLE GERMAN ADVANCE—MORE BRILLIANT BELGIAN SUCCESSES—CROSS OF THE LEGION OF HONOUR FOR LIÈGE—RECORDS OF INDIVIDUAL GALLANTRY—NOTHING AVAILED AGAINST THE BIG GUNS—DIFFICULTY OF THEIR TRANSPORT—COLLAPSE OF THE FORTS—MESSRS. KRUPP'S TRIUMPH—SUMMARY OF THE SIEGE—PLAYING HIDE-AND-SEEK WITH SHELLS—DESTRUCTION OF BUILDINGS—OCCUPATION OF THE TOWN—UNIQUE POSITION THUS CREATED—ILL-FOUNDED REJOICINGS IN BERLIN AND MISTAKEN HOPES IN LONDON—IN SPITE OF CHECKS GERMAN ADVANCE IRRESISTIBLE—LIÈGE AND NAMUR COMPARED—THE VALUE OF RING FORTRESSES—GENERAL LEMAN "PLAYS THE GAME"—MORAL AND POLITICAL EFFECTS OF BELGIAN SUCCESS IN RESISTANCE—DESTRUCTION OF FORTS AND CAPTURE OF GENERAL LEMAN—PATHETIC AND GALLANT FINALE—TESTIMONY OF BRITISH STATESMEN.

THE usual description of Liège as the "Birmingham of Belgium" gave one no idea of the peaceful beauty of the town with its numerous spires and spacious streets, fringed with boulevards spreading outwards from the wide waters of the Meuse toward the undulating country with its many lovely woods, the haunts of butterflies and birds. Between these were situated the forts, like great iron ant-hills, each cupola crowning the smooth glacis on which on the night of August 5 the German dead lay in high ridges like the jet-sam of the tide upon a beach, each ridge indicating the high-water mark to which the futile rush of a wave of infantry had reached. But as the sun set peacefully on August 3 the forts were no more conspicuous than usual

amid their picturesque surroundings. They were always familiar features in a bird's-eye view of the environs of Liège, but they did not dominate the landscape; and there was little, even in the minds of the Liégeois as they listened to the music of St. Barthélemy's evening chimes, to suggest that the morrow would see that landscape ringed with steel or that for many days the incessant thunder of the guns would be speaking to the world of the heroism and the wreckage of Liège.

Indeed, on that close, hot evening at the beginning of August the wooded slopes beyond which the Germans were waiting for nightfall seemed to contain nothing more dangerous than the magpies that flickered black and white along the margins of the thickets; and the quiet fields



LIÈGE.

The above, with the illustration on the opposite page, forms a panoramic view of Liège as it was, and shows the entrance to the Railway Station.

around the farms showed no worse enemies than the family parties of crows prospecting for early walnuts—crows that would soon fatten on horses' entrails and pick the eyes of men.

No serious shadow of the coming evil had yet fallen across those fair hills. There had been rumours, of course, and of course the troops were ready in Liège; but the contented Walloon farmer paid little attention to rumours or the activities of the soldiers. He hoped the sultry sunset did not portend thunder—little dreaming of the thunder of the guns that would be in his ears for many nights and days. Perhaps he thought, as he looked over the rolling fields, ripe through abundant sunshine with early crops, that the harvest of 1914 would be one that the Liégeois would remember for many years. And so indeed it was; for it proved to be the crowning harvest of the city's stormy prominence in history, passing back for nearly 1,200 years.

Liège made her entry into the field of political history in the year 720, when, with the consent

of Pope Gregory the Second, the Bishop of Maestricht transferred the See from that sleepy city to its fast-growing rival at the junction of the Meuse and the Ourthe. In the following century the Bishops of Liège added to their honours the titles of Princes of the Empire and Dukes of Bouillon. Their residence in the city of Liège added of course vastly to its dignity and consequence, and their ecclesiastical and military subordinates swelled its population and fed its growing trade.

But there was another side to these benefits. The difference between the lay and ecclesiastical aristocracy of the Middle Ages was often merely skin-deep, a matter of title and costume rather than of nature or of habit of life; and the long list of the Prince-Bishops of Liège comprised few individuals who were not as insolent in their pretensions, as sudden and quick in quarrel, as vindictive in revenge, and as extortionate as their unsanctified brethren. The history of Liège is the story of a long struggle between the turbulent and liberty-



LIÈGE.


Centre of the town, and the river, with a view of the bridge that was destroyed.

loving citizens and their priestly oppressors, many of whom were only able to enter the city either at the head or in the rear of armies of mercenaries. Revolts were frequent and bloody, and sometimes more or less successful; but on the whole the Prince-Bishops of Liège held their own so well that the French historian, Jules Dalhaize, tells us that even in the eighteenth century they were still absolute rulers, and that Gérard de Hoensbroeck, who occupied the episcopal throne in 1789, "knew no other law than his own will."

The continuance and growth of the Prince-Bishops' power would indicate that most of them must have been men of considerable political talent, with a keen eye for the winning side, as, in the interminable quarrels between the Empire and the Papacy, they pursued no settled line of policy, but fought with or against the Holy See as their personal interest tended. One of them, Henry of Leyden, Prince-Bishop from 1145 to 1164, followed Frederick Barbarossa to Italy, helped in the downfall of

Pope Alexander III., supported the Anti-Pope Victor, and consecrated his successor, Paschal. In strange contrast with rebels of this type were Bishop Alexander, who, deposed in 1134 by Innocent the Second, died of shame; Albéron of Namur, whose heart broke at an angry summons to the presence of Eugenius the Third; and Raoul of Zeringhen, who, admonished for malpractice by the pontifical legate, laid aside his crozier and expiated his offences as a crusader. Best known of all to history is Louis de Bourbon, the victim of the ferocity of William de la Marek, "the Boar of the Ardennes." Far from an ideal priest, worldly, luxurious, and indolent, the courage and dignity with which he met his death would have earned pardon for much heavier offences.

Amid all these turmoils Liège had flourished and grown, and about the year 1400 the democratic element had held its own so well that it could be described as "a city of priests changed into one of colliers and armourers." "It was," we are told, "a city that gloried in its

STEPS LEADING UP TO THE FORTS, LIÈGE. *[Underwood & Underwood.]*

rupture with the past," but "the past" rose and reasserted itself in 1408, when the Prince-Bishop John of Bavaria, assisted by his cousin, John the Fearless, broke the forces of the citizens and excluded them ruthlessly from power. A generation later democracy triumphed again, again to be overthrown, this time by Charles the Bold of Burgundy, who, in 1467, defeated the Liègeois in the field, and reinstated the Bishop and his kinsman, the afore-mentioned Louis de Bourbon. In the following year the undismayed burghers rose

in fresh revolt, provoked thereto by the intrigues and promises of the crafty Louis XI. of France, Charles's seeming friend and deadliest enemy. It was probably the most triumphant hour of Charles's life, and the bitterest hour that Louis ever knew, when, in the enforced presence and with the extorted consent of the latter, Charles stormed Liège, put its inhabitants to indiscriminate slaughter, and, save for its pillaged churches, razed it to the ground. It was characteristic of Charles that he failed to complete the political annexation of the

principality he had so frightfully chastised. At his death, nine years later, in 1477, the unconquerable spirit of the Walloon population had already done much to restore the city to its former strength, and a single generation sufficed to erase the last vestiges of her ruin.

Liège passed practically unscathed through the long agony of the struggle of the Netherlands against Philip II. and the Duke of Alva, and underwent no such calamities as those which desolated the sister cities of Maestricht, Brussels, and Antwerp. She was stormed and occupied by the soldiers of Louis XIV. in 1691, and in 1702 was occupied by the English under Marlborough. Her occupation in 1792 by a French contingent commanded by La Fayette concluded the tale of her warlike experiences until the outbreak of the present struggle.

In its modern aspect Liège, as the centre of the coalmining industry of Eastern Belgium, has always exhibited to the traveller, even at a distance, the signs of its occupation in the pall of smoke overhead, to which the countless chimneys of the factories which the output of coal supports are constantly contributing. One of the mines is the deepest in the world, and many others, now abandoned, pass beneath the city and the river.

Among the chief industries for which Liège has long been, and will doubtless again be, famous through the world is the manufacture of arms and weapons of all kinds—congenial work, one might suppose, for the quick-witted Walloon people, who have always in their city's stormy history shown that they know how to use weapons as well as how to make them. Perhaps a little over-readiness in this direction on their part, forgetting that modern war is confined to combatants only, offers some explanation, but no excuse, for the savagery of the German "reprisals."

Besides the manufacture of arms, of which there were more than 180 factories, the Liège zinc foundries, engine factories, and cycle works were all world-famous, and the zinc works of Vieille Montagne were the largest in existence.

But though this vast industrial activity clouded the air above Liège with smoke, and though wherever one looked upon the encircling hills the chimneys and shafts of mines were to be seen, the town itself was pleasant and well laid out, and the surrounding landscape beautiful.

Many of the improvements in Liège dated from 1905, when an International Exhibition was held there; and in preparing the area for this the course of the river Ourthe, which here joins the Meuse, had been diverted from its



GENERAL LEMAN,
The Gallant Defender of Liège.

[Alfieri.]

old bed and converted into the Canal de Dérivation, the old river course being filled up and added, with the adjoining land, to the Exhibition grounds. A fine park was also laid out on the Plateau de Cointe, whence the best general view of Liège is obtained, and several new bridges and streets were made, including the handsome and spacious boulevards.

Another grand view was obtained from the Citadel, an ancient and disused fort close to the north side of the town, which was built on the site of still older fortifications by the Prince-Bishop Maximilian Henry of Bavaria after the famous siege of Liège in 1649. No doubt he thought that he was making the city impregnable for ever; but three centuries had not passed before the newer fortresses, whose construction relegated the Citadel to the level of an antique curiosity, had themselves fallen utterly before the power of modern guns. The position of the Citadel, however, still remains commanding, and the view therefrom includes the entire city, of which all the centre from north to south looks like a cluster of islands between the canals and winding rivers, as well as the thickly-wooded background of the Ardennes Mountains on the right, and on the left the hills near Maestricht in Holland and the broad plains of Limburg, whence the German armies crossed the frontier in three streams at the beginning of the great war.

Between this distant historic landscape and the near view of Liège, rising from her ashes, the valleys of the Meuse, the Ourthe, and the Vesdre diverge, thickly dotted with populous Walloon villages. This had been a favourite country for German tourists and a rich field for German commercial enterprise; but 1914 wrought a change.

On the other side of the city another disused fortification, Fort Chartreuse, gave an almost equally fine prospect from the opposite point of view; and although the old fort itself was blown up by the Belgians during the siege in order that it might not provide cover for the enemy, the hill remained a vantage point from which, as far as the eye can reach on either hand, evidence of German devastation could be seen.

Before the bombardment the general aspect of the city was that of a place of parks and pleasure gardens, fine churches and spacious buildings. Among the latter the University, by its prominence, became a magnet for the German shells, and though only founded in 1817 as the central seat of learning for the Walloon race, no priceless heritage of ancient days could have been more thoroughly smashed and pulverized.

The grand Palais de Justice also, with its picturesque courts and vaulted pillars, blending late Gothic and Renaissance styles—and its west wing used as the Government House, faced by pleasure grounds and fountains on a picturesque slope—was only a product of 16th to 19th century genius; and the Town Hall only dated from early in the 18th century, although it contained pictures and tapestries of great age and value.

But in the Church of St. Jacques, with its famous stained-glass windows, the western façade was nearly 700 years old, while parts of the Cathedral Church of St. Paul, also containing beautiful stained glass and statues, dated back to 968, 1280, and 1528. The Church of St. Jean belonged to the 12th, 14th, and 18th centuries, that of St. Croix to the 10th, 12th, and 14th, St. Martin to the 16th, St. Antoine, with its wood carvings and frescoes, to the 13th, and St. Barthélemy to the 11th and 12th, with its two towers and well-known chimes and famous bronze font of 12th-century work. In addition there were the domed church of St. Andrew, used as the Exchange, and the baroque fountains in the Place du Marché. Thus, as a subject for German bombardment, it may be seen that Liège had many attractions, even if it did not come up to the standard of Louvain or Reims.

Such, then, was the ancient town which lay sleeping peacefully amid its ring of watchdog forts that nestled so comfortably between the wooded uplands on the night of August 3, 1914.

The stirring events of the following day, culminating in the tragedy of Visé, have already been narrated, showing that varied fortunes had so far attended Germany's first steps in the war. The successful seizure of Luxemburg and the quiet crossing of the Belgian frontier, with the occupation of Limburg, had promised well for her. At the moment, indeed, it looked as if the Kaiser's plans for an invasion of France would be smoothly carried out and his Majesty would be able to count Belgium among the dutiful children of his Empire. Perhaps he even found some hope in the fact that the Queen of the Belgians was a German Princess, born at Possenhofen, and before her marriage known as the Duchess Élisabeth of Bavaria. But Germany who treated the claims of national honour so lightly herself had yet to learn that others placed them above ties of family and even above considerations of self-interest!

Instead of an obedient vassal the Kaiser found in Belgium a most resolute antagonist; and, when the storm broke, General von Emmich's three Army Corps, travelling lightly-equipped for speed, discovered that it was not so much an attack upon France through Belgium as a serious invasion of Belgium itself which lay before them, while the taking of even the little town of Visé had caused so much bloodshed and provoked such bitter enmity as augured ill for future progress.

The bombardment of Liège commenced in the early morning—a dull and hot morning—of August 5, the advance of the artillery having been covered—as is always the case in a German movement—by masses of cavalry, and it was continued without cessation until the 8th. The Germans attacked along a very wide front, stretching north to the smoking ruins of Visé close to the Dutch frontier, and on the south a considerable distance below Liège; but the artillery employed was not heavy enough. The big siege guns had not arrived and the forts had the best of the preliminary duel.

Then the amazing thing happened. It was as though the German generals, knowing nothing of war, had just read in some book how Napoleon won victories by the sudden, unexpected use of solid masses of men and had said to themselves, "Good! No one will expect the sudden application of masses of men in a case like this: so we will apply them." The result almost moved even the busy Belgians in the trenches



THE QUEEN OF THE BELGIANS.



WHERE THE GERMANS ARE SAID TO HAVE FIRST CROSSED THE MEUSE.

to pity. "It was death in haystacks," said one of them afterwards, trying to describe the effect of the combined field-gun, machine-gun, and rifle fire upon the masses of men. Another eye-witness stated that the average height of the ridges of German dead was $1\frac{1}{2}$ yards. Many corpses are required to reach that level. It was the visible result of a form of military enterprise which a civilian who had dined too well might conceive.

As the day wore on the battle became more fierce, for the simple reason that the successive waves of Germans jammed each other on, until before one of the forts a great host of men succeeded in gaining a footing on the near slopes, where the great guns could not be depressed to reach them. For a brief space they seemed to think that they were on the threshold of victory and rushed forward, only to discover—what, surely, their officers should have known all along—that the machine guns were waiting for them. Further back their comrades had been killed: here they were massacred.

In contrast with this useless waste of German life, the Belgian troops in the trenches appear to have been kept admirably in hand. Some of the subsiding ripples of the tide of German assault were only definitely suppressed by rifle fire at 50 yards; and often the ideal distance for a bayonet charge, when you can see the whites of your enemies' eyes, seemed almost reached. Now and again it actually was reached; and

then the staggering German ranks appeared to have no stomach for cold steel. Many turned and ran; many held up their hands and surrendered; the rest were killed.

It was rather surprising that men who had gone through so much should have been cowed at the last by the bayonet. Considered in cold blood, as a feat performed by intelligent men, it should seem a much more terrible test of courage to march, as on parade, in solid ranks into the hell of an entrenched enemy's combined and concentrated fire of big guns, machine guns, and rifles than to meet a bayonet charge in which such solidity as the ranks retained would have been all on the side of the Germans. Yet it was not only at Liège, but also on many fields of subsequent battle, that the Belgian and allied troops discovered to their surprise and almost to their disappointment that the German infantry would not wait for the application of steel. Scores of instances could be quoted in which British soldiers, after expressing their personal contempt for the German rifle-fire—"they can't shoot for nuts" was a favourite comment—still expressed their great admiration for the way in which those ranks of men came stumbling over the corpses of their slaughtered comrades to be slaughtered in their turn. And then always came the final criticism—"but they won't wait for the bayonet." This seeming anomaly is explained by one word used above, in considering

whether the courageous advance of the German soldiers to almost certain death was "a feat performed by *intelligent men*." That is just what it was not. The German system of discipline took a human being and converted him, in spite of whatever individual intelligence he might possess, into a military machine which could exhibit no individual intelligence whatever. The British system, and the French and Belgian also, set a higher value upon the men, seeking to convert each human being in the ranks into an intelligent fighting man. The result was that in action the Allied troops did not perfunctorily loose off their cartridges at the landscape in general. Each man of them tried to kill as many Germans as he could. Hence the tremendous difference in the effectiveness of the rifle fire on the two sides ; and, of course, when it came to bayonet work the difference was more marked still. Behind each Belgian, French, or British bayonet was a trained man intelligently determined to do as much damage with it to the enemy as he could. Behind the rows of German bayonets were almost mechanical combatants, whose discipline and courage had already been strained to the breaking point by the fearful ordeal through which they had been marched. Of course, they did not want to wait for the cold steel.

Yet it is not to be denied—as indeed the Belgians admitted without reservation—that up to this point the unfortunate German soldiers showed most stoical courage. The blame for the disaster rested with their commander. It was as though he had heard that you cannot make an omelette without breaking eggs, and so flung a whole basketful of eggs upon the floor to show himself a cook !

Contrast this with the wiser and, as it proved, much more rapid method adopted against the equally strong fortress of Namur later on. Then the first news which we received came, at the end of a long telegram describing the continued advance of the German Army towards Paris, in the following words :—"They (the Germans) have, too, partially invested Namur and opened upon its forts with heavy artillery." This was, of course, the right course to adopt in attacking a ring fortress. Such a fortress is comparable to an encircling wall, and the first thing to do is to invest it and make a breach in it. Then and not till then is the time to send masses of infantry forward—through the breach. At Liège the masses of infantry were sent against the unbroken wall. At Namur the fire of the heavy guns was so overwhelming that the ring was broken in several places almost simultaneously. No wonder that at Liège the



THE CHURCH AT VISÉ.
Probably the First Church Destroyed by the Germans.

[Newspaper Illustrations

Germans were sent staggering back or that at Namur they quickly advanced to victory.

To understand why Liège could not be taken by assault, in spite of the great force which was hurled upon it; why, up to a certain point, it was able to resist the determined and continuous attack subsequently made upon it by superior force; and also why it inevitably fell, we must have a clear picture of the defences in our minds. The diagram maps published on pages 340 and 341 illustrate the main facts of the position, and we must remember that the ring of twelve forts was 33 miles in circumference, and that they were situated each about four miles from the town and on the average about two to three miles from one another. Thus the interval between fort and fort was too large to be held by a garrison which was numerically so weak as was the force under General Leman's command. It is true that during the earlier stages of the fighting, when the German attack developed only on a narrow front, the superior mobility of the Belgian forces, moving higher and thither on short interior lines of communication, enabled them on each occasion to oppose a withering machine-gun and rifle fire to the German advance and even to fling back the shattered ranks of the assailants finally with resolute bayonet charges; but this advantage was lost so soon as the widening area of the German attack involved so many of the forts that no man could be spared from the defender's trenches between any two of them to strengthen the defence elsewhere. It was then that the necessity of withdrawing the field forces became apparent to General Leman, who elected to hold out with the forts alone. By this time, however, the 400 guns, which represented the total armament of the forts, were both outnumbered and outclassed by the heavy artillery which the Germans had brought into position, and the last stand of Liège was quite hopeless. All that General Leman could hope to do—and grandly succeeded in doing—was to delay the German advance a little longer and to make sure that the forts on falling into the hands of the enemy should be only masses of ruins.

The conflicting nature of the accounts which were published at the time concerning the resistance offered by the forts was largely due to confusion between the large and the small forts. Of the ring of 12, three on the north and east, namely Pontisse, Barchon, and Fléron, and three on the west and south, namely, Loncin, Flémalle, and Boncelles, were large and strong. The other six were comparatively small and unimportant as strongholds, although if the whole ring had been held

by an adequate force they would have continued to be, as they were at first, invaluable as buttresses to the fighting line and connecting links between the large forts.

They were not, however, strong enough, when isolated, to withstand a siege with modern artillery; and in regarding Liège as a ring fortress for this purpose only the six forts named above should be taken into consideration; and when the Germans claimed to have demolished three of the south-eastern forts, namely, Embourg, Chaudfontaine, and Évegnée, this did not really affect the claim of the Belgians that "the forts on the east and south," namely, Barchon, Fléron, and Boncelles, were "still holding out." All of the larger forts were constructed upon the same plan, being triangular in shape, with a moat on each side and guns at each corner. In the centre of the interior space was a steel turret with two 6in. howitzers, and in a square round this four other steel turrets, all armed with 5in. quick-firing guns. All these turrets were embedded in one solid concrete block; and in addition, besides searchlights and many machine guns, the corners of the triangle held quick-firing guns in disappearing turrets. Against any known artillery at the time of their construction these forts were probably impregnable; and even at the time of the war they were doubtless capable of holding out for months against any ordinary field force. But the big siege guns which the Germans brought against them were another matter; and the daily legend, "Liège forts still holding out," only continued to be true until they had been bombarded.

In order to understand some of the curious incidents in the first stages of the attack upon Liège we must remember that the same secret preparations which succeeded so well in Luxemburg had been made in Liège also. In many of the houses, occupied by unsuspected citizens who were really secret German agents, were found thousands of rifles, quickfiring guns, and sets of harness, intended for the armament of the Germans who had entered the city in mufti and unarmed. It was this arrangement, only very partially successful, which nearly cost the life of General Leman on the occasion when Colonel Marchand was killed, at the beginning of the siege, because it enabled a party of armed Germans surreptitiously to surround the house where the Commandant was conferring with the General Staff. Various accounts are given of the mêlée which followed, but all agree as to the circumstance of Colonel Marchand's death and the saving of General Leman by an officer of Herculean build who



BRAVO, BELGIUM!

This cartoon, reproduced by special permission of the proprietors of "Punch," admirably expresses the true spirit of the Belgians' resistance to German aggression.

forced him over the wall of an adjoining foundry.

It was, no doubt, this startling discovery of the presence of concealed enemies in Liège which led General Leman—who in many of his methods and the personal enthusiasm which he evoked reminds the British reader of Baden-Powell in Mafeking—to lay the trap which led

to the annihilation of one German band and the capture of another.

From the welter of confused accounts of the bloody happenings on the night of August 7 one fact seems to stand out boldly, that, while the German demand for an armistice for the alleged purpose of burying their dead was supposed to be still under consideration,



PLACE ST. LAMBERT AND PALACE OF JUSTICE, LIÈGE.

German troops succeeded in entering the town of Liège and fierce street fighting ensued, as a result of which the greater part of the Belgian garrison retreated in good order from the town. Unfortunately, as at Visé, some of the inhabitants had taken a prominent part in the fighting, and in retaliation the Germans shot every one, man, woman, or child, who fell into their hands. There appears to be no doubt that this was done, or that it was done by order.

A semi-official statement, issued in Berlin on August 9, ran:—"According to news received here about the operations around Liège the civilian population took part in the struggle, and German troops and doctors were fired upon from ambush. . . . It is possible that these facts were due to the mixed population in industrial centres, but it is also possible that France and Belgium are preparing a *franc-tireur* war against our troops. If this is proved by further facts our adversaries are themselves responsible if the war is extended with inexorable strength to the guilty population. The German troops are only accustomed to fight against the armed power of a hostile State, and cannot be blamed if in self-defence they do not give quarter."

If the severely judicial note of the first part of this proclamation had been maintained in the conduct of the troops in the field the world might have had little reason to complain of Teuton brutality. Non-combatant Belgians undoubtedly took part in the defence of Liège as well as of Visé.

But everything had happened so suddenly through the treacherous completeness of Germany's plans for the invasion of Belgium without warning that there had been little time for the Belgian authorities to issue any effective advice to the Belgian population as to the rules of war regarding non-combatants. Every effort was made indeed to placard the villages with warning notices; but there is no evidence that such notices were or could have been placarded in the neighbourhood of Liège in time to anticipate the events of August 5.

If, moreover, there could be any circumstances in which the plain duty of an invader was to waive the strictness of the rules of war and to strain his spirit of mercy and forbearance to the utmost those circumstances were present here: because the German Government openly admitted before the world that it was doing a "wrong" to Belgium by breaking down her sanctioned neutrality. Indeed, unless international law is based upon some lower ideal of justice than that which inspires all civilized law as between man and man, the Germans could not lawfully appeal to the rules of war at all. The armed burglar cannot take legal proceedings for assault against a householder who arrests him. It is true that according to law the right to arrest belongs to the police, and that one ordinary civilian who violently seizes another commits an assault; but the armed burglar, by doing wrong himself in the first instance and thus provoking the plucky householder to seize him, has deliberately discarded that status of

ordinary citizenship which would have entitled him to protection by the law.

If, then, there had been an adequate force behind international law, as there is behind the ordinary law of all civilized countries, the Belgian civilian who resisted the German invader should have been able to say to his opponent, as the householder can say to the armed burglar: "If I kill you, it is only justifiable homicide, but if you kill me, it is murder." This difference in their positions before the law would directly follow from the fact that the burglar had caused the whole trouble *by doing wrong*. Yet we have the spectacle of the German Government admittedly doing wrong and at the same time claiming the right to take extreme advantage of international law!


Moreover, even if the German Government had not deliberately placed itself outside the pale of international law by committing the "wrong" to which it brazenly pleaded guilty, any claim which it might have to execute international law would only hold against those who had committed breaches of that law. Great latitude is necessarily given to civilized commanders in the field in interpreting the law of war and in carrying out their judgments. A civilian strongly and reasonably suspected of having fired upon the enemy's troops, who has fallen into that enemy's hands, cannot claim

to be defended by counsel; nor is he often able to call witnesses in his behalf. His trial is brief, often with—it is to be feared—a strong bias against him in the mind of his judge. The fact that in war time many an innocent citizen thus gets shot by the enemy as a spy is one which international law is forced to overlook as one of the incidental evils of war, which can be neither prevented nor remedied. But this shooting of an innocent citizen on suspicion only, after a mockery of a "trial," is the utmost limit to which the inflamed passions of civilized men can claim the sanction of international law in shedding innocent blood. There is no "law," human or divine—or one might even say devilish—which could sanction the hideous and wholesale atrocities committed in Liège by these sanctimonious apostles of German culture.

Still further—in order to leave no loophole for casuistry to wriggle out of the frightful charge recorded against Germany in this war—even if the German Government had not, on its own admission, placed itself outside the pale of international law, and even if the outrages committed by its agents had not gone far beyond the worst form of reprisal which that law could sanction, this mock-serious "warning" of reprisal was deliberately issued by the German Government *after it knew that the bloody deeds had already been done*.



SQUARE OF THE VIRGIN, LIÈGE, BEFORE BOMBARDMENT.



CHURCH OF ST. JACQUES, LIÈGE.

It was on August 9 that in Berlin the Kaiser's Government proclaimed: "*If this (that France and Belgium were preparing an illegitimate form of war against the German Army) is proved by further facts our adversaries are themselves responsible if the war is extended with inexorable strength to the guilty population.*" And it was on August 7, two days earlier, that the German Government had full information of the atrocities committed by its troops upon unarmed Belgians in Liège, where there was general massacre of "*tous ceux qui leur sont tombés sous la main, hommes, femmes et enfants.*"

Think of the hideous irony of it all! Here was the armed burglar who had, by his own confessed crime, put himself outside the pale of the law, not only claiming a legal right to execute the householder who resisted him, but also self-righteously threatening to apply "*inexorable strength*" to the rest of the household two days after he had murdered them all and burned down the house.

It has been necessary thus to deal somewhat fully with the terrible charges which lie at the door of the German Government at this point of our narrative, because it was here, in and near Liège, at the very outset of the campaign in Belgium, that the German commanders had a golden opportunity to strike a high and noble keynote of the war. Since their Government had admitted doing a wrong to Belgium and had promised reparation later, they should have realized that they lay under a moral disadvantage and should have done everything

in their power to put themselves right with the Belgian people. Instead of insisting upon their "*right*" to enforce, and even to exceed, the rules of war in dealing with civilian belligerents—like a burglar demanding the observance of Queensberry rules, with additions of his own, in a fight with an aggrieved householder—they should have been watchful for opportunity to exhibit forbearance and clemency to civilians taken in arms, thus illustrating their Government's professed desire to make reparation for its wrongdoing.

But this did not satisfy the Germans. They were in a hurry to begin with. Like a man who has wagered to go round the world in a certain time and has missed his train at the start, they were already infuriated by their own failure to bring up their heavy artillery and ammunition in time to make short work of the Liège forts. They were further enraged by the vigorous resistance of Belgian troops, which they did not expect to find in their way so much; and the fact that patriotic Belgian civilians took part in the fighting caused their fury to boil over. So they sought to terrify the Belgian nation by massacre; and Liège's blood-drenched ashes bore the first signature of the new German war-spirit on Belgian soil—an evil spirit for which, as the evidence shows, not merely the German soldiery were to blame, nor even merely their commanders in the field, but also the coldly brutal centre of military power in Berlin.

Among other specific charges, supported by evidence, which were issued on August 25 by

the British Press Bureau on the authority of the Belgian Minister, it was stated that on August 6, before one of the forts of Liège, the Germans surprised a party of Belgian soldiers engaged in digging entrenchments. The latter, being unarmed, hoisted a white flag; but the Germans ignored this and continued to fire upon the helpless party. On the same day, before Fort Lonein, a case of treacherous abuse of the white flag occurred in the case of a body of German troops who hoisted the signal of surrender and then opened fire at close range upon the party of Belgians sent to take charge of them.

Contrast such conduct as this with the war-spirit of Belgium. The victim of an unprovoked attack and almost unprepared for the storm that had burst upon her, she gave to the world an example of public spirit which electrified Europe. That in the excitement of the moment she struck with both hands at the invader, obviously unaware that the laws of war permit the use of the swordhand only—for the Belgian Government had not had time then to post up in the villages the official warning to civilians not to take part in the conflict—was a venial offence, which a generous enemy would have met by a serious warning of the consequences which would follow its repetition; and for a generous enemy Belgium and her allies would have felt at least respect. But that was not the German way;

and for the evil consequences which followed the brutalization of war in Europe the Kaiser's Government is directly responsible.

General von Emmich was at this period the Commander-in-Chief of the German Army of the Meuse. He had been previously in command of the 10th Army Corps at Hanover, and this, with the 7th Corps, was the part of his force which he employed to carry out the orders that had evidently been given to him to capture Liège quickly at all costs. He used 88,000 men on the first day, increased to 120,000 on the second, against the Belgian 22,500, which the Germans knew to be inadequate for the complete defence of the fortress; and what was more natural than that he should have determined, even without the explicit orders from Berlin, to sweep them out of his path as a preliminary to swift advance through Belgium towards the French frontier? His officers certainly believed that they had an easy job before them—a task *pour rire*, as one of them, a prisoner, explained afterwards—and entered into action in the gayest spirits. Bitter must have been their disappointment when the great 7th Army Corps, after concentrating its attack upon the three eastern forts—namely, Barchon, Évegnée, and Fléron—was met with such devastating artillery fire from the forts and such well-directed machine-gun and infantry fire from the trenches and



THE CLOISTERS, PALACE OF JUSTICE.



A RUINED STREET IN LIÈGE.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]

barricades which had been thrown up between them that only a remnant came reeling back.

The value of the success gained by the Belgians in withstanding the first German onset was incalculable. Not only did it destroy one large factor in the Kaiser's scheme for the conquest of France, *i.e.*, the belief that, as he himself had said, he could sweep through Belgium as easily as he could wave his hand; not only did it disarrange the time-table by which the conquest of France was to be completed before Russia could come to her assistance; it also shattered the European reputation of the Kaiser's Army for invincibility; it had been supposed that German officers necessarily were prodigies of military efficiency and that the troops which they commanded were the most perfect man-slaying machine which human genius and German "thoroughness" could create. But at Liège the German commanders showed themselves to be grievous bunglers in setting their men tasks which mere flesh and blood could not perform, while the men also showed themselves to be inept with the rifle and to have a wholesome dislike for the bayonet. British troops made these discoveries on their own account later; but in the initial stages of the campaign in Belgium it was worth another 100,000 men to General Leman that his soldiers should know that they had only to use their rifles and bayonets with intelligence and courage to beat the Germans every time if they met on anything like equal terms.

At the outset, therefore, General von Emmich's effort to overrun Liège—to "take it in his stride," as it were, on his march to Paris—with the 7th Army Corps failed utterly; and when the 7th was reinforced by the 10th and 9th Corps, and six of the forts were simultaneously attacked, no better results, from the German point of view, followed the assault in force.

That the Belgians should thus have held up 120,000 of the best German troops for two whole days of fierce fighting was a splendid feat of arms which gladdened the hearts of the Allies as an omen of ultimate victory.

Some notion of the carnage which resulted from the German method of attack may be gathered from the following description given by a Belgian officer who took part in the defence:—

"As line after line of the German infantry advanced, we simply mowed them down. It was terribly easy, monsieur, and I turned to a brother officer of mine more than once and said, 'Voilà! They are coming on again, in a dense, close formation! They must be mad!' They made no attempt at deploying, but came on, line after line, almost shoulder to shoulder, until, as we shot them down, the fallen were heaped one on top of the other, in an awful barricade of dead and wounded men that threatened to mask our guns and cause us trouble. I thought of Napoleon's saying—if he said it, monsieur; and I doubt it, for he had no

care of human life!—‘C’est magnifique, mais ce n’est pas la guerre!’ No, it was slaughter—just slaughter!

“So high became the barricade of the dead and wounded that we did not know whether to fire through it or to go out and clear openings with our hands. We would have liked to extricate some of the wounded from the dead, but we dared not. A stiff wind carried away the smoke of the guns quickly, and we could see some of the wounded men trying to release themselves from their terrible position. I will confess I crossed myself, and could have wished that the smoke had remained!


“But, would you believe it, this veritable wall of dead and dying actually enabled these wonderful Germans to creep closer, and actually charge up the glacis! Of course, they got no further than half-way, for our maxims and rifles swept them back. Of course, we had our own losses, but they were slight compared with the carnage inflicted upon our enemies.”

In spite of these terrible experiences General von Emmich appears to have adhered to the old-fashioned German idea that a fortress like Liège could be rushed if you only hurled a sufficient number of men against it. But the third day of the assault added nothing to the result of the previous two, except that a division of German cavalry which had forded the Meuse was surprised and cut up by the Belgian Mixed Brigade; and the 9th German Army Corps had been brought to a standstill by the side of the 7th and 10th, with enormous losses—although these do not appear to have approached the number of 25,000 given in contemporary accounts, which was more than the strength of the entire Belgian garrison. Yet how severely the Germans’ advance had indeed been checked appeared from their request for an armistice of 24 hours to bury the dead and collect the wounded; and it was not inhumanity but reasonable distrust of German honour which prompted the Belgian commander’s refusal.



EFFECT OF GERMAN SHELL FIRE.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]



LEFT SIDE OF THE FAMOUS BRIDGE AT LIÈGE.
Blown up by Belgians to impede the German Advance.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]

Practically the sole witnesses of this terribly unequal duel between the advancing German hosts and the intrepid defenders of Liège were the Dutch, who at Maestricht, just within the safe frontier of Holland, were almost within eyeshot of it all. Thus, on the afternoon of the fateful August 6 came the following glimpse through the fog of war which had settled around Liège from a correspondent at Maestricht:—

"I could clearly see from the hill the Germans in little boats and others building a pontoon over the Meuse south of Visé. The horses were swum across. The crossing was carried out in half a dozen places with great regularity. The Germans did not seem much concerned at the fire of the Belgian forts. The Belgian troops were spread out over the rising ground. Fire from a German mitrailleuse kept the Belgians at a distance, and slowly the whole hillside became covered with German soldiers, who drove the Belgians before them.

"By 5 o'clock a large force of Germans had crossed the Meuse and commenced to march south on Liège. The Belgians tried to harass the Germans by firing into the progressing columns. At last the Belgians cease firing

and retire. From the houses along the road the people take to flight in despair.

"In the village of Eben I find people calm, looking with astonishment at the tremendous body of troops passing along the route. They were not molested at all as the Germans progressed towards Liège along both banks of the Meuse.

"With characteristic optimism Germans said, 'In two days we will have Liège, and within a week we will be before Paris.' "

This brief telegram gives a picturesque but accurate summary of the whole tenor of the campaign not only before Liège but beyond Liège and Namur and Brussels to the line where they first encountered the shock of the allied French and British in battle. First, we see the steady inexorable advance of the German hosts swarming forward like ants—even when, as happened later, the ground was increasingly cumbered with their own dead. We see the spirited but futile counter-attacks of the numerically weak Belgian forces. We see in every direction small but gallant parties of the defenders of Belgium swallowed up and destroyed by the advancing grey-green flood of German soldiery. In many places we see the



RIGHT SIDE OF BRIDGE AT LIÈGE.

Left side shown on opposite page.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]

rural population fleeing along the crowded roads in mad panic before the German advance. In others, we see them lining the streets of towns and villages, staring in stolid despair at the seemingly interminable hosts of Germans marching in columns to the west.

That is the whole picture of the war around and beyond Liège; but its minor episodes varied dramatically from day to day.


Thus, on the eve of that fateful August day when Liège town surrendered and the forts of Barchon, Évegnée, Fléron, Chaudfontaine, Embourg, and Boncelles were all subjected to bombardment, one counter-attack by the Belgians was crowned with brilliant success.

This was delivered from the heights of Wandre, a position to the west of Barchon, which was the most northerly of the forts then involved. It was in fact an assault upon the outposts on the right flank of the Germans; and the Belgians succeeded in slaughtering many and driving the rest northwards, away from their main army, to Maestricht. From here they were said to have been sent by the Dutch authorities to Aix-la-Chapelle, an instance of misguided assistance to belligerents which


might have raised serious international questions. The Dutch, however, claimed that the only persons thus befriended were German civilian refugees from Belgium; and the neutrality of the Dutch had been so correctly maintained in other respects that this was probably the case, although of course great numbers of the German refugees were spies and military agents.

On the same day, at the other extremity of the semi-circular line of battle, on the outside left, that is to say, of the German advance, the Garde Civique of Liège gained a brilliant little success and practically destroyed an attacking force near the fort of Boncelles. Here, too, international questions were involved, because the Germans insisted upon regarding the Garde Civique as non-combatants.


Yet another trivial Belgian success on this day stands out from the battle smoke enveloping two sides of Liège at the Château de Langres. Here the Belgians made a show of resistance before taking to flight; and when the victorious Germans crowded into the stately building, intent on loot, a terrific explosion for a moment drowned even the deafening noise of the big



MAP OF LIÈGE AND THE
Showing the roads, railways, rivers, etc., and indicating the



THE SURROUNDING COUNTRY.
 Reference between the large and small forts defending Liège.



ONE OF THE FAMOUS GERMAN SIEGE GUNS.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]


This photograph shows part of gun mounted on a special trolley to facilitate transport. The photograph below illustrates the lower mounting of the gun, with recoil cylinders. The gun is mounted up and placed on a concrete foundation for firing.

guns which were battering the forts. The château had been skilfully mined.

Thus the fortunes of the day seemed to vary so much in detail that the Belgians, who had taken many prisoners and seven guns and had

certainly defeated the crack corps of Brandenburg, were elated with the result.

Already, too, the gallant defence of Liège had won for the city the highest honour which the French Government could bestow. Anti-



MOUNTING OF THE GUN SHOWN ABOVE.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]

icipating the impulse of gratitude and admiration which went out not only from France but from the entire civilized world to this battered and blood-stained Walloon town, M. Poincaré, President of the Republic, sent on August 7 the following message to the King of the Belgians :—

“I am happy to announce to your Majesty that the Government of the Republic has just decorated with the Legion of Honour the valiant town of Liège.

“It wishes thus to honour the courageous defenders of the place and the whole Belgian Army, with which since this morning the French Army sheds its blood on the battlefield.

“RAYMOND POINCARÉ.”

To the Belgian nation no doubt many names, both of regiments and individuals, have been consecrated by the martyrdom of Liège as worthy to be placed with that of General Leman in the roll of undying honour; and even to the necessarily superficial view of the international historian the valour of the 13th Mixed Brigade in meeting the brunt of the German assault stands out as a permanent record of fame. The successful charge of a single squadron of the Belgian lancers upon six squadrons of German cavalry was another brilliant episode of arms which Belgians will never forget when the Great War is discussed; while of individual heroes—from Colonel Marchand, who gave his life for his chief, to Private Demolin, who carried out a bayonet charge on his own account against the advancing Germans and returned safely after killing four—these were enough at Liège alone to satisfy any nation's pride. Of the Belgian heroes of Liège, Europe will always cherish a grateful memory.

But the high hopes awakened by these Belgian successes, which had so deservedly earned this tribute from the French Republic, were entirely fallacious in so far as they encouraged the belief that the Germans had been worsted in a trial of strength. This was not so. Nothing which the Belgians could have hoped to do could have been of any avail against the overwhelming German numbers and the great guns which slowly lumbered up into position and to which the Belgians had no artillery that could hope to reply effectively, nor any fortifications that could offer resistance. According to eye-witnesses, nothing so terrible had ever been seen in war as the effect of the great shells fired into the Liège forts. Men were not simply killed or wounded; they were blackened, burnt, and smashed. No wonder that three of the forts, although they had been expected to hold out for at least a month, surrendered within the week, when the real bombardment



DISMANTLED CUPOLA.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]

began. Indeed, the only reason why all the forts in the ring around Liège were not quickly reduced was the difficulty encountered by the Germans in bringing up these monstrous engines and moving them into position.

Although many rumours had been rife on this subject, it was not until September 22, more than a month after the centre of war interest had been shifted from Liège, that any detailed account of the method by which these big 42cm. (16.4in.) siege guns travelled was received. For its hauling each gun required no fewer than 13 traction engines. Each gun was in four pieces and each piece was drawn by three engines, the extra engine going ahead to test the road and being used as a helper up hills. The engines were all of the broad-wheeled steam-roller type, and it was noted, as a sort of compliment to British engineering, that very nearly all the engines bore the name plates of an English firm. The delay in getting these guns forward was not due to the slow pace of the traction engines, but to the difficulty of finding or making roads suitable for such heavy traffic.

During the first few days of assault upon Liège these siege guns were not available; and the Belgians seemed still to be fighting with success until the morning of the 7th, when the German enveloping movement extended to the north-east beyond Fort Barchon and Fort Pontisse became involved. On the opposite side of the ring fortress—namely, the extreme south-west—Fort Flémalle was also attacked, being bombarded like Pontisse from across the

Meuse, which ran close to both of these forts on the south-eastern side and through the town of Liège, which lay in a direct line between them.

This, however, was the limit for the time being of the effective range of the German artillery from the wooded heights south of the Meuse; and the forts of Loncin, Lantin, and Liers, on the north-west side of the town of Liège, were able to hold out and, with the aid of the small but mobile and energetic force which General Leman still maintained in the open, to embarrass all the attempts of the Germans to cross the Meuse in force.

It would almost seem as if the Belgian headquarters were unaware of the possible value which the second line of defence, consisting of the four north-western forts with the river Meuse across the whole front at a distance of about five miles, might have possessed if it had been strongly held. Even with the skeleton force at his disposal General Leman was able to hold up the main force of the enemy for days on the other side of the river. Even so late as August 21 these forts were still able to harass the Germans by destroying their pontoon bridges across the Meuse. One Belgian gun alone had, it was said,

succeeded in smashing ten of these structures.

On Thursday, August 13, however, the booming of the heavy guns recommenced after two days of quietness. The Germans had succeeded at last in getting them across the Meuse and through the town of Liège. Such elaborate machines of war were these terror-striking guns that the German gunners were not competent to handle them. This was done by specialists from the factories of Messrs. Krupp; and no doubt their admiration of the short work which they made of the Belgian defences was sweetened by patriotic recollections of the way in which Messrs. Krupp, on one excuse after another, had delayed delivery of fortress guns ordered by the Belgian Government until it was too late. Promptitude and dispatch were not characteristics of Messrs. Krupp's dealings with a neutral Power upon which Germany was planning a secret attack. The guns, however, had no more qualms of conscience than the Krupp experts who handled them. They at any rate did their business for the Germans with promptitude and dispatch. The forts were silenced in two hours, one being destroyed in four shots.



GERMAN SOLDIERS STANDING ON ONE OF THE OVERTURNED BELGIAN GUNS.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]



GROUND SURROUNDING ONE OF THE LIÈGE FORTS.

Showing shattered armour plate.

[Daily Mirror.

Nothing like these guns had been expected, otherwise no doubt much greater efforts would have been made to prevent them from being brought across the Meuse; for, as it was, they introduced a new factor which entirely vitiated all the calculations of the Allies as to the holding power of the fortresses of Liège and Namur.

Owing to the departure of the field troops and the flight of the populace, the demolition of the forts and the capture of General Leman with the survivors of his staff, followed by a rigorous German occupation of the place, nothing in the shape of an authentic record of the last days of Liège before its fall has been available; but the following facts deserve permanent record.

The German attack commenced on the night of Tuesday, August 4, with an advance of the 7th Army Corps against the Forts Fléron and Évegnée. The point was well chosen because the approach was made through undulating and heavily-wooded country, in which the troops were able to occupy a natural semi-circle, opposite which an interval of more than three miles separated Fléron from Fort Chaudfontaine on her right. This space was, of course, strongly entrenched and occupied by Belgian troops full of the courage and confidence engendered by their previous successes. This was shown by the fate of the 3rd Battalion of the German 125th Regiment, which, in taking up position, got too close to the Belgian lines and was cut to pieces. By the lurid light of

subsequent events such successes seem trivial indeed; but the excitement of the moment had magnified them into victories. Nevertheless, had the Germans been able to employ the same tactics here as they did subsequently at Namur and deferred action until they were able to concentrate an insupportable artillery fire from heavy guns simultaneously upon all the forts and the trenches between them, the result would not have been many hours in doubt. Instead, after an ineffective bombardment of the two forts selected for attack with badly-timed shells which made no impression upon them, masses of infantry were sent forward. Of course, the inevitable happened. Under the glare of searchlights the solid ranks of men were simply mowed down by machine guns and field guns, until the shattered remnant was ripe for retreat before the bayonets with which the already victorious Belgians charged upon them from the trenches.

Thus the first attack of the 7th Army Corps was brilliantly, if easily, repulsed; and on the morning of the 5th the Liège forts on the east opened fire upon the Germans and the latter replied; but, although the noise of the guns drove the inhabitants of Liège into their cellars at first, it was soon discovered that there was little danger, because the enemy evidently had few guns in position and these were out-classed by the artillery in the forts. So during the day most of the Liégeois learned, as besieged peoples do so quickly, to play hide-and-seek with the shells, bolting into shelter only when the

look-out bell, signalling the flash of a German gun, was heard.

During the day, however, there were ominous rumours that the Germans had threatened a heavy bombardment of the town unless both it and the surrounding forts were surrendered; and it was stated that, while the Mayor, in order to save the helpless houses from destruction, was then willing to yield, General Leman decisively refused to give up the forts. Then real panic seized part of the population, who stormed the train leaving the city, while many returned to their cellars.

So the day of dread passed, and on the following day (August 6) the Germans, having got their heavy guns into position, commenced bombardment of the town as well as the forts. One shell completely wrecked the roof of the Cathedral, and the University—which the Germans appear to have mistaken for the Government House, as they made it a special target—was destroyed; but most of the buildings were still intact when the town surrendered, though the forts still strove to maintain the unequal struggle.

Meanwhile the invaders marched into Liège, singing patriotic songs, but maintaining good order; although a hint of the German methods

was immediately given to the people in a proclamation by the German Commander that if a single shot were fired the town would be devastated.

The actual bombardment of the town occupied only seven hours, with an interval of one hour; but many people were killed and wounded and the general effect was so terrible that further resistance would have been useless folly on the part of the unprotected town, since it could do nothing now to aid the doomed forts.

To understand why Liège thus surrendered in the midst of a seemingly brilliant defence, we must realize that when the attack which commenced on August 5 was continued until the morning of the 6th by the united strength of the 7th, 10th, and 9th Corps, the chief brunt of the extended assault fell farther to the south between the forts of Flémalle, Boncelles, and Embourg; and to meet this the Belgian general was compelled to move down his field force to fill the entrenchments between those forts. Although here also the German advance of massed infantry was again met and repulsed, the simultaneous reopening of the attack upon Forts Fléron and Evénée warned General Leman of the inadequacy of his force to hold the entire 33-mile



THE LIÈGE FORTS
A photograph taken after bombardment.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]



EFFECT OF FIRING ON CUPOLAS.

[C. Bendall.]

Top dotted line shows the line of flight of siege howitzer shell, finally bursting on top of cupola, the exact range having been ascertained by the Germans long before war was declared. The bottom dotted lines represent field-gun fire and show shell glancing off cupola.

circle of the fortress. He wisely took the warning, and even in the hour of victory successfully sent back his little field army across the Meuse, leaving the town of Liège open to the invaders.

Thus the very peculiar position was created of a great industrial city, only partially demolished by bombardment, peaceably occupied in force by an enemy who had appointed a military government and had entrenched his forces in the suburbs, surrounded by the forts which had been constructed for its defence and were still occupied by the defenders.

The explanation of this unique situation was, however, simple. There was now nothing whatever to prevent the free passage of German troops, especially in small parties and at night, through the wide intervals between the forts, thus keeping open the communications between the investing force and the force in occupation of the town; while on the other side the Belgian forts refrained from opening fire upon the town from patriotic considerations. In war, however, obedience to the nobler sentiments is usually—at any rate temporarily—costly, and the Germans in Liège of course took advantage of the inaction of the forts to entrench themselves more completely while the siege batteries were being erected for the final demolition of the forts.

Thus ended Act I. of the drama of Liège; and although the fortune of war had no choice but to declare on the side of the “big battalions”—or, perhaps it would be more correct to say, the “big guns”—the honours of the war lay so completely on the Belgian side that the report—often contradicted

and as often “confirmed”—that the German Commander, General von Emmich, had committed suicide excited no surprise. Whatever the orders given to him may have been and however great may have been the difficulties which he had encountered in bringing up his heavy siege guns, the attempt to rush a modern fortress with mere masses of flesh and blood was not even magnificent—and it certainly was not war.

A remarkable contrast to the unfortunate, blundering von Emmich was presented by General Leman, the astute and cool-headed defender of Liège. Although a martinet in discipline, his own life was so strictly soldierly that he commanded the absolute loyalty of all ranks under him. Like Lord Roberts, he seemed incapable of fatigue; and it is related of him, before the outbreak of the war, that he would often after a ride of 30 miles return to the Military School, of which he was Commandant, and discuss strategical and tactical problems with his officers until early morning. Many other anecdotes are told to his credit, for he evidently possessed the remarkable personality which almost always distinguishes the born commander. Thus the two most striking incidents which are narrated by the survivors of Liège relate to him personally. One of these is to the effect that by means of a clever ruse, “the character of which [says the special correspondent who narrates it] had better be left undescribed,” the General tempted a number of Uhlans to enter the town of Liège on the morning of August 6 in the hope of

capturing him. The Uhlans came in two patrols, every man of the first being killed and of the second captured.

The other incident occurred when, according to the Brussels Special Correspondent of *The Times*, two German spies, disguised as French officers, gained access to the town and desired to be conducted to the General. "Their plan miscarried, however, and they were arrested just in the nick of time. They were taken out and shot at one of the gates of the town."


Although such narratives may have little connexion with the serious history of the war, they are interesting as showing the great influence which the personality of General

Leman had upon the opening phase of the campaign. It is probable that when, as commander of the Liège garrison, he was shut up in the fortress, and later was nearly killed in the explosion of Fort Loncin and taken prisoner by the Germans, Belgium lost the services of one of its finest soldiers.

In addition to his practical mastery of strategy and tactics in the field, he was a recognized expert in Roman law, military architecture, and engineering science. With ready skill he had so handled the opening phase of the great game of war, which his country was playing for her very existence, as to inflict greater damage than perhaps even he could have hoped upon the enemy, and then to extract his force from a position that was destined to become almost immediately hopeless. Thus he brilliantly commenced that long series of withdrawals before superior force which marked the whole of the first chapter of the great war, until in fact the wearying German hosts were brought up "with a round turn" almost under the walls of Paris.


The great fault of the German attack upon Liège was its total lack of co-ordination. It commenced with an ineffective bombardment against which the Belgian artillery, whose fire was accurate and well-directed, easily held their own, with the result that during the three hours' duel two heavy pieces of German artillery had been destroyed by the guns of Fort Évegnée, where not a man was killed or wounded and the cupola was undamaged. Having thus completely failed to prepare the way for an assault, the German commander, nevertheless, flung a solid army corps at the fortress. As was inevitable, the advancing ranks were cut down like standing wheat by the concentrated fire from the trenches and the forts. The trenches were never reached, and the 7th Army Corps staggered back more than decimated.

Next day, when it was too late to repair his initial blunder, General von Emmich began to make some use of his superior strength by bringing the 10th Army Corps, the famous Iron Division of Brandenburg, to the support of the 7th, and thus extending the front of his operations so that five of the Liège forts, instead of two only, were involved. Later the 9th Army Corps and a division of cavalry were brought up to assist the other two, and thus the entire force of 120,000 men to which the Kaiser had entrusted the prospective honour of sweeping through Belgium to the French frontier was held up before Liège by General Leman and 40,000 Belgians. So unequal a



No. 1 DIAGRAM SHOWS A CUPOLA RAISED FOR FIRING. No. 2 SHOWS CUPOLA LOWERED. [C. Bendall.

These cupolas were main features of the Brialmont system of ring-fortresses, which have been proved by this war to be incapable of withstanding artillery heavier than their own.



ANOTHER TYPE OF GERMAN GUN—SIEGE HOWITZER.

[Record Press.]

contest could not, however, be maintained indefinitely ; and although the second German onslaught was no more effective than the first, the ill-served artillery proving unable to make more impression on the forts than the mis-directed infantry fire had upon the trenches, while the massed cavalry had no opportunities at all, nevertheless General Leman recognized that he had done all that could be prudently attempted to stay the German advance, and adroitly withdrew before his powerful enemy could recover from his second staggering blow.

The chief excuse which can be offered for the German mismanagement of the attack upon Liège is that the Belgian resistance must have come upon General von Emmich as a surprise. All his plans were made with a view to a rapid advance through Belgium towards France. These plans were in complete readiness before the ultimatum to Belgium was sent. Indeed, a calculation of the time necessarily occupied by the German corps in getting from their headquarters in Germany to the frontier shows that they must have commenced their march on July 31, before the declaration of war. The disposition of the entire Belgian force at the time was well known to the German staff, and no considerable part of the Belgian Field Army was on August 3 nearer than Diest, where the 3rd Division, under General Leman, was stationed. So there is little doubt that the German commander, when he arranged

his night attack upon Liège on August 5, imagined that he had only to reckon with the garrison of the forts and one mixed brigade of the Belgian Army. His intention apparently was to engage heavily the three eastern forts with his artillery and push his forces through the wide intervals between them, when the town of Liège in the centre would have been at his mercy. What he had not calculated upon apparently was the possibility that in the 48 hours which had elapsed between the delivery of the ultimatum and the preparation for attack, General Leman, with the 3rd Belgian Division, would, by forced marches, have covered the 80 miles from Diest to Liège and be occupying the trenches between the forts. This probably explains why the German attack was delivered in such a way as to render disaster inevitable in the circumstances ; and it would seem to show that at the outset the blind confidence of the Germans, that Belgium would be unable and unwilling to offer serious resistance, was such as to render them temporarily oblivious of the plainest dictates of prudence.

In the subsequent phase of the campaign, indeed, when German army corps were crowding upon the rear of the British Army, as it retired, fighting step by step, towards Paris, there was always the same waste of German troops through sending them forward in masses against an entrenched enemy. But there this

prodigality of human life may have been deliberately calculated expenditure, the only weak point of the calculation being that it underestimated the steadiness of the British soldier. Had the Germans been able to smother Tommy Atkins, even with heaps of their own slain, the game would have been worth the stakes. It is just possible, too, that even at Liège the importance of swift passage through Belgium in order to strike France down before help could come to her so dominated all other considerations that prudence in tactics was thrown to the winds. These are the opportunities of the Nemesis which waits upon unjust invaders; and the disaster which marked the first step of the Germans on Belgian soil was ominous.

It was not so accepted in Berlin, however, for news came thence that on the 7th the happy tidings of "the fall of Liège" had spread with lightning-like rapidity throughout the city and created boundless enthusiasm. The Kaiser himself, never reluctant to pose with theatrical effect, sent his own uniformed aide-de-camp out to the crowds before the Palace to give the news, and policemen on bicycles dashed along Unter den Linden with the joyful tidings! Imagination fails utterly to conceive a similar scene being enacted before Buckingham Palace and in the Mall over the first reports of a pre-

liminary success in war. But allowances must be made for the Germans, who knew at the back of their minds that their Emperor had staked all the interests of their country upon a gambler's throw. No wonder that they listened with excitement to the first rattle of the dice, and the German Press rapturously exclaimed that the line of advance into Northern France was assured.

This was not, of course, exactly the way to state the case. So far as the fighting which had then taken place was concerned, the advantage had all been on the side of the Belgians. Yet, as happened more than once during this first phase of the great war, the conclusions drawn from false news of "victories" in Berlin were nearer to the truth than the hopes based upon accurate accounts of successes in Paris or London. The explanation of this seeming anomaly was that the Germans were fighting at this stage—as they had carefully arranged that they should be fighting—with preponderating odds in their favour. So immense was the volume of their initial moving strength that local reverses scarcely checked it at all. They caused little more than swirls in the resistless tide of advance.

So when Berlin, shouting itself hoarse over a victory which had not been won, declared that



ONE OF THE FORTS AT LIÈGE AFTER BOMBARDMENT.
Showing damage caused by German siege guns.

[Daily Mirror.



ANOTHER VIEW OF THE RUINED BRIDGE.

the way was now open to the French frontier, it was nearer to the truth than London, which calculated that, if 40,000 Belgians could thus check the German hosts at Liège, the combined French and Belgian armies might fight a decisively victorious battle not much farther west.

At that time people in England were not thinking much about what the British soldiers might be able to do. They had heard that there was to be a substantial "expeditionary force"; but the very title suggested its employment in some side-issue of the war, and all eyes were fixed in hope upon the gallant defenders of Liège.

Disappointed bewilderment therefore ensued when it was seen that, although the Berlin reports of victory were indubitably false, the subsequent course of events was no better than if they had been true. The German hosts poured through Liège into the heart of Belgium, and the fog of war settled deeply over the ring of forts, which daily bulletins assured us were "still holding out."

Thus it was that the crucial test of war had definitely decided the much-debated question of the value of great ring-fortresses like Liège and Namur. Liège and Namur were sisters, and it is not possible to draw definite conclusions from the determined resistance which one was able to offer to the invader, without considering also the reasons why the other fell so quickly. For both of these strongholds represented the mature genius of

Brialmont in the science of fortification; and the success or failure of both to hold the Germans would have been taken by rival schools of theorists as conclusive evidence for or against the principle of ring-fortresses. What actually happened was therefore entirely unexpected by both sides; for while Liège seemed to crown the memory of Brialmont with glory, all the costly and extensive fortifications of Namur served no better than a trap for its unfortunate defenders.

The fact is that both were strongholds which would have been absolutely impregnable if two conditions had been fulfilled. One condition was that the cupolas of the forts in their beds of cement should be strong enough to resist the enemy's heaviest guns; and the other was that an adequate force should be available to hold the trenches which occupied the intervals between the forts. If these conditions were present Brialmont's ring fortresses might be compared to gigantic entrenched camps, with invincible artillery placed at all the numerous salient angles. Such a position would undoubtedly be impregnable. But at Liège one, and at Namur the other, of these conditions was not present. Namur fell quickly because the Germans, profiting by the experience of Liège, had brought up artillery of sufficient strength to smash the forts by bombardment at the commencement. Liège also fell quickly as a military position, although the forts held out gallantly, because the adequate force to



GERMAN SOLDIERS MARCHING THROUGH LIÈGE.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]

occupy 33 miles of entrenchments was lacking. This was not generally understood outside the war councils of General Joffre and the Belgian King. In Berlin the people rejoiced in the fruits of a fictitious victory, and in Britain the people wondered why victory had no apparent fruits.

Even with all the facts of the situation before us, we are inclined to wonder at the self-sacrificing steadiness with which General Leman adhered to his part in the general plan of campaign. The war which was being waged was so vast that his handful of 40,000 men at Liège was only a pawn in the game. Yet it was a pawn which in the gambit selected had occupied so brilliant a position that a less cool-headed and less dutiful player would have been excused in history if he had been tempted to sacrifice it in a glorious "check" to the opponent. But checkmate was the end for which the Allies were playing; and in the alert and mobile Belgian Army—which, more than a month after the defence of Liège had become past history, commenced to harass the German army corps hurrying Pariswards to help their comrades sorely pressed by those pestilent British—were many men who would have been sleeping in their graves among the ruins of Liège's defences if General Leman had not known when to move back his pawn.

It was dismal experience of the same kind as General French endured when the compact British force, admirably fitted in every detail to be the spearhead of a victorious advance, was

compelled day after day, week after week, to fight rearguard actions against superior forces in order to keep the general plan of campaign intact. The reward of such devotion to duty may seem slow in coming, but it is sure; and in the aggressive activity of the Belgian Army of Antwerp, even after Namur had fallen and Brussels had been occupied, General Leman, then a prisoner in Germany, must have seen, with justifiable pride, a factor of ultimate success to which his own self-denial had largely contributed.

But the really great service which the Belgians who defended Liège so gallantly had done for the cause of the Allies lay in shattering the Continental superstition that German armies were invincible. This did not affect the British soldier, who always has a cheery confidence—which this war has done nothing to shake—that he is as good a man as anybody else in any company into which he may happen to be thrown by the exigencies of service. But every man in the French ranks was the son of parents who had seen France, after prolonged and desperate resistance, forced under the heel of Prussia; and just when he was nerving himself to the supreme effort to endeavour to right his country's ancient wrong in spite of this previous disparity of strength, it was like a message of hope from heaven to learn that 40,000 Belgians had held back 120,000 Germans for days, slaughtering them wholesale and coming out of the encounter almost unscathed themselves. Thus General Leman's success, fruitless as it

may have seemed in tactical results from a superficial point of view, was infinitely valuable to the Allied Armies in consequence of the new spirit which it gave to all the Continental enemies of Germany. It was the first prick to the bubble of the German reputation.

Equally important was another result of General Leman's success: that it threw out of gear the whole time-table of the German campaign. In any case this would have been a serious matter, because all the detailed arrangements in connexion with the transport of a great army are necessarily co-ordinated with the utmost precision. An army in the field is a vast and complicated fighting machine, of which every nut and bolt must be exactly in its right place at the right moment to ensure smooth working. If any part of it is seriously and suddenly obstructed, the whole machine may be unexpectedly delayed, and it is true of all armies in the field that unexpected delays are very dangerous.

In the case of the German Army which was invading Belgium this was doubly true, because the necessity for promptitude and dispatch in the performance of the task which had been allotted to it was paramount, inasmuch as the greater part of it would almost certainly be required, after defeating France, to hurry back in order to confront Russia. For this reason delay at the outset of its advance amounted to a

defeat much more serious in its consequences than there had been any reason to hope that the Belgian Army would be able to inflict.

To this extent, then, it was easy to award the honour due to General Leman's gallant little force; and it was a happy day for Belgians all over the world—except in Germany—when the news of the Battle of Liège was received. In Berlin, indeed, by some process of sanctimonious casuistry, Belgium, against whom the Kaiser's Government admitted that a wrong had been done, was regarded thenceforward as an associate of the Evil One and a sort of rebel against God, because she fought against the wrong. No German seemed to realize that Belgium by admitting the German Army would in effect be declaring war upon France, and that even the almighty Kaiser could not at that moment have protected Belgium's western frontier from the hostile onslaught which France would have been justified in making. But in all the world, except Germany, the heroism of Belgium was worthily acknowledged, and the newspaper headlines of "Gallant Little Belgium" in every language must have gladdened the eyes of Belgian exiles, who were, of course, not unaware how often in the past the phrase "les braves belges" had been used in irony. Thus time brings its revenges and teaches mankind that in the issue between right and wrong the strong are still liable to be humbled by the weak.



GERMAN SENTRIES ON THE BANKS OF THE MEUSE.


These considerations rendered it difficult for contemporary onlookers to appreciate the kind of courage—moral courage of a high order—which the Belgian commander displayed in deliberately depriving himself of the chance of winning further glory, in order that he might not imperil the success of the war drama as a whole by over-acting the minor part which had been assigned to him.

For, when the psychological moment had arrived when, in General Leman's cool judgment, it was time to abandon Liège as a stronghold and use it merely as a *place d'arrêt*, he had sent back his 40,000 men to their place in the Belgian field army, remaining himself as Military Governor of Liège in order to co-ordinate the defence of the forts as much as possible and to exercise moral influence upon the garrison. This is the explanation of his decision given by himself in a pathetic letter written from captivity to his master, the King of the Belgians, narrating how the Fort Loncin, where he had established his headquarters when the town of Liège had

been occupied by the Germans, was blown up, "the greater part of the garrison being buried under the ruins." The letter continues:—

"That I did not lose my life in that catastrophe is due to the fact that my escort, composed of Commandant Collard, a sub-officer of infantry, who has undoubtedly perished, the gendarme Thevenin, and my two orderlies, Vanden Bossche and Jos Lecocq, drew me from a position of danger where I was being asphyxiated by gas from the exploded powder. I was carried into a trench, where a German captain named Gräson gave me drink, after which I was made prisoner and taken to Liège in an ambulance.

"I am convinced that the honour of our arms has been sustained. I have not surrendered either the fortress or the forts. Deign, Sire, to pardon any defects in this letter. I am physically shattered by the explosion of Loncin. In Germany, whither I am proceeding, my thoughts will be, as they have ever been, of Belgium and the King. I would willingly have given my



GENERAL WONDERS AND HIS AIDES-DE-CAMP.

The General who directed most of the tactical moves against the Germans in Belgium.

Newspaper Illustrations.



BELGIANS LOADING A GUN.

Actual photograph taken in the firing line.

[Daily Mirror.

life the better to serve them, but death was denied me."

It would scarcely be possible to add a more illuminating commentary to this simple, soldierly letter than the following testimony of a German officer:—

"General Leman's defence of Liège combined all that is noble, all that is tragic.

"As long as possible he inspected the forts daily to see everything was in order. By a piece of falling masonry, dislodged by our guns, both General Leman's legs were crushed. Undaunted he visited the forts in an automobile. Fort Chaudfontaine was destroyed by a German shell dropping in the magazine. In the strong Fort Loncin General Leman decided to hold his ground or die.

"When the end was inevitable the Belgians disabled the last three guns and exploded the supply of shells kept by the guns in readiness. Before this General Leman destroyed all plans, maps, and papers relating to the defences. The food supplies were also destroyed. With about 100 men General Leman attempted to retire to another fort, but we had cut off their retreat. By this time our heaviest guns were in position, and a well-placed shell tore through the cracked and battered masonry and exploded in the main magazine. With a

thunderous crash the mighty walls of the fort fell. Pieces of stone and concrete 25 cubic metres in size were hurled into the air. When the dust and fumes passed away we stormed the fort across ground literally strewn with the bodies of the troops who had gone out to storm the fort and never returned. All the men in the fort were wounded, and most were unconscious. A corporal with one arm shattered valiantly tried to drive us back by firing his rifle. Buried in the *débris* and pinned beneath a massive beam was General Leman.

"'Respectez le général, il est mort,' said an aide-de-camp.

"With gentleness and care, which showed they respected the man who had resisted them so valiantly and stubbornly, our infantry released the general's wounded form and carried him away. We thought him dead, but he recovered consciousness, and, looking round, said, 'It is as it is. The men fought valiantly,' and then, turning to us, added, 'Put in your dispatches that I was unconscious.'

"We brought him to our commander, General von Emmich, and the two generals saluted. We tried to speak words of comfort, but he was silent—he is known as the silent general. 'I was unconscious. Be sure and put that in your dispatches.' More he would not say.

"Extending his hand, our commander said, 'General, you have gallantly and nobly held your forts.' General Leman replied, 'I thank you. Our troops have lived up to their reputations.' With a smile he added, 'War is not like manœuvres'—a reference to the fact that General von Emmich was recently with General Leman during the Belgian manœuvres. Then, unbuckling his sword, General Leman tendered it to General von Emmich. 'No,' replied the German commander, with a bow; 'keep your sword. To have crossed swords with you has been an honour,' and the fire in General Leman's eye was dimmed by a tear."

Many similar authentic cases were recorded during the war of Germans, both officers and men, behaving with true chivalry and kindness to French, British, and Belgian wounded and prisoners. If only this had been the guiding spirit of their conduct in general!

In the foregoing, however, we are anticipating the *finale* of the last chapter of the glorious story of the defence of Liège. The forts, bereft of support from the Belgian Army in the field, with the city and ancient citadel which they were designed to protect in ruins, with an insolent enemy in occupation lording it over the trembling populace—the forts maintained their

gallant resistance, the Military Governor, shut up in one of them, continuing to exercise, so far as was possible, his moral influence upon the scattered garrison.

This was the position of affairs from the night of August 7 onwards, for Liège was then closely invested by the Germans and all communication between the forts and the outer world was completely cut off. They were, however, still intact, and, being well supplied with food and ammunition, they were expected to hold out for a long time.

At the same time the Belgian field force which had taken so brilliant a part in the defence, including the Third Division and the Fifth Brigade, had joined the headquarters of the Belgian Army, when it was reviewed by King Albert, who congratulated all ranks upon their achievement. The Tsar also telegraphed to the King an expression of his sincere admiration for the valiant Belgian Army and his best wishes for their success in this "heroic struggle for the independence of the country."

In the circumstances it was perhaps inevitable that the General Staff of the Belgian Army should have overrated the tactical value of the success which had been achieved; and on the night of August 9 the official announcement was



BELGIAN SOLDIERS.

In front of the tree trunk a pit has been dug, and covered over with branches.

(Underwood & Underwood.)



INSIDE A BELGIAN TRENCH.

[Record Press.

made that "the offensive movements of the enemy had been completely stopped" and that the French and Belgian Armies would "take offensive action simultaneously in accordance with their concerted plans." If, at this time, offensive action was really contemplated by the Allies, it must have been through lack of perspective, because the losses suffered by the three army corps which had assaulted Liège, heavy as they were, were mere trifles compared with the price which Germany was prepared to pay on the spot for a rapid advance through Belgium upon France.

This more serious note in the struggle had been emphasized in the deep tones of the big guns which had arrived at last and began to speak to the Liège forts in a way that there was no misunderstanding. These heavy siege guns were supposed by Messrs. Krupp and their patrons the German War Department to be the last word in modern artillery, and their existence had been a jealously-guarded secret for "der Tag." It must be admitted, too, that they were a secret worth keeping; for the havoc which they wrought in the forts of Liège was terrible and insupportable. From that day—since the relief of Liège by any adequate force was not possible—the question whether the forts should surrender or be destroyed was only a question of the comparative endurance of steel and concrete on the one hand and of flesh and blood on the other. To the everlasting honour of the Belgians be

it recorded that the indomitable courage of the garrison of Liège outlasted the strength of the shattered cupolas.

Perhaps we cannot more fitly close this blood-stained but glorious chapter in the history of Belgium better than by quoting from the measured utterances of leading British statesmen in the two Houses of Parliament on August 27.

In the House of Commons the Prime Minister, Mr. Asquith, rising to propose a resolution of sympathy and gratitude to the Belgian Government and the gallant Belgian nation, said:—

"The defence of Liège (cheers) will always be the theme of one of the most inspiring chapters in the annals of liberty. The Belgians have won for themselves the immortal glory which belongs to a people who prefer freedom to ease, to security, even to life itself. We are proud of their alliance and their friendship." (Cheers.)

He was immediately followed by Mr. Bonar Law, the Leader of the Opposition, who said:—

"Belgium has deserved well of the world. She has added another to the long list of great deeds which have been done by the heroic patriotism of small nations."

As further proof of the solidarity of the British in their admiration of Belgian pluck and prowess, Mr. Redmond, the leader of the Irish Nationalist Party, said that there was no sacrifice which the Irish would not willingly make on behalf of Belgium.

In the House of Lords Lord Crewe, on behalf of the Government, and Lord Lansdowne, speaking for the Unionist majority, expressed similar sentiments ; and the former uttered a solemn warning to Germany with regard to the atrocities committed by her troops at Liège. "I do venture to declare," he said, "that any nation that so conducts itself pays, soon or late, and pays to the uttermost farthing."


With the British nation it had already become a serious resolve to see that farthing paid.

The story of Liège leaves us with a sense of having witnessed a drama complete in its theme and glorious in its *motif*. And the glamour of it seemed to ennoble every contemporary reference to its circumstances. At Dublin, on September 25, 1914, the British Prime Minister, Mr. Asquith, expressed in measured words no more than the heart-feeling of every man in his vast audience when he said that the indomitable resistance of the Belgians "proved to the world that ideas which cannot be weighed or measured by any material calculus can still inspire and dominate mankind." These are not the words in which the man in the street would have clothed the thought. He would have been content to say :—"Belgium is in the *right* and, *by God*, we'll see her through!" There are times when an expletive becomes dignified as the very spirit of a sentence ; and

this was one of them. The words italicized in the supposititious sentence above, common as it may seem, were the national British expression of the "ideas" which still dominate mankind, in spite of Kaisers. Belgium was "*right*" and "*by God*" we would see her through. That was the idea.

Mr. Asquith rose to the level of that idea. So did Mr. Lloyd George, the Chancellor of the Exchequer ; so did Mr. Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty ; so did all the other Ministers in their degrees and according to their abilities. So did the leaders of the Opposition. So did the Irish Nationalists and the Ulstermen, lately so ready to fly at one another's throats. So did the Boers and the British, not long ago deadly foes and until then mostly suspicious of each other's motives. So did Canada and Australia and New Zealand. So did all the diverse races with jarring creeds which compose Britain's most magnificent heritage, the loyal Indian Empire. So did all our Crown colonies. So did all our Allies and our friends in other lands.

Nor did Mr. Asquith overstate the case when he said that by establishing this idea Belgium had done more than change the whole face of the German campaign. Even the tremendous political results of the war were not so important as this new unity of mankind in defence of the Right. It is not a coincidence that throughout



AN 11-in. GERMAN MORTAR.

This is the barrel section on a special carriage for transport.

[Record Press.]



BELGIAN SOLDIERS FIRING AT A PASSING AEROPLANE.

[Topical.]

Britain the war period was marked by an amazing absence of crime. There may seem to be no direct antagonism between a scheme of world-war hatched at Potsdam and a burglary planned in Whitechapel. But many a burglar, moved to honest indignation by the German outrage, enlisted as a soldier or found some other way to declare himself on the side of the Right; and thus many police were set free to protect the nation's interests, instead of watching the criminals.

And what happened in Britain occurred in varying degrees throughout the civilized world. Men became better. This is what Belgium did for the world; and it was a service for which mankind can never sufficiently thank her. The crisis was one towards which the civilized world had been inevitably advancing for many years; and to the historian of the distant future the era of 1914 will still stand out as a great landmark, for a companion to which his eye may even travel down the long perspective of centuries to that time when Christ preached "peace on earth and goodwill towards men"—the idea which, to repeat Mr. Asquith's phrase, "still dominates mankind." That in most spheres of human activity it has seemed little more than an "idea," as far removed from daily practice in individual as in international life, has been due to the stress of the persistent

struggle for existence. The "idea" was in every heart; but the pressure of necessity controlled every brain, and the brain was, almost always, the working partner.

And out of the struggle for existence engineered by the brain arose the armed might of the German Empire, a gigantic organism deliberately constructed in every detail upon theories of hard science. Christ's "idea" had no place in this; although even in German dreams it asserted itself as the final ambition—a world-peace of goodwill and content under the sheltering wings of the Prussian eagle.

Thus the real question at issue was whether or not Christ's teaching should definitely be shelved until Germany, after subduing the world, had time to attend to it. It would have been difficult, and rightly so, to persuade the British nation that so plain an issue was involved in the quarrel between Serbia and Austria, or between Austria and Russia, or Germany and Russia, or even Germany and France. Treaty obligations might have compelled the British Government to declare war against Germany under conditions which did not apparently involve this issue; for treaties are entangling things which sometimes drag a nation in the direction whither it should not go.

Whether we should necessarily have been embroiled in a war between Germany and France would have depended upon circumstances; and if the Kaiser had realized that the British Empire would go headlong into war for the "idea" of which Mr. Asquith spoke at Dublin, his diplomats might have been adroit enough to shift the rupture with France on to ground where the "idea" had no place. But the fact was that the German mind, having itself shelved the "idea"—that the Right must prevail by the will of God—did not conceive that it could still be the mainspring of British policy, nay, more, that it should, as Mr. Asquith said at Dublin, "still dominate mankind." So the German, claiming to be a superman, did not trouble himself to be adroit in diplomacy. "Finesse and scruples," he said—in action, if not in words—"for weaker folk; for me the mailed fist and the big battalions—and the big guns." So the German deliberately embarked upon his course of war by committing a wrong—by outraging the neutrality of a little State which he had pledged his honour to protect. His lofty excuse to God and his own conscience was that he would make it all right afterwards. "I shall defy God now," he said, "in order to win this war easily by a dishonourable trick, and then, when I have won the war and all Europe is at my feet, I shall condescend to make amends to poor little Belgium who will then be my grateful slave." From this mad dream he had a rude awakening at Liège.

And in describing the German's dream of treachery and conquest as "mad," we are not going beyond the facts of the case. "Quem Deus vult perdere prius dementat"—"Whom God decides to ruin He first makes mad"—is the ancient Christian form of a still more ancient classic proverb, founded—like our own simple old proverb, "Pride goeth before a fall"—upon the immemorial theme of the oldest Greek tragedies in which Nemesis always waited grimly upon the insolence (*ὑβρις*) of triumphant tyrants.

This was the ailment of the German. He was too swelled with pride in the Teuton "thoroughness" of his own preparations for the conquest of the world in peace and war to be able to give way to the "rights" of little peoples. He would look into the matter after he had finished his conquest. Belgium and Britain—and God—must wait until then. These may not be the exact words which the German Government used, but they convey no exaggeration in fact of the attitude which that Government adopted. It had quite forgotten the idea which still inspires and dominates mankind—the idea that in defending the Right we fight on the side of God.

Thus the German, who deliberately omitted the Right from his scheme of world-conquest, unconsciously did greater service for the Right than any philanthropist could have conceived in his wildest dreams.

"It is my Imperial and Royal intention," said the Kaiser in effect on August 3, 1914, "to give consideration to the wishes of God with regard to Belgium when I shall have executed my Imperial and Royal will with regard to France and the pestilent and contemptible English." As a foreigner his Imperial and Royal Majesty was not to be blamed for failing to observe that, besides the English, there were Scotch, Irish, Welsh, Canadian, Australian, South African, Indian, and many other contingents concerned in the offence of *Isse majesté* which he so much resented. Even those natives in South Africa who are wisely prohibited from carrying arms had petitioned the Government that they might be allowed to "throw a few stones" at the Germans!

The Kaiser did not dream of the magnificent work which he was doing; how he was welding the Empire upon which the sun never sets into a single active organism for the good of the world and to the glory of God. He was thinking only of Germany as typified in its Supreme War Lord, himself.



CHAPTER XVI.

THE GERMAN ADVANCE TO BRUSSELS.

BELGIUM'S REAL AMBITIONS—SOCIAL REFORM—THE NEGLECT OF MILITARISM—PREPARATIONS COME TOO LATE—HOPES OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE—THE PEASANT GUARDS—GERMAN CAVALRY ADVANCE—FIRST SKIRMISHES—THE BATTLE OF HAELEN—EGHEZEE—FRENCH TROOPS IN BELGIUM—THE GERMAN ADVANCE IN EARNEST—BELGIAN RETREAT ON ANTWERP—BELGIAN STAFF EXPLANATION—THE POSITION IN BRUSSELS—REFUGEES—GROWING PUBLIC ALARM—GOVERNMENT RETIRES TO ANTWERP—FALSE HOPES OF VICTORY—M. MAX—THE GERMAN ENTRY INTO BRUSSELS.

THE position of Belgium in the days immediately following the outbreak of the war was one of obvious peril.

The forts of Liège controlled the main roads from Germany to the coast, but Liège could not hope to hold out against a resolute German attack for more than a few days. Once Liège fell, there were no effective fortress defences between the German frontier and Antwerp. Brussels was an open city, and the battles for its possession must be fought, not in its suburbs, but farther afield, in the neighbouring districts of Aerschot, Diest, Louvain, and Wavre. If Germany made a sustained attempt to conquer Belgium, it was evident that no unaided effort of the Belgians could save it. The hope of the nation lay in two possibilities, the arrival of immediate aid from England and France, or the chance that the German Armies would advance, not to the coast, but straight to Paris. The road to Paris lay to the west. Hence, even although day by day the news from the front foreshadowed the early capture of Liège, the people of Northern Belgium hoped against hope that their homes, at least, would escape the horrors of foreign occupation.

The country on the Franco-Belgian frontier between the Lys and the Yser and the valley of the Somme below Amiens could be flooded, from which it seemed to follow that the right of

the main German advance on Paris would be limited by the line Liège-Brussels-Lille-Amiens. The Germans were very unlikely to make considerable detachments until after their main object—the rout of the hostile field armies—had been attained. Hence it was likely that the whole country west and north of the line indicated would escape effective occupation until after the German advance on Paris had succeeded or failed.

To the people of Belgium war came undesired and unsought. They had nothing to gain by it and everything to lose. Social reform, not militarism, had been their aim. The Army, and all that had to do with the Army, was for long regarded with a feeling of indifference not untouched with contempt. There was no strong military caste, as in France and Germany. Trusting to the pledged word of Europe, guaranteeing Belgian independence and permanent neutrality, the Belgian Parliament had until 1912 neglected adequate preparations for national defence. Compulsory service was only compulsory for the poor or those without influence; the time of training was far too short. Service in the ranks was regarded as a task to be avoided whenever opportunity offered. While France and Germany endured the heaviest burdens to maintain their fighting strength, Belgium devoted herself to commercial and industrial progress.



NAMUR, FROM THE MEUSE, BEFORE BOMBARDMENT.
Showing the Citadel Hotel and Fortifications.

Social problems, arising out of the density of the population and the comparative poverty of a large number of the people, were the main subjects of public concern. Industry was carefully encouraged. Cooperative experiments were initiated, and the standard of well-being of the people was appreciably raised. The Belgians were able to boast—with a large degree of truth—that their country afforded the maximum of comfort and the minimum of expense for those living in it of any part of Western Europe. Belgian manufactures steadily gained reputation. The products of the Cockerill Ironworks at Liège, for example, competed successfully with those of Germany, England, and America. Belgium became a favourite centre for the erection of factories, many German and British firms maintaining works on the various river banks. Antwerp grew to be one of the largest and best-equipped shipping ports in Europe. Belgian finance was making itself more and more felt in certain specialized fields. The Belgians were markedly active in the newer markets of the world. In China and in Central Africa, in South America and in Manchuria, their representatives were found seeking concessions, laying railways, promoting electrical schemes, and acquiring power.

Belgium, with its ideal geographical position

and its widespread prosperity, aroused the envy and desire of its ambitious and powerful neighbour to the south-east. Germany wanted an outlet to the sea—Antwerp and Zeebrugge would afford it. Germany wanted an open road to the heart of France—the road lay right through Southern Belgium. It was the unhappy fortune of this little kingdom to be the Naboth's Vineyard of Europe.

It is true that since 1912, alarmed by the growing German menace, sustained efforts had been made to remedy the backward defences of the country and to recreate the Army. But a great national army cannot be created in less than two years. Thus Belgium found herself at the outbreak of the war lacking trained fighting men, lacking in equipment, lacking in officers, and lacking in experience. What was not lacking, as events soon proved, was boldness, courage, and eagerness to meet the foe.

Had the Belgians been given time, they might have raised and trained within a few months a force of half a million men that could have at least held up the Germans along prepared lines of fortified places until France and England could come to their aid. But time was the one thing denied Belgium. Her borders ran, from Visé to Luxemburg, next to those of Germany. The German railways from

Düsseldorf, Cologne, and Coblenz could bring strong armies into Belgian territory in a few hours, and line after line of long sidings were already prepared at each frontier station from which the troop trains could disgorge their men in the shortest possible time. The military headquarters at Aix-la-Chapelle were practically within sight of Belgian soil. Germany had made all her preparations to strike at Belgium suddenly and overwhelmingly. Even before war was declared German troops crossed the border. Allowing for the necessary troops for the fortresses of Namur and Antwerp, Belgium could put on the fighting line after the fall of Liège only a Field Army of about 110,000 men to guard the road to Brussels and the north. Against these the Germans could easily bring a quarter of a million men and as many more as might be necessary.

The Belgians did not, perhaps, anticipate having to conduct their own defence for more than a few days at the outside. They believed that the British and the French would be able to give them strong help at once. Day after day, at the beginning of the war, crowds of people stood on the front at Ostend, many of them with powerful glasses, searching the horizon for the first signs of the coming of the British Relief Expedition. Every Englishman throughout the country was constantly asked: "When will your troops arrive?" When news came to hand that a British Expeditionary Force had left England, Brussels papers stated that it was landing at Zeebrugge and Ostend, and would soon be fighting on the Meuse. On more than one occasion crowds hurried to the Gare du Nord at Brussels on the rumour that the British had come, prepared to give them a great welcome.

The Belgians were equally confident of French assistance. They assumed that French armies assembled between Namur and Verdun would move eastwards through Belgian Luxembourg and the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg. Belgian hopes of the cooperation of the French were encouraged by the appearance of French Staff Officers in Brussels and of French cavalry in apparent strength from Longwy northwards to Gembloux. Reports were received that the French were advancing in force eastwards from Namur along the banks of the Meuse towards Liège. It was known that they were strongly holding the strategic triangular position where the Sambre and the Meuse meet close to Namur.

The Belgian people, as has been said, knew that their Army was in itself insufficient to offer any permanent resistance to a German

attack. This, however, did not check the resolution of the people to fight to the last. A wave of patriotism swept over the nation that wiped away all local and party differences. The King voiced the cry "Aux armes!" and led the way to the trenches. He became in an hour the popular idol, and men who had persistently sought his overthrow admitted gladly: "If we make Belgium a republic, we will have Albert as our first President." The Socialists, a powerful and numerous group, who in the past had led the cause of pacifism and opposed Army reform, were now among the first to volunteer for war. The Prime Minister invited the cooperation of all parties. M. Vandervelde, the Labour leader, was appointed a Minister of State and voiced the sentiments of his party when he declared that the workers would defend their country when attacked with



A BELGIAN LOOK-OUT MAN.

[Daily Mirror.



GERMAN FIELD KITCHEN CAPTURED AND USED BY THE BELGIANS.

[Sport and General.

the same ardour with which they had defended their liberties in the past. *Le Peuple*, the organ of the Labour Party, called upon the workers to arm: "Why do we," it asked, "as irreconcilable anti-militarists, cry 'Bravo!' from the bottom of our hearts to all those who offer themselves for the defence of the country? Because it is not only necessary to protect the hearths and homes, the women and the children, but it is also necessary to protect at the price of our blood the heritage of our ancient freedom.

"Go, then, sons of the workers, and register your names as recruits. We will rather die for the idea of progress and solidarity of humanity than live under a regime whose brutal force and savage violence have wiped out right."

While the German troops were flinging themselves against Liège, the Belgians were preparing for a stubborn national defence. The Army was already at its post, the reserves had been called up, the Civil Guard were being armed, and the towns and villages south of Brussels from Hasselt to Gembloux and Namur were held in force. The peasants in many villages gathered together. They brought out their guns—ancient fowling-pieces, rook rifles, sporting guns, anything they had. Those who had no guns could at least secure knives. They banded

themselves together and formed local guards. No stranger could pass without satisfying them concerning his business. "As showing how all the roads leading to the front are guarded," wrote one correspondent who attempted to reach the front at this time, "I may say that I was stopped during a journey of 70 kilometres no fewer than 52 times by police, civil guards, soldiers, and, last but not least, by peasants. These latter are armed with the most varied collection of guns, far more fearful and wonderful than any I have seen outside of a museum. Many carry in addition bayonets which certainly must have been picked up on the field of Waterloo. They shout in bad French and Flemish for any innocent voyager to stop, and swarm round your car with the firm conviction that you are a spy. Passports signed by the highest military and civil authorities in the country are often of no avail whatever."

A spy fever spread over the country, and there was good cause for it. People who had lived in different parts for years as trusted neighbours suddenly disappeared, only to return later as guides for advance parties of the German Army. Others were discovered attempting to injure telegraphs and railways or endeavouring, by carrier pigeons and other means, to keep up communication with the Germans on the

frontier. Some were disguised as monks or nuns, some as parish priests, some controlled secret wireless apparatus. The German espionage department proved its efficiency here as elsewhere in the early days of the war.

The uprising of the peasants, admirable as it was as a revelation of national spirit, was useless, if not worse than useless, from the point of view of real fighting strength. Chance groups of ill-armed and untrained civilians can present no effective resistance to regular troops. The Belgian peasants caught a certain number of isolated Uhlans, thus giving an excuse for subsequent German severity against the people at large. Soon their own authorities asked them to desist. The German commanders let it be known that they would show no mercy to civilians who took up arms, but would treat them *and the districts from which they operated* with the utmost rigour. For civilians generally there was to be one penalty for resistance—death. The places where they fought were to be burned to the ground. Even the civil guards, uniformed though they were, were to be treated as civilians and shot at once when caught with arms in their hands.

The Belgian authorities posted notices throughout the country warning civilians that they must not resist German troops, but must leave military measures to the Army. The peasant uprising did not delay the main advance of the German Army for an hour. It ended almost as quickly as it began, but not before a large number of men and boys of all ages throughout Brabant, Namur, Liège, and Belgian Luxemburg had been sacrificed. It served to emphasize the lesson that resistance to a powerful enemy must be organized in advance. The man who refuses to serve his country in times of peace by preparing for war may find, when real national danger comes, that his only occupation must be to sit down and do nothing because he is—from a military point of view—good for nothing.

The little Belgian Army used the time at its disposal during the German delay in front of Liège to the best advantage. The whole southern countryside was prepared for resistance. Roadways were blown up with dynamite sticks. Cunning traps were laid across the roads for the Uhlans, low and almost invisible barriers of barbed wire being arranged in two parts in such a way that ordinary traffic could pass in safety with care but any attempt



BELGIAN SOLDIERS HAVING THEIR MIDDAY MEAL.

[Underwood and Underwood.]

to rush by would inevitably bring horses and riders to the ground. The country southward of Louvain lent itself to guerilla warfare, being well wooded and suitable for the concealment of small parties of troops.

The sustained resistance of General Leman and his garrison at Liége, described in the previous chapter, gave the main Belgian Army a few days of grace. Liége was the principal railway centre for the lines southwards, the main roads ran through there, and the important bridges across the Meuse lay under the reach of its guns. When the Belgian troops blew up the bridge at Visé in the opening hours of the war, the Germans at once attempted to throw pontoon bridges across the river. Their first efforts were continuously unsuccessful. At Visé itself they built no fewer than 20 pontoon bridges, it is reported, each one being immediately destroyed by the guns of the Liége forts. One bridge was, however, erected within 200 yards of the Dutch frontier and considerable forces were poured in over it.

While the Germans were waiting around Liége for the arrival of their large siege guns


which were to destroy the forts, a strong force—no fewer than five army corps—was brought into the region to the south of the river. A cavalry screen was thrown across the river and proceeded to overrun the countryside. Following the plan that had proved so successful in the Franco-Prussian War, little bands of Uhlans, Hussars, and Cuirassiers were sent out throughout the north. Many of these were apparently ill-equipped for their task. They had no proper supply of maps, and they did not seem to have any definite plan except to move ahead until they got in touch with the Belgians. They had very little food. This was probably deliberately arranged in order to make them live on the country. Many of them were captured and many were killed. It is possible that the dispatch of these unsupported and isolated little bands was purposely devised, not alone to keep in complete touch with the enemy, but also to give the Belgians a false idea of the German preparations. It is a well-known and admitted principle of German military strategy to make a show of weakness until preparations are completed which enable an army to strike with its full strength. And if the German cavalry were defeated at some places they drove terror home in others.

Soon the reputation of the Uhlans spread through hundreds of villages, as that of men who spared neither themselves nor their foes, who rode recklessly against any enemy in sight, who died with a laugh when beaten, and who slew man and boy, ruined women and burned homes without compunction and without mercy wherever they went. It is not necessary at this point to inquire how far this reputation was deserved, or how far the advancing German cavalry were actually guilty of the charges soon to be laid against them. It is clear, however, that their instructions were not only to find out what forces were in front of them and what serious resistance would have to be faced, but also to strike fear into the hearts of the people.

The countryside between Liége and Louvain presented a sombre picture in these early days of the war. The fields were ripe for harvest, but there were no men to spare to gather the crops of golden corn, and the women and children had in many cases fled northwards. In the villages some houses had been destroyed by the Belgians themselves lest they should afford protection for the enemy, while others had been burned down by advancing Germans. Every road was barricaded, and behind the lines of barrels and bushes and the earthen



BELGIAN SOLDIERS FIRING FROM COVER. (*Underwood & Underwood.*)



GERMAN SHELLS BURSTING IN A FIELD NEAR THE BELGIAN POSITION WHERE INFANTRY WERE CONCEALED.

[Daily Mirror.

embankments little companies of soldiers and civil guards lay waiting. Many of these men were reservists who had been called up almost without notice—fathers of families and responsible citizens whose hearts were still full of anxiety for their families and their affairs. Already they showed, however, abundant signs that the ancient courage of the men of Flanders could still be counted upon. There was a gay grimness among them that betrayed the born fighting man. Their discipline was lax, their military knowledge was in many cases trivial, and they were ill-prepared for the physical and material strain of day-and-night work against an active foe in the open. But none could deny their courage or their zeal. The pity of it was that men so brave and so fine should not have been more fully prepared for the tremendous task ahead.

Many regiments started out accompanied by priests, who exhorted the soldiers to fight for their country and their faith. The wives and friends of the soldiers visited them in the very front line of trenches, bringing them food and cigarettes. These men were fighting, many of them just by their homes, almost within sight of their own families. They did not hesitate, however, to sacrifice everything in front of them that could help the enemy. The railways were torn up, bridges were blown into the

air whenever possible, and tunnels were blocked by derailing locomotives and then sending others crashing into them, forming one great tangled and mixed mass. The Belgians laid part of the country to waste—the Germans, as they advanced, completed the work.

The Belgians at first made some use of aeroplanes for reconnoitring purposes. But their own peasants and volunteers fired on every aeroplane they saw, and there is only too much reason to believe that they brought down several Belgian aeroplanes in that way. Orders were issued when too late to stop this indiscriminate shooting. Gradually, as the German armoured Taube aeroplanes came into action, less and less was heard of the Belgian aircraft, and before the fall of Brussels the German aeroplanes apparently held supremacy of the air.

At the end of the first week the Belgian military authorities expressed considerable satisfaction with the state of affairs. Liège was still holding out and was engaging the attention of three German Army Corps. In numerous minor engagements the Belgian troops had proved their mettle. The Belgian cavalry in particular had distinguished themselves by the most reckless bravery. 'Tout est calme. Tout va bien' was the phrase on many lips. Reports were even circulated that the Germans were contemplating retirement and were entrenching



THE LAST STAND MADE BY THE BELGIANS AT LOUVAIN.

[Record Press.]

themselves on the banks of the river Ourthe and in Luxemburg to protect their retreat.

The reality was very different. The Germans had at last succeeded in erecting a bridge at Lixhe over which their cavalry and heavy artillery could be conveyed. A considerable force of cavalry had already crossed the river, and this made a preliminary advance while the main force took up its position.

On Sunday, August 9, two divisions of German cavalry, numbering about 7,000 sabres, and supported by infantry, moved upwards towards the Hesbaye. The people of Tongres were surprised that day to find a detachment of the enemy riding down their main street. There was a sudden panic, and people hastily closed and barred their windows and locked their doors, leaving the roadways deserted. The cavalry rode to the town hall, and there ordered the mayor to produce his money chest and to lower the Belgian flag hanging out of the window. The mayor refused to lower the flag, whereupon the Germans lowered it for him. They appropriated the town's money and seized 10,000 francs at the post office. Then they ordered food, for which they paid, and had a meal in the market place.

Cavalry moved forward along different roads and joined issue with the Belgian troops all along the line at St. Trond, Tirlemont, Osmael, Guxenhoven, and at smaller places. The German troops were accompanied by motor machine-guns, which did great execution. It is evident that their purpose was only to

reconnoitre and not to engage in serious battle, for, after some skirmishing, they retired. The Belgians imagined that they had defeated and driven them back.

On the next day word came into Louvain, the Belgian Military Headquarters, that a German scouting force of 6,000 cavalry was moving upwards close to the Dutch frontier. That same afternoon the Germans captured Landen, only 38 miles east of Brussels. A passenger train was stopped when it arrived there by a strong force of the enemy. The Germans destroyed the telegraphic apparatus and the railway signals and tore up the rails, and then moved on.

In addition to the cavalry reconnaissance, military aeroplanes were now to be seen advancing and hovering at great height over the Belgian positions.

Another engagement was reported at Tirlemont, where there was a fierce charge of Belgian lancers against German Uhlans. The lancers routed the Germans, who returned later, however, with reinforcements and with machine-guns and forced the Belgians, in turn, to fall back upon their infantry supports.

Hasselt was the scene of a sustained fight. Here a German cavalry division supported by a battalion of infantry and 12 guns attacked a Belgian force consisting of a cavalry division and a brigade of infantry. The place was taken and retaken three times.

It became evident that the plan of the German Army was to move northwards through the plain between Hasselt and Haelen and to seek

to turn the Belgian Army. So long as the Belgians could hold the line they had taken up from Hasselt to St. Trond and Tirlemont, all was well. But this line was soon broken, and strong German forces attacked Hasselt on the one side and Haelen and Diest on the other.

Early on the morning of August 12 a force of German cavalry, estimated at 10,000 men, accompanied by artillery and a few infantry, moved forward from various directions towards Haelen and Diest. The country in this region is intersected by three tributaries of the River Demer, the Herek, Gethe, and Velp. In order to reach Diest it was necessary to cross the Gethe at Haelen. The Belgians were fully informed of the German advance and had laid their plans to meet them at this spot. Barricades were erected and entrenchments dug and field artillery placed in advantageous positions. The Germans approached about 11 o'clock in the morning and were allowed to draw comparatively near, when the Belgian artillery opened on them. The German guns were quickly unlimbered and an artillery duel followed. The Belgians had their ranges and were able to plant their shrapnel over the cavalry with great effect. The utmost violence and courage were shown on either side. The Belgian cavalry attempted to charge the Germans but failed on account of

the broken nature of the ground. The German cavalry in turn came on at a gallop against the Belgian barricades. As they approached, machine guns that had been concealed opened on them, sweeping many away. Notwithstanding their losses the Germans rode right up to the barricades, attempting to break through them or to tear them down. The effort was hopeless, and after losing three-fifths of their effective strength the Germans had to retire.

Other German forces attempted to advance at Cortenaeken. There were fights at several river bridges. Everywhere the result was the same. The Belgians themselves were the first to proclaim the great courage shown by the Germans in this sustained engagement. At one point when they were driven back the survivors sought to entrench themselves behind a rampart of dead horses and dead men.

Compared with the fighting that was soon to follow, the engagement at Haelen and Diest may seem too small to demand much attention. It was a striking example, however, of the way in which the Belgian soldiers, many of them called to the colours from the reserves only a fortnight before, were able to face the foe. Several stories were told of the conduct of the Belgian troops. Here is one:—

“One notable instance of Belgian bravery



GERMANS HOLDING A REVIEW IN RUINED LOUVAIN.

Newspaper Illustrations.



THE CHURCH AT HAELEN.

All Belgian Churches appear to have afforded special targets for the Germans.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]

is found in the conduct of a farrier sergeant, Rousseau, of the Chasseurs à Cheval. At the head of eight men he charged a whole squadron of Uhlans, who dispersed, leaving many dead and wounded. The brave squadron of Belgians returned in triumph to Haelen with a dozen excellent horses as trophies of their exploit.

"During the afternoon Lieutenant Van Doren, who was specially detailed to defend Diest, was asked to send reinforcements to the neighbouring village of Zechk. There was a difficulty, insomuch as practically all the available troops had been sent forward to Haelen, but, undismayed, Lieutenant Van Doren summoned the town fire brigade and, picking up as many soldiers as he could from different posts on the road, made a dash for Zechk."

There was a fight at Eghezee, 10 miles to the north of Namur, where a party of 350 Uhlans rode up, preceded by 60 cyclists, who had forcibly requisitioned three motor-cars,

one of them belonging to a doctor of the Belgian Red Cross Service. The Germans stayed at the place for the night, and in the morning a Belgian airman, flying low over the cornfield in which they had parked their horses, drew their fire, thus revealing their whereabouts to some Belgian cyclist scouts, who hurried in the direction of the firing. "The Uhlan cyclists, who were out scouting, saw them coming," wrote the special correspondent of *The Times* in describing the scene, "and rode back as hard as they could to give the alarm. At once there was a general *sauf qui peut*. Most of the Germans were sitting quietly in the cafés of the village of Boneffe at the time, talking to the villagers. They rushed off down the road away from Eghezee leaving everything behind them, horses, rifles, mitrailleuse guns, and the requisitioned motor-cars. The few men who were looking after the horses in the cornfield let them loose, the bugler who was with the fugitives sounded a call to which they rallied, and as the pursuers, only about 30 in number, came round the corner of the road into view, the Uhlans threw themselves on to their horses and galloped off. The Belgians meanwhile dashed into a trench in a field of beetroot, about 500 yards off, which had been thrown up last week to repel the expected German advance, and opened fire on the horses and the retreating Uhlans on the road. They killed four or five men in the field and about 35 more in the retreat, including an ober-lieutenant and, it is thought, the colonel and several of the horses.'

On Friday, August 14, it was officially announced that French troops had entered Belgium by Charleroi and had joined forces with the Belgian Army. Three French officers had been attached to the Belgian headquarters and two Belgian officers were to represent the Belgian Army with the French troops. The French advanced northwards from Charleroi in the direction of Wavre. They were reported to be holding a very strong position, and numerous engagements were reported between the French and German cavalry.

Then followed a slight pause. The Germans, having discovered the strength of the enemy, awaited reinforcements. Their cavalry scouting parties, however, kept creeping around by the Dutch frontier until some of them were within 25 miles of Antwerp at Gheel and Moll. The Germans, as they traveled across the country, ruined most of the villages they left behind them. They hanged or shot every peasant suspected of resistance; they returned to places where isolated Uhlans had been killed a few days earlier

and razed them to the ground. The mere suspicion of having attacked Germans was sufficient to ensure death. The policy of wholesale terrorism was carried out on too wide a scale to have been anything but a deliberate plan executed in obedience to orders from headquarters. The German General Staff probably aimed not only at terrorizing the Belgians and stamping out any sign of civilian resistance, but also at creating such alarm throughout the neighbouring Dutch districts that the people of Holland would not permit their Government to take steps against so merciless a foe.

The Belgian General Staff continued to issue reassuring bulletins concerning the position at the front, but it could have had no delusions about the real state of things. It became evident, hour by hour, that the position of Brussels was becoming more perilous. Once the Belgian Army was turned Brussels must fall. Should the Germans renew the attack at Diest and succeed, not only would Brussels itself be open, but the entire Field Army would be threatened with capture. Brussels could not be defended. It is true that 20,000 civil guards had been armed with Mauser rifles and the environs of the city had been entrenched and protected with barbed wire entanglements. Trenches manned

with civil guards might be of some service in checking a slight cavalry raid—they could do nothing of any value against the serious advance in force such as it was now more and more apparent the Germans were attempting.

On Monday, August 17, the Germans began their advance in earnest. One strong force drove itself in like a wedge between the French and Belgian Armies in the neighbourhood of Wavre. From Diest, from Tirlemont, and from a hundred villages around came news that the Germans were moving forward in overwhelming force.

The Belgian Army resisted desperately all along the line, but it was hopelessly outnumbered in men, in field artillery, and in machine-guns. All the villages had been made into entrenched camps, with wagons upset across the roadways, wire entanglements erected, and trenches dug. But the Germans adopted tactics before which such precautions were useless. Villages were first overwhelmed with artillery fire. When the Belgian cavalry attempted to repeat their former exploits and charge the enemy they were met by the fire of well-placed machine-guns, before which they were swept away. At the least sign of weakening the German cavalry came on at the charge.



THE VILLAGE OF MELLE.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]

Scene of very fierce fighting. Remains of a German gun carriage.



GERMAN SOLDIERS TENDING THE
WOUNDED.

[*Newspaper Illustrations.*]

Tirlemont was the scene of a specially vigorous attack. Powerful German guns shelled the place with great effect, and then the German cavalry suddenly charged. Their advance was so rapid and so unexpected that numbers of peaceful villagers, women and children, were unable to escape. Hurrying across the fields as quickly as they could it was impossible to get away from the German cavalry, who followed them, shooting and stabbing men and women alike, riding down children, sweeping over the place in a mad, reckless charge.

It became obvious that the Belgian Army could stay no longer in its positions. Further delay might well lead to total destruction. Some regiments were already almost completely wiped out, particularly some of the cavalry. Two mixed brigades were given orders to hold the enemy back at any cost and to cover a retreat in the direction of Antwerp.

The defeat of the Belgian Field Army all along the line was complete and overwhelming. The fighting started early on Monday, August 17th. In the darkness of that night the Belgian retreat began.

Everywhere it was the German artillery that broke the Belgian defence. Now the Belgians were forced back to Vertryck. Next they were at Corbeek Loo, and from Corbeek Loo they had to retire on Louvain, where they were prepared to make a last stand. At this point one consideration stayed them. In view of the way they had been forced back, they could hope to do no more at Louvain than temporarily to arrest the German advance. The Germans, already pressing up, would undoubtedly shell and destroy the town, and would probably put it to the flames as they had already that day burned numerous villages.

To every Belgian Louvain was a city of precious memories, regarded with veneration, to be guarded, protected, and shielded from harm. Its ancient University, its beautiful Town Hall, its quaint 14th-century buildings, and its priceless library, once lost could never be replaced. To risk the destruction of these would be a crime against civilization. Yielding to this consideration, the Belgian Army retired beyond the city and allowed the Germans to enter without opposition. They little imagined—for they had not yet realized the depths to which some German commanders would go—that in surrendering Louvain as they did they were only handing it over to a worse fate and a more remorseless slaughter than any which fighting could have involved.

The position of the Belgian Army was impossible. It could not hope to keep back the Germans. To remain in the open much longer was to invite needless destruction. The spirit of the men was for the moment shaken by the terrific attacks they had endured. The Army was separated from the French. Only one course remained—to abandon Brussels and to retire upon Antwerp. The main fighting had fallen on the 1st, the 2nd, and the 3rd divisions of the Army. The two mixed brigades that covered their retreat held out for some hours against a formidable attack made by the Germans between Becquoboort and Gelrode.

The Belgian Staff considered it necessary to issue a somewhat elaborate explanation of the retirement. It ran as follows:—

“At the present moment the general situation in the Belgian theatre of war may be described as follows:—After having lost a great deal of time, a large number of men, and a great quantity of material, the Prussian Army has managed to gain ground on both banks of the Meuse up to a line where it is in contact with the Allied armies. The German troops on the north side of the Meuse belong to various corps whose operations

have been principally directed against Liège and who in the course of time have become available in other directions. There is also a strong force of cavalry, by means of which the Germans have been able to make a great show by extending to the north and south. In the south they came into collision with our troops and were repulsed. In the north, on the other hand, they found an open road, and small portions of them managed to make dashes far afield.

"In a word, the Germans have taken the measure of our position, but that they should have lost a fortnight in attaining this result is all to the honour of our arms. That may have incalculable consequences for the issues of the operations. The normal development of the latter according to the plan concerted between the Allies may lead to the carrying out of 'manœuvres' — that is to say, to changes of position in order to effect a change in the general situation. We are on the outside wing, where these manœuvres are nearly always necessitated either for the direct or indirect protection of the flank. Our Army therefore must necessarily modify its original positions and thus carry out completely the first task devolving upon it, which consists in gaining time. There is, consequently, no ground for anxiety if the Army makes a movement in such and such a direction, and arm-chair strategists need not occupy themselves with the arrangements made, but

should realize that our Army now belongs to a co-ordinated whole and remember that the strategic conditions have entirely changed since close contact has been established with our allies on our right.

"The object of the operations as at present going on is not to cover such and such a district or such and such a town, which has now become a matter of only secondary importance.

"The pursuit of the aim assigned to the Belgian troops in the general plan of campaign preponderates over everything. This object cannot be revealed, and the most well-informed persons are unable to discover it, in view of the veil of obscurity which is rightly being spread over all the news allowed to come through regarding the operations. Fighting is going on along the whole front from Basel to Diest. The closer the contact comes between the two armies and the closer one gets to a decisive action the more one must expect to see an advantage gained at one point while ground is lost at another. That is only to be expected in the case of battles taking place over such immense fronts as those occupied by the great armies of modern times.

"To sum up, one may say that what is going on at our gates is not the only thing to be thought of. A strategic movement conceived with a well-defined object is not necessarily a retreat. The fighting which has taken place at



PRIEST ASSISTING THE WOUNDED AFTER THE BATTLE OF HOFSTADE.

[Daily Mirror.

the front during the last few days has resulted in making the enemy more circumspect and in delaying his forward march, to the great advantage of the whole scheme of operations. There is no reason at the present time for letting oneself be hung up, thus playing into the hands of the Germans. That is the motive of the movements now being carried out. We are not beaten, far from it, but are making arrangements for beating the enemy in the best possible conditions. The public should, in this matter, place all trust in the commander of the Army and should remain calm and confident."

It has been asked why the French Army, resting upon its lines from Namur northwards, did not, by a forward movement, attempt to relieve the Belgian position. A considerable German force was already facing and engaging the French. The blow on the Belgians came so suddenly that there was scarcely time for French relieving forces to arrive. Further, there is every reason to believe that the French at this stage were not in sufficient force north of Namur to make such an advance possible. The main French armies were concentrated, not here, but further south. Even after the Belgian Field

Army had been defeated the French General Staff apparently believed that the advance into Belgium was little more than a feint made to take attention off the Alsace-Lorraine front. Believing this, it refused, until the danger to its own left flank was almost overwhelming, to alter its original plans.

Brussels, the Belgian capital, rested secure from the opening of the war in the conviction that the English would come to help it before the Germans could arrive, and that another Waterloo would be fought beyond the suburbs of the city with the same result as the battle 99 years before.

The General Staff issued reassuring bulletins. The Press fully supported the attempt to maintain the confidence of the people. There was little grumbling, and no signs of weakening. A fierce flame of patriotism had been kindled, and manifested itself among all classes. If devotion and self-sacrifice could have made up for lack of military training, it certainly would have been accomplished here. "This is a war for home and for faith—in the truest sense of the word a holy war," wrote one observer at Brussels at the time. "It has united all classes; it has



HOMELESS.



GERMAN TROOPS RESTING AFTER THE FIGHTING AT VISE.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]

made of the nation one man. The very clerks in the Government offices are giving their services voluntarily; the workmen lay telegraph wires, handle trains, perform all manner of services, in many cases without reward. In the country villages peasant women bring bread and beer for the soldiers, giving of their best freely. They scorn payment. And the poorest of the poor have contributed their pence gladly to the cause."

There could no longer be any ignoring the realities of the war, even had the people desired it. The city was now the great receiving home for the wounded from the front. Royal palaces, hotels, private houses, and public institutions were occupied by doctors and nurses, and steady processions of the wounded arrived either in specially equipped automobiles or by train. The contingents of disabled men were received often enough by vast crowds who stood bare-headed and bowing as a token of respect as the stretchers were borne by. The Queen led the Red Cross work, and women of every rank joined in the mission of pity and help for the victims of war.

Apart from the wounded, another army of war victims was beginning to pour into the city—refugees from the villages and towns destroyed by the advancing Germans. Many of them had nothing but what they stood up in. Others had baskets and bags containing all that was left of their worldly possessions. Mothers came along footsore with their children, well-dressed mothers and well-dressed children often enough, accustomed hitherto to a life of comfort, and now with their homes burned and their men-folk killed, penniless, not knowing

what to do, where to go, or where to obtain their next meal. Here were peasant women who told how their husbands and sons, venturing to resist the Uhlan outposts, had been promptly hanged from the nearest trees. Here were young lads who related how, in their villages, all the men had been seized as hostages, the priest and the doctor and the schoolmaster shot, and the remainder sent off they knew not where. Many of the tales were more dreadful still, tales which left the listener wondering whether grief had turned the brains of the people or whether the details which they passionately poured out of outrage and maiming and murder of women and children could be true.

Significant preparations were going on for the defence of the city. Much confidence was reposed in the civil guard, who could be seen drilling in the parks. Trenches were being dug, and barbed wire barricades put up out on the Chaussée de Louvain, in the Champs des Manœuvres, and beyond the cemeteries. The military authorities explained that these precautions were necessary because various scattered bands of Uhlans were about. They were being rounded up by the Belgians, and some of them might be driven back in such a way as to fall upon the city, which therefore must be protected against the danger of a sudden raid. Such a raid, it was added in an official announcement, was for that matter entirely improbable.

On Monday, August 17th, however, the real gravity of the situation became more evident. Refugees began to arrive in increased numbers. The Government considered it necessary to make a formal statement of the measures taken for local defence. At the same time significant



BELGIANS DRIVEN FROM THEIR HOMES.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]

notices were put in the papers, warning civilians that they must not attempt to resist German troops if they arrived, but must stay in their houses, close their doors and windows, and do nothing which would give the enemy an excuse to shoot them down.

The Press was under the strictest censorship. A decree of the 17th limited the editions of the newspapers to two a day. Later the limitation was made still closer. Each paper, before publication, had to be submitted in proof to military censors, who cut out whatever they did not like. One paper did attempt to give some warning of what might happen. It was quickly brought to book.

By the afternoon of the 17th it became clear to the authorities that Brussels could not be held, and it was determined to transfer the seat of Government to Antwerp. The Official Journal attempted to minimize the importance of this news as much as it could in a notice published next morning. "Contrary to the provisions of the law of 1859," it said, "the Government has remained in Brussels during the phase of the war in which our Army was alone to oppose the enemy. Now, when the Armies of our friends are on our territory, the Government has judged that its seat may without inconvenience be transferred to Antwerp, in conformity with the wish of those who created that great fortified position.

"It is not that events are more grave than they have been hitherto. On the contrary, we are recording a new success of our troops supported by French cavalry. But as it is necessary that the transfer should be made normally and without the slightest interruption in the execution of the sovereign functions, the Government has considered it preferable to begin to transfer the services of the various Ministries while the families of the Ministers remain in the capital. Certain of the Ministers will therefore take up their residence in Antwerp, where the war services will be better placed while the Army is in the field. In deference to the desire of the Government, her Majesty the Queen and the Royal Princes will remove to the Palace at Antwerp. As long as the King remains among our valiant soldiers the establishment of the Royal Palace will continue to work in Brussels.

"At the request of the Government several statesmen holding the rank of Minister, especially those of the Opposition, will proceed temporarily to Antwerp."

Even before the announcement was made the military archives had been dispatched in motor wagons to Antwerp. State papers and treasure were also on their way.

During all these stormy scenes of impending tragedy Brussels had had its fill of emotion. Day by day during the previous fortnight crowds had

assembled and demonstrated in the streets on any excuse. Now it was the King riding to Parliament, riding on a war-horse in the uniform in which he was to take the field at the head of the Army. Now it was the Queen and the Royal children driving through the streets followed everywhere by the shouts and acclamations of the people. Now it was soldiers going forth to the south, the regulars, the volunteers, the special corps, all of them surrounded, not alone by their own friends, but by all who could gather to encourage them. Now the people found fresh cause for enthusiasm in the sight of the uniform of a French Army officer. That surely meant the arrival of the French troops! Now they cheered at the word that the English were coming.

The city had determined to maintain its good spirits and to show a brave front. What if the Germans were only forty miles or so to the south? The Allies would see to it that they came no farther.

In the early days, before the Press restrictions were enforced, limiting the number of editions issued each day, the newspapers appeared every hour and were bought eagerly. The streets were decked with flags. The "Brabançonne" was heard on all sides. At certain hours one might have imagined, were it not for

the processions of the wounded and the houses marked with the Red Cross, that Brussels was *en fête*.

Then the great display of enthusiasm cooled. The constantly repeated rumours of the arrival of foreign armies turned out all to be false. Day after day people got tired of hearing that the English were a mile or two away, or the French just to hand. "I received information this morning," wrote one experienced correspondent on the day after the outbreak of the war, "that British troops had landed and were on their way to the frontier to defend Belgian neutrality. I at once drove out to Laeken, through which suburb they must pass. There I learned that the news was premature. French regiments are alleged to have arrived at Namur. Others are marching into Belgium." Multiply such reports a thousandfold, add to them detailed accounts of the automobiles attached to the British Army, of the flower-decked guns, of the cheering and triumphant British troops, and of the countless armies of French infantry marching to the north-east, and the reader will have some idea of the reports which, never proving true, made the hearts of the Bruxellois sick.

Then there came something else to think of. Rumours of massacres at Visé racked with



GERMAN TROOPS HAVING THEIR MIDDAY MEAL IN THE GRANDE PLACE, BRUSSELS.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]



BELGIAN AIRMEN.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]

They have been of great use in locating the enemy's positions.

anxiety many of the people in the city who had friends and relatives at Visé. The stories of massacre and of looting to the south were no more impersonal to the folks of the capital than stories of the burning of Kentish villages or Northampton farms would be impersonal to Londoners. The authorities tried to suppress the accounts of a ruined country side, but the very attempt made them spread the more. Then the sight of the civil guards at drill around the town, the digging of entrenchments and the building of the barricades, were recognized even by the most optimistic as having a tremendous significance. When on the morning of Tuesday, August 18th, it was known that the Government had transferred itself to Antwerp, anxiety became acute.

Even as late as Tuesday night, however, many people in the city attempted to argue that all would yet be well. The French, it was said, were assuming the aggressive and were hunting the Uhlans out of the woods and back across the roads between Namur and Brussels. The Germans had changed their plan of campaign.

They had lost so much in attacking the Belgian Army that they would now abandon the northward move. "From a good source I have the news," wrote one correspondent on Tuesday night, "that the French generals have chosen their battle-ground and have the Germans now in such a position that they cannot avoid fighting a battle in which two-thirds of their northern forces must be engaged if it is to face the main body of the French which has been rolled up into Belgium." Obviously, if such a fight came, the Germans would be too fully engaged to make an immediate attempt to press on to the city.

Men told one another in the cafés and in the streets that the approach of the Germans formed part of the Allies' plan. They were being lured on to destruction. They had not yet secured a victory. Brussels was the bait, and in attempting to take it the foe were to be caught in a steel trap from which there would be no escape.

The stories of coming victory grew as they passed from mouth to mouth. Meanwhile the

people could hear the dull sounds of explosions in the distance as bridges and roadways were being blown up to check the German advance. In the suburbs the poorest inhabitants gave up everything they could in helping to build up the barricades against the Germans. "Hundreds of people," wrote one observer, "have sacrificed all their household furniture in the common cause. Beds, pianos, carts, boxes, baskets of earth—one child I saw filling up a basket from the gutter—are all piled up. Roads and bridges had been destroyed wholesale."

During Tuesday night and all Wednesday armies of refugees poured in. They came in family parties, small and great, old women of 80 helping along little toddling children, men and women in their prime with faces stricken with grief which told of ruined homes and broken prospects. Some sat down in the main streets on their little bundles, waiting on fate. Others, people of means, rushed through in their carriages to the coast. "On Wednesday," wrote one visitor, "the aristocracy from the surrounding châteaux began to come in in carts, motor-cars, and wagons. I saw women and children in every sort of clothes mixed up with household goods, many of which were quite without value in such a crisis, but which had


been snatched up at the moment of departure. These people with money did not stay a second in Brussels, but continued their wild peregrination towards the coast. Every motor, cart, and carriage was plastered with huge red crosses hastily improvised out of wallpaper, old petticoats, or any material which happened to come to hand. That evening thousands of terrified peasants poured down the Avenue du Régent, weeping and bemoaning their fate. They, poor souls, had no money and nowhere to go to. For the first time in their lives they found themselves homeless. It was a terrible sight." Every train going to the north was packed with people. Thousands of Bruxellois, caught in sudden fear, not knowing what to do, started tramping out on the road towards Ghent.

The great masses of the people, however, took the graver situation with comparative calmness, and most strangers who were present recorded their surprise, not so much at the crowds of refugees in the streets or the crowds of others seeking to escape from the city to the north, but at the vast number of men and women who went about their work quietly right up to the end. Even yet they did not give up all hopes of succour. But if the worst were to come, the



GERMAN INFANTRY IN THE SQUARE AT BRUSSELS.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]



GERMAN ADVANCE TO BRUSSELS.

German occupation of the city would be only momentary. They rested content in the rightness of their cause. It became generally known on the 19th that the Belgian Army had retired from Louvain towards Antwerp. It was reported at first that a considerable Belgian force still held the high wooded country between Louvain and Brussels, that it was well equipped with artillery, and that it could hold any attack back. These troops, it was added, would be still further reinforced, and would have as their reserve the much-advertised civil guard. But those at the head of affairs had no delusions. They knew very well that any effort to check the Germans at this stage could only result in more or less destruction to Brussels itself. There were those who yet advocated fighting to the last. They were in the minority, and cool advisers from neutral nations strongly urged the duty of not attempting an impossible task. To attempt a battle at the barricades would only mean bombardment of the city and street fighting, with all the horrors that street fighting entails. The wiser counsels prevailed, and it was resolved to allow the Germans to enter peacefully.

That night a proclamation was posted on the walls of Brussels. It was signed by M. Max, the Burgomaster, who in the anxious weeks that followed was to win high reputation by his

courage and common sense in dealing with the Germans, and read :—

Despite the heroic resistance of our troops, aided by the Allied armies, it is to be feared that the enemy may occupy Brussels. In the event of such an occurrence I rely on the population to remain calm. Avoid all panic. The laws of war forbid the enemy obtaining by force information relating to national defence. The inhabitants of Brussels have the right to refuse all such information.

As long as I am alive or a free agent I shall endeavour to protect the rights and dignity of my fellow-citizens. I pray you to render my task less difficult by abstaining from all hostile acts. Citizens, whatever befall, listen to your burgomaster. He will not betray you. Long live a free and independent Belgium! Long live Brussels!

On Thursday morning the Burgomaster went out in a motor-car, accompanied by his four sheriffs, to meet the German military commander. He was attired in his scarf of office. He was received with great brusqueness, bidden to remove his scarf, and then asked if he was prepared to surrender the city unconditionally. If not, it would be bombarded. He intimated that he had no other choice than to yield. He was thereupon informed that he would be held personally responsible for the good behaviour of the citizens, and that any acts of violence on the part of the people against the Germans would be visited on him and the other responsible heads of the city. The German troops would enter and occupy the place that day.



GERMAN TROOPS OUTSIDE THE BOURSE, BRUSSELS.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]



M. MAX, [Central News.
Burgomaster of Brussels.



COUNT VON ARNIM, Stanley's.
who was Military Governor of Brussels.

The German Commander, General Sixtus von Arnim, issued the following proclamation, which was placarded in Brussels :—

German troops will pass through Brussels to-day and on the following days, and are obliged by circumstances to demand from the city lodging, food, and supplies. All these matters will be regularly arranged through the municipal authorities.

I expect the population to conform itself without resistance to these necessities of war, and in particular to commit no act of aggression against the safety of the troops, and promptly to furnish the supplies demanded.

In this case I give every guarantee for the preservation of the city and the safety of its inhabitants.

If, however, there should be, as there has unfortunately been elsewhere, any act of aggression against the soldiers, the burning of buildings, or explosions of any kind, I shall be compelled to take the severest measures.

The General Commanding the Army Corps,
SIXTUS VON ARNIM.

During the morning quiet crowds assembled in the main streets in the heart of the capital. No one knew quite what to expect. Every one was drawn by curiosity to see the arrival of the invader. It was told that the Germans were

already outside in great force on the roads to Waterloo, to Louvain, and to Tervueren.

The German General Staff had evidently ordered that the entry into Brussels was to be made as effective as possible. In place of parading the thinned ranks of the regiments that had fought so hard on the road from Liège, a fresh Army Corps was brought up. The people of Brussels expected to see exhausted and battle-worn soldiers—men bearing scars and wounds, with torn uniforms and depleted ranks. The reality was very different.

Soon after 2 in the afternoon the distant sound of artillery fire proclaimed the approach of the Germans. Then the sound of music could be heard, and the advance guards of the triumphant Army appeared. At the head rode a Prussian general, described by onlookers as “a swarthy, black-moustached, ill-natured brute, dressed in khaki-grey.” Had he been Apollo himself his looks would scarce have pleased the people of Brussels that day. Every

regiment, infantry or cavalry, had its band, and the music of the instruments was broken by the singing by the soldiers of "Die Wacht am Rhein" and "Deutschland über Alles." The troops were fresh and marched as though on parade. Their uniforms were new, their equipment undamaged, and their military *élan* such as to arouse the unwilling admiration of the onlookers. The long procession of troops was estimated to number 40,000. Every branch of the German service was represented. One part was a procession of a hundred motor-cars with machine-guns mounted on them. There was a complete siege train. The whole Army was dressed in one colour—a greenish grey. The very guns and the pontoon bridges and the equipment of the sappers were all grey. It was the war dress of Germany.

The Army moved down the Chaussée de Louvain into the Grands Boulevards up in the direction of the Gare du Nord. As they reached the main section of the route the word of command broke out and the infantry instantly broke into the famous German goose-step. It was a dramatic touch and it had its effect.

The people watched and wondered and feared.

"Towards the centre of the city," wrote the special correspondent of *The Times*, "the crowds had gathered on the pavements ten and twelve deep. In stony silence they watched the German soldiers pass; the children appeared interested in the wonderful spectacle, women trembled and whispered beneath their breath, old men and men too young for the Belgian colours stood white as ghosts and speechless with anger."

The troops quickly took possession of various strategic points in the city. All fears of immediate massacre were set at rest. The soldiers, so far from plundering the people, seemed anxious to prove the German power and prosperity by their display of abundance of money and their willingness to spend it. M. Max, the Burgomaster, was still held responsible for much of the routine work of local administration. The Germans appointed their own Civil Governor, who was the supreme authority. One of the first demands of the Germans when they had taken control was for an indemnity of eight million pounds as a war levy. This demand the Burgomaster informed them could not be complied with, as the city's money had been sent away to Antwerp.



A COMMON SIGHT IN DISTRESSED BELGIUM:
Villagers flying from the approaching Germans.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]



DESTITUTE BELGIANS.


They came from the villages around Malines before the bombardment.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]

With the German entry into Brussels the first stage of the war came to an end. The Belgians had done their work well. They had succeeded in holding up the German advance in unexpected fashion. They had given France time to complete the mobilization of her forces, and England opportunity to land her completely equipped Expeditionary Force in France. The war was now to assume another aspect. In place of the fighting of

comparatively small forces along limited fronts in Belgium, there was to be direct conflict between the big armies of France backed by the English against the forces of Germany, first on the Belgian frontier and then on French soil. Germany had made ready for her great blow. The blow was now about to be struck, to use the characteristic phrase of the German General Staff, "like a thunderbolt."





MAP TO ILLUSTRATE THE FRENCH OPERATIONS IN ALSACE.

CHAPTER XVII.

THE FIRST FRENCH OFFENSIVE IN ALSACE.

THE FRENCH INVADE ALSACE—CRITICISMS ON GENERAL JOFFRE'S STRATEGY—HIS CAREER—THE FRONTIERS INVOLVED—BELFORT THE FRENCH BASE—FRENCH FRONTIER DEFENCES—THE OBJECT OF AN OFFENSIVE—FERMINT IN ALSACE-LORRAINE—PROBABILITY OF A GERMAN OFFENSIVE—THE FRENCH RAID—THANN, ALTKIRCH, AND MÜLHAUSEN CAPTURED—THE GERMAN COUNTER-ATTACK FORCES THE FRENCH TO WITHDRAW—SUPERIORITY OF FRENCH ARTILLERY ESTABLISHED—SERIOUS FRENCH INVASION OF ALSACE—GERMANS ROUTED—THANN AND MÜLHAUSEN RETAKEN—PREMATURE JUBILATION IN PARIS—GERMAN COUNTER-OFFENSIVE DRIVES THE FRENCH FROM THE LOST PROVINCES.

ON August 2 the Germans had violated the neutrality of Luxemburg; on the 3rd they had invaded Belgium; and from the 3rd to the 5th they were attempting to take some of the forts of Liège by a *coup de main*. Two days later the French forces, moving to succour the Belgians, joined hands with their new allies, while simultaneously a French brigade from Belfort—at the point where the frontiers of Germany, France, and Switzerland converge—advanced into Upper Alsace and, towards nightfall, occupied Altkirch. The next day—the 8th—Mülhausen was entered by the French, and the following proclamation by General Joffre, the French Commander-in-Chief, was being circulated among the Alsatians :—

Children of Alsace,

After 44 years of sorrowful waiting French soldiers once more tread the soil of your noble country. They are the pioneers in the great work of revenge. For them what emotions it calls forth and what pride!

To complete the work they have made the sacrifice of their lives. The French nation unanimously urges them on, and in the folds of their flag are inscribed the magic words "Right and Liberty." Long live Alsace. Long live France.

General-in-Chief of the French Armies,
JOFFRE.

The strategy of General Joffre in throwing troops into Alsace when every spare man and gun was, as it happened, required in Belgium has been—after the events—severely criticized. But, in fairness to the French generalissimo, it must be pointed out that at the time it seemed to experienced critics to be justified. Mr. Belloc, whose striking prophecy of what would occur if the Germans invaded Belgium will be remembered, observed, ten days or so after the French entered Alsace, that there had been "at the very other end of the field of war the first signs of a movement that was to have a profound effect (the future would show it) upon all succeeding operations," and that, though the effect of "this raid" into Alsace was "political rather than strategic," there was "strategy behind it."

That was indeed probable. The French Commander-in-Chief was no hot-headed general of the Murat type. Born in 1852, he was, like Lord Kitchener, a student when the Franco-Prussian War broke out. Like Lord Kitchener, he had been an engineer. For three years he was occupied on the new fortifications for Paris. In 1885 he took part in the expedition to Formosa, and afterwards organized the defences of Upper Tonkin. Three years later he joined the engineer staff at headquarters, and was employed on railway work. He returned to the



PANORAMIC VIEW OF MULHAUSEN.

French colonies, but on this occasion to Africa, directing the construction of the railway from Senegal to the Niger. It was largely thanks to Joffre that Timbuctoo was secured by the French. Next he saw service in Madagascar. Again in France, he became Director of Engineers at headquarters, and afterwards he was in command of the 6th Infantry Division. From May, 1908, to February, 1910, he commanded the Second Army Corps. Finally, he entered the Superior Council of War, and in 1911 was appointed Chief of the General Staff. As Chief of the General Staff, he had signalized himself by sending into retirement five commanding generals whom he had judged to be incompetent. Quiet, taciturn, masterful, he was the last person to allow purely political considerations to dictate his strategy. MacMahon had gone to Sedan because the politicians at Paris had ordered him to. After Sedan Gambetta from Bordeaux had, with disastrous results, manoeuvred the armies which he had helped so materially to create. But Joffre was neither a MacMahon nor a Bourbaki. "I assure you," said the French Minister of War at the opening of the struggle to an English journalist, "that if I were to take a motor-car and drive into the zone of operations without General Joffre's permission General Joffre would have me turned out."

On August 3 the French generalissimo left Paris for the frontier behind which the French covering troops had been withdrawn some eight miles in order that it should be clear

to the world, and especially to Italy, that the Germans, if they invaded France, were unprovoked aggressors.*

To understand the problem that this military scientist was called upon to solve it is necessary to have present in the mind a picture of the frontier open to attack by Germany. This frontier starts from the point where three countries—Switzerland, France, Germany—meet, runs north for 70 miles, and then strikes north-west for 275 miles, finishing on the North Sea some seven miles E.N.E. of Dunkirk. For the first 165 miles France is bounded by her lost provinces—Alsace-Lorraine; for four or five miles by the independent principality of Luxemburg, and for 175 miles by Belgium. The obsolete† fortress of Longwy stands in

*It should be recollected that the Triple Alliance, to which Italy was a partner, was an alliance for defensive and not for offensive purposes. The Kaiser and his diplomatists made a desperate attempt to drag Italy into the war by pretending that Germany had been attacked by France. On August 3 they issued at Berlin the following mendacious statements:—"It has become known here that it is declared in France that Germany began the war by invading France with her troops. This is not correct. Yesterday morning, the 2nd inst., a French aviator threw bombs over Nuremberg. During the night of the 1st inst. French aviators manoeuvred over the Rhine provinces. Yesterday morning, moreover, French officers in German uniforms crossed the frontier from Belgium into Germany in motor-cars. Later in the day French troops crossed the frontier near Belfort and endeavoured to press forward into Upper Alsace. It is therefore considered here that France has attacked us without breaking off diplomatic relations." Reuter's Agency was also informed that, "according to telegrams received on August 3 in London from the Chief of the German General Staff, a party of French men and officers disguised in Prussian uniforms tried to cross the German frontier near the Dutch boundary. They were detected and prevented from crossing. The German telegram added that a French doctor and two other Frenchmen tried to poison the wells near Metz with cholera microbes." These false allegations are evidence that the German Government was already meditating the most flagrant breaches of International Law. They, doubtless, wished to be able to plead justification for the barbarities about to be perpetrated by their Huns!

†Despite its antiquated defences Longwy held out for three weeks and more against the German invaders.

the pocket formed by the frontiers of Belgium, Luxemburg, and Germany.

The geographical, as opposed to the strategic, frontier ran from the eastern environs of Belfort, mostly along the crest of the Vosges, to the Donon, a peak a little to the south of a straight line connecting Nancy and Strassburg. Thence it turned westward along the edge of Lorraine until, abreast of Metz, it struck north and touched, a few miles to the east of Longwy, the frontier of Luxemburg. The formidable German ring-fortress of Metz is in the same longitude as Nancy. The rest of the frontier need not be described for our purpose.

Between Longwy and the spurs of Mt. Donon the country is what is called "rolling." Some miles to the south-west of Metz the Moselle enters German territory and proceeds northwards through the capital of Lorraine and the fortress of Thionville (to the south-east of Longwy) by Treves—the centre from which the Germans had marched, motored, or trained on Luxemburg—to Coblenz, where it joins the Rhine. At the head-waters of the Moselle was the French ring-fortress Épinal, and midway between Épinal and Metz, 10 miles or so to the west of Nancy, another, Toul.

From the Donon (3,310ft.), a peak 250ft. lower than Snowdon, the range of the Vosges falls and rises to the Ballon de Soultz, the

highest point of the Vosges, 4,670ft. in altitude and some 260ft. higher than Ben Nevis, the loftiest point in the British Isles. To the South-west of the Ballon de Soultz was the Ballon d'Alsace (4,085ft.).

The Vosges is a precipitous range, more abrupt on the German than on the French side; its lower flanks and crest are mostly wooded. Several carriage roads cross the Vosges and light railways ascend German and French valleys leading to the crest of the mountains. North of the Donon the line from Nancy and Luneville to Strassburg traversed Saarburg and the Zabern tunnel, both of which were in German territory. South of the Ballon d'Alsace a railway connected Belfort with Mülhausen.

Belfort, the base for the French operations in Alsace, lies 15 miles or so south of the Ballon d'Alsace. This ring-fortress, with the forts round Montbelliard to the south of it, blocked the depression between the Swiss Jura and the Vosges, known as the Trouée de Belfort. The lie of the land here is apparent from the fact that the Rhone-Rhine Canal passes through the gap of Belfort.

Captured by the French in 1636, ceded to them in 1648, and successfully defended by its garrison in 1814, 1815, and 1870-1, Belfort is, as it were, the lock of the southern gate between France and Germany. The Germans must have



ALTKIRCH, LOOKING TOWARDS SAINT MORAIN.

Where very severe fighting took place at the beginning of the War.

regretted that it was not transferred to them at the end of the Franco-German War. With Belfort in their possession they might have marched on Paris by the plateau of Langres (they would, however, have had to mask or capture the ring-fortress of Langres) or on Lyons by the valley of the Saone. As it was, the French could open the gate at Belfort and move with ease into the plain of Upper Alsace and, also, to the banks of the Rhine, which at Basel passes between the Jura and the Black Forest and sweeps northwards to the strongly fortified Strassburg. On the left (west) bank of the Rhine from Basel to Strassburg, however, stood the fortress of Neu Breisach, through which Bavarian and Austrian troops—if Austrian corps were detached to the French theatre of war—could be poured on the flank of an army advancing from Belfort in the direction of Strassburg.

Provided that the French did not violate the neutrality of Belgium and Luxemburg, the obvious avenue into Germany lay through Belfort. To protect France from a German offensive on the Alsace-Lorraine frontier, a chain of forts ran from Belfort to Épinal. Between Épinal and Toul a gap—the gap of Nancy—had been intentionally left unprotected by fortresses. It was hoped that the Germans,

with their habitual contempt for their neighbours, might traverse the gap and expose their flanks to French armies pivoting respectively on Toul and Épinal. To the east of the Nancy gap and guarding the approaches to Lunéville was the Fort de Manonviller.

As we have seen, the Upper Moselle was French, the Lower Moselle German. The Meuse, on the other hand, rose in France and, until it entered Belgium at Givet, ran through French territory. A few miles to the west of Toul it approached the Moselle and then turned north-westwards to Verdun. Another chain of forts stretched from Toul to Verdun. One of them, St. Mihiel, played later an important part during the attempts of the Germans to burst through this barrier. Verdun, the most northern of the ring-fortresses on the eastern frontier, faced Metz. It blocked a German advance on Reims or Chalons.

So far, then, as engineers could make it, the French line of defence from Verdun to Belfort was a strong one. But would the fortifications along it be able to resist howitzers—and the super-howitzers which a cunning and secretive enemy might bring against the fortresses? The Germans had predicted that, if a sector of a ring-fortress were attacked by brave and



A TRAIN OF WOUNDED AT NANCY.




VIEW OF NANCY FROM THE HÔTEL DE VILLE.

determined troops under cover of the fire of modern artillery, the fortress would certainly fall. The reckless indifference to human life which was a feature of Hohenzollern statecraft pointed to the probability that the Prussian generals would sacrifice their men by tens of thousands to capture the ring-fortresses or links in the chain of fortifications between Verdun and Toul, between Épinal and Belfort.

There was another factor to be considered. The German Government had reduced treachery to a fine art, and the successors of Stieber had honeycombed France with spies and traitors. Treason might effect what howitzers could not, and, until war had shown that France was united to a man against Germany, it would be perilous to rely on a passive defensive. Of recent years there had been a rapid growth of, apparently, anti-patriotic Socialism, and the ferment aroused by the murder of M. Calmette in the spring of 1914 seemed to point to the possibility of a foreign war being accompanied by civil disturbances. The successes of the Prussians in 1870 had been largely due both to treachery and to domestic dissensions. A victorious advance on to hostile territory would cement the nation, and against a nation boiling over with enthusiasm the German advance guard of spies and desperadoes would be able to effect little. Every Frenchman would then be an eager detective.

There were still more powerful reasons why General Joffre should throw troops into Alsace and Lorraine. The majority of the inhabitants of those provinces were French at heart, if German by nationality. Whatever their remote racial origin may have been the Lorrainers and Alsatians had not taken kindly to the strait-waistcoat of German Imperialism. The Kaiser and his agents by cajolery and threats had endeavoured to persuade them that they were mad to prefer the French language, literature, customs, and habits. Like the Poles, the Alsatians and Lorrainers persisted in their resistance to German "Culture." Unlike the Poles, they had still a fatherland to which they could appeal for aid and sympathy.

The year before the Great War the ever-smouldering hostility of the population had been fanned into a flame by a typical example of the brutal conduct always to be expected from their German oppressors. At Zabern in Alsace a Lieutenant von Forstner was reported to have promised to reward a recruit if he stabbed a "Wacke." This term was a local and opprobrious expression for a native of Alsace. Disturbances arose and, in the course of them, Von Forstner drew his sword and cut a lame cobbler over the head. The military superseded the civil authorities and their action was supported by the Prussian Minister of War, General von Falkenhayn, who declared in the Reichstag



COLONEL VON REUTER,
who supported Von Forstner.

[Daily Mirror.

that "if the military authorities had given way, there might have been momentary peace in Zabern, but it would have been a treacherous peace. . . . The recent scandals," he continued, "cried to Heaven, and unless the authorities could suppress the agitation with vigour they must be prepared to see life for a German at Zabern become less safe than life in the Congo."

It was the lame cobbler, however, not the soldier whose head had been cut, and the Reichstag, for once showing some independence, censured the Imperial Chancellor by a heavy majority. Further, the Military Court of the 30th Division at Strassburg sentenced the lieutenant to 43 days' imprisonment.

It need hardly be said that the conduct of the Reichstag and the Military Court was violently attacked by the German militarists. The Police President of Berlin, Herr von Jagow, in a letter to the papers, described Alsace-Lorraine as "almost an enemy's country." The superior Military Court of the Strassburg Army Corps reversed the sentence passed on Lieutenant von

Forstner and the Military Court of the 30th Division acquitted Colonel von Reuter and Lieutenant Schad, who, between them, had substituted the rule of the sword for the rule of law in Zabern. Colonel von Reuter had pleaded a Cabinet Order of Frederick William III., issued in 1820, which had been reprinted and countersigned by the Minister of War 15 years before the Zabern incident. During these proceedings the Crown Prince by telegram had signified his approval of the tyrannous and illegal behaviour of his father's Janizaries.

With the Zabern outrages fresh in their memories the Alsatians and Lorrainers would surely flock to the tricolour if it crossed the frontier! As Alsace and Lorraine were the immediate bases for a direct invasion of France by the Germans, to raise Alsace and Lorraine was one way of preventing or hindering a German offensive. That the whole of the vast German forces (which might, moreover, since the Russian mobilization was slower than that of the Teutonic Allies, be reinforced by one or more Austrian corps) would traverse only Luxemburg and Belgium was improbable.

"It is well known," runs an official French *communiqué* published on the 15th of August, "by the declarations made by Germans themselves, such as Generals Bernhardt and Falkenhayn, Marshal von der Goltz, and others, that the German plan consisted in the first place in an abrupt attack upon the French covering troops near Nancy. It is also known that a second abrupt attack was to take place in Belgium with an immediate march on the French frontier. A decisive proof of the reality of this double plan is revealed by the fact that a number of Germans who should have joined the colours on the fifth to the fifteenth day of the mobilization had received orders to join their regiments in French towns, such as Verdun, Reims, Chalons, and other places."

Lastly, the French nature needed and demanded a movement such as the invasion of Alsace. The last war with the Germans had been attended by a succession of disastrous defeats. For over 40 years the Germans by speech, gesture, and writing had done their utmost to impress on the French that the German Army was incomparably superior to their French neighbour's, and that the German soldier was a better man than the French soldier on the field of battle. The reverses in 1870-1 had destroyed the prestige of the French Army. Japan and Turkey—to take two examples—had sent for German instructors in the art of war. The Anglo-Saxon world, too, had, for a period, been inclined to revere the German

strategists and tacticians. Recently, indeed, the Christian Balkan States had turned towards Paris as the military centre of the civilized world, but even the King of the Hellenes had seemed to acknowledge that he and his kingdom were in greater debt to German strategists than to the French instructors of the Greek Army. At the earliest moment to remove the burden of the memory of past defeats from the shoulders of the French nation and to prove that the leaders who in 1870 made the French fight on the defensive had utterly misunderstood the national temperament, may well have been the main motive at the back of General Joffre's mind when he ordered or sanctioned the invasion of Upper Alsace.

"We knew," said a *communiqué* of August 22, "from the reconnaissances of our aviators that the Germans had left relatively unimportant forces between the French frontier and Mülhausen, and that the bulk of their forces had fallen back on the right bank of the Rhine. This being the case, our objective was to attack those forces and throw them back, in order to gain command of the Rhine bridges

and to be able to repulse a counter-attack there, should the enemy make one."

There was an excellent chance of routing the hated enemy in the first days of the war, of releasing the French in Alsace from bondage, of disturbing the plans of the Kaiser and his son, of threatening the flank of a German Army advancing towards the gap of Nancy, and also, perhaps, of firing mines of disaffection in Southern Germany. Becker in 1840 had written, addressing the French :—

"Sie sollen ihn nicht haben

Den freien Deutschen Rhein : "

and De Musset had replied :—

"Nous l'avons eu, votre Rhin Allemand."

For French troops once more to bivouac on the banks of the mighty river which their great grandfathers had so often crossed under Napoleon would be the happiest of auguries for France in the gigantic struggle which had just opened.

As already mentioned, the campaign began with the capture of Altkirch on August 7. Previously to this, and even before the declaration of war, the Germans had at various points



RETURN OF COLONEL VON REUTER'S NOTORIOUS REGIMENT TO ZABERN.



LIEUTENANT VON FORSTNER of ALSACE,
who cut the head of a cripple at Zabern.

[Daily Mirror.]

crossed the French frontier and a German airman had dropped bombs on Lunéville. The French troops were divided into two columns; their objective was Mülhausen. One advanced through the gap of Belfort on Altkirch, the other crossed the Vosges near the Rheinkopf (4,260ft.), a little to the N.W. of the Ballon de Soultz, descending by the valley of the Thur on Thann. Mülhausen is at the apex of a triangle, of which the base is a line drawn between Thann and Altkirch.

The wings of the German forces were posted at Thann and Altkirch; between Mülhausen and the Rhine lay the Forest of Hard, 20 miles in length, "where a whole Army Corps could take shelter."* The first operation of the French was to dislodge the Germans from Thann and Altkirch.

Thann, 12 miles from Mülhausen, was a town of less than 10,000 inhabitants. It lay at the mouth of the valley of the Thur. The mountains between which the river flowed were covered with woods on their upper and vineyards on their lower slopes. The town was interesting from both an antiquarian and a modern standpoint. The Church of St. Theobald was a gem of Gothic architecture, and on the left bank of the Thur rose the Engelburg, a castle which commanded the town and entrance to the valley. The tower of the castle had been

destroyed by Turenne in 1674. Thann in 1914 was a small manufacturing town. It contained machinery, cotton and silk factories. The Germans had placed artillery behind earthworks at Thann and at the smaller town of Altkirch, situated in an amphitheatre on the right bank of the Ill.

Despite the fact that the Germans were entrenched and in approximately equal numbers the French carried both positions. The German losses were considerable. The next day (August 8) the French pushed forward to Mülhausen, which, amid the acclamations of the inhabitants, they entered at nightfall. Mülhausen, on the Rhine-Rhone canal, with a population of some 100,000 inhabitants, was the most important manufacturing centre in Alsace, and the seat of government for the district. It had been a free city of the old German Empire, and from 1515 to 1798 it had been in alliance with the Swiss Confederation. Numerous monuments attested its ancient importance, while the Arbeiterstadt—the Port Sunlight of Alsace—founded in 1853, was one of the earliest examples of a town built expressly for the benefit of the working-classes.

It was not to be supposed that the Germans would tamely acquiesce in the loss of this important place. The 14th Army Corps (recruited from Baden)—or a considerable portion of it—on the night of the next day (August 9) attacked the French from two directions, viz., through the Forest of Hard and from Colmar and Neu Breisach. The French communications which passed through Thann were struck at by the Germans at Cernay on the Thur. "In remaining at Mülhausen with insufficient forces," says the French official *communiqué*, "we risked losing our line of retreat on the Upper Vosges and Belfort." It is possible, but not probable, that the Germans had permitted the French to enter Mülhausen with a view to discovering, through spies left behind, the names of the disaffected inhabitants. The alternative of delivering a counter-attack with the reserves at Altkirch, which was not immediately threatened by the Germans, did not meet with the approval of the French commander. "To retreat," again to quote from the French *communiqué*, "was the wisest course in the circumstances. After this affair we were certain that the Germans did not intend to abandon Upper Alsace without fighting, and had strong forces there at their disposal."

This raid—it was little more than a raid—had confirmed the reports of the French aviators that the Germans had left relatively unimportant forces between the French frontier and

*French *communiqué*.

Mülhausen. A small body of French troops had immobilized in Upper Alsace a much larger body of Germans; the superiority of the French field artillery had been demonstrated; the French infantry had exhibited the *élan* for which it had been so celebrated in the past; and the Alsatians had been encouraged to expect a speedy deliverance from the yoke of their German tyrants.


On the other hand, the French had had to evacuate Mülhausen, which paid dearly to the Germans for its burst of enthusiasm, and it had been discovered that the ravines through which the French must debouch from the Vosges into the plain were commanded by German howitzers firing from skilfully concealed positions.

Writing 10 days later, a soldier in the French ranks gave his impressions—probably the impressions of the average French soldier—of the results achieved by these combats. His letter, allowing for pardonable exaggeration, brings vividly before us the nature of a modern battle.

“Already after a fortnight’s war eye-witnesses can state definitely that the first operations in Alsace clearly prove two things—the indisputable superiority of our artillery and the qualities of our infantry in attack. On August 9 we were at Riedisheim after having entered Mülhausen. One of our divisions was attacked by a superior force and we had to withdraw. Prudence dictated this with-

drawal, which was in no way disturbed by the enemy, so greatly had he been demoralized by the damage wrought by our field artillery, which was using melinite shells with terrible effect. From afar off we could clearly see whole sections of the enemy wiped out by our accurate fire. When a shell fell near a German half-company it was annihilated. After a few seconds one saw two or three men get up and flee, the rest remained. It was a complete destruction. Our batteries of four guns do the work of four or six gun batteries of the enemy. Our fire is quicker, and we can direct a hail of shells from a given spot in a very short space of time. Our gun-carriage does not move during fire. Only a very slight and a quickly executed adjustment is required before the next shell goes. The Germans find that their guns shift after each shot. In addition to the rapidity of our fire, our shells are extremely powerful.

“On August 13 the 109th Infantry Regiment of the enemy advanced upon positions occupied by us between Brèche-au-Mont and Vauthiermont. Suddenly our guns were heard, and a panic followed in the Baden ranks. Our immediate success was due to our artillery. I saw the battlefield and the damage done was awful. Our artillery compare the effect of the bursting of our melinite shells with that of a gigantic blow with an axe. This is quite exact. The impression one has



THE CITADEL AT BELFORT.
Showing the huge carved Lion which faces Germany.



CAPTURED GERMAN GUNS IN BELFORT.

is that a giant has struck everywhere with some Titanic axe. Those who are hit directly are pulverized, others are killed by the shock of the explosion. Their convulsed faces are blackened with the powder of the enemy. At Brèche-au-Mont they fled in such panic that the infantry we sent in pursuit was unable to catch them up.

"Letters written by the enemy were seized in villages occupied by our troops. They all bear testimony to the havoc and panic wrought by our guns. One of these letters, written by an officer to his wife, states that such carnage is unimaginable."

The second paragraph in the above letter anticipates the narrative of events. On August 9 the French had retired from Mülhausen, but General Joffre decided that the raid should be followed by an invasion of Alsace. The forts at Liège were holding out; the defences at Namur were supposed to be as strong as, or stronger, than those of Liège; a German offensive from Lorraine and Alsace into the Nancy gap between Toul and Épinal would be dangerous and difficult if the French secured Upper Alsace. Should, too, the French succeed in establishing themselves round the Donon they might cut the communications between Metz and Strassburg, and perhaps divert a portion of the enemy's forces seeking to break through the French lines (which were not protected by permanent fortifications) between Verdun and Sedan. Moreover, there was the feeling of the Alsatians

and Lorrainers to be considered. They would be bitterly disappointed if the French remained on the defensive. Many Alsatians had compromised themselves irretrievably, and the suspicious and savage rulers of the two provinces had already shown in Belgium that they would not hesitate to overawe the population by making the most terrifying examples.

General Pau, a veteran of the Franco-Prussian War, was entrusted with the direction of the invading army. Like Nelson, he had lost an arm. His capacities were such that he had been a candidate for the post held by General Joffre himself. "It was a question this time," says the French *communiqué*, "of a decisive effort and not of a mere reconnaissance."

At first the French had everything their own way. They moved through Thann and Danne-marie, which lies between Belfort and Altkirch, on Mülhausen. Both places were stormed. Mülhausen was the next to fall. It was attacked by both the French left from the direction of Thann, and by the French right, which had been pushed towards the Rhine-Rhone canal. The fighting at Mülhausen began in the suburb of Dornach. No fewer than 24 German guns were captured, and the city, after a brief resistance, was once more in the possession of the French (August 19-20).

From Mülhausen the bulk of the invading troops at this point of the theatre of war were directed southward to Altkirch, which had been abandoned by the French at the conclusion

of the raid. The Germans, afraid of being cut off from the Rhine bridges, retreated in great confusion. The western ends of the bridges fell into the hands of the French and the upper part of Upper Alsace was evacuated by the Germans. Their line of battle, which stretched from Liège to Basel, had been turned and General Pau was in a position to move up the plain between the Vosges and the Rhine to Colmar and Neu Breisach—a fortress to the east of Colmar protecting one of the main crossings of the Rhine.

While these events were taking place the French were swarming across the Vosges by the passes between the Ballon d'Alsace and the Donon, thus threatening the communications of the Germans between Colmar and Strassburg. The pass of Saales, south of the Donon, was seized. Counter-offensive moves of the Germans from the direction of Metz towards Spincourt (north-east of Verdun) and La Garde and Blamont (to the east of Lunéville and Nancy) had been unsuccessful. On August 15 the French Staff was able to inform the public that "the German attack by way of Nancy had scarcely been attempted" and that "the Germans had been forced to desist by the French covering troops. As to the abrupt attack through Belgium," they added with undue assurance, "that had had no better fate. The resistance of the Liège forts, the valour of the Belgian Army, and the action of the French cavalry had had the result that the German plan had been foiled."

The advantages, small though they were, gained in Alsace had destroyed the legend of German invincibility. The French, who had entered on the war with grim determination, felt their spirits rise. The memories of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars—of Valmy, Rivoli, Austerlitz, Jena, Auerstadt, Eckmühl, Wagram, Lützen, Bautzen, Dresden, Montmirail, Ligny, Magenta, and Solferino—revived within them. It may have seemed a good omen to them that the Germans had felt constrained to call Austrian troops to Alsace. The name of Austria was associated with innumerable victories in the mind of France!

To illustrate the confidence felt at French headquarters we quote the concluding paragraphs of the *communiqué* of August 15, issued before the recapture of Mülhausen:—

"The French mobilization and concentration have been carried out with perfect regularity. The men have been carried to their dépôts without incident and armed and equipped with a minimum of delay.

The concentration has been effected in conditions just as satisfactory. The fears often and legitimately expressed of the disorganization likely to result to the French concentration by the German invasion have, happily, been set definitely at rest.

"Again, there has been a co-ordination of movement between the allied armies. The Belgian Army has brilliantly played its part. The Russian Army is accelerating its mobilization, and it can now operate with the French and Belgian armies. On the other hand, the Servian Army, which is now mistress of Herzegovina, has made Austria hesitate to send more troops to Upper Alsace, as she has been doing for a week past. The last and not the least factor is the domination of the sea. English and French squadrons have been able to assure the perfect security of the sea for the transport of troops from Africa to France. The two German cruisers are out of the running, and the revictualling of the belligerent allies of France and of



THE FAMOUS MILITARY MONUMENT
AT BELFORT.

Erected in commemoration of the three sieges
of the town.



A TYPICAL VIEW IN THE VOSGES.

Difficult country so ably captured by the French.

France herself is certain and easy. Such are the indisputable results attained at the present hour. They are of capital importance, and are an augury of success for the combined operations of the allied armies against the invaders."

Such was the situation as it appeared to the military authorities of France on August 15. Events were to prove that they were deceived and that the people of Paris who, on August 11, had removed all signs of mourning from the statue of Strassburg had acted prematurely.* For a few days more, however, success crowned the French invasion of Alsace and the outskirts of Lorraine. As has been mentioned, the French from the crest of the Vosges dominated the plain of Alsace.

Though at the opening of the Great War they had abandoned the summits of the Vosges, which had been at once occupied by the Ger-

mans, they had, commencing from the south, captured one by one the principal passes and positions. First the Ballon d'Alsace (Welsche Belchen) and the Col de Bussang had been taken; next the Hohneck and the Schlucht. These had been easy achievements. On the French side the mountains sloped gradually to the plain. In the central sector of the Vosges the difficulties encountered had been very serious. The approaches to the crest were steep and the Germans had entrenched themselves, while the valleys leading to the plain of Alsace were defended by field fortifications and heavy artillery. The summits here were narrow and wooded and the French could not instal their artillery when they had captured them. In securing the Cols du Bonhomme and St. Marie aux Mines they had lost 600 killed or wounded. The Col d'Urbeis and the Col de Saales (to the north) had offered less obstacles to the invader. and they and the Donon had been gained at a comparatively trifling loss.

The French, too, were in strong force at Avricourt, on the railway from Lunéville to Zabern, and, so far from the Germans penetrating through the gap of Nancy, their enemies from that gap were beginning to enter Lorraine. From the Donon they descended into the Valley of the Bruche and struck the railway from Saales to Strassburg, capturing 1,500 prisoners, 12 guns,

*A brief report in *The Times* of this patriotic outburst will interest the reader. "The occupation of Altkirch by French troops prompted the Alsations of Paris to march in pilgrimage to the statue of Strassburg on the Place de la Concorde. The procession was led by a number of Alsatian women in Alsatian costume, carrying palm branches. Behind them came the standards of the Alsatian Federation and the Belgian flag. These were followed by the Alsations, who marched bareheaded, led by their president. Ladders having been placed against the pedestal of the monument, an Alsatian mounted and wound a broad tricolour sash around the statue. The crowd below shouted 'Away with the crêpe!' and in an instant all the signs of mourning that had surrounded the statue since 1871 were torn away. Each Alsatian secured a shred of the crêpe. After a patriotic speech by the president of the association the 'Marsellaise' was sung and the pilgrimage dispersed."

and eight mitrailleuses. On the 15th the Germans had been repulsed at Dinant and on the 16th the whole of the British Expeditionary Force was on French soil. A *communiqué* of August 17 reported that in Upper Alsace the Germans were retiring in great disorder, abandoning vast quantities of material. Various German atrocities in the region of Belfort were notified, and it is interesting to observe that German civilians took part in the fighting. The Germans had one law for themselves, another for their enemies. To the south of Saarburg, between Avricourt and Zabern, the Germans had fortified a strong position and armed it with heavy artillery. They were driven from it by the French, and on the 18th Saarburg was seized and the direct line of railway between Metz and Strassburg cut. It almost seemed that the French would be in front of Metz and Strassburg before the Germans arrived at Brussels.

The satisfaction felt in Paris was speedily turned to anxiety. The Germans had concentrated several corps d'armée for a counter-attack, which began on August 20, the very day that the enemy entered Brussels. The

Germans by superior numbers overwhelmed the French troops in Lorraine; they claimed to have captured 10,000 prisoners and 50 guns. The French left wing retired on the advanced works of Nancy, while the right endeavoured to maintain itself on the Donon. By August 23 — the day after the defeat of the French at Charleroi and the day of the battle of Mons and the capture of Namur by the Germans—the French were on or behind the Meurthe which flows into the Moselle below Nancy; and Lunéville, on the Meurthe, was in their possession. The Donon and the pass of Saales were evacuated. Two days later the French retired from Alsace, abandoning Mülhausen. They were pursued by the Germans, but a general attack all along the line was repulsed. The exceedingly vigorous advance of the enemy on Paris had forced General Joffre to re-form his right wing and to concentrate his reserves on the extreme left. It was the arrival of General Pau at Paris which, perhaps, as much as anything saved the capital from being besieged by Von Kluck.

The news of the German victory in Lorraine was received in Berlin and elsewhere throughout the German Empire and in Austria with great



GENERALS JOFFRE, MICHEL, GALLIENI, AND PAU. [Newspaper Illustrations.]

rejoicing. A Cabinet Order was issued by the Kaiser, in which he stated :—

The mobilization and concentration of the Army is now complete, the German railways having carried out the enormous transport movements with unparalleled certainty and punctuality. With a heart filled with gratitude my first thoughts turn to those who since 1870-1 have worked quietly upon the development of an organization which has emerged from its first serious test with such glorious success. To all who have cooperated with them I wish to express my Imperial thanks for their loyal devotion to duty in making possible in obedience to my call the transportation of armed masses of German troops against my enemies. The present achievement convinces me that the railways of the country will be equal to the heaviest demands that might be made upon them during the course of the gigantic struggle in which we are engaged for the future of the German nation.

The reflections of the Kaiser were justified. Napoleon III. in exile had said that the French had been defeated in 1870-1 because they

had not understood the value of railways. The Germans will not be able to complain that the Kaiser neglected to provide adequate means of traction. Never, indeed, had an army been better supplied with mechanical appliances than the German.

The French invasion of Alsace had failed, but had it been, as a strategical move, a failure ? Time would show. It had stiffened the *moral* of the French ; it had convinced them that man for man they were more than a match for the Germans ; it had probably prevented the Germans at the outset of the war flinging themselves through the gap of Nancy and disturbing the French mobilization ; and the advance on Saarburg had forced the German leaders to draw southward to the Meurthe forces which could have been used more effectively on the Meuse between Verdun and Sedan.



CHAPTER XVIII.

GERMAN CONQUEST OF BELGIUM.

PRUSSIAN "CULTURE"—MOMMSEN'S UNAVAILING PROTEST—TREITSCHKE'S DOMINANCE—THE COUNTRY OF BELGIUM—INDUSTRY AND INDEPENDENCE—ART AND CIVIC LIFE—GERMAN METHODS OF WARFARE—VISÉ—LIÈGE—DINANT—NAMUR—LOUVAIN—ITS HISTORY—ITS BUILDINGS—ITS UNIVERSITY—LOUVAIN SCHOLARS—LOUVAIN AND ENGLAND—DESTRUCTION OF LOUVAIN—MALINES—ITS ANCIENT DIGNITY—ST. ROMBAUT—OLD HOUSES—DESTRUCTION OF MALINES—TERMONDE—ITS UTTER RUIN—ALOST—DEYNZE AND THIELT—ANTWERP—AGRICULTURE.

AT the outbreak of the war it became swiftly evident that the German forces had no intention of sparing any of the horrors of war to the towns and villages through which they were to pass. This need, perhaps, have caused little surprise, at any rate among those who had studied German methods of warfare in other parts of the globe. In July, 1900, the Emperor William II., addressing the German troops dispatched to quell the Boxer rising in China, said: "Whoever falls into your hands is forfeit to you, just as 1,000 years ago the Huns under King Attila made a name for themselves which is still mighty in tradition and story." Such an utterance seems as sharply opposed to the common ideal of that "culture" of which the German Empire has proclaimed itself the apostle as the acts committed by the Prussian troops are to the accepted notions of warfare among civilized peoples; but the contradiction is not so difficult to understand when the true meaning of German "culture" is realized.

The root-principle of German "culture" is this: German civilization is the best, therefore it is Germany's duty to impose it everywhere. "The Germans" (writes Mr. Cloudesley Brereton in his book "Who is Responsible?") "are the chosen people of the twentieth century. Hence, one law for the Germans and another for other nations—or, in other words, a total disregard for international law, as instanced by

the Belgian atrocities and the destruction of Louvain." One man in particular is responsible for the expression and the systematization of this philosophy, which had its origin in the Prussian mind at least as far back as the days of Frederick the Great. That man was Heinrich von Treitschke, a professor in the University of Berlin and a member of the Reichstag. Tall and impressive in appearance, though harsh-voiced, clumsy, and mechanical in speech, Treitschke attracted round him not only the students of the university, but soldiers, writers, officials, all the intellectual leadership of Germany. So far back as 1866 Sir A. W. Ward, now Master of Peterhouse, Cambridge, called attention to the tendencies in Treitschke's teaching, his avowed aim being "through history to govern politics," to forecast and bring to being the future through an understanding of the past. The victory over France in the war of 1870-1871 largely determined what that future was to be, and at the same time influenced and directed the teaching of Treitschke. Success in arms led to a wave of materialism that swept over the country. Wealth and industry were the sole objects of German desire. The great German historian, Theodor Mommsen, had issued a warning which might well have been laid to heart. "Have a care," he said, "lest in this State, which has been at once a power in arms and a power in intelligence, the intelligence should vanish and nothing but the



BELGIAN SOLDIERS ON THE MARCH.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]

pure military State should remain." But Mommsen's warning remained unheeded; and Treitschke was there to throw the glamour of a false idealism over these debasing tendencies. He gave them, it has been said, a soul, and that soul was the quintessence of the worst and most dangerous qualities of victorious Germany, glorified only by the scale on which they were to be applied. First, all Germany must become an expansion of Prussia; next, Germany being the chosen people, German dominion must be extended over the whole world by any and every means. There must be no surrender to "fine phrases of tolerance and enlightenment"; that the strong should triumph over the weak is an inexorable law of nature. Such are the grounds of the "new barbarism," which Mommsen foresaw as the outcome of victory and material aims as philosophized by Treitschke. To most civilized peoples "culture" means a state of mind that includes knowledge and love of the great works of beauty of the past and the present; an inner "sweetness and light," as Matthew Arnold expressed it; respect for other people's rights and feelings: a chivalrous attitude to the weak and a pride that will not stoop to barbaric acts of violence. German "culture" means rather the aggrandisement by any and every means of Germany and the Germans; the imposition upon the whole world of the German

dominion; the ruthless destruction of any thing that may stand in the way of that object.

In Belgium the Germans found a country peculiarly liable to vandalism. The leading characteristic of Belgium's achievements in all fields is that she owes very little to unsought advantage and nearly everything to hard work. Her natural beauties, save in the south-eastern corner, are not the ready-made beauties of Italy, of the Alps, of the Rhine. Over a great portion of her surface she has not the fertile soil which makes parts of England, of France, and of Italy peculiarly and almost inevitably fruitful. Between Ghent and Antwerp, to take an instance, lies the district known as the Waesland. A few centuries ago the Waesland was a barren moor; to-day every inch of it is cultivated, and some of the trimmest and most attractive farms in Belgium are dotted about it. The whole sandy district has been covered, cartload by cartload, spadeful by spadeful, with good soil brought from elsewhere; and, in order to be worth cultivation, each field, shaped at edge and corner with the characteristic neatness of the Belgians, must be as carefully and minutely tended as a flower-bed. By comparison with the Waesland, even the flower-gardens of Ghent are a light achievement; yet Ghent, the flower-city of Europe, owes her supremacy far less to any natural

kindliness or wealth of soil than to the minute and unremitting labour that has created what Nature had denied. Belgium loves her flowers—we may imagine, then, the feelings of the people of Brussels when they watched, on the arrival of the Germans, cavalry officers wantonly trampling under their horses' hoofs, in a lust of brutal destruction, the flower-beds of the city. To her unremitting labour in the coal-mines of the Borinage, the great iron and steel factories of Charleroi, the fields and gardens of Flanders, Belgium owes her wealth. Even the forests of the Ardennes are kept with a careful arboriculture that no other country can excel. And to this thoroughness and skill in labour Belgium has always owed her position. Very early in her history we find the Belgian weavers the finest in Europe, their trade and commerce rich enough to bring them safely through all but the most serious of their troubles. Turbulent fellows they were, these weavers. Louvain, Ypres, and especially Ghent could tell terrible tales of their risings against authority imposed from without. The tall and noble belfries which adorned many old Belgian towns before the outbreak of war had stood for centuries as memorials of their watchfulness against attack or tyranny; for there hung the great bell whose most notable function it was to summon the citizens together to resist the troops of the foreigner or of the ruler. But it was precisely

this sturdy independence of theirs, controlled and intensified by the corporate spirit of the trade guild, that made the greatness of medieval Belgium, and also raised the Flemish to a position in the world of art second only to that of Italy. In Belgium, for all the magnificence of Philip the Bold of Burgundy, or his grandson Philip the Good, or in later years of the Archduchess Clara Isabella Eugenia and her husband, the Spanish Governors, the most effective patron of art in Belgium was not, as in Italy, the prince or ruler, but the town, or the trade guild, in its intimate association with the Church. This applies in particular to architecture. The church and the town hall and the market hall are the chief beauties of every Belgian town, and all three are the creation of the workers, the burgesses and traders, seeking to fulfil their own needs and ideals, not, like the Siegesallee at Berlin, an ideal imposed by a single dominant will and taste upon a submissive public. With regard to the churches, though architecturally most of them are less interesting than the Cloth Halls and the Town Halls, inasmuch as they are due rather to the influence of French Gothic than to any independent Flemish school of architecture, they are nevertheless almost inevitably dearer to the Belgians than to most peoples, not only because the Belgian still emulates his forbears in lavishing upon the Church all the wealth he



FUGITIVES ON THE ROAD.

[Central Press.]



LOUVAIN.

General view after bombardment.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]

can spare, that it may be rich in pictures and carving, in stained glass and marble and plate, but because Belgium remains a devoutly religious country, a more thoroughly and willingly Catholic country even than Spain. And just as the civic life reached in Flanders its strongest and freest development, so the ancient Town Halls of Belgium are the most elaborate and daring expressions of that development. Upon them the public spirit, working through its architects and sculptors, set free all the pride and independence, all the riotous imagination, religious and worldly fancy, all the broad humour and spiritual aspiration and earthly satisfaction which characterized Flanders in its ancient days of prosperity. The Town Hall dominating the Groot'-Markt, or *grand' place*, of a Belgian town, is more than a work of art. It is a symbol of a spirit that has not yet died out of Belgium, though the towns which possess the finest examples may be but one-third of their ancient size, and the greater part of the once crowded space within the old walls may be laid out in gardens and walks. The Town

Hall proclaims the spirit of hard and honourable work ; it is the voice of Belgium's old prayer, "Leave me alone to do my work and be happy in my own way !" That prayer has but seldom been answered, and once more "the cockpit of Europe" was to be subjected to the brutalities of an invading force.

It is the same story with regard to the Flemish school of painting. Unlike the rest of Europe, Flanders in painting owed little or nothing to Italy. Characteristically, she worked out her own art on her own lines, independent of foreign influence and largely independent of Court encouragement. It is democratic art—the art of the town and the home—that won fame for Flanders in the domain of true culture. It can scarcely even be said that there was any artistic centre in the land. Sporadic schools of art grew up in separate towns. Bruges gave birth to Van Eyck ; Louvain was the artistic home of Roger van der Weyden and of Dierck Bouts ; Termonde had its special school of painters and so had many other towns.


This, then, was the country to which all the horrors of false culture were let loose : a country

of genuine and ancient culture, which its people had worked out for themselves along their own lines with their characteristic independence and sturdy individuality; a country where men loved their comfortable homes, their noble churches, their monuments of civic wealth and self-governance. It was not the less on that account, as the invader learned to his cost, a country where each man could defend, with unmatched pertinacity and courage, the rewards that he had toiled to win, the home that he had built up for himself, his family, and his kind.

The first news of the methods by which the Germans intended to carry on war upon the country which they had invaded, in spite of their sworn promise to maintain its neutrality inviolate, came from Visé, 12 miles north-east of Liège. On August 6 it became known that they had burned a portion of the town; but a few families remained there. Some few days later shots were again fired in the town—by the inhabitants, said the Germans; by drunken German soldiers, said the inhabitants. Whichever the truth, Visé was burned to the ground. An attractive city of nearly 4,000 inhabitants, typical in the cheery pride and gaiety of the Walloon portion of Belgium, Visé possessed a quaint town hall, and in the church was a famous reliquary, the silver Châsse de St. Hadelin, of which the fine relief work proclaimed it to date from the early part of the 12th century. The stories of those who visited Visé soon afterwards tell of nothing but smoking ruins, not a house standing intact, and in the blackened and smoking streets the bodies of non-combatant townsfolk riddled with bullets or pierced with bayonets. The town of Argenteau, beautifully situated on the Meuse beneath its limestone rocks, crowned with the ancient and the modern châteaux, shared the same fate. And all about this district, wherever the German troops could reach, lay burnt-out farms and smouldering villages. Streets were burned at Huy, the fascinating town on the Meuse at the mouth of the Hoyoux. Louveigné and Bar-le-Duc were totally destroyed. Verviers was largely burned. Soiron was sacked. Before the Germans had captured Liège they had done their best to devastate the countryside and to destroy all the villages and towns, all of them open and undefended, upon which they came.


Liège itself was a fortified town, and must therefore expect to suffer for defending itself; but Liège unquestionably suffered more than the demands of military action required. She had always been a storm-centre in history and had suffered much, as has been shown in a

previous chapter; but now, although still an ancient and a proud city, Liège was an industrial town of great importance and activity. For more than a hundred years she had settled down to quiet if strenuous labour, and in those hundred years she had done very much to improve her appearance and her conditions. She had built bridges over the Meuse; she had provided a university. Of these bridges, the Pont des Arches, the town's pride, built on the site of a bridge dating from the 11th century; the Pont de Fragnée, with its sculptured tritons and mermaids, and others were destroyed. The University buildings, which included an ancient Jesuit college, with its library, its museum of antediluvian animals found in the caves for which the district is remarkable, were burned; and of the tale of houses destroyed by incendiarism or by shell fire there is no end. On one occasion, some shots being fired from a house, the German soldiers turned machine-guns on the street, destroying many houses and killing the inmates, while other houses were set on fire.



BRIDGE OVER THE MEUSE,
Showing the destroyed centre.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]



DINANT.

As it appeared before bombardment.

[S. E. Fincham.]

Far more dreadful was the fate of Dinant. This wonderfully picturesque old town is well known to a great many English people. Quiet, smiling, and gently gay, it lay on the banks of the Meuse in a country peculiarly rich in the fables and history of romance. Just as the district round Liège is sacred to the legends of Charlemagne and the cradle of the race of Pepin, which gave to France her kings, so round Dinant lies a world of beautiful legend. The four sons of Aymon, for instance, and their great horse Bayard, dwelt in the castle hard by; and here is the Roche à Bayard, where the great steed left his hoof-mark, as, pursued by Charlemagne, he leaped across the valley. And Dinant itself was surely one of the most picturesque towns in the world. It lay on the bank of the Meuse, under the shelter of the enormous cliff on which stood its citadel. The church of *Nôtre Dame* lay just beneath that cliff, pressed so closely against it, wrote Camille Lemonnier, "that it seems like a block of the mountain itself into which light has been let through its tall windows. The mountain has here said to the work of man's hands: 'Thus far shalt thou go, and no farther.' Thus, pressed against the rock, the flower of the late half of the 13th century, which would otherwise appear imposing, seems reduced to moderate proportions by comparison with the colossal height that crushes and stifles it with its prodigious

mass. Seen from below or from above, the church looks like a dwarf beside a giant, as if Nature had intended to make the real cathedral of the cliff and left nothing to the builder of the church but the chance of distantly imitating the mountain. Yet, dwarfed as it is by this huge pile of stone, the church none the less keeps its precious beauty. Scarcely has one set foot beneath its vaulted roof than its magic begins to work, and within this restricted space, which from outside seems incompatible with the idea of grandeur, the three aisles open out, ample and magnificent between their venerable pillars, like the deep alleys of a forest. *Nôtre Dame* of Dinant was one of the purest blooms in the garden of early Gothic, a fair and spotless lily in the glorious pleasaunce of great Catholic churches." In decoration *Nôtre Dame* de Dinant was not rich, though it contained some admirable work in copper, and had notable twelfth-century fonts. But its architectural beauty, its wonderful doorways, and its mural paintings made it remarkable, no less than its position under the cliff which dwarfed its tulip-shaped tower of more than 200 feet high. The Town Hall was ancient and interesting. On the summit of the cliff, reached by a flight of 408 steps, stood the Citadel, erected by the Dutch in the 15th century. And the bridge of Dinant, a worthy successor of a very old bridge, which in its turn replaced others yet older

—one of which had five arches and a tower two storeys high—was famous all over Belgium.


By shell-fire and the incendiarism provided by their special celluloid bombs and discs of compressed chemicals the Germans destroyed Dinant in a few hours. Not Charles the Bold of Burgundy, when he seized the town in 1466, not all the attacks and havoc in the long struggle between Dinant and its neighbour and rival Bovignes, worked so much destruction as the entry of Prussian "kultur" in August, 1914. The excuse was the familiar one—that shots had been fired at the German troops by non-combatant inhabitants. The civilized world had soon good reason for doubting the truth of that invariable pretext. Be that as it may, this is the story of Dinant, as told by Mr. Arthur Terwagne, brother of the Deputy of Antwerp, in the Belgian newspaper *Le Matin* :—

On August 15 a tremendous battle was fought in the streets of the town between the French and the Germans, while the guns thundered away at each other from both sides of the Meuse. The town suffered very little during this battle, only a few houses afterwards bearing signs of the bombardment, which lasted 13 hours. During the following days the French retired on to the left bank of the Meuse, where they remained up to the day on which the order for a general retreat was given.

In the night of August 21 a German armoured motor-car entered Dinant by the Rue Saint-Jacques, and, without the slightest provocation, began to fire on the houses in this street. A woman sleeping in her bed was killed, and her child, which was at her side, was mortally wounded. Startled by the noise of the firing, a man and his wife opened the door of their house. They were immediately done to death by Uhlans. An employee of the gasworks who was returning from his work was killed on his doorstep. The assassins—for one cannot call them soldiers—set fire to several houses before they bravely withdrew.

But these savage acts were only the prelude to the fate which the horde of brigands were reserving for the unhappy town of Dinant. On the following day large masses of troops arrived and were guilty of the most abominable atrocities which have ever been recorded. The Germans forced open the doors of the houses and murdered everyone they found within. There was Victor Poncelet, done to death in the presence of his wife and of his six children ; there were the members of the staff of the firm of Capelle, murdered in cold blood. In every house a fresh crime was committed, while the women were driven from their beds and taken, half naked, to a monastery, where they were kept for three days with hardly any food, half dead with hunger and fear.

Some workmen of Leffe hid in a drain near the large cotton mill, the manager of which, M. Himmer, was killed. There were about 60 of them, and when the Germans discovered them they shot them all, although not one of them was armed. In the Faubourg Saint-Pierre a number of men hid in the cellars of the brewery owned by the brothers Nicaise, old men of over 70, and their nephew, Jules Monin.



DINANT AFTER BOMBARDMENT.
Remains of the famous Church and Bridge.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]

The modern barbarians had pity on none. All of them fell under the German bullets—they were about 40 in number.

Over 200 men and lads—old men of 75 and boys of 12 and 14—fathers and sons together, were driven on to the Place d'Armes. In order that the work might be carried out more quickly a machine gun was brought up. It was here that Xavier Wasseige, the manager of the Banque de la Meuse, was killed, together with his two sons, and here too died Camille Fisette and his little boy, aged 12.

The fate of the male inhabitants having thus been settled, the Germans set to work methodically on the destruction of the town, using bombs to set fire to the houses. Soon nothing but a heap of ashes remained. The district of Saint-Médart, between the station and the bridge, has been wiped out. Coming from the bridge to Bouvignes, the first house that is left standing is the Hôtel du Nord. The splendid post-office building is a heap of ruins. The bridge is destroyed, the Germans having built a pontoon bridge a little higher up the river. The church has lost its celebrated tower, and all the houses of the Rue Sax, near the Meuse, have been destroyed. In the Rue Grande, the Grand' Place, and the Place Saint-Nicolas it is the same, and it is said that many families who had hidden in the cellars died in the flames. But for one or two houses in the Place de la Meuse, the Laurent restaurant and a few houses standing beside it, the barracks and the communal school, in which the German garrison is lodged, the whole town of Dinant has been destroyed.

That is what the bandits of the great Empire which wished to rule Europe have done to one of the most picturesque towns of Belgium. The monster who presided over these abominable atrocities was Lieutenant-Colonel Beeger.

Namur, the famous town on the Meuse, beloved of all English people for its memories of Tristram Shandy's "My Uncle Toby," who, it will be remembered, was wounded there, and solaced his declining years by following

the movements of the Allies in the miniature fortifications in his own orchard—Namur, a great fortress town in the 17th and 18th centuries, and a yet greater fortress town in the 20th century, was given up sooner than was expected, and therefore escaped all the horrors of devastation that were with good reason feared. Scarcely, however, had Namur fallen than the civilized world was horrified by the news of an act of vandalism far greater than any that the German troops had yet committed—a greater, indeed, than it seemed likely that they could commit in the course of the whole war. On August 25 the town of Louvain was destroyed.

Louvain, on the River Dyle, some 30 miles south-east of Antwerp and 18 miles east of Brussels, had the reputation of being a dull town. A quiet town it certainly was, but not dull for anyone interested in the humanities and the study of ancient achievements in art and learning. In old days Louvain, like most of the towns of Belgium, was a large and prosperous commercial place, with something over 100,000 inhabitants, more than double its population on the outbreak of the Great War. It was the seat of the ducal house of Lower Lorraine, or, as it came afterwards to be called, the house of Brabant; and, like most of these cities, it had no great love for its rulers. A more terrible scene than any enacted even in Ghent took place here in 1378-9, when from the windows of the town hall (not the present building) 13 magistrates of patrician



REFUGEES ON THE ROAD BETWEEN MALINES AND BRUSSELS.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]



NAMUR.

The Citadel from the river.

blood were tossed by the populace on to the swords and halberds raised up to receive them from the square below. A terrible vengeance was exacted by Duke Wenceslas a few years later—a vengeance from which Louvain had never commercially or financially recovered—yet a vengeance less terrible than that of the apostles of culture, who had received no provocation whatever from its then peaceful and quiet citizens.

Ecclesiastically the central point of Louvain was the magnificent late Gothic church of St. Peter, designed in 1425 by Sulpice van Vorst to take the place of an earlier building, with his son and the statuary Eustache van Molenbeke to aid him in the sculptural portion of the splendid edifice. It was originally intended that of its five towers the highest should rise to 535ft., but the foundations proved insufficiently strong. The interior of the church had a majesty and solemnity all its own, and in treasures of art it was peculiarly rich. At one time it was the fortunate possessor of the famous triptych by Quentin Matsys, the great master—originally an ironsmith and always an exquisite

worker in metal as well as in paint, who was born in Louvain, to become later the greatest Flemish colourist and the founder of the Antwerp school. This triptych was removed some years ago to the Museum at Brussels; but St. Pierre of Louvain still possessed one, or more, of the glories of Flemish painting, the great “Last Supper” of Dierck Bouts (long attributed to Memling) and the striking, if unpleasant, “Martyrdom of St. Erasmus,” by the same painter, who settled in Louvain about the middle of the 15th century and became painter to the municipality. The “Last Supper” was painted about 1467, and is universally acknowledged to be the artist’s masterpiece. The picture in St. Pierre of Louvain was only the central portion of a triptych of which one wing was in Berlin and the other in the Pinakothek at Munich. Another famous picture, “The Descent from the Cross,” attributed to Roger van der Weyden, hung in one of the chapels of the ambulatory. But pictures were not alone the wealth of St. Pierre of Louvain. A famous object was the great stone tabernacle of St. Peter, 40ft. high, exquisitely carved by Matthew de Layens (who built the



LOUVAIN.

Sanctuary of the Cathedral. A Priest is seen standing by the ruins of the Altar. [*The Sphere*.]

town hall). The carved wooden rood-screen with the surmounting figures and cross was one of the most renowned in Belgium, or in Europe ; and there was a font, of cast bronze superbly worked, which was commonly said to be the work of Quentin Matsys himself. The church of St. Pierre, though the noblest, was not the only church in Louvain. There was St. Jacques, a fine 15th-century building, noteworthy for its reliquaries of St. James, St. Margaret, and St. Hubert, its Gothic tabernacle in stone with a wonderful brass balustrade in the style of the Flemish Renaissance, and a painting of St. Hubert by De Crayer. Close by stands the statue of Father Damien, the Belgian missionary who gave his life for the lepers. There was the 14th-century church of St. Gertrude, with its lofty tower and its magnificently elaborate choir stalls of the 16th century by Mathias de Wayer ; and there was the almost fantastically baroque Jesuit church of St. Michael.

Yet in Louvain, for all its churches, the sacred buildings gave place to the secular. The Town Hall of Louvain is (and it seems almost miraculous that it can still be spoken of as existing) one of the most extraordinary productions of the human genius ever created. Its towering walls speak of the pride of the wealthy town which in the middle of the

15th century entrusted the design of its official centre to Matthew de Layens. Its statues speak of the citizens' active religious faith. "All the Bible," says Camille Lemonnier, "flies past ; you may follow from niche to niche the principal episodes of the Old Testament, and the naïf sculptor, to make his story the easier understood, has given the characters the aspect of men and women of his own time." The riot of carving which covers every inch of the walls, the steep roof and lofty fretted pinnacles, the elaborate windows, speak of the full and many-sided life of hard-working, wealthy, and comfortable people, while here and there breaks out a lively humour. "The building resembles a vast, joyous chronicle where many a contemporary could see himself sculptured from the life ; and the gaiety breaks out now and then into licence—a Rabelaisian commentary on the vast satire." Dierck Bouts designed two paintings for the Council Room ; and the works of art in the Town Hall included two triptychs by the Louvain master, Jan van Rillaert the Elder.

But even the Town Hall of Louvain was eclipsed by another centre of interest—the buildings of the famous University. Originally the Cloth Hall, this beautiful edifice was made over to the University in the first half of the

15th century. For, as Louvain declined in commercial eminence after the vengeance of Duke Wenceslas, she rose to fame in another direction. She became the most famous university town in Europe next to Paris—the “Athens of Belgium,” as she was called by one of her professors, who was also one of the greatest scholars the world has ever seen, Justus Lipsius. The University was founded in 1425 by Pope Martin V., and Duke John IV. of Brabant, one of a line of princes whose court was always associated with a love of French and Latin poetry. In 1431 it moved into the Cloth Hall. Yet, founded as it was by a Pope and a Prince, the University of Louvain owed yet more to “the educational and intellectual strength of the schools of the Brethren of the Common Life,” and, as Prof. Foster Watson has written, “as in art, so in intellectual culture,

Belgium traces its origin to native, not to Italian, sources.” The University of Louvain produced or employed a large number of famous humanists, who had a peculiarly close connexion with England. One of these was Jerome de Busleiden, who studied law at Louvain, and was appointed Councillor of State and Master of Requests. He came to England to offer the congratulations of his nation on the accession of Henry VIII.; and here, perhaps, he made the acquaintance of Sir Thomas More. In 1516 More wrote an account of a visit that he paid to Busleiden in Louvain while the English statesman was on a mission in Flanders. More found in Busleiden’s house an organ, which delighted his musical heart; he praises his great library and his mind that was even better stocked than his library; his wonderful collection of Roman medals, his sculptures,



THE LAST SUPPER, by Dierck Bouts.
In the Church of St. Pierre, Louvain.


[Mansell & Co.]

paintings, and carvings. Prof. Foster Watson suggests that More's own famous house at Chelsea was built and adorned, in its more modest way, with Busleiden's mansion at the background of More's memory. Then there was Peter Gilles, or Gilles, of peculiar interest to English people, because it was in conversation with him that More saw first the seafaring man, Raphael Hythlodæ, formerly the companion of Amerigo Vespucci, into whose mouth More put the "idle talk" of the "Utopia." It was Gilles who gave More the Utopian alphabet, and the "four verses in the Utopian tongue." And it was Gilles who wrote to Busleiden of More as "the singular ornament of this our age, as you yourself (right honourable Busleiden) can witness, to whom he is perfectly well known." Further yet; it was in the hands of Peter Gilles that More put the "Utopia" for publication; and after consultation between Gilles and Erasmus, who was much at Louvain, it was to a famous Louvain bookseller, Thierry Martens, that the production of the book was entrusted. It was a Louvain artist, the great Quentin Matsys, who painted

a portrait of Erasmus, and in the picture with him was Peter Gilles, holding in his hand a letter from Sir Thomas More. The picture was sent to More as a present, and passed in time to the collection of Charles I.; since the dissipation of which it has been lost to knowledge. "In the friendship of Thomas More with Erasmus and Gilles," writes Prof. Foster Watson, "English and Belgian humanism were united, and this union was typified and cemented in their common delight in the visions of the longed-for ideal Commonwealth." And it was Louvain, the august and hallowed birthplace of these dreams of an ideal state of mankind, that the Huns of the 20th century chose for destruction.

The bookshops of Louvain, that great city of learning, were famous, and often must Erasmus and other great scholars have visited that of Martens, which was the most famous of all, Thierry Martens was the successor of the earliest of printers in Belgium, John of Westphalia. He printed, among other well-known works, the "Enchiridion Militis Christiani" of Erasmus; and, by a strange coincidence, he issued





LOUVAIN.


Ruins of the Vestibule of the Library.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]

the same author's "Bellum," of which it has been said that it is "a soul-stirring protest against war, a contribution to real progress, for which the world will yet thank Erasmus, and will look to Louvain also with gratitude as his home of the time."

Louvain has often been called "the Oxford of the Low Countries"; and in one respect especially it resembled the great English University. It was made up of a number of separate colleges attached to a central order. Indeed in this respect Louvain was actually ahead of her intimate sister-university; she had more colleges than Oxford. In the 18th century Louvain had 42 to Oxford's 18. The first of these came into being as the result of the will of Jerome de Busleiden, who left money for the teaching of Latin, Greek, and Hebrew. The Latin of the University Professors was not pure Latin, but the jargon of the medieval schoolmen, endlessly engaging in disputations on theology in a peculiarly corrupt form of the tongue. And so the executors of Busleiden's will found it advisable to found a special college where Latin and Greek should be taught properly and Hebrew should also be in the curriculum. This College, named the College of the Three Languages, was opened on September 1, 1518, and Erasmus agreed to become the supervisor. Thus "the 'prince of literary Europe' directed the scholars of the future, and he directed them—from Louvain."

Among the famous men of the College who maintained the intimate connexion of Louvain with England was Adrian Barland, the great Latinist, who visited our country. To Justus Lipsius, one of the most eminent philologists that the world has ever produced, a statue was erected but a few years ago near the station at Louvain; he is well known to many English people, if for no other reason, on account of the sly joke which Sterne permitted My Uncle Toby to make upon him in "Tristram Shandy." Two Englishmen, Robert Wakefield, of Cambridge, and Robert Shirwood, of Oxford, were successively professors of Hebrew at Louvain. Juan Luis Vives, a Spaniard, lectured for part of the year at Oxford, where he had rooms in Corpus Christi College, then lately founded by Bishop Foxe, and part of the year at Louvain; and it was from a book by Vives, called "De Consultatione," that Ben Jonson took many passages in his "Timber." Among other great men of Louvain were Dodoens, the botanist, a native of Malines, Mercator, the geographer, van Helmont, the chemist, and Andreas Vesalius, the founder of modern anatomy. And all these men loved Louvain well. "Hail, our Athens, the Athens of Belgium, O faithful, fruitful seat of the arts, shedding far and wide thy light and thy name"—so sang Justus Lipsius. Erasmus dwelt upon the delicious skies and the quiet for study. Vives says that there "all things are full of love and charm,"



LOUVAIN.

The old Church of St. Pierre before its destruction.

[Central News.]

Clenard, ardently prosecuting in Spain and in Africa the study of languages, longs for "sweet Louvain." But the mere pleasure of physical surroundings does not explain their enthusiasm. So writes Prof. Foster Watson in an article in the *Nineteenth Century* for October, 1914, to which we have been deeply indebted for information; and he continues thus:—

"It was the ideal element in life, the saving of the soul by losing it in something greater than itself that stirred the humanists—Erasmus seeking in his scriptural and classical studies a method of criticism and research which should lead to historical truth; Vives aiming at social amelioration by a reasoned method of poor relief; Vesalius bent on establishing habits of exact observation in anatomy; and Clenard intent upon applying linguistic studies for the up-raising of Eastern thought and life. These high and broad aims of the inner life became as real as the marvels of the discovery of the New World geographically. These things entered into the 'study of imagination' of the humanists, and were the deeper sources of the active joy which they ascribed to the physical charms of Louvain, for it was the atmosphere in which their inspirations had come to them."

Since those great and lofty days of the Renaissance of learning, in which Belgium, as we have seen, played her part, the career of the University of Louvain had not been unchequered. The Emperor Joseph II. of Austria, in the course of his long quarrel with his subjects of the Low Countries, closed the university. Reopened later, it became the only road to public appointments in the Austrian Netherlands. The French closed it again in 1797; but in 1817 it was opened once more by the Dutch during the Union. In 1834, after the separation of the two kingdoms of Belgium and Holland, the State ceased to control the University, and it had since been maintained by the Belgian bishops as a Catholic University. The University of Louvain was therefore the headquarters of religious education in the most Catholic country in Europe, and as such it maintained the tradition of its long and honourable past.

Such was the atmosphere and the spirit—an atmosphere of learning in a quiet old town, the spirit of culture and peace—upon which on that Tuesday evening in August broke all the din and devastation, all the rapine and savagery, of the hordes of modern Huns. It is time to turn to the narrative of what the Prime Minister of Great Britain called "the greatest crime

against civilization and culture since the Thirty Years' War."

The destruction was not accidental, nor the result of shell-fire. It was systematically and deliberately carried out by German soldiers provided with special appliances for the purpose. The name of the officer who gave the order was Major von Manteuffel, who, about the end of September, was superseded in his command, possibly as the result of an official inquiry into the atrocities committed by the German troops. The Germans first pleaded in defence of their action that their troops had been engaged in a conflict with the inhabitants for 24 hours, and that the town had been damaged in the course of this fight. It was proved, however, that before the invaders' entry of the undefended town the Civic Guard had been disarmed and a thorough search made among the inhabitants for all weapons, ancient or modern. The next excuse was that the son of the Burgomaster had fired on the Chief of Staff of the General commanding Louvain, and this had been a signal for the civic guard of Louvain to fire at the soldiers, 50 Germans being killed or wounded. The same objection answers this excuse as the preceding plea. A more probable account of the affair is this. A body of German

soldiers driven out of Malines by the Belgians fell back upon Louvain. Of their comrades, already in the town of Louvain, many by this time were very drunk, since the German soldier, looting the choice cellars of a people with a fine taste in good wine, had been, here as elsewhere, swilling Burgundy as if it were beer. Mistaking the arrival of their fugitive fellows for an attack by the Belgian troops, the drunkards fired upon their own men. The mistake had to be covered up at all costs; and the cost in this case was the burning of the town. Numbers of the male inhabitants were driven away and shot. An eye-witness, who was among those threatened with death, gave the following account of his experiences:—

At 6 o'clock, when everything was ready for dinner, alarm signals sounded, and the soldiers rushed into the streets; shots whistled through the air, cries and groans arose on all sides, but we did not dare leave our house, and took refuge in the cellar, where we stayed through long and fearful hours.

At break of day I crawled from the cellar to the street door, and saw nothing but a raging sea of fire. At 9 o'clock the shooting diminished, and we resolved to make a dash to the station. Abandoning our home and all our goods except what we could carry, and taking all the money we had, we rushed out. What we saw on our way to the station is hardly describable. Everything was burning; the streets were covered with bodies shot dead and half burnt. Everywhere proclamations had been posted summoning every



LOUVAIN.

The Church of St. Pierre as the Germans left it. The Hotel de Ville on the right was practically uninjured.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]

man to assist in quenching the flames and the women and children to stay inside the houses.

The station was crowded with fugitives, and I was just trying to show an officer my legitimation papers when the soldiers separated me from my wife and children. All protests were useless, and a lot of us were marched off to a big shed in the goods yard, from where we could see the finest buildings of the city, the most beautiful historical monuments, being burned down.

Shortly afterwards German soldiers drove before them 300 men and lads to the corner of the Boulevard van Tienen and the Maria Theresa-street, opposite the Café Vermalen. There they were shot. The sight filled us with horror. The Burgomaster, two magistrates, the Rector of the University, and all police officials had been shot already.

With our hands bound behind our backs we were then marched off by the soldiers, still without having seen our wives or children. We went through the Juste de Lipse-street, along the Diest Boulevard, across the Vaart, and up the hill. From the Mont César we had a full view of the burning town, St. Peter in flames, while the troops incessantly sent shot after shot into the unfortunate town.

The soldiers worked at the incendiarism methodically. They began at the heart of the city and worked down to the outskirts, taking street by street and house by house. They went into the houses, churches, and shops, gathered the goods or furniture together, and when they saw that all was well alight passed on to the next building. There was no opposition from the inhabitants, who had either been driven away or were too terrified even to protest. The firing of houses went on steadily for 36 hours or more.

The district most thoroughly wiped out was that in which were situated the university, the library, and the church of St. Pierre. It was at first reported that the famous Town Hall had been destroyed. Later it was learned that the Germans themselves had prevented the flames from attacking it, and that the exterior at least remains uninjured, though it stands amid a waste of desolation and blackened ruins, while the interior was much injured. The damage to St. Peter's Church was not altogether irreparable, though the marvellous and exquisite rood-screen was destroyed; and its pictures were rescued by the soldiers—for subsequent transport, no doubt, to Berlin. A famous early 16th-century house in the Rue de Namur was utterly wrecked. As to the University, a university cannot be burned. It is not a matter of buildings and works of art, it is a thing of the spirit, an organization, an ideal; and the University of Louvain, helped no doubt by her sister universities in other countries, some of whom immediately hastened to offer their hospitality to the survivors among her professors and students, may be confidently expected to rise again from this the most dastardly and the heaviest blow that has ever

fallen upon her. But the University of Louvain must for the future do without the famous old building in which her headquarters had been established for nearly 500 years. The old "Halles," the Cloth Hall, of Louvain, a noble building in the severer form of Gothic, was totally destroyed. True, it had not survived in its pristine form and beauty. Towards the close of the 17th century an upper storey was added, and the interior had been much altered in order to adapt it to the purposes of a university. But there remained, until the Germans came, the wonderful Romanesque arches and pillars in the great hall, or Salle des Pas-Perdus, and much else of architectural and artistic beauty. "Nothing could better indicate," writes Camille Lemonnier, "the power of this citadel of scholarship than the scope and amplitude of its installations; the vesture of long accumulated wealth, nurtured into spreading bloom by privileges, which enabled the university to prosper in the midst of the most cruel torments. Large and spacious courts, imposing buildings, a succession of vast halls, monumental staircases, suggesting the palace of a prelate luxuriously lodged in the midst of all the conveniences of life. Here, one feels, a sovereign master reigns over stone and intellect, equally subservient to his will; and, in fact, the Rector maintains complete jurisdiction over all the members of the university." The pillars alone were left standing. The laboratories, the museum, the workshops, all the equipment of this seat of learning, were destroyed. Even this however, pales before the entire loss of the great library of the University of Louvain, "the arsenal of the great institution," a library smaller, indeed, than the Bodleian or the British Museum, but yet a library famous all over the world, and one of the finest in Europe. Founded by Canon Beyerlinck, continued by Cornelius Janssens, Pierre Stockmans, and Jacques Boonen, Archbishop of Malines, the library of Louvain University had been the recipient through centuries of treasures of learning books, manuscripts, incunabula, in all amounting to more than 100,000 in number and including priceless and unique things that can never be replaced. A Professor of the University, standing in his garden hard by, saw, floating past him on the summer air, charred fragments of priceless illuminated manuscripts. He could do nothing to save them. The loss is irreparable. Learning must suffer for it so long as the world endures. And the destruction was carried out in the name of Culture.



DESTRUCTION OF LOUVAIN.

[Central News.

A photograph of Louvain before the German devastation will be found on page 104 of this volume.

After Louvain, Malines. Malines, or Mechlin, as it was known to the English in the past, and especially to the ladies and gallants who bought the favourite Mechlin lace, is a town of very great antiquity and historical interest, and was a town of great charm and beauty. It was a capital before Brussels. Towards the close of the 15th century Malines became the seat of the Provincial Court or Great Council, the supreme tribunal of the Netherlands.

It was to Malines that Margaret of York moved her seat after the death of her husband, Charles the Bold, and here were educated Philippe le Bel and Margaret of Austria, the famous Regent of the Netherlands. Margaret's successor transferred her residence to Brussels in the middle of the 16th century, and shortly afterwards Malines, which had previously been in the ecclesiastical diocese of Cambrai, was made the seat of the Archbishopric, a dignity which it still held.



LOUVAIN.

Destruction in the Rue de Namur.

[Central News.]

Round the railway station of Malines was always activity and bustle, for here was a great junction of three lines of the excellent Belgian railway system, and here, also, were railway workshops and factories. On the Dyle, too, which winds through the town, there was in times of peace a modest amount of quiet shipping in progress under the bridges, along the quays, and between the tall gabled houses. Everywhere else in Malines there was the quiet of a city which had seen her great days go by and lived only in the dreams of the past. Once a gay and luxurious town, she was scarcely more than a memory, save for the buildings that bore witness to her ancient splendour and the rich life that teemed within her walls. The centre of the town and the town's life was, as in all old Belgian cities, the Grand' Place. Here stood the large and sombre Halles or Cloth Hall, rebuilt in the early part of the 14th century on the model of the Halles of Bruges, with a later and unfinished belfry and a 16th century north wing that was never completed. Here, too, stood the Gothic house, the Schepenhuis, or Vieux Palais of the 14th century, where for a century and a half the Great Council used to sit, and where lately were kept the city archives and the library of Malines; and the Town Hall, a much restored and uninteresting building. A statue of the town's

great patroness, Margaret of Austria, stood in the centre, and all round were charming old houses. But in the Grand' Place of Malines it was always difficult to look about, so engrossed were the eyes and the mind by one object—the immense and lovely fabric of the great Cathedral of St. Rombaut. To turn from the street into the Grand' Place, however well one might know what to expect, was always to be arrested with a shock of delight at the spectacle of the enormous tower flinging itself mightily into the sky. And yet that tower was little more than half what its 15th century builders intended it to be. Within the cathedral used to stand a model of the church with the tower as it was to have been; a springing mass, colossal yet exquisitely graceful, 550ft. in height. Could it have looked nobler than the unfinished tower that was the pride of Malines? This tower was the home of one of the most famous and beautiful of all those carillons, or sets of chimes, which are among the chief attractions of the Belgian towns. The carillon of St. Rombaut was the rival of that of Bruges, and nothing more exquisite in the sound of bells can be imagined than the music that came from this mighty tower on summer evenings. The church, which was very largely built out of the offerings of the myriads of pilgrims to Malines, where indulgencies were

to be obtained, was begun late in the 13th century, and finished early in the 14th; but a fire in 1342 compelled the rebuilding of a great deal of it, and subsequent centuries saw still further changes. It was cruciform in shape, with a high-pitched roof and many elaborate pinnacles—a noble building, entirely worthy of its high position as the archiepiscopal metropolitan church of the Low Countries.

And within it was more full of glories than any church in Belgium, save perhaps Ste. Gudule at Brussels and the Cathedral of Antwerp. Behind the massive pillars of the huge nave lay a profusion of chapels; and the whole cathedral was rich in carved doorways, tombs, statues, pictures, painted glass, altars, tabernacles, stalls, marble and metal. An object rather extraordinary than beautiful was the famous “Chaire de Vérité” or pulpit, a work of the early 18th-century, designed by Michael Vervoort, of Antwerp, an immense and very elaborately carved structure of wood, with tree trunks and foliage twining up the shaft to break in ebullience at the top, while the base consisted of a representation of the conversion of St. Norbert, who was seen falling from his horse at the spectacle of the Crucified towering above him, with the holy

women at the foot of the Cross. Amid the foliage appeared Adam and Eve, the latter just raising her hand to take the apple from the serpent’s mouth. But the chief glory of the interior of St. Rombaut lay in its pictures. There were, as usual in Catholic cathedrals, a vast number of paintings of inferior artistic merit; but St. Rombaut’s was the possessor of a Van Dyck of surpassing beauty, a “Crucifixion,” painted in 1627, in which the colour is superb, the dramatic contrasts are powerful, and the gradations of grief in the chief personages and in the crowd of spectators is finely observed.

There were other churches in Malines with proud claims to distinction. The 15th-century church of St. Jean contained, besides some notable carved woodwork in pulpit (representing the Good Shepherd), high altar and confessionals by Verhaeghen, a famous picture by Rubens of “The Adoration of the Magi,” which hung above Verhaeghen’s altar. Painted in 1617, this was one of the master’s finest works. Not to speak of its superb colour, on which Rubens lavished all the pomp of his glowing palette, the picture shows his unique power over the artistic representation of various



LOUVAIN.

Remains of part of the University buildings.

[Farrington Photo Co.]



LOUVAIN.

Interior of the famous Library before its destruction.

The Sphere.

moods and sides of life. The smile on the face of the Virgin seems to create the whole atmosphere of the main subject. One of the volets shows the beheading of St. John the Baptist, the other the martyrdom, in a cauldron of boiling oil, of St. John the Evangelist; and the palm-bearing angels who fill the sky in the latter subject cannot detract from the horror of the execution. On the outside of the shutters are the Baptism of Christ, and St. John writing the Revelations in the island of Patmos. The picture, as were most of Rubens's works, was very rapidly painted. The parish of St. John gave him the commission at Christmas, 1616; the picture was in position in September, 1617, though Rubens paid several visits to Malines to put finishing touches to it on the spot.

Rubens was to be seen at his noblest again in another church of Malines—the church of Nôtre-Dame au delà de la Dyle, the church of the Boatmen of Malines, whose guild did much

for its ornamentation. This was the church which the Guild of the Fishmongers chose for their gift of a picture by Rubens, choosing an appropriate subject, “The Miraculous Draught of Fishes,” and commissioning the work in 1618. Never, perhaps, did the brush of Rubens achieve a finer work than the head of the figure of Christ, Who, standing at the edge of the boat, watched His disciples haul ashore their teeming nets. The colour of the whole was magnificent, and the action was as dramatic and full of movement as even Rubens could make it. The wings showed equally germane subjects—Tobias and the Angel, St. Peter finding the coin in the fish's mouth, and four fishermen saints.

The interest and beauty of Malines, however, was not confined to its churches. The Palais de Justice was formerly the residence of Margaret of Austria, and afterwards of the great Cardinal Granvella; and this rambling building

round its wide courtyard combined in very interesting fashion the late Gothic with the earliest example in Belgium of Renaissance architecture. Inside were very handsome and elaborate chimney-pieces and other works of art. In old houses of interest, indeed, Malines was particularly rich. The Academy of Music, where church music had its official headquarters in Belgium, occupied part of the old house of Canon Busleiden. Of the old Keizerhof, built by Margaret of York in 1480, and late the residence of Philippe le Bel and of Charles V., nothing remained except the façade. But on the Quai au Sel stood the well-known Maison du Saumon, "In den grooten Zalm," the guild-house of the Fishmongers, with a wonderful Renaissance front, the pillars and carvings of which between the lofty windows clearly betrayed Italian influence. Near by was the Lepelaer, another fine 16th-century house; and on the Quai aux Avoines stood three remarkable old buildings together. The middle one had a tall and severe front, with three strange figures supporting the tier above the door. This was the Maison du Diable, or "Duyvelsgevel," and other grotesque figures carved in the woodwork helped to emphasize the idea. Next to it at the corner stood a more elaborate structure under a lofty gable with painted reliefs representing Adam and Eve in Paradise, and the Expulsion from Paradise. And on the other side of the Devil's House stood a very elaborately-ornamented house of pleasure, on which were carved figures representing earthly joys. The list of old houses in Malines might be almost indefinitely extended; and among the town's treasures was the Grand-Pont, the 13th century bridge over the Dyle, and the Brussels Gate, or Overste Poort, rebuilt in the 17th century, and the sole remaining out of the twelve gates which once gave ingress and egress through the city walls. But enough has been said to show that the ancient and once proud city had preserved sufficient memorials of her august past to deserve the respect and affection of all who see in Culture the understanding and care of the future by means of the softening and refining influences of the ancient days and the enduring expressions of the life, work, worship, and enjoyment of mankind.


Malines, a treasure-house of ancient memories, of works of art, and of peaceful dignity, was an undefended, or open, town; yet it was several times bombarded by the German troops. The first occasion was on August 27, in the course of the German advance north-west across Belgium. There was no good military reason, as it appears;



MALINES.

Removing a picture by Van Dyck to a place of safety.

for the Belgian forces lay between Willebroeck and Termonde. But on this occasion the Town Hall was reduced to ruins, the roof of the Cathedral of St. Rombaut was broken up, large holes were knocked in the walls on one side, and the stained glass was all shattered. The population almost immediately deserted the town; the shops were barricaded, and upon Malines, always a quiet place, there fell the silence of death. A second bombardment, nevertheless, was thought necessary by the German commanders. And this time damage yet more serious was ruthlessly achieved. Among the work of destruction, shells fell upon the church of Notre-Dame au delà de la Dyle. Fortunately the Belgians, with their usual care for things of interest and beauty, and their usual foresight, had removed the famous Rubens to a place of safety, as later they removed other pictures from Antwerp Cathedral and elsewhere. On September 2 Malines was again bombarded for two hours. Nearly 100 shrapnel shells exploded in the defenceless and innocuous town. This time St. Rombaut's suffered more seriously than before. It was at first reported to be in ruins, though that, so far as the exterior, at any rate, was concerned, was an over-statement. What was left of the roof and windows was destroyed; and the Germans cannot be acquitted of the charge of deliberately aiming at the famous tower, which, of course, furnished them with an excellent mark. The magnificent gateway beneath it was turned to a heap of ruins. And now the time had come, too, for the carillon of Malines to share the fate of the other things of beauty and charm which gave to the ancient archiepiscopal



MALINES CATHEDRAL.

The Famous Carved Pulpit, which has been nearly destroyed. (*Mansell & Co.*)

city its chief title to distinction. Playing upon the tower of St. Rombaut, the German guns knocked the bells to pieces, and in a very short time they were totally destroyed. Meanwhile, the refugees from the city, driven from their ruined homes, were still struggling along the roads towards Ostend, with as much of their possessions as they could contrive to carry with them—a pitiful remnant of devastated comfort and peace. Happily, forethought had been at work. On September 14 the chiefs of all the Diplomatic Missions then in Antwerp went to Malines by motor-car in order to see for themselves the destruction that had been committed and report upon it to their Governments. “Unnecessary destruction” was the temperate phrase in which the wrecking of the defenceless town was described by the responsible


people who saw it. Yet the Germans had not finished with Malines. On September 26 a detachment of German troops was surprised on its march from Brussels to Termonde through Alost. Attacked by the Belgians in front and in the flank the detachment fell back in disorder upon Assche, leaving many wounded and much ammunition in the hands of the victors. In revenge for this (for no other motive can be assigned for the deed) the Germans on the following morning shelled Malines with long-distance guns. It was a Sunday morning; and such few people as had remained in the town, or had crept back since the last bombardment, were returning from Mass about half-past nine, when a shell suddenly fell in the middle of a group, killing several people. The remainder fled to a café. Shortly afterwards a shell exploded in the café and several more people were wounded. The rain of shells continued, falling at the rate of nearly one a minute. The railway station was early shelled. Shells fell in the Place de la Gare and the neighbourhood; and the fires then set up consumed the railway station, the barracks, the factory of a cabinet-maker, the house of the Little Sisters of the Poor, the national stamp manufactory, and many private houses. Other houses collapsed in the street, completely blocking traffic. If the destruction of Malines was not so thorough-going as that of Termonde, nor, on the whole, so disastrous as that of Louvain, it was great enough to satisfy the most exacting lust for havoc. “The Cathedral of St. Rombaut,” wrote an eye-witness, “is almost completely destroyed, and the tower is seriously injured.”

Meanwhile the Kaiser's modern Huns had been spreading their peculiar form of “Kultur” further afield over the peaceful and gallant little country which had done them no injury. It was early in September that news came of the Germans' behaviour in Aerschot. Aerschot lies a few miles north of Louvain, on the line from Antwerp to Maastricht and Aix-la-Chapelle. It had a fine Gothic Church of St. Sulpice, chiefly remarkable for its magnificent carved rood-loft and choir stalls, 15th-century work of the richest order. It was this church that the German troops chose as a stable for their horses; this carved woodwork that the troopers of the advance movement destroyed in wanton insolence. In Aerschot, as elsewhere, houses were burned to the ground in revenge for some alleged shooting on the part of the inhabitants, which was probably the act of drunken German soldiers firing their rifles in sport; and in Aerschot, the

burgomaster, his son, and brother were shot in the enforced presence of 150 of the male inhabitants, and the males of the town were forced to run towards the river while the Germans fired at them. Over forty were killed by this cultured form of sport.


We come now to one of the most appalling of all the crimes of vandalism committed by the apostles of Culture in Belgium. Among all the ancient cities of Belgium the town of Termonde had a charm peculiarly its own. Termonde, or Dendermonde, lay in the low country about half-way between Ghent and Malines, on the right bank of the Scheldt, and both banks of the Dendre. Around it ran fortifications which had been formidable in their day. Louis XIV. attempted to capture the place in 1667; the inhabitants opened the sluices, as the modern Belgian has proved himself not afraid to do, and the Grand Mon-

arque's army was flooded out. It took Marlborough ten days' bombardment in a dry season to reduce the gallant little city. The central beauty of Termonde was its Grand Place, with its exquisite and severe Town Hall and belfry on one side, and on another the ancient building that was once the Cloth Hall and was later adapted to make the town's museum. The Grand' Place of Termonde was small, but it was strikingly beautiful. Of the Town Hall Camille Lemonnier well says: "Certainly it has nothing of the imposing solemnity of the belfry of Bruges; but such as it is, with the symmetry of its proportions, the balance of its lines, and the delicious silhouette that it throws into the air, it makes a good appearance among the other stone ancients of the country." The streets were smiling and comfortable, giving every evidence of ease and peace; and on one of the cosy-looking houses the curious might



MALINES.

Interior of Cathedral photographed from above. In the left corner is one of the manuscript notes of the last sermon preached before the bombardment; and a leaf from a book on the right, both pierced by pieces of shell. [Underwood & Underwood.



ST. ROMBAUT, MALINES,

And the Market-place: a characteristic view of life as it was in times of peace.

discern a tablet which recorded the birthplace of a young Belgian, Polydore de Keyser, who afterwards became Lord Mayor of London and was knighted by Queen Victoria. The Gothic church of Nôtre-Dame, massive and somewhat gloomy on the exterior, standing a little aside from the road amid a bower of trees, was not large, but it had rare treasures within it. First of all might be mentioned the superb Romanesque font dating from the twelfth century, and

surrounding it the severe and beautiful oak and brass-railed doors, dated 1635, which were a feature of the famous Brussels Exhibition. But the glory of the Church of Nôtre-Dame at Termonde consisted in its three great pictures, "The Assumption of the Virgin," one of the finest works of that fine painter, De Crayer, who was at one time held to be the only serious rival of Rubens, and a "Crucifixion" and an "Adoration of the Shepherds," by Van Dyck.

This picture was apparently not destroyed. This painting of "The Crucifixion" is one of the best of the master's sacred pictures. At the foot of the cross are the figures of St. Francis of Assisi, the Virgin, and St. Mary Magdalene, and the whole picture is a masterpiece not only of emotional painting but of silvery and exquisite colour.

In the early days of September Termonde, an open town, was bombarded and captured by the Germans, despite the fact that, as in the days of Louis XIV., the surrounding country had been flooded. A good many buildings were destroyed by shells; the suburb of St. Gilles was wiped out, and on the entry of the invading troops the town was sacked and the bridges blown up. Villages around Termonde suffered a similar fate and were burned to the ground. The demand for a fine of £40,000 proving fruitless, the Germans in revenge trained heavy guns on the houses, and burned right and left. By the evening of Sunday, September 6, not a house stood whole; the place was practically a smouldering ruin. As if this were not enough, the Germans, having later evacuated the position, returned some days afterwards and again bombarded the town. This time the Town Hall shared the common fate. The famous peal



THE CRUCIFIXION, by Van Dyck,
In the Church of Nôtre Dame, at Termonde.

Mansell & Co.]

[Photo by Herman.]

of bells in the belfry were brought down; the interior was gutted and its paintings and other art treasures utterly destroyed. Field guns were trained on the tower of Nôtre-Dame, and the church was seriously injured.

A fortnight later the remains of this once famous and beautiful city were visited, in company with a Belgian Staff Officer and others, by Mr. J. H. Whitehouse, M.P., who has thus recorded what he saw :—

Termonde a few weeks ago was a beautiful city of about 16,000 inhabitants; a city in which the dignity of its buildings harmonized with the natural beauty of its situation; a city which contained some buildings of surpassing interest. I found it entirely destroyed; I went through street after street, square after square, and I found that every house was entirely destroyed with all its contents. It was not the result of a bombardment. It was systematic destruction. In each house a separate bomb had been placed which had blown up the interior and had set fire to the contents. All that remained in every case were portions of the outer walls still constantly falling, and inside the cinders of the contents. Not a shred of furniture or of anything else remained.

This sight continued in street after street throughout the entire extent of what had been a considerable town. It had an indescribable influence upon the observer which no printed description or even pictorial record could give. This influence was increased by the utter silence of the city, broken only by the sound of the guns. Of the population I thought not a soul remained—I was wrong. For as we turned into a square where the wreck of what had been one of the most beautiful of Gothic churches met my eyes, a blind woman and her daughter groped among the



MALINES CATHEDRAL.

Window destroyed by German shell.

[Underwood & Underwood.]



MALINES.

The Old Brussels Gate.

[Underwood & Underwood.]

ruins. They were the sole living creatures in the whole of the town. Shops, factories, churches, the houses of the wealthy, all were similarly destroyed. One qualification only have I to make of this statement. Two, or perhaps three, houses bore a German command in chalk that they were not to be burnt. These remained standing, but deserted, amidst the ruins on either side. Where a destroyed house had obviously contained articles of value looting had taken place. In the ruins of what had been a jeweller's shop the remains of the safe were visible amidst the cinders. The part around the lock had been blown off and the contents obviously rifled. I inquired what had become of the population. It was a question to which no direct reply could be given. They had fled in all directions. Some had reached Antwerp, but a great number were wandering about the country panic-stricken and starving; many were already dead.

I had other opportunities of seeing that what had happened at Termonde was similar to what had happened in other parts of Belgium under the military occupation of Germany, and I have given this record of the condition of Termonde because it is typical of so many other parts of Belgium. The result is that conditions have been set up for the civilian population throughout the occupied territory of unexampled misery. Comparatively only a few refugees have reached this country. The others remain wandering about Belgium, flocking into other towns and villages or flying to points a little way across the Dutch frontier.

The whole life of the nation has been arrested; the food supplies which would ordinarily reach the civilian population are being taken by the German troops for their own support; the peasants and poor

are without the necessities of life, and the conditions of starvation grow more acute every day. Even where, as in some cases happens, there is a supply of wheat available, the peasants are not allowed to use their windmills owing to the German fear that they will send signals to the Belgian Army. We are therefore face to face with a fact which has rarely, if ever, occurred in the history of the world—an entire nation in a state of famine, and that within half a day's journey of our own shores.

The completeness of the destruction in each individual case was explained to me later by the Belgian Ministers, who described to me the numerous appliances which the German soldiers carried for destroying property. Not only were hand-bombs of various sizes and descriptions carried, but each soldier was supplied with a quantity of small black discs little bigger than a sixpenny piece. I saw these discs which had been taken from German soldiers on the field of battle. These were described to me as being composed of compressed benzine; when lighted they burn brilliantly for a few minutes, and are sufficient to start whatever fire is necessary after the explosion of the bomb.

"The revengeful act of disappointed black-mailers" is a fitting description of such a deed as this. The responsible author of the outrage was Major Sommerfeld.

The turn of Alost was to come. Alost, a thriving town of East Flanders and a railway junction about half-way between Ghent and Brussels, was important as the centre of the Belgian trade in hops, but still more perhaps for its ancient memories. Alost, or Aalst, was once a capital—the metropolitan city of Keizer-Vlaanderen, the realm of the Counts of Flanders from the eleventh century onwards. Little remained of its ancient glories except the evidence of the elaborate and handsome Town Hall with a very high and crocketed belfry of the fifteenth century. The Church of St. Martin, unfinished, could give but a poor idea of the great fame that should have stood upon the site; but it contained, besides some fifteenth century mural paintings, one great treasure—a picture painted by Rubens about 1625 for the Guild of Alost of Brewers. The subject is Christ appointing St. Roch the guardian of the plague-stricken, and the painter has made the most of the dramatic contrast between the lepers and other sufferers and the radiant glory of the celestial figures.

The ancient ramparts of Alost had mainly disappeared—partly to gratify the modern Belgian's love of broad and airy boulevards, but partly in the stress of centuries of combat. For Alost was no stranger to the horrors of war. In the Wars of Religion it suffered terribly; again and again in later times it was ravaged, and Turenne left an indelible mark upon it. Its final ruin by the German forces in the Great War seemed to be as wanton and needless as the burning of Louvain. A Belgian force advancing westward drove out



TERMONDE.
The Railway Bridge.

[Sport and General.

of Alost the German troops who had entered the undefended and peaceful town. No molestation had been offered them while they were there; but in departing they set fire to the town in several places.

The tale might be almost indefinitely prolonged. On September 28, 1914, a special correspondent of *The Times* wrote an account of the German treatment of two inoffensive and undefended towns, Deynze and Thielt, on the night of



BELGIAN SOLDIER STANDING ON THE RUINS OF ABOVE BRIDGE.

Photographed shortly after it was blown up.

[Sport and General.



TERMONDE.

Re-occupied by the Belgian soldiers after bombardment.

[Record Press.]

Saturday, September 26. Both were small places a few miles south-westward of Ghent. Thielt retained from its busy and prosperous past an old Cloth Hall and belfry; Deynze had an old church. "Nothing that Germany has done in this war," wrote *The Times* correspondent,

has been more contemptible than the dropping of bombs on Saturday night on Deynze and Thielt, and especially on Deynze. At Thielt no harm whatever was done. The bombs fell where they could do, and did, no damage. At Deynze the result was not much different.

Deynze is an open town of no military strength or importance. Besides the church it has one conspicuous institution, the Hospital and Pensionnat of the Sisters of St. Vincent de Paul. It is the mother institution of the order in this region, with some 25 affiliated hospitals and orphanages in other towns. It contains 90 sisters. In addition there are the serving sisters, a number of aged and infirm sisters who are tended here, sick folk who are taken in and nursed, a number of girl orphans, and, at the moment, some 20 poor refugees from Malines. In all, the building shelters some 200 people, women and children, either sick or aged or orphan or giving their lives to charity. Over the building floats a large Red Cross flag.

On this building the airship on Saturday night dropped four bombs. That the injuries to persons were limited to the slight wounding in the leg of one old man of over 80, who had been allowed to sleep in a kind of outhouse, is nothing less than a miracle. The particular bomb which hurt the old man landed and exploded at the outhouse door, shattering it and the bed in which he slept and digging a hole nearly 2ft. deep in the ground. Another fell harmlessly, digging another deep hole in a small paved alley or *endroit* alongside. Two others struck the building.

Both these exploded immediately on hitting the roof—one at a point where it did no harm, except to

the roof itself, and the other immediately above the party wall separating the sisters' dormitory from other rooms. The wall, the passage outside, much of the floor, and a large part of the ceiling of the dormitory were completely wrecked. The sleeping women were covered with plaster and wreckage, but not one was even scratched.

I went over the building yesterday afternoon with the Sister Superior and the Directress, and stood in the half-wrecked dormitory open to the sky. The sisters were even yet carrying their bedding down to the ground floor in fear of a second attack, a work in which we lent a hand. It seems to me that even more damning than any of the great atrocities which the Germans have committed is the picture of that building, the abode of charity and gentleness, with all its helpless inmates, and the midnight bombs exploding in the very sleeping chamber of the Sisters of Mercy. The sight of the house and its inmates to-day enraged me as I have been enraged by nothing even in Termonde, Malines, and elsewhere.

The fate of Antwerp is the subject of a separate chapter; but as early as the night of August 24-25 it had received a menacing hint of the coming "Kultur," when a German airship passed over the city and dropped a number of bombs. According to the calculation of an eye-witness, nearly a thousand houses were slightly damaged and over 50 houses nearly destroyed. One bomb fell very near the Royal Palace; and the majority were aimed at public buildings. The number of victims was considerable. Yet there was a touch of humour in the affair. It was said that a bomb fell upon the German Club and destroyed a statue of the Emperor William. On subsequent occasions Antwerp was again

visited by airships, and among the buildings struck was a large hospital, clearly marked by the Red Cross. The Belgian authorities took the precaution of removing the most valuable objects in the great Cathedral of Antwerp into a place of safe custody; and among the pictures so safeguarded was Rubens' great masterpiece, "The Descent from the Cross."

The facts already given by no means exhaust the list of towns and villages pillaged, shelled, or destroyed by the German troops in their advance towards France through Belgium. At Lierre, for instance, the religious houses of the Black Sisters and the Jesuits were shattered to pieces; the Town Hall of Willebroeck was blown to bits by shells; the village of Andegem was almost totally wrecked, and the church reduced to little better than a ruin. A heavy fate befell Saventhem, a place of peculiar interest owing to its association with Van Dyck. Not only did it possess a famous picture of "St. Martin dividing his cloak with a beggar," painted by that master as one of a series during his early days in Italy, and commissioned for Saventhem by the Seigneur of the place, Ferdinand de Boisschot, Comte d'Erps, but it was Saventhem that saw the famous romance between the painter and the "fair maid,"

Isabella van Ophem, which occupied some months of his life in or about 1630. To all true lovers of art Saventhem should have been a place to protect and cherish for the sake of its association with a great artist. But the more the subject was examined the more complete and awful became the evidence of the trail of devastation which the German forces left behind them in the spread of culture. War, of course (and especially war by means of the terrible explosives which modern science has invented for the destruction of man and all his works), cannot be carried on without havoc. In some cases the Germans could justly plead military necessities. In many others history is unable to acquit them of wanton damage, inspired merely by revenge or by a lust of brutal destruction.

The loss of crops, stock, and farming plant throughout the countryside was incalculable. Before the war Belgium was a densely populated country; most of the land was occupied in small holdings, into which the peasant proprietor and every member of his family put the incessant labour which was characteristic of the people, especially in the portion of the country inhabited by the Flemings, and which had made Belgium what she was. It was no uncommon sight to see the smallest



TERMONDE.
Scene of Destruction.

[Record Press.]



HOTEL DE VILLE, LIERRE.

Former Belgian Headquarters; Garde Civique in the foreground.

children taking their simple and easy share in the cultivation of the family fields and gardens; and it was this universal and un-remitting labour that brought prosperity to the countryside. Such small occupations leave their holders a much narrower margin between comfort and destitution than do large estates, the owner of which can frequently afford to finance his tenants in case of necessity; and the destruction—not all of it, no doubt, wanton—which was wreaked upon these small holdings by the invader entailed a much greater amount of loss and suffering than would have been the

case with large holdings, both by reason of the greater proportion of people to the area, and because small occupiers necessarily put everything they have into their farms and can maintain little reserves of money. Of the refugees who came in their thousands to England a great number were absolutely destitute. Their homesteads had been knocked to pieces and burned; their horses and dogs carried off, their crops utterly ruined, and their very land so left that only years of cultivation could restore it to the state into which minute and laborious toil had brought it.



CHAPTER XIX.

THE GERMAN ADVANCE ON PARIS: BATTLES OF NAMUR, CHARLEROI, MONS.

THE GERMAN OBJECTIVE—AN INVASION THROUGH BELGIUM INEVITABLE—STRENGTH OF THE FRENCH EASTERN FRONTIER AND WEAKNESS OF FRENCH NORTHERN FRONTIER—EXPENDITURE ON FORTRESSES—SYSTEMS OF FORTIFICATION—THE GERMAN AND FRENCH PLANS—A RAPID OFFENSIVE IMPERATIVE FOR THE GERMANS—THE BRITISH EXPEDITIONARY FORCE AND ITS PLACE IN GENERAL JOFFRE'S SCHEME—COMPOSITION OF THE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE—SIR JOHN FRENCH AND HIS RECORD—MOBILIZATION, COMPOSITION, AND TRANSPORT OF THE BRITISH ARMY TO FRANCE—THE THEATRE OF WAR AND POSITION OF THE BRITISH IN IT—THE KAISER AND THE "CONTEMPTIBLE" BRITISH ARMY—MARCH OF THE GERMANS ON THE SAMBRE—CAPTURE OF NAMUR—FORCING OF THE SAMBRE AT AND NEAR CHARLEROI—BATTLE OF MONS.

WE have seen from a foregoing chapter that the German plans were completely upset by the gallant resistance offered by the fortress of Liège and the determined opposition of the Belgian Army. It is true that rarely can any operations of war be carried on continuously in accordance with a previously prepared scheme, for, as Moltke pointed out, the measures taken for any strategical movement only hold good up to the first collision between the opposing forces, the result of which may strongly influence or even completely change the direction of the line of action. It is more correct, therefore, to say that war is conducted in accordance with some "General Idea," which bears in mind certain specific objects.

The first and most important of these is the destruction of the enemy's field armies, for once these are crushed his power of resistance is at an end, and he must perforce yield to the wishes of the victor.

Still, history shows that while this is the main objective, there are others, the attainment of which will often influence the result of a war. The capture of important sources of supply,

whether of food or munitions of war, will have some effect, and in highly centralized States the occupation of the enemy's capital has always produced a profound impression.

Remembering the results previously obtained by the fall of Paris, the Germans believed that its reduction would produce a like effect in the present struggle. Hence the leading idea in the German plan was a quick rush through Belgium, to be followed by a rapid advance on Paris. It might be bombarded from all sides or at any rate a sufficient number of its forts were to be reduced by this means, and then it was believed the city itself would soon surrender under the threat of destruction.

With the large forces which the Germans put in the field at the outset of the war it was absolutely necessary to have a long line of strategical deployment, *i.e.*, the line of country along which the forces were to be developed as a preliminary to their advance into France. To move through the Vosges was impossible on any large scale owing to the paucity of roads. Moreover, the heads of the German columns debouching through the passes would have been brought up by the long line of barrier forts from Épinal



ROYAL MARINE LIGHT INFANTRY ARRIVE ON THE CONTINENT.

This was the first time they had worn khaki.

[Record Press.]

to Belfort. The Gap of Belfort, through which the Austrian Army under Schwartzberg came in 1814, was stopped by the important fortress erected at that point. There remained only two zones of invasion, viz., that between Nancy and Thionville, and that from Maubeuge to Dunkirk, the latter being approachable only through Belgium. For between Thionville and Maubeuge lay the difficult country of the Ardennes, covered with woods, with few railroads leading towards France, and with roads unsuited for the movement of large bodies of men with their heavy military wheel carriage. This region, therefore, could only be used for a comparatively small portion of the invading army.

The advance through Belgium then had many advantages; it was hoped that the Government of the country would yield to *force majeure* and oppose no hindrance to it. It was believed the Belgian Army was of but little value and could be swept out of the way. Thus the Germans would reach a point on the French frontier only about 120 miles from Paris, and their further advance would turn the line of defences on the French eastern frontier. It was known that those of the Northern frontier were not capable of resisting an attack with modern weapons, and would, therefore, not oppose a vigorous resistance to the onward march of the Germans.

France, after the war of 1870, had entered on a period on which it was admitted she must at first assume a defensive attitude towards a

German invasion, and she had constructed a vast series of fortifications at a cost of over £95,000,000 to protect her frontiers. Two main lines of invasion had to be dealt with, which may roughly be described as being the one through Belgium against the line Lille-Maubeuge, the other from the Bavarian Palatinate between Treves and Nancy. The Committee of Defence, presided over by General de Rivière, proposed to meet both dangers by lines of works directly barring them.

The eastern frontier was naturally considered the more important, as the danger of irruption in that direction was more imminent since the northern frontier was to some extent rendered secure by the neutrality of Belgium, guaranteed jointly by France, Prussia, and England; accordingly it received the first and greatest attention. The fortifications of Paris also were so improved that by 1878 it was considered that the enormous perimeter a blockading army would have to occupy—not less than 120 miles—would involve such a subtraction from the German field armies as to reduce the latter to a very restricted offensive and neutralize the advantage that the numerically greater population of Germany, and consequently larger army, gave to that country.

But the heavy cost of construction prevented the carrying out of the plan of work for the northern frontier in its entirety. The first project had comprised a very complete defensive organization. An army was to be assembled

in a central position between the Scarpe and the Sambre, ready to resist a frontal attack from Belgium or to act on the flanks of a force penetrating from that country into France. It was to be supported on its left by Douai and a number of forts which were to protect the inundations to be created on the Scarpe. The Scheldt was also to furnish similar obstacles, which were to be covered by an important fortress at Valenciennes. The right end was to be defended by Maubeuge, to be made into an entrenched camp,* while minor works were to support the latter and also the centre at Quesnoy and other places. Between the Scarpe and the Lys, Lille was also to be made a great entrenched camp, and further to be protected by inundations, while on the coast Dunkirk was to be raised to the status of an important fortress, and Gravelines and Calais were also to be defended.


Further to the south-east of Maubeuge, Mézières on the Meuse was to be converted into a powerful fortress, and forts were to be erected at Rocroy and Hirson; Montmédy and Longwy were to be strengthened.

The discovery of high explosives which could be employed instead of ordinary gunpowder

for the charges of shells—thereby enormously increasing their disruptive effect—brought about a complete change in the military engineering world. The French designers of the seventies had built their fortifications to resist the old weapons; against them could be brought the new. Not only were these superior in the efficacy of their projectiles, but it became plain that heavier guns would, with the great improvements made in the construction of carriages, be brought into the field. For instance, in the middle eighties the Germans kept in constant readiness at Mainz a so-called light siege train of sixty 15m. howitzers intended for use against barrier-forts on the eastern French frontier.* The enormous sum of money already expended on the provision of fortifications, which, as we have seen, amounted to nearly a hundred million pounds sterling, precluded the complete remodelling of the whole system, but considerable sums were devoted to improving that portion which faced Lorraine, and this was largely provided from savings due to the non-completion of works on the Belgian frontier. Those projected at Dunkirk, Valenciennes, and Mézières were postponed, but Fort des Ayolles at the latter place was constructed. A like fate befell St. Omer, Douai, Péronne and other works which it had been


*An entrenched camp is a region enclosed by a ring of forts. If constructed round a town, the latter is often protected by a continuous line of fortifications known as an "enceinte." This secures the town from being rushed should a section of the forts be overpowered. The absence of an enceinte allowed the Germans to rush the town of Liège before the forts had yielded.

* Equivalent to an English 6in. weapon, firing a shell of about 90lb. weight.



A SECTION OF THE ROYAL FLYING CORPS AT THE FRONT.

(Newspaper Illustrations.)



BRITISH TROOPS AT THE FRONT.

Photograph taken in a French town.

[London News Agency.]

originally intended to erect on this frontier. Nor was Lille finished in accordance with the original plan, and was, therefore, in the Great War, not defended. Moreover, the second line which it had been determined to build from La Fère-Laon-Rheims was never properly completed, and thus offered little or no resistance to the onward march of the Germans.


There had, indeed, long been growing up a school of engineers which held that the future of fortification lay in the use of concrete, a more homogeneous material, and therefore not so easily destroyed as brick or stone work, and which believed that the only protection for

guns was to be found in armoured positions made of concrete (later on ferro-concrete), with the guns placed in steel defended cupolas. Spasmodic efforts had been made in this direction a few years after the termination of the Franco-German War. One of the old Antwerp forts had been given an armoured turret. The Germans at first proposed to use large masses of chilled iron to cover gun positions for defence against attack from the sea. Rumania built a ring of forts armed with 6-inch guns in turrets round Bukarest. Lastly, that great master of fortification, the Belgian General Brialmont, who may be truly called the modern Vauban, adopted the system of concrete and iron which he applied to the fortresses of Namur and Liège and the intervening fort of Huy, all on the Meuse, fortresses intended to bar the entry of the Germans into Belgium to Liège and to the ramifications of railways from that town to Brussels, to Namur and through the Ardennes, and to prevent them using the main railway from Aix-la-Chapelle beyond the frontier. Recent events seem to show his views were scarcely correct; he certainly did not foresee the enormous development in power of artillery, and, moreover, he armed his forts with too light guns, viz., 6in. and 4.7in. howitzers firing shells weighing about 90lb. and 40lb. respectively, which could not successfully cope with the far heavier weapons brought against them. It cannot be said that the resistance offered by Namur was adequate to the amount spent on its defences. In the case of Liège, however, the stand it made was of the highest value to the Allies.

The deduction is obvious; if the concrete and turret system is to be employed, the very largest guns must be used and the most powerful cupolas. Will the result be adequate to the price paid? It seems very doubtful, and more than ever the old adage seems to hold good—"Place assiégée, place prise."

It was this consideration which gave rise to another school of engineers which held that all elaborate fortification was a mistake; that forts should be built of earth for infantry defence only, and that guns should be placed in positions carefully thought out, but not constructed till attack was imminent. They pinned their faith on mobility and regarded a railway round the position to be defended as the most important item in a scheme of defence which would allow weapons and munitions to be transferred from one point to another as the requirements of the case demanded. Such a railway would, of course, be

covered from the enemy's fire by a parapet of gentle slope, as shown below. Here *b, b, b*, are the earthen forts, *c, c, c*, the railway.



Section through *d. e.*

Sebastopol and Plevna were good examples of the possibilities of such a system. The lines of Torres-Vedras in 1811, constructed by Wellington for the defence of Lisbon, were beyond the power of Masséna's army to attack. The forts constructed at the end of the 19th century for the defence of London were based on these ideas. On the advent of a Radical Government to power the whole project, however, was abandoned.

To understand the fighting which marked the opening of the war it is necessary to realize the General Ideas of both the German and French commanders. Both were simple in their conception. The former proposed to overrun Belgium and to move rapidly across the French frontier down to Paris and, after the destruction of the British Fleet, to invade England and dictate peace in London on such terms as Germany might determine. The French plan offered a more modest programme. At first it was to be defensive. An army was to watch the debouch of the Germans from Belgium, another was to watch the Eastern frontier of France from a position behind Verdun. Probably a force was to be assembled within the pentagon formed by the entrenched camp of Épinal, Langres, Besançon, Dijon, and Belfort, while behind there was to be a reserve ready to be thrown towards whichever flank required it. None of these arrangements was carried out in its entirety.

With a reprehensible neglect of the wishes of the great War Lord, the Belgians determined to play the part of honourable men and defend their country. The Belgian Army barred the way and Liège was prepared to defend itself to the bitter end. So certain had the Germans been of the easiness of the task of disposing of the Belgian forces that the troops which first invaded Belgium appear to have been



A BELGIAN CART DRAWN BY DOGS.
Has been used in France for transporting machine-guns and ammunition.

[Sport and General.



GERMAN PRISONERS CAPTURED BY THE BRITISH.
British troops are lining the route.

[London News Agency.]

imperfectly mobilized and to have possessed very little siege artillery to deal with the forts. The result is well known. Liège held out; the Germans uselessly expended thousands of men, and the time-table of campaign so carefully drawn up by the German demi-gods of the Imperial General Staff had to be radically revised. The possession of Liège and its sister-fortress of Namur was vital to the Germans, because without them the main railway line through Belgium to the French frontier was not available nor could the other lines from Liège be used. But the gallantry displayed in the old archbishopric town did something more. It was difficult for a nation like the French, so brave in itself and such an admirer of bravery in others, to avoid the principle of moving to the sound of the cannon. Part of the French northern army, therefore, was moved up to aid their allies. When Namur fell and the enemy was enabled to bring up more troops and supplies, the advanced force found itself exposed to direct attack by far superior numbers, and, what was more dangerous, to flank attack on its right by Germans coming through the Ardennes. In the meantime Sir John French had brought up two divisions and the cavalry division of the English Army, in accordance with the arrangement come to with General Joffre, to occupy the ground on the left of the French, and this, as we shall see, helped to stem the German advance.

Before going into considerations of the fighting which thus arose, let us consider briefly the

strategical events up to the time of the junction of the British with the French.

In the German plan time was the essence of the bargain. To rush down to Paris and capture it was to form the first act of the drama. As the main advance of the Emperor's troops was to be made through Belgium, a considerable part of his army moved in this direction, and of the whole German Army by far the greater part was used against the French, whom it was desired to crush before dealing with the Russians, who would, it was calculated, be scarcely concentrated on the joint frontier before the French were put out of action. This plan, however, had in it the fatal error that no one of the German adversaries did what the German General Staff had laid down as its duty to do. On the Allies' left Belgium resisted, the Russians mobilized far more rapidly than was anticipated, while all along the line of invasion the French put up so good a fight that the cooperation of the German centre and left wing coming through Luxemburg and Lorraine was limited to obtaining contact with their right wing.

Of the 25 Army Corps of their first-line troops four only seem to have been employed against Russia and 21 against France.* Of these about four were used at first for the operations against Liège, and, in the advance against

* The French had 21 Army Corps, i.e., the same number as the Germans, and of about equal strength. The Germans put into the field 21 Reserve Corps, besides a number of Landwehr and even Landsturm divisions, but all of these were probably not available at first. The number of Reserve Divisions of the French is uncertain.

the retiring Allies, appear to have been partly on the left of the German First Army, which formed the right of the force following up the left of the Allies in their retreat towards Paris.

Now, it was essential for the Germans to keep the French occupied on the whole line of their north and north-eastern frontiers and along the intervening section between these two regions facing the Ardennes. For if the line of attack through Belgium was clearly indicated from the first, it would be possible for the French, with their extensive network of railways stretching along the line on which their troops were deployed, to move their troops so as to concentrate in superior force against them. Roughly, at the outset, so far as the regular troops were concerned, the numbers must have been fairly equal, and the German superiority, which undoubtedly existed, must have been due to the use of Reserve Corps from the beginning. But this superiority never had any great effect on the struggle. Why? In the first place, the French incursion into Alsace from Belfort and over the Vosges seems to have diverted a considerable body of German troops against it. In the second, there can be no doubt that Verdun and the forts around it were able to resist any attempts made against them because the Germans were not able to spare their heaviest artillery for use in this direction, and because the fortifications were more thoroughly prepared

than those facing Belgium. Hence their infantry advances were all eventually repelled. The line of battle, it is true, fluctuated, but, on the whole, the French held their own on their right flank and in the centre.

When the Allied left was driven back the distance retreated was much greater than was the rearward movement on their right. The explanation of this is simple. Under modern conditions frontal attack is exceedingly difficult and costly, and almost impossible against a well-held line. Hence, in the centre, where flank attack on any large scale was impossible, progress was necessarily slow. On the right (the Verdun-Belfort) flank, the defensive positions held by the French were too strong when directly attacked, while to outflank them was impossible because, great as were the numbers the Germans brought into the field, they did not suffice to devote sufficient force to encircling the right as well as the left of the Allies. The Germans had definitely committed themselves to the former course; they had perforce to abandon the latter for fear their general front, becoming too thin, should be penetrated, which would have given rise to a highly dangerous position, as it would have exposed the portion cut off from the rest (which would certainly have been the right wing) to complete disaster.

It is an axiom of war that every offensive must in time come to an end, because when



BRITISH FIELD GUN.

Covered with wheat to conceal its presence from the enemy.

[Daily Mirror.

invading an enemy's country troops have to be left behind to guard communications, which the defenders do not need to do as the country is friendly to them. This was clearly shown in Russia in 1812, when out of the 600,000 with which Napoleon crossed the Niemen only 90,000 were available for the battle of Borodino. When Kluck with the first German Army followed up the British, extending his line more and more to the right, there came a time when he had so weakened it that it was liable to penetration, combined with flank attack, by the reinforcements the British received, and by the bringing up to the extreme left of the Paris army. This was impossible at first because very large forces were committed to the offensive operations in Alsace. But as soon as these came to an end, the French being driven back by the superior forces the Germans brought against them, the attitude on the eastern frontier became entirely defensive, and Pau was sent off with the 6th Army to support the British left. The German leaders began to appreciate this danger when they saw the peril which their own extension of the right wing had led them into, and from the end of the first week in September they saw the need for drawing in their horns. Instead of the Allies' left wing being threatened with outflankment, it was the German right wing which was now in danger; hence the pulling it in and Kluck's flank march of concentration to join the German centre. Then the Allies assumed the offensive.

To the upsetting of the German plans by compelling them to abandon all attempts on Paris—the second act of the Kaiser's drama—the British largely contributed.

The composition of our Expeditionary Army was as follows :—*

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF:

FIELD-MARSHAL SIR JOHN FRENCH.
CHIEF OF THE STAFF.

LT.-GEN. SIR ARCHIBALD MURRAY, K.C.B.
MAJ.-GEN. SIR W. ROBERTSON, K.C.V.O.,

QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL.

MAJ.-GEN. SIR NEVIL MACREADY, K.C.B.,

ADJUTANT-GENERAL.

1st ARMY CORPS.

LT.-GEN. SIR DOUGLAS HAIG, K.C.B., &c.
(1st and 2nd Divisions.)

1st DIVISION—MAJ.-GEN. LOMAX.

1st INFANTRY BRIGADE—BRIG.-GEN. MAXSE,
C.B.

1st Coldstream Guards.

1st Scots Guards.

1st Royal Highlanders.

2nd Royal Munster Fusiliers.

2nd INFANTRY BRIGADE—BRIG.-GEN. BULFIN,
C.B.

2nd Royal Sussex Regiment.

1st North Lancashire Regiment.

1st Northamptonshire Regiment.

2nd King's Royal Rifle Corps.

3rd INFANTRY BRIGADE—BRIG.-GEN. LONDON,
C.B.

1st Royal West Surrey Regiment.

1st South Wales Borderers.

1st Gloucester Regiment.

2nd Welsh Regiment.

ROYAL ARTILLERY—BRIG.-GEN. FINDLAY, C.B.
XXV., XXVI., and XXXIX. Brigades Royal
Field Artillery, 18-pounders.

XLIII. Howitzer Brigade.

26th Heavy Battery, 60-pounders.

ROYAL ENGINEERS—LT.-COL. SCHREIBER.

23rd and 26th Field Companies and 1st Signal
Company.

There was also a Cavalry Regiment with the
division.

* These details have been compiled entirely from the Army List and by reference to the Field Service Pocket Book, and from notices which have appeared in the newspapers.



MEAUX FROM THE RIVER MARNE.
Showing the broken bridge and sunken house-boats.

[Sport and General.

2ND DIVISION.

4th INFANTRY BRIGADE—

2nd Grenadier Guards.
2nd Coldstream Gu rds.
3rd Coldstream "
1st Irish Guards

5th INFANTRY BRIGADE—BRIG.-GEN. HAKING, C.B.

2nd Worcester Regiment.
2nd Oxford and Bucks Regiment.
2nd Highland Light Infantry.
2nd Connaught Rangers.

6th INFANTRY BRIGADE—BRIG.-GEN. R. H. DAVIES, C.B.

1st Liverpool Regiment.
2nd South Staffordshire Regiment.
1st Berkshire Regiment.
1st King's Royal Rifle Corps.

ROYAL ARTILLERY—BRIG.-GEN. PERCEVAL, D.S.O.

XXXIV., XXXVI., and XLI. Brigade Royal
Field Artillery, 18-pounders.
XLIV. Brigade Howitzers.
35th Heavy Battery, 60-pounders.

ROYAL ENGINEERS—LT.-COL. BOYS.

5th and 11th Field Companies, 1st Bridging
Train. 2nd Signal Company.

There was also a Cavalry Regiment.

2ND ARMY CORPS.

GENERAL SIR H. L. SMITH-DORRIEN, G.C.B. &c.
(3rd and 5th Divisions).

3rd DIVISION—MAJ.-GEN. H. I. W. HAMILTON, C.B.

7th INFANTRY BRIGADE—BRIG.-GEN. MC-CRACKEN, C.B.

3rd Worcester Regiment.
2nd South Lancashire Regiment.
1st Wiltshire Regiment.
2nd Royal Irish Rifles.

8th INFANTRY BRIGADE—BRIG.-GEN. DORAN, C.B.

2nd Royal Scots.
2nd Royal Irish Regiment.
4th Middlesex Regiment.
1st Gordon Highlanders.

9th INFANTRY BRIGADE—BRIG.-GEN. SHAW, C.B.

1st Northumberland Fusiliers.
4th Royal Fusiliers.
1st Lincoln Regiment.
1st Royal Scots Fusiliers.

ROYAL ARTILLERY—BRIG.-GEN. WING, C.B.

XXIII., XL., and XLII. Brigade Royal Field
Artillery, 18-pounders.
XXX. Brigade Howitzers.
48th Battery, 60-pounders.

ROYAL ENGINEERS—LT.-COL. WILSON.

56th and 57th Field Companies. 3rd Signal
Company.

There was also a Cavalry Regiment unidentifi-
able from the Army List.

5th DIVISION—MAJ.-GEN. SIR C. FERGUSON, Bt., C.B.

13th INFANTRY BRIGADE—BRIG.-GEN. CUTHBERT, C.B.

2nd King's Own Scottish Borderers.
2nd West Riding Regiment.
1st Royal West Kent Regiment.
2nd Yorkshire Light Infantry.

14th INFANTRY BRIGADE—BRIG.-GEN. ROLT, C.B.

2nd Suffolk Regiment.
1st East Surrey Regiment.
1st Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry.
2nd Manchester Regiment.



A BRITISH OUTPOST.

On the look-out for the enemy.

[Daily Mirror

15th INFANTRY BRIGADE—BRIG.-GEN. COUNT GLEICHEN, C.B., &c.

1st Norfolk Regiment.
1st Bedford Regiment.
1st Cheshire Regiment.
1st Dorset Regiment.

ROYAL ARTILLERY—BRIG.-GEN. HEADLAM, C.B.

XV., XVII., XVIII. Brigades Royal Field
Artillery, 18-pounders.
VIII. Howitzer Brigade.
108th Heavy Battery, 60-pounders.

ROYAL ENGINEERS—LT.-COL. TULLOCH.

7th and 59th Field Companies. 5 Signal
Companies.

There was also a Cavalry Regiment.

The 4th Division apparently formed part of
the 3rd Army Corps, the other Division being
the 6th. Only the 4th Division took part in
these operations

It was composed as follows:—

4th DIVISION—MAJ.-GEN. SNOW, C.B.

10th INFANTRY BRIGADE—BRIG.-GEN. J. A. L. HALDANE, C.B.

1st Royal Warwick Regiment.
2nd Seaforth Highlanders.
1st Royal Irish Fusiliers.
2nd Royal Dublin Fusiliers.

11th INFANTRY BRIGADE—BRIG.-GEN. HUNTER-WESTON, C.B.

1st Somerset Light Infantry.
1st East Lancashire Regiment.
1st Hampshire Regiment.
1st Rifle Brigade.



ENTRENCHING A 60-POUNDER GUN.

[Daily Mirror.]

12th INFANTRY BRIGADE—BRIG.-GEN. H. F. M. WILSON, C.B.

1st Royal Lancashire Regiment.
1st Lancashire Fusiliers.
2nd Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers.
2nd Essex Regiment.

ROYAL ARTILLERY—BRIG.-GEN. MILNE, C.B.
XIV., XXIX. and XXXII. Brigades Royal Field Artillery, 18-pounders.
XXXVII. Brigade Howitzers.
31st Battery, 60 pounders.

ROYAL ENGINEERS.
54th Field Company. 2nd Bridging Train.
There was also a Cavalry Regiment.

The Cavalry with the Expeditionary Force numbered five brigades, according to the Army List :—

1st CAVALRY BRIGADE, under BRIG.-GEN. C. J. BRIGGS, C.B.

2nd Dragoon Guards.
5th Dragoon Guards.
11th Hussars.

2nd CAVALRY BRIGADE, under BRIG.-GEN. DE LISLE, C.B.

4th Dragoon Guards.
9th Lancers.
18th Hussars.

3rd CAVALRY BRIGADE, under BRIG.-GEN. H. GOUGH, C.B.

4th Hussars.
5th Lancers.
16th Lancers.

4th CAVALRY BRIGADE, under BRIG.-GEN. the HON. C. E. BINGHAM, C.B.

Composite Regiment Household Cavalry.
6th Dragoon Guards.
3rd Hussars.

5th CAVALRY BRIGADE, under BRIG.-GEN. SIR P. W. CHETWODE, Bt., D.S.O.

2nd Dragoons
12th Lancers.
20th Hussars.

Of these, the first four formed the Cavalry Division, under Maj.-Gen. Allenby, C.B. Other troops with the Division would be two Horse Artillery brigades, or 24 guns, 2 machine guns per regiment, or 24 in all. It had, in addition, one Field Squadron of Engineers and one Signal Squadron.

The average strength of a British Division may be taken as 12,000 infantry, one regiment of cavalry, and 76 guns, viz., 54 18-pounders, 18 howitzers and 4 60-pounder guns for the heavy battery; two Field Companies of Engineers, besides signallers and the train services for ammunition and food supply. Altogether the division has 24 machine guns distributed among the twelve battalions, two to each. For the purposes of calculating the fighting strength in the line of battle, it is the infantry and artillery alone which count.

Sir John French, the generalissimo, was turning sixty-two, and, therefore, a couple of years younger than Lord Kitchener. Like Sir Evelyn Wood and other illustrious officers, he had been originally destined for a naval career. The son of a naval officer, and, though born in Kent, of Irish descent on his father's side, he had joined the Britannia in 1866, and served as a naval cadet and midshipman for four years. His experience in the Navy had caused him to hold strong views on the advantage of training soldiers from their boyhood for the arduous profession of arms. "I have," he had publicly said in the January of 1914, "always been an ardent advocate of the principle that youths and boys who are destined to become officers in the Army should commence a special military training at the earliest possible age. The principles of war have to be known and remembered, and its practice conducted under very distracting conditions. The science of war . . . must, so to speak, form part of our flesh and blood, and the earlier in life this knowledge is instilled and acquired, the more instructive, valuable and lasting it is likely to be." He had left the Navy, and through the Militia had entered the 8th Hussars in 1874. Transferred immediately to the 19th Hussars, he had, after being Adjutant to the Auxiliary Forces, served

through Lord Wolseley's Nile Campaign, and he had been present at the actions of Abu Klea and Metemmeh. In 1889, at the age of thirty-seven, he became Colonel of his regiment, and was the first to establish the squadron system of training which was subsequently adopted throughout the Army. He had attracted the notice of Lord Wolseley and, from 1893 to 1894, he was employed on the Staff as Assistant Adjutant-General of Cavalry, and, from 1895 to 1897, as Assistant Adjutant-General at Headquarters. In the latter year he was appointed Brigadier to command the 2nd Cavalry Brigade, and in 1899 he was transferred as temporary Major-General to the 1st Cavalry Brigade at Aldershot.

The South African War broke out and he departed for Natal in command of the cavalry. He directed the troops at the victory of Elands-laagte, so graphically described by the late George Steevens, and he was present at the actions of Reitfontein and Lombard's Kop. He left Ladysmith in the very last train to start before that town was completely beleaguered. "Had it not been for this," he is reported to have said, "I should never have had the luck subsequently to command the Cavalry Brigade, and someone else would have been filling my shoes to-day, and," he added with characteristic modesty, "probably filling them a good deal better."

His conduct during the remainder of the war belied his self-depreciation. At Colesberg, with a skeleton force, he guarded Cape Colony while

Lords Roberts and Kitchener were preparing for the great offensive movement to relieve Kimberley and Cecil Rhodes, and, indirectly, to relieve Ladysmith and Sir George White. It was French who, as Lieut.-General, commanded the cavalry which galloped through the Boers at Klip Drift and raised the siege of Kimberley. From Kimberley he was called by Lord Kitchener to Paardeberg, where he headed the retreating Cronje. Throughout the remainder of the war he was one of the right-hand men, first of Lord Roberts, and then of Lord Kitchener, being mentioned in dispatches eight times.


On his return to England in 1902 he commanded the 1st Army Corps at Aldershot until, in 1907, he succeeded the Duke of Connaught as Inspector-General of the Forces. In 1911 he was appointed Chief of the Imperial General Staff. The efficiency of the British Army, especially the Cavalry (the conversion of which into mounted infantry he had strongly and, as it turned out, very properly resisted), was largely due to his exertions and ability.

He was a cool, level-headed soldier, and—as his action in resisting the tide of plausible opinion which was for relegating the lance and sword to military museums had shown—an independent thinker. Though he had written little, he was widely read in military history and military science. He had attended the French manoeuvres, and was liked and respected by the French officers. His affection for their



BRITISH ARTILLERY ON THE MARCH.

[Photopress.]



A RAILWAY WRECK.

[Sport and General.

A train of wounded was precipitated into the River Ourcq near Lizy, caused by the blowing up of a bridge, the driver believing the line to be safe.

nation was sincere and undoubted. Seventeen years older than Cromwell at Marston Moor, ten years older than Marlborough when he took command of the allied forces in Holland against Louis XIV., fifteen years older than Sir John Moore at the date of the latter's daring stroke against the communications of Napoleon in 1808, seventeen years older than Wellington on the field of Waterloo, and five years younger than Lord Roberts when he landed at the Cape in 1900, Field-Marshal French was about to undertake perhaps the most difficult and momentous operation ever entrusted to a British General. Would some future soldier say of him as he had said of Wolfe in the January preceding the fateful August of 1914:—"What has struck me more than anything in reading his history has been the extraordinary fertility of his brain in the ingenious and varied forms of stratagem which he conceived to deceive his enemy and effect surprise!" A month after the Expeditionary Force landed in France, Lord Kitchener, his old commander, in the House of Lords, was referring to the "consummate skill and calm courage of Sir John French in the conduct of the strategic withdrawal in the face of vastly superior forces. His Majesty's Government," pursued Lord Kitchener, "appreciated

to the full the value of the service which Sir John French had rendered to this country and to the cause of the Allies."

The order to mobilize was issued to the British generals who were to command the Expeditionary Force on August 4th, while at the same time the General Post Office delivered to the Reservists orders for rejoining their regiments. On the 5th, the depôts were delivering clothes and equipments to the Reservists who, clothed and equipped, were dispatched to their regiments. Meanwhile, to guard against alien enemies interfering with the railway traffic, the Special Service Section of the Territorial Force was posted on the lines, bridges, culverts and cuttings of the railroads. All Government stores, harbours, docks and transports were also protected.

By the incorporation of the Reservists the Army was stiffened with men in the prime of life, who, after a much longer term of discipline than that of soldiers in Continental Armies, had afterwards been forced to think and act for themselves in the various exigencies of civil business.

For each Reservist the clothes and equipment required for a campaign were kept in readiness. The boots furnished were the best military

boots in the world. Times had changed since George Steevens, referring to the equipment of the British contingent sent to Omdurman, wrote that the "boots our British troops were expected to march in had not even a toe-cap," and that "the soles peeled off, and instead of a solid double sole revealed a layer of shoddy packing sandwiched between two thin slices of leather."

An army marches not only on its feet but on its belly, and both facts had been fully appreciated. The organization for feeding the men and bringing up supplies of all kinds in the field were of the most modern kind. Motor lorries for the transport of stores had been abundantly provided, and soon the roads of France were to be traversed with automobiles and vehicles commandeered from the commercial firms of Great Britain and Ireland.

Within a week the Expeditionary Force was ready to start for France. This was entirely due to the General Staff at the War Office, and the fact that the concentration of the troops worked with machine-like regularity showed how admirably their work of preparation had been done.

The next step was to transport the army to the seat of war. The railways had been taken over by the Government, and were being run with the assistance of a Committee of Civilian Managers. The first Army Service Corps unit left for the Lines of Communication at 8 a.m. on the initial day of mobilization. Train after train loaded with soldiers passed to the ports of embarkation. At the quays the process of conveying the troops and materials of war was handed over to the Navy. How the Navy performed its task will be described in a subsequent chapter. Convoyed


by the Fleet, the Expeditionary Force was carried without mishap to the shores of France.

At Boulogne, Havre, and the other points where the Expeditionary Force was landed, and where in advance rest-camps had been prepared for it, the troops were received with the wildest enthusiasm. On August 14th the British Commander-in-Chief, who had been met on his landing by Comte Daru, arrived at the French Headquarters, and the next day he visited Paris to pay his respects to the President of the French Republic.

To aid intercourse with their new allies, as few of the privates and non-commissioned officers could speak French, the men had been given a half-sheet typewritten French-English dictionary, containing the words which it was most necessary for them to know, and a staff of interpreters drawn from various sources in Great Britain was provided for them.

From the rest-camps, almost the whole of the 1st and 2nd Corps—the 3rd Corps had not yet arrived—proceeded to the Belgian frontier.

It was in a gay but determined spirit that the British marched to meet the most formidable engine of war ever constructed in the history



A FRENCH RED CROSS TRAIN WHICH WAS DERAILED AND PRECIPITATED INTO THE RIVER.

[Underwood and Underwood.]

of man. One incident, however, had cast a momentary gloom over the Army; General Grierson, who commanded the 2nd Corps, had died of heart failure on the 17th August. No British officer was better acquainted with the merits and demerits of the German Army. Years before he had conveyed to his fellow-soldiers the result of his researches on Germany (in his "Armed Strength" of the German Army).

He was fifty-four years old at the date of his death. His place was filled by General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien.

The position assigned to the British Army by General Joffre was north of the Sambre, a tributary of the Meuse, into which the Sambre flowed at Namur, a Belgian ring-fortress. The bulk of the Allied Army was disposed in the area bounded on the west by the Oise, which enters the Seine a few miles below Paris, on the north by the Sambre, on the east by the Meuse, and on the south by the Seine, and by its northern tributary, the Aube. The headwaters of the Seine, Aube and Meuse are on or near the plateau of Langres, which was guarded by the fortress of that name. Between the sources of the Aube and the Meuse rises the Marne, which, traversing Vitry, Chalons-sur-Marne, Epernay, Château Thierry, La Ferté, Meaux, enters the Seine within the vast entrenched camp of Paris.

From Vitry the Marne-Rhine canal started for Strassburg, also the terminus of the Rhône-Rhine canal. At La Ferté the Petit Morin,

which runs through Montmirail, empties itself from the south into the Marne, while, between La Ferté and Meaux, the Marne is increased from the north by the waters of the Ourcq. The Grand Morin from the south joins the Marne below Meaux.


As the lower courses of the Seine, Aube, and Marne flow from the east to the west, and their upper courses from the south to the north, they form barriers to an invader coming either from the north or from the east. A further natural obstacle to an invader from the north is a tributary of the Oise, the Aisne, rising in the Argonne Forest hills which lie west of Verdun. Verdun was the fortress at the northern end of the line of artificial defences—Belfort-Épinal-Toul-Verdun—stretching from the frontiers of Switzerland to the latitude of the fortress of Metz in Lorraine, which faces Verdun. The nature of this line of artificial defences has been described in Chapter XXIII. From Verdun to the ring-fortress of Toul, from Epinal to Belfort, there were chains of isolated and powerful forts. To the south, behind Epinal, commenced that mountain barrier which, under various names, separates the valleys of the Saône and Rhône from the rest of France.

In the Argonne district is Valmy, where the Teutonic invaders of France in 1792 were finally checked. The Aisne, rising from the southern end of the Argonne, flows northward to about the latitude of Longwy, situated in the pocket formed by the frontiers of Belgium,



GERMAN OFFICERS IN AN ELABORATE SPLINTER-PROOF ENTRENCHMENT.

[Record Press.]



BRITISH SOLDIERS IN THE TRENCHES.

[Daily Mirror.]

Luxemburg, and Germany. It then turns westward and, passing about midway between the fortifications of Rheims (due north of Epernay on the Marne) and those of Laon, traverses Soissons and joins the Oise at Compiègne. The Aisne, for most of its course, is another barrier to an invader from the north. On the Oise, above Compiègne and a little to the north-west of the latitude of Laon, was the fortress of La Fère.*

In the oblong formed by the Oise and the upper Sambre on the east, the Seine on the south, the English Channel and the Straits of Dover on the west, and the Franco-Belgian frontier on the north, the chief natural obstacle to an invader from Belgium was the River Somme, which rises a little to the north of St. Quentin, itself fifteen miles north-west of La Fère. The Somme, flowing through Amiens and Abbeville, divides this oblong roughly into two halves. In the southern half, on the coast, were the ports of Dieppe and, at the

mouth of the Seine, Havre, which was strongly fortified. The chief ports in the northern half were (from south to north) Boulogne, Calais, and, on the French side of the Belgian frontier, Dunkirk. The two latter towns were afforded some protection by forts.

Half-way between Dunkirk and the fortress of Maubeuge on the Sambre was the unfinished fortress of Lille. It was between Lille and the northern bank of the Sambre that General Joffre had decided that the British Army should be stationed. Assuming that the German invasion was repulsed, Sir John French's forces would be within easy reach of Calais and Boulogne, two of their ports of disembarkation, and their base, Havre. Thrust to the vicinity of Paris, they could draw their reinforcements, munitions, and supplies, if necessary (which, indeed, happened), through Le Mans from St. Nazaire at the mouth of the Loire.

On October 1 *The Times* published the text of an army order issued by the Emperor William on August 19:—

"It is my Royal and Imperial Command that you concentrate your energies, for the immediate present, upon one single purpose, and that is that you address all your skill and all the valour of my soldiers to exterminate first the treacherous English and walk over General French's contemptible little Army*. . . ."

"Walk over" our Army, forsooth! Did the Kaiser not know that our men are the descendants of those who fought the live-long day at Waterloo till the tardy arrival of the Prussians enabled them to advance and drive their opponents from the field? That their forebears formed the immortal Light Division which at the storming of Badajoz could not win their way up the deadly breach yet stood for hours in the ditch, a prey to shot and shell, unable to go forward, but sternly refusing to go back; that their grandfathers held for months the ridge at Delhi, a mere handful compared with their foes within the town, and that they finally stormed it with a force which was not a third of the disciplined men who manned its walls?

What does Müffling say of the British?—that they were the finest troops in Europe for the day of battle. What did Marshal Bugeaud say? "The English infantry is the most magnificent in the world; happily there is but little of it." In Belgium, at any rate, there was enough to hold at bay four times its own strength of

*It has been pointed out on p. 443 that the fortresses of Rheims, Laon, La Fère, Maubeuge, and Lille had not been completed. Maubeuge alone offered a serious resistance.

* The authenticity of this order was subsequently denied by the German Government. Nevertheless an order of almost equal insolence was issued by the Crown Prince of Bavaria (see *The Times*, October 19, 1914).



GERMAN INFANTRY ADVANCING.

[Daily Mirror.]

Germans and dispute with the greatest courage every yard of the road to Paris.

Against the Allied Army on the Sambre was marching, riding or motoring a vast force of Germans. They were accompanied by an enormous number of guns and mitrailleuses—some mounted on armoured automobiles—by a flock of Taube aeroplanes and some airships, and by trains of pontoons. Motor ploughs had been provided for digging trenches—and graves. Imagine that all the inhabitants of Birmingham were men in the prime of life, that they were dressed in a uniform which rendered them invisible except at close quarters; that they were armed with repeating rifles, swords, lances, automatic pistols, and that, attended by doctors, cooks, portable kitchens, motor-omnibuses, traction engines, motor-lorries, horses and carts, and grave-diggers, they were moving in columns, on foot or on horseback, in motor-cars or char-à-bancs, or in aeroplanes, to cross or fly over the Thames from Reading to Oxford. One has then some faint idea of the disciplined horde advancing on the Allies deployed from Condé to Namur. The following description of a distinguished French artist arrested by the Germans near Namur enables us to catch a glimpse of this phenomenon so novel in the annals of humanity:—

After sleeping in a barn with Zouave prisoners, a soldier standing over us with fixed bayonet, we were called at 5 the next morning. The prisoners were told to peel potatoes for the field kitchen. I made my toilet while a guard followed me about. At 6 all the soldiers began to form up. Orders came from the officers like pistolshots, the click of heels and the thud of shoulder arms coming as from one man. Woe to the man slightly out of line! The close-cropped officer spat at him a flow of expletives, showing his teeth like a tiger ready to spring.

I was placed in the middle of a marching column, and as I was loaded with my knapsack and coat (a soldier near me carrying my papers) I could take part in the sensations of the men under the iron discipline of the officers. The road lay inches thick of chalky dust, which rose in clouds above our heads. Never were we allowed to open out as I had seen the

marching Belgians do, and let the air circulate. We plodded on the whole day, the only rest being when there was an occasional block on the road. The march was as if on parade. Should one fall out of step the shouts of his superior soon brought him up.

Now and then men were waiting with buckets and as the column swung by the soldiers dipped in their aluminium cups. Another man would be holding a biscuit tin full of sweets, or it might be handfuls of prunes, but still the march went on. It was remarkable to see the field post-office at work; the armed blue-coated postmen stood by the marching column receiving the postcards handed to them. Sometimes an officer would hand over a fowling piece or antique with the address hanging from it.

At noon I was handed over to officers, and I left the regiment. I was on the box seat of a char-à-banc full of officers and could observe the marvellous organization of the column. The pace was at a walk, but continuous. Ammunition wagons, field pieces, carts filled with flour, whole trains of enormous pontoons pulled by heavy horses, and great traction engines pulling siege guns, landaus and motor-cars filled with doctors and officers, whose only distinguishing mark is a strip of colour at the neck—all advanced at the same pace. Should a slight block occur the whole column would stop as one train, the drivers passing the message back by a pumping movement made with the fist on high. The warning of a declivity or bend in the road passed backwards like musketry fire. All vehicles belonged to the Army. Some had chalked on their grey sides "Berlin-Paris."

Sometimes the column would let an enormous grey motor-omnibus dash by, and through the glass sides I saw staff officers bending over maps. Every driver and service man carried his weapons, the great wagons simply bristling with rifles.

On our way we passed crowds of peasants returning to their ruined homes. It was pitiful to see them humbly raise their hats to the invaders. We passed many villages in ruins. Locked-up houses were instantly broken open and searched. The better-class houses were pillaged for wine, every soldier marching with bottles sticking out of his knapsack.

A French aeroplane daringly flew above the column, the German shrapnel ineffectively bursting like little balls of thistledown underneath it.

At last, at a village near the French frontier, I was set down in the littered *mairie*, where, at a long table lighted by the unshaded light of lamps, staff officers were quickly writing, giving out orders between the puffs of cigarettes. At a word the aides-de-camp stood at attention, clicking their boots and their hands at the side like a statue. Great bundles of detailed maps were brought in and distributed for the following

day's march. Then the room was left to the clerks, who were writing all night, with a bottle of wine on the table. Broth from the field kitchen, with black bread, hard as a brick, made an excellent supper with a bottle of filched Burgundy. After sleeping in the open hall, the next morning I was given papers to return, one staff officer kindly giving me the used half of his military map.

The impression I gathered from conversation with the officers was angry surprise that England had joined with their enemy. One said he was sorry for the Belgians and even for the French, but they would never forgive England. Even superior officers were under the illusion that war had been forced upon them.

We have seen that the reason why the British and French entered Belgium was the very natural desire to help the Belgians. They were suddenly struck by very superior forces and compelled to fall back before them, while a portion of the Belgian Army retired on Namur.

Namur, like Liège, was fortified by a ring of detached forts constructed of concrete, armed with 6in. guns and 4.7 howitzers behind armour-plated turrets. Unlike Liège, Namur had a considerable time to strengthen its fortifications. General Michel, who commanded the 25,000 men who formed its garrison, had availed himself of the respite afforded to close the intervals between the forts, by trenches covered in front by barbed wire and defended by mines

along the likely lines of approach. To overcome these by assault would have been a costly process, if not impossible, and the tactics of the first few days of the operations against Liège were not repeated. At the same time there was no intention of beginning the lengthy process of a regular siege. At Liège it seems probable that at first nothing beyond the guns and howitzers forming part of the Army were employed. These would include the light field howitzer and the heavy field howitzer. The heavy field guns with the Army, in what numbers is not known, fired a 36lb. shell. Of all these weapons the heavy howitzer was the only one capable of injuring to any extent the cupolas in the forts. For the first part of the attack, therefore, the iron defences of the forts were quite strong enough to offer good resistance. The fact is the Germans neither thought that the Belgians would resist the passage of their Army nor that the forts would withstand all efforts to take them by assault. Hence they had thrust their troops into Belgium imperfectly mobilized and without siege guns. The weapons of this category, when they did reach the front, were at once successfully made use of. These consisted chiefly of two classes, the 21 and the 28cm. calibre. Both of these weapons fire formidable projectiles. That of the former (equivalent in calibre to an 8.4in. English gun) is a shell 250lb



A GERMAN SHELTER TRENCH.

[Alfieri.]

Removing the earth dug out from the front, so as not to indicate its position.



BRITISH WOUNDED AWAITING REMOVAL TO HOSPITAL BASE.

[London News Agency.]

which contains $37\frac{1}{2}$ lb. of high explosive in the so-called mine shell, or $12\frac{1}{2}$ lb. in the case of the thick-walled shell. In the 28cm. (equivalent to 11.2in.) the shell weighs 760lb., the mine shell holds 114lb. of high explosive, the thick-walled 38lb. The mine shell, from its thinner walls, has not the penetrative power of the thicker-walled pattern, but has sufficient to enable it to penetrate before exploding. Both of these it will be seen are distinctly powerful pieces. The 28cm. was used by the Japanese against Port Arthur, and is credited with having caused great damage to the work, and against the Russian fleet in the harbour, and a few were afterwards taken to the front and employed against the Russian lines at Mukden.

The 8in. and 11in. howitzers can both be fired from the wheeled carriages which transport them. The illustrations on pages 349 and 358 show one of the 11in. howitzers when arranged for transport and when in firing position. The girdle attached to the wheels enables it to move more easily over bad ground. It is usually drawn by an automobile tractor. Its total weight when in action is nearly 15 tons, that of the 8in. 6 tons. The heaviest weight to be transported is $9\frac{1}{4}$ and $4\frac{1}{2}$ tons respectively. These weights can be moved along any ordinary road (though the heavier one might try some country bridges) and may be described as mobile. The ranges

of these weapons are five and seven miles respectively.

But it is a very different thing when we come to the 42cm. howitzer, equivalent to 16.8in. The weight of this piece of ordnance is $21\frac{1}{2}$ tons approximately, and when in action 50 tons. It can, of course, be quite easily transported by rail, but the task of moving it by road would be quite another thing. The heaviest load to be moved would probably be about 32 tons, and ordinary road bridges would not bear this amount, and most certainly the howitzer could not be fired from its travelling carriage. Hence, no doubt, the concrete foundations that the Germans have constructed at various points where they might consider it likely they would need to employ them. It fires a shell weighing about 2,500lb. with a high explosive bursting charge of 380lb. Now it seems probable that some of these may have been employed, and their effect would undoubtedly be great. But it is extremely doubtful if they have been used in any numbers. German papers say, without giving figures, that they have been employed. The British Vice-Consul says two were fired against Liège. Two were also reported as being seen near Waterloo on September 21. No doubt some of our readers have noticed the picture of a shell exhibited in some of the shops in London, with a record of the brave deeds the weapon in



BRITISH WOUNDED BEING CONVEYED TO A HOSPITAL TRAIN.

[London News Agency.]

question had done. This, though professing to be a 16.8in. shell, is really only an 11.2in. From Austria it is stated that 37 of these ponderous weapons have been sent to Trent—a mountain fortress! This is sheer nonsense. It would be as reasonable to send 15in. guns to Walmer Castle.

According to General Michel, who commanded at Namur, it was the enormous 28cm. guns that destroyed the defences. The fire was so continuous that it was impossible to attempt to repair the damage done to the improvised defences between the forts against which the Germans first of all concentrated their fire. For ten hours the Belgian infantry bravely bore the fire of the huge shells, supplemented by those from a multitude of smaller weapons, to which they could practically make no reply. Any man who raised his head above the shot-swept parapets was immediately struck. The majority of the officers were killed, and at last a general *saute qui peut* took place and the demoralized troops abandoned their positions, thus leaving a large gap through which the Germans could advance.


Nor did the forts, on which the Germans next turned their fire, fare any better. It has been pointed out that their old-fashioned and feeble armament was useless; it was simply snuffed out. Maizeret in fact only fired ten shots and received 1,200 at the rate of 20 a

minute. At Marcheviette 75 men were killed in the batteries. The bombardment of fort Suarlée commenced on Sunday morning, August 23, and it fell on the 25th at five in the afternoon. Three German batteries armed with the 28cm. howitzer fired 600 shells each weighing 750lb. on the 23rd, 1,300 on the 24th, and 1,400 on the 25th against it. These destroyed the whole of the massive structure of concrete and wrecked all the turrets, and further resistance was impossible. The forts of Andoy and Cognelée suffered a like fate. (For plan of Namur defences, see page 119.)


The number of the 28cm. howitzers employed is said to have been 32, the nearest being three miles from their target, a range at which the Belgian guns could do no damage even if they were, which is scarcely probable, able to identify their positions. Probably also some 42cm. (i.e., 16.8 in.) weapons were these, though not according to General Michel.

The German troops engaged on the siege, which commenced on August 20, though not in all its vigour till the next day—doubtless because it had been impossible to prepare all the positions for the artillery till the 21st—numbered some four Army Corps.

Thus it is seen that the German fire literally swept off the face of the earth forts and improvised defences, troops and guns.



MAP TO ILLUSTRATE THE SECOND PART
The first part of the retreat is



OF THE BRITISH RETREAT FROM MONS.

Illustrated by a Map on page 362

Another fact which much affected the defence was that on the south of the town the Germans managed to open the lock gates of the Meuse, thus lowering its waters and destroying the water defence of Namur and allowing their troops to enter the town.

For four days and a half the Belgians withstood the attack of the Germans, ten times more numerous than they were. When General Michel saw that further resistance was impossible without entailing the loss of the whole garrison, he tried to bring in the troops from the different forts; but, owing undoubtedly to the help of traitors or spies, he found his underground telephone destroyed and could not do so. To secure the retreat of as many as possible the commanders of each regiment fought their way out of Namur separately, thus losing a great number of men.

General Michel, the staff, his officers, and soldiers did all they possibly could to defend the town and they could do no more. He has been much criticized for having retreated, but if the garrison had remained 12 hours more in Namur, not a man, not a horse, not a gun would have been able to join the main army.

The troops thus saved were gained for Belgium; to have clung with them to Namur

would have been to lose them for no adequate purpose or sound military reason.

The Germans had seized the fortress in the angle formed by the junction of the Meuse and Sambre, and the railway back to Aix-la-Chapelle was in their hands. It was part of their plan to throw huge bodies of troops across the Meuse between Verdun and Namur, and across the Sambre between Namur and Maubeuge. We take the operations on the Sambre first.

From August 15 important French forces had been pouring into Belgium—as they had done in 1815—through Charleroi between Maubeuge and Namur. Moving in the direction of Gembloux, French troops had passed over the battlefield of Ligny, the last of Napoleon's victories over the Prussians. From a *communiqué* of August 24 it is clear that it was General Joffre's intention to take the offensive at almost all points along the gigantic line of battle from Condé to Belfort. "An army," so runs that document, "advancing from the northern part of the Woëvre" (the forest land east of Verdun) "and moving on Neufchâteau" (in the Belgian Ardennes) "is attacking the German forces which have been going through the Duchy of Luxemburg and are on the right bank of the Semoy.... Another army from the region of Sedan is traversing the Belgian Ardennes and attacking the German forces marching between the Lesse and the Meuse. A third army from the region of Chimay has attacked the German right between the Sambre and the Meuse. It is supported by the English Army from the region of Mons."

As already mentioned, Alsace and Southern Lorraine had been invaded by the French.

The surprise attack (on August 20) on the French Army in Southern Lorraine, where the 15th Corps, recruited in the south of France, had been severely handled by overwhelming German forces from the region of Metz, and the German occupation of Lunéville had effectually stopped the French offensive south of Verdun. We have now to explain the cause of the French failure on the Middle Meuse and the Sambre.

On the 15th a division of the Prussian Guard and the 5th Division of Cavalry, with several battalions of infantry and companies of mitrailleuses, had crossed the Meuse at Dinant between Givet and Namur. Suddenly they were attacked by the French and driven in the greatest disorder into or across the river. A regiment of *chasseurs à cheval* pursued them for several miles, putting to flight superior forces of cavalry covering the retreat. This small victory elated the French.



WANTON DESTRUCTION CAUSED BY GERMAN SOLDIERS IN A CHÂTEAU NEAR MALINES.

[Daily Mirror.



INTERIOR OF BARCY CHURCH WRECKED BY THE GERMANS.

[*Sport and General.*]

The next day the French officials had bad news to report. The French, defeated in Lorraine, were retiring on Nancy, and the Germans had occupied Brussels. Reports came in that the enemy's cavalry were pushing forward in the direction of Ghent and the Franco-Belgian frontier. The Germans were about to launch their hosts on the Franco-Belgians in and around Namur, on the French along the Sambre from Namur to Maubeuge, and the British around Mons.

The Germans attacked Charleroi itself, a city of some 30,000 inhabitants, the centre of the South Belgian iron industry, a town and neighbourhood reminding British visitors of the Black Country. Lofty chimneys, furnaces, iron-foundries, glass-works attested the change that had come over the world since Napoleon rode through Charleroi on June 15, 1815. At seven o'clock on Friday, August 21, 1914, a score of German Hussars entered the town, and, pretending to be British cavalry, cantered towards the Sambre. They were detected by a French officer and promptly expelled with the loss of two killed and three wounded. The inhabitants were ordered to their houses, mitrailleuses posted at different places in the town, and every preparation made

to defend it. Fighting was going on towards Genappe.

On Saturday the Germans assaulted Charleroi, and the bridges above and below it at Thuin and Châtelet respectively. Their artillery had opened on Charleroi and Thuin the day before. The Germans forced ten miners to march at the head of their column, just as at Mons they forced Belgian women to precede the columns attacking the British. On Sunday there was a desperate struggle in the streets of Charleroi itself, and on Monday a terrific hand-to-hand encounter between the Turcos and the Prussian Guard. The coloured troops from Algeria and Senegal inflicted heavy losses on the Germans, but quick-firers placed in a ruined factory appear speedily to have decided the combat in favour of the enemy. The Sambre, from Namur to the environs of Maubeuge, was in the possession of the Germans; their advance to, and crossing of the Meuse will be described later. We turn now to the position of the British Army, north of the Sambre between Maubeuge and Condé.

The concentration of the 1st and 2nd corps of the British Army had been completed by Friday, the 21st August, and during Saturday, the 22nd, Sir John French took up a position extending from the fortress of Condé, a few miles



MAXIM SECTION ON THE MARCH.
Mules are used for the transport of these guns.

[Record Press.]

to the north of Valenciennes, through Mons, to Binche on the east.

The second corps, now commanded by Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien, occupied the line from Condé to Mons, the right of the third Division, which was under General H. I. W. Hamilton, one of Lord Kitchener's most trusted officers, being at Mons itself. The 1st corps, under General Sir Douglas Haig, formed the right wing of the army. Both Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien and Sir Douglas Haig were distinguished and experienced officers.

The son of a colonel, and born on the 26th of May, 1858, Sir H. Smith-Dorrien was fifty-six years old. The brother of the "King of the Scilly Islands," he came of a well-known west country family. He had been educated at Harrow and at Sandhurst, and had been a Staff College man, and a brilliant student of the art of war. He was a devotee to sport, a first-rate rider, and an athlete. In 1879 he had been through the Zulu War, and had been mentioned in dispatches. He had fought in Egypt and the Sudan, and from 1893 to 1898, he had been in India, where he had served with distinction in the Chitral Relief Force, and also during the Tirah Campaign. He had accompanied Lord Kitchener to Omdurman, and had held high command during the South African War when, at the age of forty-one, he was promoted Major-General "for distinguished services in the field." From 1901 to 1903 he was Adjutant-General in India, and from 1903 to 1907, during the Kitchener régime, he commanded the 4th (Quetta) Division. In 1907 he became Commander-in-Chief of the Aldershot

Command. He was not a blind admirer of the Germans. "Give me," he is reported to have said, "a thousand Colonials, men well acquainted with the rifle and expert in horsemanship; let me train them for six months, and I would lead them against any equal number of men from any Continental army with the greatest confidence in the result." He was respected and loved by the rank and file. While at Aldershot he had abolished the military police and lightened the punishments. He had put the private on his honour, and, as much as any commanding officer, he had helped to produce that change in the British Army which had been so noticeable since the South African War. Wellington had called his troops "the scum"; the soldiers who fought at Mons were "the salt of the earth." General Smith-Dorrien had walked over many of the battlefields of Europe, and was already thoroughly familiar with the terrain round Mons.*

The 5th Cavalry Brigade, led by Sir Philip Chetwode, was placed at Binche (a little manufacturing town of less than 10,000 inhabitants, to cover the right. As the 3rd Corps had not arrived, the reserve was formed by the four brigades of the Cavalry Division, which also furnished parties to protect the British right. They were commanded by General Allenby. Since the cavalryman had been trained to use the rifle this body might be handled as a reserve of mounted infantry.

To guard the front of the position and watch for any forward movement of the Germans was the task of Sir Philip Chetwode with the 5th

* A biography of Sir Douglas Haig will appear in the next number.

Cavalry Brigade, assisted by a few squadrons from the reserve. During the 22nd and the 23rd the reconnoitring cavalry penetrated as far as Soignies on the road which leads from Mons, past Hal (to the left of the battlefield of Waterloo) to Brussels. The cavalry confirmed the surmise of the French that little more than one corps or, at most, two corps of the Germans were opposed to the British. The reports of scouting airmen pointed to the same conclusion.

The battle began on Sunday, 23rd. At 3 p.m. reports reached Sir John French that the enemy were concentrating on the line between Mons and Bray, to the west of Binche, and were attacking briskly. Severe fighting ensued along the Condé-Mons Canal. Sir Douglas Haig withdrew his troops to some high ground behind Bray, and Binche was evacuated by Sir Philip Chetwode's Brigade, which moved slightly to the south. The Germans promptly occupied Binche. The result was that the right of General Hamilton's Division in Mons formed, to use Sir John French's expression, "a somewhat dangerous salient." Accordingly the Commander-in-Chief directed that the centre should be drawn back behind Mons. This was effected before nightfall.

To some of the British soldiers the battle had come as a surprise. "We thought," said one of them, "the Germans were fifteen miles away, when suddenly some German aeroplanes wheeled over us, and soon afterwards the artillery opened fire, before my regiment had time to take cover."

Among the accounts of the battle on Sunday around Mons we select that of Sergeant W. Loftus, which gives a vivid picture of the essential features of the fighting.

"Well," he says, "we know what it is like to be in a battle. It came to us unexpectedly at a time when we had given up hope of seeing any Germans. The first inkling we had of it was just after 'veille,' when our cavalry pickets fell back and reported the presence of the enemy in strength on our front and slightly to the left. In a few minutes we were all at our posts without the slightest confusion and as we lay down in the trenches our artillery opened on the beggars in fine style.

"Soon they returned the compliment; but they were a long time finding anything approaching the range, and they didn't know of shelters, a trick we learned from the Boers, I believe. After about half an hour of this work their infantry came into view along our front.

"They were in solid square blocks, standing out sharply against the skyline, and you couldn't help hitting them. It was like butting your head against a stone wall.

"We lay in our trenches with not a sound or sign to tell them of what was before them. They crept nearer and nearer, and then our officers gave the word.

"A sheet of flame flickered along the line of trenches and a stream of bullets tore through the advancing mass of Germans. They seemed to stagger like a drunk man suddenly hit between the eyes, after which they made a run for us, shouting some outlandish cry that we couldn't make out.

"Half-way across the open another volley tore through their ranks, and by this time our artillery began dropping shells around them. Then an officer gave an order and they broke into open formation, rushing like mad towards the trenches on our left.

"Some of our men continued the volley firing, but a few of the crack shots were told off to indulge in independent firing for the benefit of the Germans.



BRITISH SOLDIERS FIXING A MACHINE GUN IN POSITION.

[Photo Press.]



NIGHT FIGHT IN THE STREET OF LANDRECIES.

(see p. 472)

That is another trick taught us by Brother Boer, and our Germans did not like it at all.

"They fell back in confusion, and then lay down wherever cover was available. We gave them no rest, and soon they were on the move again in flight.

"Then came more furious shelling of our trenches, and after that another mad rush across the open on our front. This time they were strongly supported by cavalry, who suffered terribly, but came right up to our lines.

"We received them in the good old way, the front ranks with the bayonet and the rear ranks keeping up incessant fire on them. After a hard tussle they retired hastily, and just as they thought themselves safe our mounted men swooped down on them, cutting them right and left.

"This sort of thing went on through the whole day without bringing the Germans any nearer to shifting us. After the last attack we lay down in our clothes to sleep as best we could, but long before sunrise were called out to be told that we had got to abandon our position.

"Nobody knew why we had to go; but like good soldiers we obeyed, without a murmur. The enemy's cavalry, evidently misunderstanding our action, came down on us again in force; but our men behaved very well indeed, and they gave it up as a bad job.

"Their losses must have been terrible. Little mounds of dead were to be seen all along the line of their advance to the attack, and in the retreat we picked off their cavalry by the score."

From Sergeant Loftus's narrative, it might almost seem that the British had the fighting all their own way. A man wounded at Mons paints a very different scene:—

"We were in the trenches waiting for them," he says, "but we didn't expect anything like the smashing blow that struck us. All at once, so it seemed, the sky began to rain down bullets and shells. At first the shells went very wide, for their fire was bad, but after a time—I think it was a long time—they got our range and then they fairly mopped us up. I saw shells bursting to right and left of me and I saw many a good comrade go out."

The German artillery fire was directed by airmen who dropped smoke bombs over the British trenches which were not easy to locate, because dummy trenches had been made before or behind those in which the men lay. The


power and accuracy of the enemy's artillery impressed most of the eye-witnesses, but there were exceptions. "They couldn't hit the gas-works at Mons," a man of the Berkshires told a *Times* correspondent. "If they had, I wouldn't be here. . . . They couldn't get it fair, and just as well for us they didn't, or we'd have been all blown up." On the other hand, the shooting of the British artillery was deadly and accurate, the big siege guns of the Royal Garrison Artillery playing havoc among the Germans.

We complete our account of the first day's fighting with the narrative of a Belgian correspondent, and a detailed account of the struggle to the south of Mons by a Gordon Highlander named Smiley. The Belgian writes—

By the most wonderful chance I happened to be in the British lines in Belgium just when the great battle of Charleroi began, a fight that will remain inscribed in letters of blood on the scroll of History. . . . It was at Mons, on Saturday, August 22nd. The first outpost engagements were beginning, and the British troops, who had only arrived on the scene the same morning, immediately entered the battle without even a moment's rest. In a few hours Mons was put in a state of defence, and you should have seen those fellows working. Trenches were dug and the bridges barricaded by eager hands. In sight of such willingness and such irresistible gaiety, you would never have thought that these men were on the eve of a terrible battle. Personally I could not help feeling that I was only watching a manœuvre scene, for the phlegm and the nonchalance of these soldiers would never have permitted one to suppose that the enemy were only a few miles away.

Smiley's report on what he saw is, perhaps, the most detailed of the narratives that have reached us. It was illustrated by the accompanying plan-

You want an account of my fighting. This shall be true of all I saw and shall apply only to Mons, because I have absolutely no coherent remembrance of Cambrai. The hurricane of shell there has left me benumbed even yet, and I do not yet realize that I am home. Our position :—



Reference.

1 - Village defended
by - ② - R. Irish Regt
③ - Middlesex
④ - Gordons
⑤ - R.F.A.

We marched out of our billets at 4 a.m. We marched up to No. 1 and wheeled to the right, which fetched us on the main Paris road (Rue Mons), with Mons itself somewhat half-left on our rear. We



THE GRAVEYARDS OF THE BATTLEFIELDS.

[*News Illustrations,*

Three hundred Germans were buried in this one huge grave, and a similar number of French in another.

immediately set about clearing the foreground of willows, beans, wheat, and anything which gave head cover. About 10 a.m. we had (except buildings) a clear rifle range of quite 2,000 yards. We then dug our trenches, and much labour and love we put into them.

The ball opened at 11.30 a.m. by a terrible artillery duel by the Germans over our trenches to No. 5. This went on for some hours, until a movement of infantry was seen at No. 6. This movement was evidently intended for the Gordons; as you will see that had they managed to reach the wood in front of us (No. 7), our position (No. 4) would have been made untenable by hidden infantry and well-served artillery, who could have flanked us merely by sheer weight of numbers.

However, we opened the ball on them at No. 6 with a terrific Maxim fire. Poor devils of infantry! They advanced in companies of quite 150 men in files five deep, and our rifle has a flat trajectory up to 600 yards. Guess the result. We could steady our rifles on the trench and take deliberate aim. The first company were simply blasted away to Heaven by a volley at 700 yards, and in their insane formation every bullet was almost sure to find two billets. The other companies kept advancing very slowly, using their dead comrades as cover, but they had absolutely no chance, and at about 5 p.m. their infantry retired.

We were still being subjected to a terrible artillery fire. God! how their artillery do fire. But we had time to see what was happening on our left flank 1, 2,

and 3. The Royal Irish Regiment had been surprised and fearfully cut up, and so, too, had the Middlesex, and it was found impossible for our B and C companies to reinforce them. We (D company) were $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles away and were ordered to proceed to No. 2 and relieve the Royal Irish as much as possible. We crept from our trenches and crossed to the other side of the road, where we had the benefit of a ditch and the road camber as cover. We made most excellent progress until 150 yards from No. 1. At that distance there was a small white house, flush with the road, standing in a clearance. Our young sub. was leading and safely crossed the front of the house. Immediately the Germans opened a hellish cyclone of shrapnel at the house. They could not see us, but I guess they knew the reason why troops would or might pass that house. However, we were to relieve the R.I.'s, and, astounding as it may seem, we passed that house and I was the only one to be hit. Even yet I am amazed at our luck.

By this time dusk had set in, four villages were on fire, and the Germans had been, and were, shelling the hospitals. We managed to get into the R.I.'s trench and beat off a very faint-hearted Uhlan attack on us. About 9 p.m. came our orders to retire. What a pitiful handful we were against that host, and yet we held the flower of the German Army at bay all day! We picked up a dead officer of ours and retreated all night. At 2 a.m. we halted, and at 4 a.m. (Monday) we started retiring again.



CHAPTER XX.

THE RETREAT TO THE MARNE.

CAUSES OF THE BRITISH RETREAT—THE FRENCH FOR THE MOMENT UNABLE TO SUPPORT BRITISH—THE GERMAN PURSUIT—ACTION OF LANDRECIES—BATTLE OF LE CATEAU—LAUDATORY CRITICISMS OF A GERMAN STAFF OFFICER ON BRITISH FORCES—ACHIEVEMENTS OF ROYAL FLYING CORPS—FIGHTING IN THE VALLEY OF THE MEUSE FROM NAMUR TO VERDUN—BATTLE OF CHARLEVILLE—FRENCH AVIATORS DROP BOMBS ON ZEPPELIN HANGAR AT METZ—CAVALRY COMBATS BETWEEN BRITISH AND GERMANS: SIR PHILIP CHETWODE'S CHARGE—THE NEW FRENCH CABINET—INTERVIEW BETWEEN GENERAL JOFFRE AND SIR JOHN FRENCH—DECISION TO RETIRE ON THE MARNE—COUNTER-OFFENSIVE OF FRENCH ARMIES TO PROTECT BRITISH RETREAT—BATTLE OF GUISE—BRITISH CAPTURE TWELVE GUNS AT COMPIÈGNE—RETREAT OF THE ALLIES BEHIND THE MARNE—RESULTS OF THE CAMPAIGN FROM THE BRITISH STANDPOINT.

SERGEANT LOFTUS, it will be remembered, could not understand why he and the other soldiers had to retire from Mons. The reason for the retreat was this. At 5 p.m. on the Sunday Sir John French had received a "most important message from General Joffre by telegram." It appeared that three German corps—a reserve corps, the 4th and 9th corps—were moving on the British front, and that the 2nd corps was engaged in a turning movement on the left from the direction of Tournai; also the Germans had gained possession of the passages of the Sambre between Charleroi and Namur, and two reserve French divisions and the 5th French Army on Sir John French's right were in full retreat. The accuracy of this information was confirmed by aeroplane reconnaissance, and Sir John determined to withdraw his army to a position which had been previously reconnoitred. It rested on the fortress of Maubeuge on the right, and extended west to Jenlain, south-east of Valenciennes, on the left, but it was difficult to hold, because standing crops and buildings made the siting of trenches very difficult, and limited the field of fire in many important localities. Nevertheless it contained some good artillery positions.

The Germans, commanded by Von Kluck, gave the British no rest in the small hours of August

24, and continuous fighting occurred during the night, the Germans at various points employing powerful searchlights to assist their attack. To cover the retreat of Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien's Corps (the 2nd) from the line Condé-Mons, Sir John French, who had posted himself with his staff at Bavai, proposed to launch the Cavalry Division against the enemy endeavouring to turn the left of his line, while to aid the retreat of the right of the 2nd Corps from behind Mons he advanced the 1st Corps, whose 2nd Division was directed to make a powerful demonstration from the direction of Harmignies as if it was desired to retake Binche. Thus the offensive was taken at both ends of the British line. The artillery of the 1st and 2nd Divisions supported the attack of the 2nd Division, and the 1st Division took up a supporting position in the neighbourhood of Peissant.

Under cover of this demonstration Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien retired from Condé-Mons on the line Dour-Quarouble-Frameries. The 3rd Division (General Hamilton's) on the right of the 2nd Corps suffered considerable loss from the enemy debouching from Mons. By Sir John French's orders General Allenby with the Cavalry Division was operating vigorously on the left flank of Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien, but about 7.30 a.m. a message arrived from Sir Charles Fergusson, commanding the 5th Division (part of Sir



FRENCH HEAVY GUN IN A VILLAGE NEAR ARRAS. [*Sport and General.*]

Horace Smith-Dorrien's Corps, the 2nd), that he was very hard pressed. General Allenby, therefore, withdrew his cavalry to Sir Charles Fergusson's support. In the course of this operation General De Lisle, with the 2nd Cavalry Brigade, charged the flank of the advancing German infantry, but 500 yards or so from the enemy was held up by wire. The 9th Lancers and 18th Hussars suffered severely in the retirement of General De Lisle's Brigade.

The situation of the British force was now most precarious. The only reinforcement it had received was the 19th Infantry Brigade, which had been hurried up from the lines of communication to Valenciennes, and on the morning of Monday, August 24, was stationed south of Quarouble to support the left flank of the Army. The 4th Division under General Snow had commenced detraining at Le Cateau on the 23rd, but it was not till the next day (the 25th) that it became available for service.

By nightfall Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien's Corps, which was retiring under cover of the cavalry, held a position west of Bavai, Sir Douglas Haig being on his right. The left wing of the British Army was protected by the cavalry and by the newly arrived 19th Infantry Brigade posted between Jenlain and Bry; the right wing rested on the fortress of Maubeuge.

A paragraph from Sir John French's dispatch of September 7 will show the reader how dangerous was the position of the British

Army. "The French were still retiring," he says, "and I had no support except such as was afforded by the fortress of Maubeuge; and the determined attempts of the enemy to get round my left flank assured me that it was his intention to hem me against that place and surround me. I felt that not a moment must be lost in retiring to another position The operation, however, was full of danger and difficulty, not only owing to the very superior force in my front, but also to the exhaustion of the troops." Moreover Sir John doubted the wisdom of standing to fight on the, about to be partially entrenched, position, Cambrai-Le Cateau-Landrecies, and he had determined to make a great effort to continue the retreat till he could put some substantial obstacle, such as the Somme or the Oise, between his troops and the enemy, and afford the former some opportunity of rest and reorganization. The line Vermand-St. Quentin-Ribemont was indicated to the Corps commanders as that towards which they were to continue their retreat. St. Quentin is on the Somme, Ribemont on the Oise, Vermand to the west of St. Quentin. Behind St. Quentin and Ribemont lay the uncompleted fortress of La Fère.

The immediate problem before Sir John was to withdraw his army from between Valenciennes and Maubeuge to the road joining Cambrai and Le Cateau. From Maubeuge to Landrecies (a few miles north-east of Le Cateau

on the road from the latter place to Maubeuge) stretches the Forest of Mormal. The guns of the forts to the south of Maubeuge would not prevent the Germans from occupying the forest. General Snow's division from Le Cateau was moved up to a central position, with his right south of Solesmes and his left resting on the Cambrai-Le Cateau road south of La Chaprie.

The retirement recommenced in the early morning of Tuesday, August 25, and the rear-guards were ordered to be clear of the Eth-Bavai-Maubeuge road by 5 30 a.m. General Allenby and the cavalry were to cover the retreat. With the 1st Corps Sir Douglas Haig was to march to Landrecies by the road along the eastern border of the Forest of Mormal.

The two French Reserve Divisions were right of the British Army, and the 24th, a French cavalry corps, under General Sordêt, had been in billets north of Avesnes to the east of Landrecies. Sir John French had visited General Sordêt and earnestly requested his cooperation and support during the fighting of the 23rd and 24th. Sordêt had promised to obtain sanction from his army commander to act on Sir John French's left, but his horses were too tired to move. Sir John could, however, rely on the aid of the two French Reserve Divisions, but

not immediately on the cavalry of General Sordêt. From the west he might also expect some indirect assistance. General D'Amade was near Arras with the 61st and 62nd French Reserve Divisions. It will be remembered that the 2nd German Corps had been moving from the direction of Tournai to envelop the left of Sir John French. Further to the west a German cavalry division, a battalion of infantry, with artillery and machine guns, had occupied Lille, on which a heavy fine was imposed, and routed the French Territorials (who had no artillery) at Bethune and captured Cambrai. West of Cambrai they inflicted another severe defeat on the Territorials at Bapaume, and threatened Arras. General D'Amade, who was organizing the French defensive north of the Somme, hurried up Regular troops to the latter place. General D'Amade, one of the most illustrious French soldiers, had been military attaché with the British Army during the South African War, and he had subsequently commanded the French troops in Morocco. Sir John French could count on his attacking the right of the German forces endeavouring to envelop the British left wing.

Throughout Tuesday, August 25, the 1st Corps continued its march on Landrecies, which was reached about 10 p.m. They had been intended to fill the gap between Le Cateau and




AFTER A BATTLE.

[Sport and General.

A country cart collecting equipment of dead soldiers from the battle-fields and unloading on the station platform.

Landrecies, but the troops were too exhausted to march further. They were heavily engaged south and east of Maroilles, a few miles north-east of Landrecies, and the 9th German Army Corps, moving through the Forest of Mormal, in the evening attacked the 4th Guards Brigade stationed in and around Landrecies itself. During the fighting a German Infantry Brigade suffered heavily. It advanced from the woods in the closest order into the narrow street, which was completely filled. The British machine guns from the head of the street swept away the crown of the German column, a frightful panic ensued, and it was estimated that no fewer than 800 to 900 dead and wounded were lying in the street alone. The German officers, who were accustomed from behind to shoot with revolvers the privates who hesitated to advance, had not been able to check the stampede. The British in these encounters had received assistance from the two French Reserve Divisions on the right, but, as Sir John French said in his dispatch, it was owing mainly "to the skilful manner in which Sir Douglas Haig had extricated his Corps from an exceptionally difficult position in the darkness of the night" that the 1st Corps was able at dawn to resume their march south towards Wassigny on Guise.



PARIS.

For defensive use in case of necessity trenches were dug across the streets.

[Sport and General.

Meanwhile Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien, covered by the cavalry which during the 24th and 25th had become a good deal scattered, and by General Snow's Division posted north of the Cambrai-Le Cateau road with its right south of Solesmes, had by 6 p.m. reached the line Le Cateau-Cambrai, their right being at Le Cateau and their left in the neighbourhood of Caudry. The 4th Division, which had been placed temporarily under the command of Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien, had fallen back beyond Caudry towards Seranvillers, the left being thrown back.

Wednesday, the 26th, was the most critical day of the retreat. At dawn it became apparent that the enemy was throwing the bulk of his strength against Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien and General Snow. The guns of no fewer than four German Corps were in position before the British left, and Sir Horace judged it impossible to continue his retreat at daybreak in face of this attack. The 1st Corps at that moment was incapable of movement, and General Sordêt, owing to the state of his horses, was unable to help the British. There had been no time properly to entrench the position.

According to the rules of Kriegspiel the British left wing was doomed to destruction, but, as on so many previous occasions in history, the British soldier did not know when he was beaten. Outnumbered as it was by at least four guns to one, the Artillery deluged the advancing Germans with shrapnel. In vain the German commander threw his picked cavalry—the German Guard Cavalry Division—into the battle. It was thrown back by the British 12th Infantry Brigade in complete disorder.

Still there are limits to human endurance, and it was obvious that if General Smith-Dorrien was to escape annihilation he must at all costs retreat. About 3.30 p.m. the order to retire was given, and, thanks to the Artillery and the Cavalry, and the General's superb handling of his Corps, this most difficult and dangerous operation was successfully effected. "I say without hesitation," wrote Sir John French, "that the saving of the left wing . . . could never have been accomplished unless a commander" (Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien) "of rare and unusual coolness, intrepidity, and determination had been present to personally conduct the operation." The British had inflicted terrible losses on the enemy, and the German public, who had been led to expect a new Sedan, were instead to read long lists of casualties suffered by the finest regiments in



SAVING THE GUNS IN THE ACTION AT COMPIÈGNE.

the German Army. From the 23rd to the 26th inclusive the British losses were estimated by Sir John French at between 5,000 to 6,000 men. Considering the enormous forces that they had baffled for four days, these figures are the most eloquent of tributes to the skill of the British commander, his officers and men.

The judgment of a foreigner—especially a hostile foreigner—is very frequently the judgment of posterity, and after ages will doubtless repeat that of a member of the German General Staff, who was conversing one day with a Dane in the September of 1914. He was referring to the Battles of Mons and Landrecies-Le Cateau; “The English,” he said, “have prepared a surprise for us in this war, especially in the battles in North France.

The Englishman is cool, indifferent to danger, and to the dispensations of Providence. He stays where he is commanded. He shoots magnificently, extraordinarily well. He is good at bayonet attack, . . . and it is during these bayonet attacks when luck is against him that he is at his very best.

His endurance and marksmanship make him an opponent of high rank. It is the English we try to hit hardest in this war.

After we had broken through the French positions on the Belgian frontier and had got Joffre's army on the move towards the south the German Army's advance appeared to be checked. It was General French's army that had stayed the retreat. We ordered the English lines to be stormed. Our troops dashed into them with fixed bayonets, but our efforts to drive the English back were in vain. They are very good at resisting a bayonet attack. The English are strong people, athletic, and well developed. So we decided to shoot them down, but we found that they aimed remarkably well. “Every bullet found its billet,” as they say.

We ordered our best shots to tackle them, but the result was not in our favour. Then we got all our artillery at work that could be spared against them. We swept the English positions with a rain of shells—a regular bombardment. When the firing ceased we expected to find the English had fled. The English artillery cannot be compared with ours or the French, and we soon silenced it. We had not heard from the English for an hour.

But how can I describe our astonishment? Beyond the shell-swept zone we saw English soldiers' heads moving and they began to use their rifles again as soon as the coast was clear. The English are a cool

lot ! We had to assault again and again, but in vain. We were in fact repulsed after having literally surrounded them. Their perseverance and pluck had gained their just reward. The retirement could now be carried out in an orderly way. All risk of catastrophe to the retreating army was averted.

Even the sight of the wounded surprised us and commanded our respect. They lay so still and scarcely ever complained.

The retreat continued far into the night of the 26th and through the 27th and 28th, when the troops halted on the line Noyon-Chaunaye-La Fère. The feebleness of the German pursuit is further evidence of the efficiency with which the British troops had been handled in action, though it must be remembered that by now General Sordêt with his cavalry was relieving the pressure on the British rear, and General d'Amade with the 61st and 62nd French Reserve Divisions from the neighbourhood of Arras was attacking Kluck's right flank. No fewer than five German corps had been flung at two British corps and General Snow's Division. The German military reputation, damaged by General Pau in Alsace, had been shattered by Sir John French. Among the officers besides those already mentioned whom Sir John selected for special praise in respect of their conduct during this tremendous test of ability, courage, and endurance were his Military Secretary, the Hon. W. Lambton ; the Chief and Sub-Chief of the General Staff, Sir Archibald Murray and Major-General

Wilson ; the Quartermaster-General, Sir William Robertson ; and the Adjutant-General, Sir Nevil Macready.

The Royal Flying Corps, under Sir David Henderson, had had their baptism of fire, and covered themselves with glory. "They have," said Sir John French, "furnished me with the most complete and accurate information, which has been of incalculable value in the conduct of the operations. Fired at constantly both by friend and foe, and not hesitating to fly in every kind of weather, they have remained undaunted throughout." They had also destroyed five of the enemy's machines by fighting in the air.

One of the duels in the air has been graphically described by a private of the 1st Royal West Kent Regiment. The airman was a Frenchman, but it brings vividly before us the nature of part of the work done by Sir David Henderson's heroic subordinates :—

There was one interesting sight I saw as the column was on the march, and that was a duel in the air between French and German aeroplanes. It was wonderful to see the Frenchman manoeuvre to get the upper position of the German, and after about 10 minutes or a quarter of an hour the Frenchman got on top and blazed away with a revolver on the German. He injured him so much as to cause him to descend, and when found he was dead. The British troops buried the airman and burnt the aeroplane. During that day we were not troubled by any more German aeroplanes.



FRENCH ARMY ON THE MARCH IN THE CHAMPAGNE DISTRICT.
Earthworks in the foreground.

[Central Press.]



REMAINS OF A GERMAN MOTOR CONVOY.
Which was surprised by a French battery.

[*Topical.*

Leaving for a time the British, we must now turn to the Meuse side of the theatre of war.

The fall of Namur and the German crossing of the Sambre might not by themselves have obliged the British and French to retreat from the Sambre. It was the failure of the French offensive through the Belgian Ardennes, the withdrawal of the French troops to the valley of the Meuse, and the forcing, after desperate fighting, of the Meuse between Givet and Namur that perhaps decided General Joffre to retreat on the Aisne and Marne. Near Givet, the point where the Meuse leaves France and enters Belgium, the Germans had traversed the river. The possession of the triangle of country from the environs of Maubeuge to Namur and from Namur to Givet enabled them to turn the French defensive on the left bank of the Meuse. A body of Germans advanced from Rocroi on Rethel.


The wooded country between Givet and Mézières permitted the French to oppose a desperate resistance to the invaders ascending the Meuse. At Charleville, on the western bank of the Meuse opposite Mézières (a few miles to the west of Sedan), a determined stand was made. The inhabitants were withdrawn from Charleville and mitrailleuses hidden in the houses. The Germans reached Charleville on August 25. They were permitted to cross the three bridges into the town. Suddenly the bridges were blown up by contact mines, and the Germans in Charleville were raked by the fire of the mitrailleuses and overwhelmed with shells. Nevertheless the Germans, with reckless courage,

persisted in their enterprise. The French guns from the hills round Charleville swept away the heads of their columns, but the Germans threw pontoon bridges over the river, and ultimately the French gunners had to retire.

South-west, between Mézières and Rethel, near Signy l'Abbaye, there was another fierce encounter. Mézières itself was abandoned by the French.

Meanwhile, the French invasion of the Belgian Ardennes and the Duchy of Luxembourg, from the region between Mézières and Verdun, had, like the invasion of the Belgian Ardennes from the valley of the Meuse, been unsuccessful. The French crossed the Semois, a tributary of the Meuse which enters it below Mézières, and advanced towards Neufchâteau. They were repulsed by the Germans, commanded by Duke Albrecht of Württemberg.

At the opening of the war a large body of German cavalry had descended from Luxembourg, and endeavoured to slip past Longwy and cut the French line between Verdun and Mézières. But the garrison of Longwy, led by the heroic Colonel d'Arche, had held them in check and driven them back with heavy losses. Longwy, though its defences were out of date, did not surrender till August 27, and the magnificent resistance of its garrison seriously retarded the advance of the German Army (based on Treves) under the command of the Crown Prince. Near Spincourt, north-east of Verdun, the French repulsed a German attack (August 10-11) and captured three guns and three mitrailleuses.



MAP TO ILLUSTRATE THE FIRST PART OF THE BRITISH RETREAT FROM MONS.



STEINHAUSER.

The Kaiser's Master Spy.

[Record Press.]

The French troops victorious near Spincourt pursued the enemy, and their artillery on the 12th surprised and destroyed a regiment of dragoons. Two aviators from Verdun, Lieutenant Cesari and Corporal Prudhommeau, flew over Metz and dropped bombs on a Zeppelin hangar. At Virton, north-east of Montmédy, the French 6th Corps inflicted a considerable defeat on the Germans. In the environs of Nancy on the 25th there was a desperate battle between the French and the Crown Prince of Bavaria's Army. The 15th Corps, surprised in the battle of August 20 (referred to in Chapter XXIII.), executed a brilliant counter-attack (August 25-26). The Germans suffered heavily.

In spite of the French successes, between Mézières and Verdun, the French, owing to the failure of the operations on the Sambre and the northern Meuse, and in the Belgian Ardennes, had to withdraw to the valley of the Meuse. On the 27th Longwy capitulated. A regiment of Germans who were crossing the river near Dun were driven into it. In the region between the Meuse and Reims there was a great battle on August 31. But, as General Joffre had decided to retire on the

Marne, the line of the Meuse between Verdun and Mézières was abandoned, and the Germans advanced to the Forest of the Argonne.

Thus pursued by the German Armies commanded by Kluck on the west, Bülow from Charleroi and Namur, Hausen from Dinant and Givet, the Allied forces by August 28 had been pushed back to a line stretching roughly from Amiens to Mézières, while their forces east of the Meuse, between Mézières and Verdun, were retiring before Duke Albrecht of Württemberg and the Crown Prince, and to the south-east of Verdun the Crown Prince of Bavaria was being headed off the gap of Nancy.

On August 28 the British Army was retiring from Noyon and La Fère on Compiègne and Soissons. Two columns of German cavalry from the neighbourhood of St. Quentin were in hot pursuit. The western column, led by the Uhlans of the Guard, was charged by General Gough at the head of the 3rd Cavalry Brigade and routed. The column to the east was attacked by General Chetwode with the 5th Cavalry Brigade. The 12th Lancers and Royal Scots Greys rode down the enemy, spearing large numbers of them. The Scots Greys were apparently acting in conjunction with the Black Watch. Imitating the Greys' tactics at Waterloo, they plunged straight into the ranks of the enemy, a soldier of the Black Watch hanging on to each horseman. The Germans, completely surprised, were broken up and repulsed with tremendous losses. "Our men," said a wounded soldier who was a witness of one of the charges, "came on with a mighty shout, and fell upon the enemy with the utmost violence. The weight of the horses carried them into the close-formed ranks of the Germans, and the gallant Greys and the 'Kilties' gave a fearful account of themselves."

Still the position of the British was critical in the extreme. For six days they had been marching and fighting continuously—by day under a blazing August sun, and by night in a heavy, stifling atmosphere—in a country the features of which were unfamiliar to them and the inhabitants of which spoke a language which most of the soldiers could not understand.

At Paris the Cabinet which had prepared for the war was being replaced by another and a stronger one. It was presided over by M. Viviani; the ex-Socialist, Briand, was Minister



MAUBEUGE.

[Central News.]

A Cupola fort after the bombardment.

of Justice ; Delcassé—to whom France and Great Britain owed such a debt of gratitude—held the portfolio of Foreign Affairs, and Millerand was Minister of War. Two days earlier (August 27) General Gallieni had been appointed Governor of Paris. A few days later the President of the Republic and the Ministry were to leave Paris for Bordeaux.

The moment had come for a consultation between the French and British Commanders. Should the retreat be continued, or, as the French and British peoples would have preferred, should the offensive be resumed ? On the 25th Lord Kitchener had delivered his first speech in the House of Lords. The Empires, he had said, with whom the British were at war had called to the colours almost their entire male population. The principle the British on their part would observe was this, that while the enemy's maximum force underwent a constant diminution, the reinforcements prepared by the British would steadily and increasingly flow out until they had an army which in numbers not less than in quality would not be unworthy of the power and responsibilities of the British Empire. A speedy victory was needed by Germany. The Russians had mobilized more quickly than had been expected ; they had invaded Galicia and Eastern Prussia, while the Serbians on the 22nd had severely beaten the Austrians. There was no need to

play into the German hands by a premature offensive.

At 1 o'clock on August 29 Sir John French was visited by General Joffre. The French Commander-in-Chief, whose plans for invading Germany through the Belgian Ardennes and the Duchy of Luxemburg, while General Pau was seizing Alsace and Southern Lorraine had, owing to the capture of Namur and defeats in the Ardennes, been rendered impossible of execution, had changed his strategy with a rapidity and coolness which would have delighted Napoleon himself. To the German offensive he had opposed a defensive which recalls Wellington's retreat in Portugal before Massena, Barclay de Tolly's before Napoleon in 1812. "His strategic conception," says Sir John French, "was to draw the enemy on at all points, until a favourable situation was created from which to assume the offensive." From day to day, owing to the development of the German plans and the vicissitudes of the immense combat, he had had to modify the methods by which he thought to attain his object. In General Joffre and the cool, eloquent President of the Republic, Raymond Poincaré, was personified the spirit of the new France, that France which, while retaining its pre-eminence in arts and literature, had given to humanity a Pasteur, a Curie, and the greatest mathematician of his day, Henri Poincaré,

that France whose aviator Blériot had been the first to fly the Straits of Dover, whose champions in the world of sport, Carpentier and Bouin* had just won the admiration of every sportsman and athlete.

The meeting of the silent, thoughtful British Commander and the calm, resolute engineer, who for the second time had seen his native land ravaged by the hordes from beyond the Rhine, will remain for ever memorable. "General Joffre was most kind, cordial, and sympathetic, as he has always been," wrote Sir John French to Lord Kitchener. The lines of the Somme and Aisne, together with the half-fortified La Fère, Laon, and Reims, it was decided, were to be abandoned, and the retreat was to be continued to the Marne. To this movement the French forces in the east were to conform.

The British were provisionally to occupy the line Compiègne-Soissons, while the German pursuit was to be checked by a French counter-offensive on the west and north-east of the British positions. General Joffre had already directed the 5th French Army (consisting of four corps) behind the Oise between La Fère and Guise to attack the Germans on the Somme. Commanded by General Pau, who had been recalled from Alsace, it engaged the

German forces from Peronne on the Somme to Guise on the Oise. The German Guard, its reserve corps, and the 10th Corps were decisively beaten south of Guise, and the Guard and the 10th Corps were rapidly driven by the French Army across the Oise. But the left wing of the French was unsuccessful, and Amiens and the line of the Somme were evacuated.

General Joffre informed Sir John French that the 6th French Army, composed of the 7th Corps, which had been railed up from the south to the east of Amiens, of four reserve divisions, and of Sordêt's cavalry, was forming up on the British left. The right wing of this army rested on Roye, north-west of Noyon. In the space to the right of the 5th Army (which had beaten the Germans at the Battle of Guise) and to the left of the 4th Army, which was retiring through the country between the Oise and the Meuse, a new army (the 9th) under General Foch, made up of three corps from the south, was operating.

Such was the situation on August 29. The retirement once more began, and the 2nd Corps of the British Army withdrew through Compiègne, the city where Joan of Arc was taken prisoner, and where at the Palace Napoleon I. and Napoleon III. had held their Courts. In the forest to the south of Compiègne the 1st

*This magnificent athlete, one of the finest long-distance runners that has ever appeared, was to be a victim of the Kaiser's ambition.



FRENCH WOUNDED SOLDIERS DETRAINING AND BOARDING A HOSPITAL SHIP. *(Topical.)*

Cavalry Brigade after momentarily losing a Horse Artillery battery, with the help of some detachments from the 3rd Corps (which were now at the seat of war) operating on their left, defeated the pursuing cavalry, recovered the guns and captured twelve of the enemy. The 1st (Sir Douglas Haig's) Corps, which was retiring from Soissons to the east, also fought a rearguard action at Villers-Cotterets on the road from Soissons to Paris. The 4th Guards Brigade in this engagement suffered severely.

As the British retreated they blew up the bridges across the rivers and streams crossed by them. By September 3 they were behind the Marne, between Lagny and Signy-Signets, but General Joffre decided that they should not halt there, but place the Seine between them and the enemy. The Germans threw bridges over the Marne and threatened the line of the British Army and of the 5th and 9th French Armies to their right. On September 5 the British were beyond the Seine, and on that day Sir John French saw General Joffre, who explained to him that he intended at last to take the offensive. The President of the French Republic, the Ministers and the Diplomatic Corps had left for Bordeaux on the 2nd. The news had arrived of a decisive victory by the Russians over the Austrians in Galicia. On the 4th the Germans appeared to have suspended their movement on Paris, and their armies to the east were west of the Argonne. Maubeuge had not yet fallen.

It was obvious that Von Kluck was moving to join Bülow and Hausen and avoid the danger of a gap in the German line. The Allied army now rested to the west on Paris, and to the east on Verdun. The moment had arrived when a blow could be struck against the German communications. Von Kluck's Army (the 1st) was moving east, the 2nd German Army, after taking Reims, was advancing south-west to the Marne, the 4th German Army was west of the Argonne, and the 7th German Army had been repulsed by a French corps near D'Einvillie.


The British losses in the operations from Mons to the Marne were estimated at 15,000

killed, wounded, or missing. Drafts amounting to 19,000 men had reached, or were reaching, the Army, and lost material had been replaced. The moral results were summed up by the Press Bureau in the following words:—


There is no doubt whatever that our men have established a personal ascendancy over the Germans and that they are conscious of the fact that with anything like even numbers the result would not be doubtful. The shooting of the German infantry is poor, while the British rifle fire has devastated every column of attack that has presented itself. Their superior training and intelligence has enabled the British to use open formations with effect, and thus to cope with the vast numbers employed by the enemy. The cavalry, who have had even more opportunities for displaying personal prowess and address, have definitely established their superiority. Sir John French's reports dwell on this marked superiority of the British troops of every arm of the service over the Germans. "The cavalry," he says, "do as they like with the enemy until they are confronted by thrice their numbers. The German patrols simply fly before our horsemen. The German troops will not face our infantry fire, and as regards our artillery they have never been opposed by less than three or four times their numbers."

Our troops held their own in the prolonged trial of the retreat because they were ably handled, because our methods of using infantry were superior to those of the Germans, because our field artillery was more than the equal of its opponents, and because when the time came for the cavalry to thrust itself into battle it rode home and proved itself far superior to the German. Never before had the British horseman shown himself to be such a master of his trade. For this he has to thank his instructors, Sir Evelyn Wood, who always preached its value, French, Haig, Allenby, Remington, Chetwode, and others, who taught it and enabled it to gain the honours it reaped in the operations in France.

The various important phases of the Great War will be dealt with in subsequent uniform volumes prepared by the London TIMES and published in America by Woodward & Van Slyke, Incorporated, 45 West 34th Street, New York.







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